So much for the theory that Ukraine has built drones all on its own which are superior to everyone else's drones. Turns out that the US, Turkey, and Poland have been providing the vast bulk of Ukrainian combat drone technology.

Nobody gets to complain about sources. I compiled that from Defense/War Department, Ukrainian media and government, German wire services, Popular mechanics, AP and UPI, and Reuters.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 06, 2026 - 12:29 pm: Edit

TO KILL A TANK: Something not everyone realizes is that even if a hit with some weapon doesn't kill the tank (i.e., penetrate the armor, set it on fire, detonate the ammo, kill the crew or force them to abandon the tank and run) it doesn't do it any good.

A hit by a high velocity tank shell that doesn't penetrate the armor still gives the tank a good shaking, often damaging the electronics and injuring members of the crew. Even if nobody in the crew is killed, they have been scared and shaken up and probably lost interest in dying for the cause. So if an M1 or Leopard 2 hits a T80 and doesn't kill it, there is a 90% probability that the tank is out of action for at least a few days, maybe permanently.

Hitting a tank with a low velocity explosive bomb of some type rattles the crew, damages the external parts (radio antenna, machinegun), might set the engine on fire, might set something else on fire (modern tanks have a scummy coating of oil and fuel that will burn), and in some cases will damage the gun or sights. A grenade fragment down the barrel will scratch it up, ruin the accuracy, and might jam against a shell in the breech with results ranging from loss of accuracy to detonation.

So a bomber drone dropping a hand grenade on the roof of a tank tells the crew "we know you're here and we can come back with something bigger any time now" at least encouraging them to move, probably to somewhere "safer but less tactically effective". Crews have been known to hear a grenade on the roof and schedaddle back to the repair shop for a "just to be safe" damage check.

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Tuesday, October 06, 2026 - 12:56 pm: Edit

The problem is defining 'best.'

The US and others build cutting edge stuff and that often has a premium cost.

So which is "better? (costs invented out of my backside & shallow googling)

$250k Javelin or 20k Stugna?

$2.5m Tomahawk or 500k Flamingo?

My point is that in this conflict there is a major emphasis on "cost per effect." I just invented that term.

So yeah, the US thingy may be better from a pure technology & performance standpoint but not be such a good value when evaluated by cost to get the "terminal" effect desired.

As an ARMY which is a better use of finite funds; one Javelin or dozen Stugna? 5 Flamingo or one Tomahawk? Sure, Corporal Infantrymanov would rather have a nice lightweight easy to use Javelin. But if I only have so much to spend what is the best use of my money?

To use a classic wargaming example, in playing WW2 wargames where you choose your own forces, battles between Panthers and Hellcats.

Much more likely were Stg 3/Pz4/ Pz3/ Pz38t vs Sherman's in real life... IIRC many Panthers lost were technical failures (transmissions, etc)...

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 06, 2026 - 02:28 pm: Edit

It's more complicated than that, and I like the term "cost per kill".

For me to kill 100 targets around Moscow I need 101 Tomahawks or 500 Flamingos. The Flamingo still costs less, but not as much less as one would think. There is also "targets destroyed vs number of factory months." If 500 flamingos is a tenth the price of 100 Tomahawks but the US builds only 54 Tomahawks a year and Ukraine can only build 345 Flamingos a month, the math is totally different.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 06, 2026 - 02:28 pm: Edit

