Bridges aren't easy to destroy. There was one case where Ukraine used drones to detonate the explosives at a bridge that Russia had prepared for blowing "just in case", thereby destroying the bridge.

Maybe Flamingoes will be able to do it. I don't know.

I follow russiafossiltracker.com. They have Russia's fossil fuel export revenues going up when the Iran war started, but now almost back down to pre-Iran war levels. Furthermore, Russia is now importing some fossil fuels, and I don't think they even measure that.

The importance of degrading Russia's economy should not be underestimated.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Monday, September 14, 2026 - 08:39 am: Edit

For the first time, two unmanned boats have fought a battle at sea, and the Ukrainian one sank its Russian rival. The Ukrainian Defense Intelligence has spotted a Russian drone in the Black Sea, and a Sargan-3000 naval drone armed with a remote-controlled machine-gun turret opened fire and destroyed it, the Ukrainian Navy said on Telegram, calling it "the first-ever naval battle between unmanned boats."

By Paul Howard (Raven) on Monday, September 14, 2026 - 01:10 pm: Edit

The UK has had it's first fatality in the Ukraine.

The unnamed member of the armed forces died in a Traffic accident.

From reading between the lines - best guess it was an SAS operative assisiting the Ukrainians - but might be totally wrong.

By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Monday, September 14, 2026 - 02:08 pm: Edit

It is ironic; Trump wanted to make Canada the 51st state, and all he got for that is Canada deepen ties with the EU. Some even talk about Canada becoming a member(!) While unlikely it is an option and could be taken if relations between CN and the US doesn't improve.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, September 14, 2026 - 02:15 pm: Edit

Carl, you stand on the edge of the swamp. Step back.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, September 14, 2026 - 02:52 pm: Edit

Procurement: American Military Buys Ukrainian Drones
September 13, 2026: The American Army recently took delivery of 2,000 Ukrainian F10 drones, which cost about $600 each. The Americans plan to acquire 200,000 of these by 2027 and have them in use by the ground forces. Specifications were not released, but based on similar quad-copter FPV attack drones, the F10 is apparently about 10 kg with a 2 kg explosive payload. Endurance is 30 minutes, and the top speed is over 100 kilometers per hour. Max range is more than 40 kilometers, and the operator can be up to 20 kilometers away. Most current drones include targeting software that lets them continue their mission when they are out of range of the controller. At that point, the drone continues toward an operator-selected target. If no target is selected, the drone self-destructs or crashes.
On the plus side, very few drone operators have been lost in the Ukraine War. That’s because the operators have a safe space to operate uninterrupted. An operations team usually consists of one or more operators, plus support staff to track the local combat situation and find targets. After combat units request targets, the assistant checks his tablet or laptop, where data is stored on how many drones they have in the bunker and what type they are. Most surveillance and attack drones are FPV, or first-person view. Operators wear goggles with a video screen showing what an FPV or surveillance drone’s camera can see. The other team members direct the operator to the target. The drone attack often fails because of electronic jamming. When that happens, the operator is given a drone that can home in on the jammer and destroy it. These drone teams have dozens of drones in their bunker.
On a busy day, the team can use dozens of drones. That means the drone team requires constant resupply. That is the most dangerous job because out in the open everyone is a target. The Russians are not as adept at this form of drone warfare, but Russian drones are still a threat. Not just for the drone transport crew but for the drone teams on their way to equip another bunker. Some of these are in partially destroyed buildings or bunkers initially built by frontline combat troops. When the troops move on, their bunker becomes available for drone teams. Since the drones can attack targets ten to twenty kilometers from their bunker, they only have to move to a new bunker if frontline troops move or retreat a significant distance. This is when the drone teams suffer most of their losses.
Unit headquarters and frontline first-aid personnel also seek bunkers. The local senior commander, or a member of his staff, decides who gets which bunker. Because of the importance of the drones in killing and keeping track of the enemy, the drone teams are often first in line to get a newly built or discovered bunker. In parts of the thousand-kilometer front line, there are bunkers that have been in use for months or years. In quiet parts of the front, drone teams spend most of their time doing surveillance, with the occasional call for an attack drone. When new operators gain enough experience in their quiet zones, they are sent to more active areas to do their thing. Hundreds of formal or informal drone teams use over 250,000 drones a month. Most of these are disabled by jamming, equipment failure, or hitting something that isn’t a target. But a third of these drones do find a Russian target and destroy it.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, September 14, 2026 - 02:52 pm: Edit

Surface Forces : Robotic Amphibious Assaults
September 13, 2026: Two months ago, Ukraine released a video showing a naval surface drone landing at a beach, dropping its ramp, and releasing a ground drone, which moved inland and opened fire with a remote-controlled machine gun. That land drone could carry other weapons, like an automatic 40mm grenade launcher or a launcher for FAE (Fuel Air Explosive) projectiles. Landing dozens of these amphibious drones in the first wave of an amphibious invasion would decimate enemy defensive forces and reduce casualties among the soldiers or marines landing in subsequent waves. Another innovation was using thousands of FPV (First Person View) drones operated by sailors and soldiers on ships offshore or in landing craft near or on the beach. The enemy might also be using a lot of drones, meaning the Amphibious force would also have interceptor drones available to diminish the impact of the enemy drone attack
The last major amphibious operation was the 1950 Battle of Inchon, also known as the Inchon landings. This amphibious invasion ended in a decisive victory for the United Nations forces. The operation involved some 75,000 U.S. Marines and 261 naval vessels. This led to the recapture of South Korea's capital, Seoul, two weeks later.
The largest amphibious operation took place on June 6, 1944. The Normandy landings were the landing operations and associated airborne operations on 6 June 1944 of the Allied invasion of Normandy in Operation Overlord during the Second World War. The D-Day operation was the largest seaborne invasion in history. The operation began the liberation of France and the rest of Western Europe and eventually led to Germany's surrender on May 8th and the end of the 20th century's costliest war in terms of cash, weapons, equipment, and casualties.
The Allies had 156,000 soldiers and 196,000 naval personnel involved, while the defending Germans had about 51,000 troops to oppose the invaders. The invasion began shortly after midnight on the morning of 6 June with extensive aerial and naval bombardment, as well as an airborne assault involving 24,000 American, British, and Canadian airborne troops. This was followed by amphibious landings on the coast of France. The landing zone stretched 80 kilometers along the Normandy coast. Allied forces divided it into five sectors: Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno, and Sword. Strong winds blew the landing craft east of their intended positions, particularly at Utah and Omaha.
Allied soldiers established beachheads at all five landing sites on the first day, but Carentan, Saint-Lô, and Bayeux remained in German hands. The Allies did not capture Caen, a major objective, until 21 July. Only two of the beaches (Juno and Gold) were linked on the first day, and all five beachheads were not connected until 12 June. German casualties on D-Day were about 9,000 men. Allied casualties were at least 15,000, with 4,414 confirmed dead.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, September 14, 2026 - 02:53 pm: Edit