Nigeria: Needs More Troops
October 6, 2026: Nigeria is increasing its military from eight to twelve divisions. This expansion makes it easier to deal with the tribal militias fighting each other, armed Fulani herders attacking farmers in the north, and Islamic terrorists throughout the Muslim north. The situation is quieter in the Christian south, where the oilfields are.
Nigeria is the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa by area and population, with 225 million people. The population was only 120 million in 2000. The economy has grown even faster, with GDP per person reaching $1,100 by 2025. While that is high for Africa, nearly half the population lives in poverty, barely getting by. One reason for this is the low literacy rate of 62 percent. This helps explain the high unemployment rate of over 30 percent. Endemic corruption means the national police are not only ineffective but part of the problem. Criminal activity is widespread and often intense. Currently, there has been a sharp increase in kidnapping for ransom. If you are wealthy, you can hire expensive but effective mercenaries to recover a kidnapping victim alive. Paying the ransom encourages the kidnappers to come after more members of your family. Hiring the mercenaries encourages the kidnappers to go after more vulnerable victims.
President Bola Tinubu recently indicated the army expansion was a direct response to a mass school kidnapping in his home region, the latest in a series of such attacks. Regardless, the groundbreaking decision could make Nigeria more secure. The expansion plan involves recruiting 28,000 soldiers and creating several new brigades and battalions to deal with regional unrest. Some troops will be trained at two new facilities built to expand the army’s recruitment capacity, and training has already begun. Tinubu also approved a huge pay increase from 30 to 80% for military personnel, as real wages declined because of high inflation.
One cause of unrest is religious differences. Only about three percent of Nigerian Moslems are Shia, but that comes to four million angry people. They have been angry for a long time, and in 1978 some of them formed a group of armed supporters called the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, or IMN. The plan was to overthrow the government and turn Nigeria into an Islamic state ruled by its tiny Shia minority. This was met with violent repression, and by 2019 IMN was banned, debilitated, and hunted down and killed wherever they were found. The bad reputation IMN earned came from a small radical faction that made the entire IMN look bad. IMN leaders could not control it, so the government went after the entire group.
The IMN was a minor problem in Nigeria where the much larger Sunni Boko Haram group attracted most of the government's armed attention. While government persecution ebbed, the local Sunni Islamic terrorists, the Islamic State in West Africa Province or ISWAP, decided that the haram, or unclean Shia IMN, was to be cleansed with gunfire and explosives. Today, only a few hundred IMN members remain. Now Iranian assistance has arrived to finish the job in their name.
And then there are the Iranians. Most Nigerian Shia believe in Western education and peaceful protests, and they face persecution from the Christian-dominated government and radical Sunni Nigerians. The arrival of Iranians did not help because most Nigerians are hostile to what Iran is doing to their neighbors and see nothing positive about Iranians seeking to assist Nigerian Shia. That assistance usually brings calamity upon the recipients. Any association with Iran, real or suspected, is nothing but trouble for the local Shia minority.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 06, 2026 - 02:29 pm: Edit

There is also the problem that sweeping statements like "X makes the best Y" when Y is a huge category of apples, oranges, watermelons, and squash, you may be in a situation where X makes the best apples, a respectable orange, no watermelons at all, and buys their squash from Turkey.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 06, 2026 - 02:32 pm: Edit

Warplanes: A-11 Ground Attack Aircraft
October 6, 2026: At first glance, the A-11 aircraft appears to be a successor to the American A-10 Warthog, armed with a loud, scary 30mm autocannon. In fact, Brazil and Italy developed the A-11 ground-attack aircraft. They built about 230 A-11s between 1986 and 1999. The first flight was in 1984, and the last was retired in 2025. The A-11 saw action in Afghanistan and the 2011 intervention in Libya.
The A-11 was a 13-ton, single-seat, single-engine aircraft with a max speed of 1,000 kilometers per hour and a combat range of 889 kilometers while carrying nearly a ton of weapons. Ferry range was 3,300 kilometers. Endurance per sortie was about four hours.
Weapons included an autocannon, up to 3.8 tons of laser-guided bombs, rockets, and missiles.
Another A-11 was the Lockheed A-11 Long Range Reconnaissance Aircraft. This was a top-secret Mach   3+ experimental reconnaissance and interceptor aircraft developed in the late 1950s – 1960s, designed for extreme altitude, long-range missions over hostile territory
The A-11 was seen as a successor to the U-2. The A-11 was originally meant for long-range reconnaissance and secret flights at altitudes above 30 kilometers. Versions of the A-11 were also considered for delivering nuclear bombs or long-range interception of Soviet turboprop bombers.
Range of the A-11: more than 7,000 kilometers. It was also the first military aircraft to achieve sustained Mach   3 flight. The aircraft featured a razor-thin double delta wing, folding ventral fin, titanium construction for high-temperature endurance, and electronic reconnaissance pod pylons
At least eight A-11s operated from a secret Nevada base in the early 1960s. A-11s proved capable of outflying contemporary air defenses over communist territory and were tested for long-range interception of enemy bombers
The A 11’s success in reconnaissance and high-altitude performance influenced later designs, including the SR 71 Blackbird. While it was not a frontline operational platform for decades, it remains a symbol of American aerospace innovation and the limits of Cold War-era reconnaissance technology.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 06, 2026 - 02:32 pm: Edit