Russia: Pay Rates For Soldiers to Die in Ukraine
September 12, 2026: Russia has spent over a trillion dollars on its war in Ukraine, and much of that money went to pay signing bonuses of $50,000 or more. Currently, the average monthly wage is about $1,100. Financially, it makes sense to take the signing bonus and go off to the Special Operation in Ukraine. That worked for the first three years, but by 2026 most prospective recruits knew that over half a million Russians had died in Ukraine and anyone going to Ukraine would be dead or wounded within days or weeks, or even less than an hour once they entered the combat zone. The first thing these soldiers noticed was the ubiquity of Ukrainian drones, most of them seeking to kill any Russian they could find. Each drone had a video camera that the distant operator could view using goggle-like headgear. Operators were often widows who became drone operators to avenge their dead husbands. For the Russians, some drones seemed more intent on killing than others.
All this carnage has made most prospective recruits reluctant to accept a $50,000 signing bonus to face certain death. Recruiters added that families of dead soldiers received over $200,000. That did not change anyone's mind.
Russia came up with another solution this year, with nearly 50,000 soldiers from Central Asia, Africa, and elsewhere serving as well-paid mercenaries for Russia. About half of these soldiers are killed, partly because Russia does not let the soldiers leave when their contracts are completed. Russian recruiters use not just financial incentives, but also pressure on migrants. Some foreigners are forced to choose between criminal prosecution and signing a contract.
According to Ukrainian intelligence, men from 136 countries have signed lucrative contracts to fight alongside Russian troops. So far, more than 3,000 foreigners remain in the military after completing their service. The money may have been a factor; the $20,000 signing bonus and over $2,000 a month in pay can change the lives of the poor families many of these foreign troops come from. Sometimes Russia does not make the promised payments, especially if the dead soldier has no next of kin to receive it, or no one complains when the payments are not made, including a substantial amount of cash paid for dead soldiers. Despite the difficulties, Russia continues to seek more foreign recruits. These foreigners are popular with Russian soldiers because the foreigners can be given most of the dangerous assignments.
Russia had earlier problems with foreign mercenaries. Two years ago, Russia was unable to recruit, mobilize, or conscript enough Russians to fight. Even before the end of 2023, Russia looked for ways to address this problem. One solution was recruiting 15,000 Nepalese men to fight in Ukraine. The Nepalese men Russia recruited were not from the Gurkha region. Gurkha soldiers are in high demand as mercenaries, and battalions of them serve in the British and Indian armies. Gurkhas were not interested in fighting for the Russians in Ukraine, so the Russians turned to non- Gurkha Nepalese who needed a job, any job, even if it was a dangerous one. The Nepalese recruits were given the usual scanty training when they entered Russian service in mid-2023. The troops were soon in Ukraine, where they suffered casualties. By 2026, nearly half the Nepalese had become casualties. Four Nepalese soldiers were captured by Ukrainian forces and held as prisoners of war. Families back in Nepal appealed to Nepalese politicians to find a way they could contact their men in Ukraine. Russia did not provide any way for their Nepalese mercenaries to send or receive mail to anyone in Nepal. That led Nepal to ban any more Russian recruiting in Nepal. Earlier, Cuba did the same when Russia tried to recruit Cuban men to fight as mercenaries in Ukraine.
Russia has been seeking countries where it can recruit local men as mercenaries but has had little or no success. Russia has a bad reputation because they are the one that invaded Ukraine, and now the Russians are losing, and most countries are fine with that or don’t care as long as the Russians do not try to recruit local men to be mercenaries.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, September 14, 2026 - 02:53 pm: Edit

Warplanes: The Current Air War Over Ukraine
September 12, 2026: Ukraine currently has 335 aircraft. A third are jet fighters, including 38 F-16s. Eventually, they will have more than sixty F-16s, but it takes time to train pilots and maintainers and prepare airbases to operate them. French Mirage 2000 fighters are equipped with modern radars and electronic warfare systems and have proved very effective at detecting and destroying incoming Russian missiles and large attack drones. France has ordered 16 Rafale fighter-bombers, and Sweden has ordered over a hundred Gripen E, with 16 to arrive this year. Ukraine still operates Russian-made aircraft that Ukraine obtained before hostilities with Russia began in 2014. These aircraft include 42 MiG-29s and 22 Su-27 fighter-bombers.
The F-16s have some unique assignments in Ukraine. Because air defenses on both sides are so robust, neither side has air superiority and must keep its aircraft out of range of enemy air defense systems. The F-16s are most useful as another air-defense weapon to destroy Russian cruise-missile attacks. One F-16 destroyed six of these missiles in one sortie during December 2024, which might make its pilot an ace, depending on the definition of ace, which historically meant downing five fighter aircraft.
The F-16s have proved invaluable as a last line of defense against cruise missiles that got past the air defenses. The Russian style of air control has jet fighters operating under ground controllers' orders. Ukraine uses the more flexible Western method, where pilots are briefed before takeoff on where to go and what to attack. After that, it’s the pilot’s choice when and how he carries out these attacks.
Ukrainian pilots found the F-16s easier to operate than the Russian-designed aircraft they previously used. The F-16s are more reliable and, with more NATO-standard aircraft electronics, pilots can detect and destroy targets much faster. This autonomy means Russian jamming has little impact. F-16s used American AGM-88 HARM missiles that detected Russian radars and destroyed them, even if the radar operators shut down the radars in an effort to save them. This suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) operations greatly reduced the number of operational Russian air defense radars.
F-16s and other Western fighters are used to intercept Russian guided glide bomb and drone attacks. The F-16s often employ inexpensive laser-guided APKWS II missiles to down Russian targets. Ukraine also has NATO-supplied anti-aircraft systems like the medium-range NASAMS and IRIS-T SLS/SLM, and longer-range interceptors like the SAMP/T and Patriot. Because of the war with Iran, they are out of Patriot interceptors and probably won’t receive more until next year. In general, Ukraine never has enough missiles for the NATO-supplied air defense systems. European nations have increased missile production and are flying them to Ukraine as soon as they come off the assembly line.
Against persistent Russian Saheed/Geran drone attacks, Ukraine uses a detection network based on ordinary Ukrainian cell phones, which transmit incoming attack locations and numbers and alert the nearest air defense systems to move to where the drones could be shot down. Truck-mounted heavy machine guns are used and proved remarkably effective. Russia is developing a jet-propelled Geran drone that will make interception more difficult. Current Gerans are known for being low, slow, and loud.
The Russian air force has suffered heavy losses that are not easily replaced. Russian aviation manufacturers face growing maintenance and production challenges. For example, recently, an air force Tu-22M3 heavy bomber crashed during a training flight. The preliminary cause was a technical malfunction. This was the third Tu-22M3 loss due to malfunctions in three years. Similarly, last month, a Russian Boeing 737 nearly crashed over the Black Sea due to engine failure while en route to Arkhangelsk. At the last moment, the plane returned to its departure airport.
These incidents highlight the growing problems with aircraft maintenance in Russia. NATO sanctions have restricted access to essential parts, reducing efforts to maintain aircraft properly. Desperate to keep its aircraft in the air, Russia has resorted to cannibalizing some aircraft and relying on expensive smuggled parts. With fewer aircraft flying more often, the risk of accidents increases.
Problems first appeared in 2023, after a year of heavy combat. Then Ukraine used missiles and drones to attack airfields close to the Ukrainian border. This forced Russia to move many of its heavy bombers to airbases up to 6,000 kilometers from Ukraine. This made it more expensive and time-consuming for these bombers to carry and launch cruise missiles at Ukrainian targets. The added wear and tear reduced their useful lives.
The NATO sanctions are also disrupting production of Russian fighters and fighter-bombers, such as the Su-30, Su-34, Su-35, and perhaps even the 10 new 6th-generation Su-57 aircraft. Production rates for these aircraft are only about 30 per year, which is not enough to replace losses from training, obsolescence, and combat. Russian plans for a new heavy bomber are on hold because of the sanctions and the cost of the war in Ukraine.
Obviously, Russian commercial aviation is suffering similar, and in many cases worse, problems. The development and production of Russian-designed and manufactured airliners were eventually halted. Russia can no longer obtain spare parts and maintenance support for its Airbus and Boeing airliners, which account for 70 percent of Russian commercial airliners, and over 90 percent of all commercial flights are operated by these foreign airliners. Boeing and Airbus had sold or leased these aircraft to Russia and demanded their return after Russia invaded Ukraine. Russia refused, but is now cut off from manufacturer support and must rely on smuggled parts and whatever help it can get from China. Currently, about twenty percent of these are grounded.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, September 14, 2026 - 02:54 pm: Edit

China: Taiwan Preparing for a Chinese Siege
September 11, 2026: Taiwanese economists and trade experts are anxiously seeking ways to keep Taiwan supplied if China imposes an informal, unannounced naval blockade. Taiwanese economic assets are spread all over the island, most of them within range of the hundreds of Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan. Fortunately, Taiwan has more defensive assets than China can deal with in wartime.
China knows this because it conducted its most elaborate live wargames around Taiwan. These included live-fire exercises in international waters near Taiwan. This was a Chinese demonstration of its ability to cut Taiwan off from American, South Korean, and Japanese support. China declared that the recent exercises were meant to discourage outside support. This comes less than two weeks after the United States revealed another arms sale to Taiwan, this one for $11 billion.
Taiwan has been relatively quiet about its long-range missile programs. Taiwan has missiles that can reach targets deep inside China. Also mentioned was a recent wargame, where Taiwanese used these missiles to defeat a Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan.
Two years ago, Taiwan tested a cruise missile version of its Hsiung Feng anti-ship missile. With a range of over 500 kilometers and a highly accurate guidance system, the missile could do significant damage to many Chinese military targets near the coast. Taiwan held off on mass production to avoid alarming China and the enormous expense of building up a Hsiung Feng stockpile. The missiles cost over $300,000 each. There are already over 700 Chinese medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles sitting across the 160-kilometer-wide Taiwan Strait. The Hsiung Feng can hit land targets along the Chinese coast and deep inland via a GPS guidance system.
Taiwan also revealed that it had developed yet another version of its Hsiung Feng II anti-ship missile. This version is launched from trucks or fixed launchers, has a range of at least 600 kilometers, and is intended to target targets on the Chinese mainland. Only if China attempts to invade Taiwan, of course. Three prototypes have been built, and production has apparently already begun. So far, 500 of these one-ton Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missiles are in service. They use GPS guidance and some stealth features, making them less likely to be shot down. Using a more efficient engine, range could be extended to 1,000 kilometers or more. The Hsiung Feng IIE is cheap, about $300,000 each, and carries a 228 kg warhead. The Hsiung Feng IIE project was kept quiet, with few official details released. Apparently, this was done to avoid alarming the Chinese, at least in public.
Taiwan also built its own version of the American AGM-154A JSOW (Joint Standoff Weapon). The Taiwanese version is called the Wan Chien. JSOW is basically a smart bomb with wings. This lets it glide up to 70 kilometers from the aircraft that drops it to a ground target. Its range is about 25 kilometers when dropped from low altitude. JSOW also has more elaborate fins and software that lets it follow a specific route. Like the wingless JDAM smart bomb, JSOW uses GPS and inertial guidance as a backup to find its target. Like JDAM, JSOW hits within ten meters of its aiming point. The U.S. pays about $250,000 for each JSOW. Taiwan could use its Wan Chien. JSOW is a form of HARM/Homing Anti-Radar Missile to take out the latest Chinese air defense radars. Taiwan is also building its own version of HARM, called Tien Chien 2A. JDAM technology is much simpler than these two projects, and Taiwan could easily design and build its own. Refusing to sell them just costs the U.S. export sales. On the other hand, it lets the United States tell China it didn't sell JDAM to Taiwan, defusing tensions over Taiwan. In reality, of course, Taiwan can just go build its own JDAM, which it can do and apparently has, but has kept quiet about it.
The United States has no formal agreement to defend Taiwan if China attacks. At the same time, Taiwan has been a major purchaser of American weapons. Since 1950, Taiwan has received or has on order over $70 billion worth of weapons. Most of these purchases are recent, as if both the United States and Taiwan expect an imminent Chinese attack.
This is despite the United States making peace with China in 1979 and establishing diplomatic and trade relations. While China believed that the Americans recognized Chinese ownership of Taiwan, the Americans also pledged to aid the Taiwanese in defending their island from a Chinese attack.
If China wants to reclaim Taiwan, it will have to fight for it, and the Americans have agreements with Taiwan to help defend the island nation. How the Americans would assist in Taiwan's defense is unclear. The 1979 agreement with China included the Americans withdrawing all their forces from Taiwan. This meant that any American help for protecting Taiwan would have to be flown in from Guam, Japan, South Korea, or the American mainland. This takes time, and the Taiwanese believe that it would be enough time for a Chinese invasion to put troops on portions of Taiwan.
From China's perspective, the threat to Taiwan is less impressive. Chinese military corruption continues to be a major factor in how the Chinese military operates or, more frequently, is prevented from operating effectively or at all. In 2023, Chinese leader President Xi Jinping made the awful discovery that his navy and air force had minuscule stocks of spare parts. This alone made an invasion of Taiwan impossible. In addition, the lack of spare parts made it impossible to sustain months of combat against Taiwanese holdouts and American reinforcements that would follow landings on Taiwan. China also discovered that corrupt officials in the Rocket Forces had allowed the loss of readiness for the hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles China has assembled in coastal areas opposite Taiwan. Only 180 kilometers of sea separates the Chinese mainland from Taiwan, and these missiles are supposed to deliver the first, and hopefully crippling, blow of an invasion. That is not possible because corruption in the Chinese Rocket Forces had led to maintenance lapses that rendered nearly all those missiles useless. The most recent awful corruption discovery, earlier this year, was that much of China’s strategic oil reserves, for use in the event of a US Navy blockade of China, had been stolen.
China and everyone else know that a Taiwan invasion is impossible because of the deplorable state of these weapons and forces. China would try to fix its invasion-force problems and build a force that could take Taiwan. That is not going to happen for several years, if ever. If the Chinese admit all their problems and actually raise the cash and other resources needed to build a credible invasion force, that would be different. Optimistic Chinese and American planners believe forces could be ready by the 2030s. Given the many current economic problems China faces, devoting significant leadership and economic resources to solving military problems is unlikely.
For example, China struggles to find reliable, capable Chinese officers to replace corrupt ones. The Chinese leader also has to deal with the bad publicity the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) has earned because of its key role in recent corruption scandals. The Chinese military swears allegiance not to China, but to the CCP.
Xi Jinping leads the CCP and the government, so this corruption scandal could force him out of power. Xi is already in trouble because the economy has been performing poorly. A failed Taiwan invasion would likely lead the CCP Central Committee to replace Xi quickly.
Things could be worse for China and the rest of the world. A successful invasion of Taiwan would trigger an economic disaster because the Americans and their local allies, South Korea and Japan, would enforce an American-led blockade of Chinese ports.
Worse, President Xi and China’s senior Communist Party officials know that China’s senior military leaders lying to them about military readiness could be one scandal too many. The Chinese people are increasingly unhappy and angry with the government for letting economic problems develop. The missteps, mistakes, and failures of Xi have already demonstrated that China is not a great power, which is enough for most Chinese to back replacing Xi.
Meanwhile, the Americans have confirmed that they will not merely initially oppose a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but that they will blockade Chinese ports for as long as it takes to force China to free Taiwan if an invasion succeeds. China has believed that it could prevent that by offering peace talks to the United States after a successful invasion of Taiwan. The Americans responded that a blockade of Chinese ports would remain in place until China withdrew from Taiwan. Sustained massive imports and exports are essential for the Chinese economy. China does not produce enough food to feed everyone at present levels and must import a lot of oil to keep the economy going. China imports 35 percent of its food and over 40 percent of its fuel. All of this comes by ship because the only alternative, the Russian Trans-Siberian railroad, can replace only a few percent of the goods coming in by sea. American economic sanctions alone would halt exports because most of them go to the United States and American European allies.
A blockade would be felt within days and become critical within weeks. Even if the Chinese could deal with American surface and air forces, the US Navy has enough nuclear submarines to keep Chinese ports closed. After a few weeks, the blockade would trigger massive unemployment.
Previously, China believed that an American blockade would last only a few months before ending at an international peace conference following China’s short victorious suppression of dissidents in Taiwan. That fantasy ignores the extensive defensive measures Taiwan has taken or is implementing.
Several years ago, the Chinese government began a public relations campaign about its purported effort to prepare China for an American blockade lasting several years. The timing of this was odd, as it started 6-9 months after the 2023 discovery of China’s military inability to even attempt to invade Taiwan. Perhaps the PR campaign was an attempt to cover up the latter by providing an alternate explanation for further delay. Or it might have been to educate the Communist Party and Chinese people about the fatal consequences of an American naval blockade before calling off the Taiwan invasion.
A US Navy blockade of China lasting several years would be fatal for the CCP and for China’s unity. China’s Ponzi-scheme economy exists primarily to create full employment to keep the CCP in power. Some 40 to 50 percent of China’s GDP and employment depend on exports; 40 percent of its fuel and 35 percent of its food are imported. Worse, 99 percent of it goes by sea.
China’s loss of the imported 35 percent of its food supply would not be immediately calamitous, as most of that is used to improve its people’s diets, not to keep them alive. But loss of their entire meat supply, especially their treasured pork, will make them very unhappy. It’s also possible that there won’t be enough fuel to supply the wholly extravagant amounts of fertilizer China uses to increase food production to the maximum.
Food rationing will be necessary within a month of the invasion of Taiwan and will start no later than three months afterward. Such a rationing program is very problematic because of the Communist Party’s size (8-9% of the total population) and corruption. They’ll immediately steal more than their fair share and, worse, not merely to eat more themselves, but to sell on the black market to offset the loss of their normal peacetime corruption income. That will be both obvious and create real hunger among ordinary Chinese, who are exceptionally fearful of mass starvation due to China’s history. National food rationing systems require public acquiescence to work. That won’t be present in China within a year of the onset of rationing, and the food rationing system will quickly collapse as just about everyone tries to grab more just to survive. This is THE most likely scenario for the collapse and end of the Chinese Communist Party.
China’s most critical problems in the event of a US blockade will be unemployment, food, and potash, especially the latter, as it is a critical fertilizer with China lacking most of what it needs. The Russians can produce and deliver all the potash China needs by the Trans-Siberian Railroad, provided the two governments are on good terms. If the Russians don’t send China any potash, mass hunger will begin after a year, and there will be multiple starving Chinas, none of them controlled by the CCP, within two years at most. Even if the Russians do sell potash to China, they will likely demand most of China’s gold and hard-currency reserves in payment. This is a no-win problem for China.
China will have a direct conflict between fuel needs and keeping employment up. If they accept 40-50 percent unemployment, they’ll have enough fuel because fuel needs will drop that much due to idle factories, mines, and construction. But they won’t have the fuel to shift production of export goods to other products, even useless ones, to keep almost half their labor force employed.
A US blockade means the Chinese Communist Party will suffer its most feared calamity – mass unemployment for the duration of the blockade. The CCP has acted as though that would be a regime-ending event, and most Chinese and their foreign trading partners believe that is how this calamity would unfold.
The CCP appears to concede that a US blockade would be effective. The US Navy could conduct it from several thousand miles away if it wished, well beyond the range of Chinese medium-range ballistic missiles. China’s navy and air force just don’t have the range to project power that far, and its navy couldn’t survive American submarines and aircraft if they tried. Chinese unemployment would soon reach 40 percent. Disrupting Chinese trade would trigger an economic recession in the United States and Europe. Compared with China's economic disasters, the problems in America and Europe are easier to handle.
Another consideration for China is that Taiwan is currently the main, and often sole, source of key electronic components, including the machines used to design and manufacture them. China, the United States, and European coalitions have tried to copy Taiwan's electronics success and have failed. Taiwan remains the most prolific producer of these components and sells them at competitive prices. A Chinese invasion, even one that failed, would wreck the Taiwan electronics industry. The Taiwanese also promise that they’ll destroy those electronic assets themselves if there is a Chinese invasion.
This would have dire consequences for the Chinese and other major economies. Other nations would be better positioned to replace the loss of Taiwan as a source, partly because many Taiwanese electronics experts and managers have contingency plans to leave Taiwan quickly if China attacks and resume operations elsewhere. China would no longer be a valued customer, at least until after Chinese forces left Taiwan and paid for some or all the damage they did.
All of this makes it obvious that China has more to lose by invading Taiwan than anyone else. That is why, for decades, the Chinese have threatened to invade but have never acted on those threats.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, September 14, 2026 - 02:55 pm: Edit