Russia: Naval Drones
October 5, 2026: Russia is rapidly expanding its naval drone programs, delivering new surface drones like the Orkan and Vizir, and subsurface drones such as the Klavesin 2R PM and Vityaz D. For attack missions, Russia also uses operator-controlled naval FPV (First Person View) drones like the Skvorets VMF. Russia’s naval drone development was a result of the successful Ukrainian use of its own naval weapons. Russian land and naval forces use naval drones for reconnaissance, strike, and defensive missions.
Russian naval drones consist of the Orkan attack drone, designed for explosive strikes on ships. The Vizir drone is a prototype system used for surveillance and possibly combat use. This drone has a long-endurance version enhanced by onboard AI. The Ghrachonok drone was adapted from counter-saboteur patrol boats and is used fore for autonomous patrolling and mine clearing. The Katran surface drone is a platform for carrying and launching small aerial attack drones.
Naval FPV attack Drones include the Skvorets VMF, with a 10 km range, 1.5 kg payload, anti-corrosion housing, and a top speed of up to 150 kilometers per hour. It is used for anti-ship, coastal strike, and swarm operations. The Soroka FPV drone is a new addition to the Black Sea Fleet.
Submarine naval drones include the Klavesin 2R PM deep-sea drone for reconnaissance and mine laying. The Vityaz D is an autonomous deep-diving drone tested in the Mariana Trench and designed for strategic undersea reconnaissance.
The Russian Navy is forming naval drone regiments across major fleets to conduct reconnaissance, offensive strikes, and defensive missions. Combined systems like the BEK drone, merging surface and aerial drones, are being tested for coordinated reconnaissance and covert coastal attacks.
Russia’s naval drone expansion is a direct response to Ukraine’s effective use of such drones against Russia. Since the war in Ukraine started in 2022, Russia has steadily lost control of the Black Sea and seen most of its Black Sea fleet destroyed or driven to distant refuges like the port of Novorossiysk on the east coast of the Black Sea. When Russian warships or commercial vessels try to operate in the Black Sea, they are subject to Ukrainian attacks. Last month a Russian frigate based in Novorossiysk was attacked by more than fifty Ukrainian drones. The frigate was badly damaged, but the real target was the oil export terminal, which handles about a third of all Russian oil exports. The drones lit up the terminal and did substantial damage.
Novorossiysk is the only fully equipped port and naval base Russia has left in the Black Sea. Despite being about 550 kilometers from Ukrainian territory, Novorossiysk is under constant attack by surface and submarine drones as well as airborne ones. At the end of 2025, Ukraine used a new submarine version of its Sea Baby naval drone to attack a Russian Kilo-class submarine in the port of Novorossiysk. This was the first time a drone submarine attacked and crippled a manned submarine. The damaged Kilo was apparently written off because earlier in the year Russia shut down all ship repair activities in the Black Sea due to increasing Ukrainian drone and missile attacks. This included the shipyards at Novorossiisk. The damaged Kilo could not be taken to a submarine repair facility in northwest Russia because Turkey has a treaty allowing it to refuse warships in wartime access to Turkish-controlled waters that are the only exit from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Another damaged Kilo is stranded in a Crimean shipyard. With its latest Kilo loss, Russia has no operational Kilos in the Black Sea.
The Black Sea Kilos were used to launch Kalibr cruise missiles at targets in Ukraine. Kalibrs launched from Russia are easier to detect and shoot down. The submerged Kilos launched Kalibrs from their torpedo tubes at sea. The cruise missiles reached the surface, and their engines took the Kalibrs to targets anywhere along the Ukrainian Black Sea coast and hundreds of kilometers inland.
Meanwhile, Ukraine continues to develop and build naval drones to enable Ukraine to make the Black Sea unusable for Russian commercial shipping as well as warships. The freighters and tankers can use the Turkish exit to the Mediterranean only if they survive Ukrainian naval and land-based drone attacks. In 2024 and most of 2025, Russia and Ukraine avoided attacking each other’s commercial shipping in the Black Sea. But with all the Kilos gone and surface warships withdrawn to Russian ports in the distant ports of the northeastern Black Sea, Ukraine is free to threaten Russian commercial shipping in the Black Sea. Ukraine already has armed commercial merchant raiders firing on Russian commercial shipping. The Russians can launch drones and missiles at Ukrainian Black Sea ports but cannot effectively attack commercial shipping in the Black Sea.
Ukraine continues to develop, build, and use drones to continue its domination of the Black Sea. Last December, Ukraine introduced its Magura V7 naval drone, which weighs about 1.2 tons and can carry 650 kg of weapons. Its operational range is a thousand kilometers. The V7 can also be equipped with an electricity generator, enabling it to stay at sea for up to seven days. This model can move at speeds of up to 72 kilometers an hour. Cruising speed is 43 kilometers an hour.
Ukrainian naval drones have revolutionized naval warfare within a few hundred kilometers of a coastline. So far, no other navy has shown much interest in replicating Ukraine's success with naval drones. The U.S. Coast Guard has used naval drones to assist in interdicting drug smuggling boats. The U.S. Navy has access to Ukrainian naval drone technology and is paying attention because China is doing a lot of work on naval drones, including a ship described as a drone carrier equipped with aerial and naval drones.
Ukraine first developed a secret weapon, the Magura naval surface drone, and used about a hundred of these drones to defeat Russia’s Black Sea fleet. When the war started, the Magura V5 was just a concept, a preliminary design for a one-ton, 5.5-meter-long naval drone. Magura initially used a fishing boat with a solid waterproof cover, plus batteries for propulsion. There were sensors and a compartment for 300 kg of explosives or weapons. These included a machine gun protruding above the drone top, while two Sidewinder anti-aircraft missiles were in launch tubes, ready to be fired at Russian aircraft or helicopters. Magura has a substantial number of electronic components, including several day/night video cameras, that give the remote operator a view of what is around the drone. It also has an autopilot, so the remote operator does not have to personally maneuver the drone over long stretches of open water. Magura is equipped with contact fuses at the front of the boat
Most Magura missions are one-way, but those equipped with machine-guns and surface-to-air missiles are also used to attack Russian aircraft. At one point, a Magura V7 used those two missiles to shoot down two expensive Russian SU-30 jet fighters. This was the first time a naval drone had shot down warplanes. Earlier, a Magura had used Ukrainian R-73 heat-seeking missiles to take down one Mi-8 helicopter and damage another.
The Ukrainian experience using naval drones to defeat the Russian Black Sea Fleet was unique. Ukraine had only surface-to-ship missiles when the war started, but eventually shifted to three new naval drones, Sea Baby, Mother, and MAGURA, or Maritime Autonomous Guard Unmanned Robotic Apparatus.
Some of these naval drones were used for a mid-2023 Kerch Bridge attack. One of the drones carried 850 kg of explosives and inflicted enough damage to halt use of the bridge. The Mother drone carried 450 kg, and the MAGURA carried 320 kg. In addition to attacking targets, these drones are used for reconnaissance and surveillance with video cameras that broadcast what they see back to the drone operator. Some drones have been armed with small rocket launchers. The Mother drone has a range of over 700 kilometers and can operate on the high seas. Endurance is about 60 hours, and top speed is over 70 kilometers an hour. Mother was used for an attack on the Russian naval base at Novorossiysk, which is a thousand kilometers from Crimea.
Ukraine has been developing subsurface drones, and in early 2023 introduced the first one, the Toloka2 TK-150. This drone was 2.5 meters long and equipped with a sensor mast that remained above the surface for navigation and target identification. Toloka2 can also carry a small explosive warhead. Later, Ukraine developed the larger Marichka drone that is six meters long and one meter in diameter. Ukraine sought a Western manufacturer to build and weaponize Ukrainian drones.
Ukrainian drones have been quite successful in attacking and sinking or disabling Russian navy ships. So far, dozens of attacks have sunk or damaged nearly a hundred ships. Ukrainian drone operations in the Black Sea forced the Russian Black Sea Fleet to withdraw to the eastern shore of the Black Sea. Sevastopol was no longer a safe place to be, and Russian ships could no longer launch their Kalibr cruise missiles without risking attack by Ukrainian drones. Russian countermeasures to Ukrainian naval drones included using aircraft and helicopters to destroy slow-moving drones before they attack and expanding the use of jamming to disrupt drone control signals. These changes made it much more difficult for Ukrainian naval drones to reach and destroy targets. But by 2025, the Russians had already lost control of the Black Sea and were not getting it back.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 06, 2026 - 02:33 pm: Edit