Russia: A Financial Disaster
September 11, 2026: The Ukraine War has bankrupted Russia, and it can no longer pay war-related expenses. Earlier this year, an attempt to sell a trillion rubles ($11.44 million) worth of government debt failed. No bank, foreign entity, or wealthy Russian oligarch was willing to participate. The Russian budget deficit in the first half of 2026 was $77 billion, mainly due to war-related expenses. Military expenses for the rest of the year are estimated to be more than $60 billion. Wealthy Russians have noted this and have moved more of their assets into cryptocurrencies and foreign investments. This has forced the government into a risky “pay as you go” approach to funding the war. This method depends on what Russia can get for its sanctioned oil exports. NATO nations are cracking down on the Russian fleet of shadow tankers.
Economic sanctions have made it difficult to export petroleum. This is Russia's main export and a major source of income for the Russian government and its war effort. To evade these sanctions, Russia created a shadow fleet of 112 tankers purchased and/or leased abroad and gained unrestricted access to a Chinese smuggler haven in Hong Kong.
The nations enforcing the sanctions, particularly the United States, have tracked the Russian shadow fleet's routes and noted Hong Kong's key role in moving sanctioned Russian oil to its primary customers in China and India. Hong Kong is also a major source of weapons and munitions for sanctioned nations. A current customer is Russia. Hong Kong does this by allowing Russian tankers and cargo ships, operating with fake credentials to disguise their Russian affiliation, to bring in Russian oil and other raw materials. The Russian ships then leave Hong Kong carrying weapons for their war in Ukraine.
Another major player in the Russian smuggling effort is North Korea. For years, North Korea has been buying small, secondhand cargo and tanker ships and using them for smuggling. A favored evasion technique consists of taking on or transferring cargo at sea in its own territorial waters. The North Korean merchant fleet has about 134 ships, most of which it bought from Chinese firms.
North Korea is a notorious and persistent maritime smuggler. Because of North Korean smuggling, the United States expanded its maritime smuggling and sanctions enforcement program in 2018 by creating a new multinational enforcement organization. Initial members were the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Britain, France, South Korea, and Japan. The Enforcement Coordination Cell, or ECC, is enforcing the UN sanctions that curb North Korean smuggling related to items needed for their nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In addition, the ECC allows member nations to enforce other sanctions or naval missions their governments prioritize. The U.S. has since invited India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines to join and help monitor growing Chinese violations of offshore water rights, especially in the South China Sea and other areas of the West Pacific.
The ECC concentrates on the 2,000-kilometer-long shipping lane from the Indian Ocean, through the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea, to North Korea. Along this route, not only North Korean-flagged ships participate in smuggling, but also Chinese, Taiwanese, Liberian, and Sri Lankan ships, as well as independent ships that fly whatever flag they believe will keep them from being seized for smuggling. Including false flags. Earlier U.S. efforts had already identified many North Korean- and Iranian-owned tankers and cargo ships that were often engaged in smuggling. This led Iran and North Korea to use their own ships less and to use foreign ships instead. These third-party ships are the ones the ECC sought to identify. The ECC can identify these ships and their owners, and it can place banking and other sanctions on the owners. Many nations outside the ECC, but economic partners with ECC members, will cooperate if a smuggler ship visits one of their ports. In that case, authorities can arrest the captain and impound the ship.
ECC member warships do not rely on inspecting suspicious ships at sea, but on confirming who is where and when. This is especially useful for spotting smugglers who often turn off their location beacons and continue in running dark mode. These location beacons transmit the ship's ID and location to nearby ships and, often via satellite, to the owner and international shipping organizations. You can find past and current location data on several public websites. The beacons exist mainly as a safety measure for ships operating at night or in bad weather in heavily used shipping lanes. Smugglers have learned how to turn off their beacons near a port where, it is assumed, they have docked or anchored off the coast waiting for an available dock.
Some smugglers use spoofing, a form of jamming that modifies the beacon signal to present a false location. This is where warships and maritime aircraft come in, as these can identify ships visually or using radar, followed by visual inspection. This is more damaging to smugglers because it provides more evidence that their ship was involved in smuggling; with enough evidence, you can go after the ship owners and seize the ship whenever it enters coastal waters within 22 kilometers of land belonging to a nation that will seize outlaw ships. The US also seizes such ships at sea.
There are other problems. Not too long ago, Russian leaders, especially the president, were determined to eliminate the corruption that has delayed procurement of new weapons and driven prices up at the same time. The president's move led to a criminal investigation into the management of the Severnaya Verf shipyard. This yard builds Steregushchy-class corvettes and Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates. But investigators weren't looking into delays on these shipbuilding projects; they were looking into how management took $212 million meant to build the ships and instead used it to shore up a bank in which they held a stake. The bank still went under, taking the $212 million with it. Now the yard lacks sufficient funds to complete the ships the government contracted it to build.
Later, the Russian president was increasingly critical of the Defense Ministry for delays in spending money for new weapons and equipment. This set off all sorts of finger-pointing and accusations. For example, one of the leading ballistic missile designers told a reporter that missiles could not be built as fast as the government wanted, because the Defense Ministry would not sign purchase orders on time. An official explained to the procurement bureaucrats that some missile components took longer to manufacture and had to be ordered earlier to assemble finished missiles on schedule. But the bureaucrats either didn't comprehend that, or didn't care.
Some officials were taking enormous risks going public with this sort of thing, but that's what the Russian president had been calling for. When the President heard of these accusations, he ordered an investigation. But the Defense Minister said the purchase orders hadn't been signed because prices had risen sharply, and the suppliers wouldn't explain why. Officials had been ordered to root out corruption in the Defense Ministry, and now the Defense Minister may face a perfect storm of incompetence, corruption, and pressure from above to "make things happen." This isn't the first time the Russian president has had problems with Defense Ministry leadership and senior officers who rose during the Soviet era. The message doesn't seem to be getting through. So the President ordered prosecutors to investigate the finances of defense manufacturers, and they're finding a lot of dirt.
FYEO

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Tuesday, September 15, 2026 - 05:49 am: Edit

Ukraine hit the Syzran oil refinery in the Samara region, causing a massive fire. The refinery does make diesel, among other oil products.

If Trump does not retaliate against Ukraine, this raises the hope that his request that Ukraine refrain from hitting Russian diesel targets was one of those throwaway requests one sometimes sees in diplomacy. That is, it may have been a request that he knew the other side would not honor, but felt he needed to make anyway for domestic political reasons.

We need to wait a few days before drawing that conclusion, however.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, September 15, 2026 - 09:55 am: Edit

I cannot confirm it but I saw a headline in my feet that Ukraine and Russia had agreed to stop attacking energy infrastructure.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Tuesday, September 15, 2026 - 10:09 am: Edit

Trump said that on Truth Social. Ukraine said that Russia attacked its energy sector anyway, so it struck Russia's refinery.

Separately, Ukraine said gas stations in Kyiv were hit. I don't know if this was the energy sector attack Ukraine was referring to.

Ukraine also hit Taganrog very hard last night, causing a large fire at the Beriev aerospace complex, which modernizes and repairs several types of Russian combat aircraft.

They also destroyed a Nebo-U long-range radar (est. cost: $100M)

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, September 15, 2026 - 02:59 pm: Edit

Intelligence: Things That Matter You Rarely Hear About
September 15, 2026: In the last twelve years, U.S. counterterrorism operations have evolved significantly, focusing on both domestic and international threats, including drone strikes and intelligence operations against various terrorist groups. Strategies have adapted to emerging threats while emphasizing prevention and community engagement. Since 2014, strategies for dealing with Islamic terrorism have improved substantially and evolved significantly, focusing on adaptive counter-terrorism measures and addressing the ideological roots of extremism. The loss of territorial control by groups like ISIS has shifted the focus from military engagement to intelligence and a presence in recently pacified regions.
Initially, intelligence sharing among nations dealing with Islamic terrorists has been crucial for pre-emptive action. The counter-terrorism landscape has transformed in several ways since 2014. There has been a shift in focus with more emphasis on dismantling networks and organized beliefs that support and sustain terrorism. There are also greater efforts to support communities where signs of Islamic terrorism are emerging. A decade ago, online recruitment of new Islamic terrorists was a problem. That has declined due to territorial losses, leaving Islamic terrorists fewer opportunities to enlarge current efforts.
A decade ago, the six worst violence hotspots on the planet were Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, and Somalia. These nations seem hopeless, and the search for solutions seems futile. But when you step back and look more closely, you find that these countries share a lot in common, beyond being “failed states.” All are largely Moslem and all have serious problems with governing themselves. This spotlights the fact that Muslims in general and Arabs in particular have developed a peculiar relationship with democracy to cure these longstanding problems.
This democracy movement has grown since the 1960s, as more Muslims have been able to migrate to the West. As a result, millions of Muslims have come to understand democracy through personal experience. They did this either by moving to the West or by being visited by family or friends eager to explain this curious but wonderful form of government in detail. As a result, opinion polls in Muslim countries have shown growing approval of democracy, at least in theory. This was especially true in 2011 after the Arab Spring uprisings. But since 2011, that approval of democracy has dimmed a bit, as Muslims unaccustomed to running a democracy found that doing so was not easy. Most Muslims still think democracy is the best form of government, but a quarter of Muslims also believe that democracy may be unsuitable for Muslim countries at this time. This disappoints and confuses many Muslims. They can see that democracy produces superior results where it has been established, but making democracy work reliably is much harder than many Muslims originally believed. This is largely because of some unique problems in Muslim states.
One unique problem is opposition from some Islamic conservatives. This is made worse because many Arabs believe what al Qaeda preaches: that the world should be ruled by an Islamic religious dictatorship, and that this must be achieved by any means necessary (including force against non-Muslims and Muslims who don’t agree). This sort of thinking has been popular with Islamic conservatives since Islam first appeared in the sixth century. Since then, it has periodically flared up into major outbreaks of religiously inspired violence. But that’s not the only problem. Arabs sustain these outbursts with their fondness for paranoid fantasies and an exaggerated sense of persecution and entitlement. For example, most Arabs believe that the September 11, 2001, attacks were not carried out by Arabs but were a CIA scam to provide an excuse for the West to make war on Islam. That’s just the tip of the iceberg. U.S. troops in Iraq were amazed at the number of fantastical beliefs that were accepted as reality there. Currently, it is popular to believe that ISIL was created by Israel and the United States and is still supported by those two countries.
Then there is corruption and intense hatred. It’s a very volatile and unpredictable part of the world and always has been. This has resulted in Arab states failing to achieve the same prosperity and other social, economic, and educational achievements found elsewhere in the world. In the first decade of the 21st century, it became popular to call many of the Muslim countries that were having trouble establishing democracy "failed states." This became a generic term for unstable countries prone to rebellion and civil disorder. What they all have in common is a lack of "civil society" (rule of, and respect for, law), and lots of corruption. The two sort of go together.
The best example of a failed state has long been Somalia, largely because the concept of the "nation of Somalia" is a very recent (1960s) development. It never caught on. The same could be said for the Palestinians. Sudan is accused of being a failed state, but it isn't in the same league as Somalia. Sudan has had a central government of sorts, on and off, for thousands of years. Not so Somalia.
Another common problem in failed states is many ethnic groups. This is a common curse throughout Africa, which is why many of the worst failed states are there. Europe and much of Asia have managed to move past tribalism, although that has not always resulted in a civil society. Tribalism has kept most African and many Arab nations from making much economic progress. The top failed states tend to be African, Moslem or both. Somalia is also unique in that it is one of those rare African nations that is not ethnically diverse. Instead, Somalia suffers from clan animosities and severe warlordism.
A similar problem exists in the Middle East. For example, three current hot spots, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, have long been torn apart by tribal and religious animosities. The same is true of the Balkans and parts of India and Pakistan. No one has found a quick or easy solution for failed states. It all comes down to effective local leadership, and that often fails to show up. Some success has come from helping good leaders develop by installing democracy. But just letting the people vote often leads to someone who looked like a good guy turning into a dictatorial "president for life." Haiti has, for two centuries, tried to develop a civil society, and for over a century has used democracy in that effort. That has never worked, and right now Haiti is more anarchic than Somalia.
The Arab world has watched Iraq closely. It's one of the few Arab states to have held free and fair elections lately. Iraq, however, is at the center of the Arab world, and its success or failure as a democracy will determine how well democracy fares in the region. Thus, the current struggle with ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) takes on an added urgency.
The consensus so far is that the old reasons (outside interference) for the poor government in Arab states no longer apply. Since the 1950s, people have blamed centuries of Turkish rule and, more recently, a few decades of European rule. Tiny Israel also got some blame. But it's become obvious that the Turks, Europeans, and Israelis are not the cause. The problems are internal, and the search for workable solutions is on.
One exemplary leader can make a difference. Examples abound. Kemal Ataturk, more than any of his close followers and advisors, turned Turkey from a medieval monarchy into a functioning democracy. India also had a handful of strong early leaders who achieved what many believed impossible and created the world's largest democracy (over a billion people). Neither Turkey nor India is as efficient and prosperous as many older democracies. But compared to many of their neighbors, Turkey and India are beacons of hope in an otherwise dreary political landscape. Alas, they are the exception, not the rule, and this sorry situation will continue for the foreseeable future.
Meanwhile, many Muslim leaders have absorbed all this and come up with their own solution. This has not been easy. For example, for years the king of Saudi Arabia has been telling other Arab leaders that they are the problem, and you can take that as a sign of progress. But real progress isn’t. Arab leaders are victims of their own success. Their rule is based on corruption and police state tactics. Think about East Europe before 1989. The big difference is that, although the populations of East Europe then and the Arab world now were both fed up with their leaders and governments, Arabs were not willing to make as painless a switch as East Europeans did in the 1990s. That's because the East Europeans had two choices: communism or democracy. The Arabs have four: despotism, democracy, tribal factionalism, or Islamic dictatorship.
In Iraq and Gaza, we see how the Islamic radicals react to democracy. They call it un-Islamic and kill those who disagree with them. The Arabs must deal with this, and in Iraq they do. In Gaza, they don’t. But the violence in Iraq has revealed another Arab problem. Even if you remove religion from the equation, not all Arabs are keen on democracy. In Iraq, the Sunni Arab minority believes it is their right (or responsibility) to run the country. This pattern is common in Arab countries. One minority believes they are rulers by right, and that democracy is an abomination and un-Islamic (or at least inconvenient for the ruling minority). This pattern appears in nearly every Arab country.
Like South Africa, India, and many other places where "democracy won't work," it does. Not democracy like in the United States, or Europe, or anywhere else. Every democracy is different, just like every culture. Democracy is a messy, inefficient form of government, but compared to the others, most people tend to prefer it.
Arabs, even Arab leaders, know they need democracy. They have tried everything else, and nothing else works. But democracy is strong medicine for Arabs, and many would rather just talk about it and go no further. And that is the problem in the Arab world. Islamic terrorism is the result.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, September 15, 2026 - 02:59 pm: Edit

We will know things are serious when Ukraine starts bombing the vodka distilleries.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, September 15, 2026 - 03:00 pm: Edit

Weapons: AI Gun Sights
September 15, 2026: In Ukraine, the search for drone-destruction weapons has been underway for years. The latest innovation is an Israeli computerized rifle scope, SMASH . The Israeli military tested it with infantry and special operations troops and approved it for use. Shortly thereafter, SMASH was offered to foreign militaries (and police organizations). The latest version incorporates AI (artificial intelligence) technology to improve accuracy.
Two other innovations have been shotguns, which prove to be an excellent last-resort defense against drones. The Italian shotgun manufacturer helped by providing special ammunition. Ukraine has also developed and manufactures a special 5.56mm bullet that consists of several sub-projectiles instead of a single bullet. Soldiers still have to fire several of these rounds before downing a low-flying drone.
SMASH offered several major innovations compared to the computerized sights pioneered by American firm TrackingPoint. SMASH could be mounted on any weapon with an M1913 Picatinny rail (allowing the sight to work with the trigger). The sight puts a visual block around potential targets the user is aiming at. When the user has the intended target in the block, they push a button, and the system locks that target, calculates a precise firing angle, and fires unless the user intervenes.
An American firm (TrackingPoint) pioneered this tech and in 2013 introduced its first computerized shooting system, the XS1. These initially cost $27,000, but the price has since dropped to less than half as the firm introduced more models and sales increased. These scopes were still expensive because they are sensor-equipped and computerized, to the point that initial tests showed over 70 percent of first-time users could hit a target over 900 meters away with the first shot. For a professional sniper, first-shot success averages about 25 percent and 70 percent on the second shot. Second shots aren't always possible, as the target tends to duck after the first shot. The army tested the XS1 and found it worked, but it did not adopt the system for many military sniper rifles, even though it would have been a major improvement for snipers. The major obstacle was battlefield wear and tear and the fact that most snipers were satisfied with their existing scopes. Snipers are trained to take good care of their rifles, scopes, and the growing number of electronic gadgets they now use, but the XS1 was a major leap in terms of electronics, sensors, and required maintenance. It was recognized that the XS1 technology was the future, and just as the many new (since the 1990s) sniping accessories have become rugged and reliable enough to be standard items, so will the XS1 approach, or something similar to it. Meanwhile, TrackingPoint adopted the tech for a small number of sniper rifles that could use it as-is.
In 2016, TrackingPoint introduced another version of its computerized scopes: NightDragon. This version lets you use an IR (infrared) spotlight with a range of nearly 200 meters and a scope with a sensor that makes the IR light visible to the shooter. Normally, IR is not visible to human (or animal) eyes. The computerized scope tracks the target in the crosshairs and fires when the computer determines a hit is possible. Targets can be moving as fast as 24 kilometers an hour. Costing $13,000 each, this is one of the few TrackingPoint sights available for the civilian market. Most of their computerized aiming systems are only for military or police organizations. The manufacturer sells TrackingPoint-equipped rifles mainly to police organizations or a few wealthy hunters who don’t like to miss. TrackingPoint now provides a growing list of computerized scopes for ranges of 350-1,300 meters. Prices range from $10,000 to $17,000.
SMASH costs much less than the cheapest TrackingPoint system and works with many rifles and pistols. SMASH is also coming in new versions that can shoot down small UAVs, operate at night, record video, and offer 4x magnification. Other firms are developing computer-controlled sights, and over time these sights will have more features, become cheaper, and more reliable.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, September 15, 2026 - 03:00 pm: Edit

Winning: What Computer Game Designers Forget
September 14, 2026: “Fun” is a slippery quality. Most designers take for granted that a game must be fun and make a conscious effort to ensure it is. Unfortunately, that fun often gets lost somewhere between caffeine/pepperoni fueled ideas and the last-minute rush to master the •••• thing and get it out the door. This problem is not new. Even before computer games came along, the rush to ship could trample the fun out of a game.
But in a computer game, unlike a manual one, no single person has control over both (a) what is going into the game and (b) how all that effort comes across to the player. Computer games are much more of a team effort, and too often nobody retains enough control to keep the fun in. I’ve designed a hundred or so games, and although only a few were computer-based, I’ve found the computer platform the hardest to make unfailingly fun.
There’s got to be a better way. There probably isn’t, but just in case, here are a few areas to tread carefully on.
1. Figure out how much fun you can afford and try not to sacrifice it to solve other development problems.
Computer game development spends most of its money on graphics and sound. The game design itself accounts for 5-10 percent of the cost. Thus, the design effort gets about as much respect as the screenwriter does during the making of movies.
2. Find out what design elements in your game enhance fun, and which put a damper on things.
Once you’ve staked out its budget, how do you describe “fun,” much less define it? I generally go with the “addiction” interpretation: if a game keeps people at it for hours, something’s got to be turning them on. So, look for the addictive elements as well as those that drag the action down. To keep the fun elements in your sights, you also need a constant supply of fresh testers; this way you avoid inbreeding during game testing. Finally, beware of Designer Hubris, especially if you don’t have much design experience: this is when someone thinks that because they have the power, they also have the talent. It doesn’t always work that way.
3. Defining Fun.
Looking for addiction is all well and good, but how do you identify it? Any gamer who's thought about this will recall moments that were fun in a particular game. What any single player considers fun, however, varies by individual preference; not every gamer buys every game. Nevertheless, a few “fun” items constitute the majority of what turns on all gamers:
• Action. The first computer games always emphasized active involvement. The first was PONG, and in recent years many others have added continuous action.
• Puzzles. In many early PC games, players had to type in questions, read the computer's answers, and solve puzzles.
• Exploring. Another early feature of PC games was the ability to explore unknown territory, discover goodies, and embark on adventures.
• Collecting and Building. The player has explored the unknown and- lo and behold- found stuff. Some items are useful, others are a bother, and a few are even disastrous, making the entire enterprise a very sporting proposition. Sometimes you can combine the useful ones to make even more useful things. The original role-playing games (including some predating Dungeons & Dragons) used this angle of collecting things and building up your character to drive the entire game.
• Strategy. Even the simplest game — chess, for example, or even checkers —has a strategic element for players who can think beyond the immediate situation. Some games emphasize strategy, but all games involve its use.
• Conflict. All games are competitive to one degree or another, but some make conflict central. Wargames are the most obvious example. Direct conflict “gets the blood going,” making it one of the more popular fun elements.
• Surprises. One of the most difficult elements to build into a game is surprise, because even the most lackadaisical players will anticipate what a game will do next. Nothing improves a game more than the ability to truly surprise. This is much easier to do in computer games than in paper games, incidentally.
• Achievement. All games include a way to recognize player accomplishment. The more you can do this, the better the game will be received. This is basically stroking the player. It never hurts, no matter what fun element you are working on.
The list can go on, but you get the idea.
4. Set up procedures to keep track of how much fun surviving in your game is as it struggles towards a ship date.
This is a tough one. How do you keep track of something that was so difficult to define in the first place? First, you’ve got to quantify your fun elements, or at least identify them, and do so in writing at the outset. If you don’t, opinions scattered among individual development team members and management will do it for you. These opinions are likely to (a) conflict, ultimately and inevitably, and (b) fade in the face of more seemingly important items--like getting the 3D library debugged before mastering--unless they exist in black and white somewhere in the spec.
Make a list of the fun elements. Then note which game elements support each. You can add items like how many development resources are needed, and an estimate of how important each element is to the game's overall success. Does this sound complicated? I usually put all this on a spreadsheet. The purpose is to help you decide how to use limited development resources.
Design resources are less limited, and I often “design my way around software problems.” This also brings the designer into the development process in a highly productive way. Too many projects come down to two feuding camps: the programmers and the designer(s). A third combatant is usually the producer. Oh, all right, it gets more complicated than that. The marketing people, the bean counters, and perhaps a few suits intrude. Many game development projects have come to grief when these factions brawled and trampled the game in the process.
5. Quantify fun for profit
The important thing is to use gaming techniques to build the game itself. Too many game designers do not practice what they preach. Psst: A game is a mathematical system, and it must be a good one to work for the players. I figured this out before there were computer games, and all you had was cardboard and paper. (“And we liked it!”) By the end of my manual game design career, circa 1980, I was creating design tools in BASIC on PCs; before that, I used programmable calculators to lay down algorithms and perfect them before ever implementing them within an overall design system. Designers may not like acknowledging it, but all they are doing is arranging algorithms and visual elements in a way that will grab players. That’s all there is. Some designers were reluctant to embrace my method, but I have dozens of successful games to prove it works. I also found the “fun list” approach worked.
Enough ruminating. We’ve all seen a few disasters. Let’s concentrate on what will prevent the civil wars that probably produced them. By using the “Fun Database” and quantifying tasks, resources, and goals, you can create a tool to achieve peace among competing interests on any game project. If you don’t, the one item you want most — fun — will be trampled in the rush to accomplish many more obvious but ultimately lesser goals.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, September 15, 2026 - 03:02 pm: Edit

Russian Starlink Jammer
September 14, 2026: Russia has developed a new jammer, VKG, or Volna Kupol Grant (Грант «Волна-Купол). A new ground-based EW (electronic warfare) system, Russia’s latest attempt to disrupt Starlink satellite communications, has each VKG unit allegedly capable of jamming up to eight transmission bands simultaneously. Each VKG system provides 360-degree coverage and weighs about 120 kg. One soldier can operate a VKG unit, which protects vulnerable electronics within a four-kilometer radius.
According to those who created VKG, the jammer saturates the satellites’ antennae, blocking the signal and allowing VKG operators to disrupt communications without damaging the Starlink satellite.
Unlike conventional EW (Electronic Warfare) systems that disrupt signals near the receiver, VKG uses narrow-beam, high-frequency transmissions to target the satellites themselves. It can also be used in multiple ways: if VKG beams a Starlink bird, it may damage that satellite.
The developer also claims the disruption can persist beyond the initial attack, as affected satellites may require maintenance before returning to normal operation.
A VKG system consists of six trailer-mounted containers, each using two steerable satellite antennas housed inside protective radio-transparent domes. Each VKG unit can block Starlink signals in an area of up to 20 square kilometers. VKG signals are in the 14- to 14.5-gigahertz frequency range and have a disruption range of up to 16 kilometers.
A Starlink receiver and antenna on a drone let it be guided precisely to its target, if it isn't shot down, and stay in contact until the last split second. Russian forces in Ukraine realized that if they didn’t find a solution to this satellite constellation problem quickly, there would be higher losses from more accurate Starlink-assisted Ukrainian drones.
The latest Starlink modification, in addition to the communication channel, provides alternative navigation, which, unlike GPS, has very high interference immunity. It also has an extremely narrow communication beam, which is difficult to detect and virtually impossible to jam with conventional electronic warfare systems.
Moreover, such a terminal costs far less than a four-ton Reaper surveillance drone. The Americans can integrate it into many of their weapons systems, including Tomahawks, JASSMs, and the new Precision Strike Missile, which has a range of 150 kilometers and is launched from a HIMARS vehicle.
This revolutionary evolution in military affairs has had an extraordinary impact on the war in Ukraine. SpaceX, the firm that created and controls the Starlink satellite network, can block Russian access to its black-market Starlink systems and diminish the effectiveness of Russian forces.
The Russians aren’t the only ones having misadventures with Starlink equipment. Last year, Starlink was suspected of playing a role in the outcome of a Red Sea conflict. Yemen’s Shia Houthi rebels had been devastated by weeks of intense Israeli and American airstrikes. These attacks continued with increasing accuracy. The Houthis couldn’t do anything about satellite or aerial surveillance, so they turned to nearby suspects. That meant searching for and seizing Starlink terminals owned by Yemeni families and businesses. Starlink is a simple, inexpensive system that connects anyone to thousands of Starlink satellites orbiting Earth. This gives users access to electronic media worldwide. Much of it is free or easy to steal. Starlink's widespread use in Yemen led the Houthis to believe it was the key means for disloyal locals to let the enemy know where Houthi weapons and other assets were.
Starlink played a small role in finding and identifying targets for airstrikes. All its satellites carry optical sensors, which software using multiple Starlink satellites converts into VLA/Very Large Array cameras capable of picking out amazingly small details on Earth. This is invaluable for military targeting. Seizing all the local Starlink terminals only made locals angrier at the Houthi response and more willing to use their cellphones or other communication devices to let the outside world know where Houthi targets were.
The Houthis are a radical clan militia from the Shia minority in northern Yemen. For over a decade, the Houthis had been disrupting life and the economy in Yemen. Houthi control in Yemen is diminishing because of the recent air strikes.
FYEO

By Paul Howard (Raven) on Thursday, September 17, 2026 - 01:15 pm: Edit

Caught a good 'discussion' on a Business Radio Station (Bloomberg) on the way jome tonight - and it raised a good point.

Is the current speed of IT/AI development moving at a speed which is too fast for a Modern Military to keep pace with - with the inbuilt controls needed?

i.e. We need a new Drone to do X.

By the time it has been designed, prototypes made, tender to build it go out and are assessed and phsically built, tested and put into 'active service'..... it's 5 year old technology?

This isn't new - and best example I can think of is late 19th Century Warships - I don't know what starting point is good (1830 to 1850, 1850 to 1870 or 1870 to 1890 all have huge changes and any work I think for the example) but technology was moving so fast, ships was often launched and within a year or two wwere obselete.

And to add to that - some ships LOOKED old, before they was put into service (French 1870/1880's Iconclads - wonderful Steam Punk looking things).

The Radio news article mentioned the US was trying to get it improved .... but radio quality wasn't good and I missed what the solution was going to be?

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Thursday, September 17, 2026 - 01:46 pm: Edit

We need a faster cycle time. Ukraine is constantly updating its drone designs. It has gone through multiple generations of military technology during the 4 1/2 years of war we've had so far.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, September 17, 2026 - 08:29 pm: Edit

War provides urgency to update things. Look how many versions of the Pz4 and Sherman appeared in just a few years. Or the ME109 for that matter, or the Spitfire. Hitler demanded production of the Panther in 1941 and it was in combat two years later.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Thursday, September 17, 2026 - 09:11 pm: Edit

Yes. Part of the West's problem right now is that Russia is also iterating on drone warfare faster than the West is. We are badly behind Russia in this area. But fortunately, Ukraine is faster still.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, September 17, 2026 - 09:22 pm: Edit

Everyone says we're behind. We're not that far behind. Remember that we had Ravens, Raptors, Gray Eagles, and a dozen others before anyone.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Thursday, September 17, 2026 - 09:46 pm: Edit

AI is telling me that the US plans to make "tens of thousands" of military drones this year. Russia plans to make 7 million this year; Ukraine 10 million.

Then there is practical experience, where but Ukraine and Russia obviously have far more.

I'd add that when I watch interviews with Ukrainians about the West's prospects if Russia attacks, they sometimes say that due to the current drone imbalance, they really fear what would happen.