Mali: and the Russian Navy
October 5, 2026: Seven months ago, a sanctioned Russian cargo ship, escorted by an armed Russian amphibious ship, delivered Chinese and Russian armored vehicles to a port in Guinea where it unloaded them; they were then transported a thousand kilometers inland to Mali’s armed forces and a Russian paramilitary group, the African Corps, formerly the Wagner Group. For years, the Mali military government hoped that hiring Russian Wagner Group mercenaries would enable Mali to maintain control of northern and central Mali. These two regions have been under growing attack by Islamic terror groups, and the Russians made it worse. The Mali military government is running out of people to blame for the mess they got themselves into.
The problems began when the military government ordered the independent 4,000-man French Barkhane counterterrorism force out of Mali by the end of 2021. Since then, Mali has threatened to force the 15,000 UN peacekeepers out of the country unless the UN agrees to give the Malian military government control over what the peacekeepers can do. The UN and AU (African Union) nations supplying the peacekeepers refuse. The government is particularly angry at the way the peacekeepers report on atrocities committed by Mali security forces as well as the Russian Wagner Group military contractors. Brutality and incompetence by the military are what triggered a 2011 rebellion in the north, and it was France that restored government control in the north and that Mali held elections and restored democratic government. The new “reform” government quickly proved as corrupt as previous ones, and two more military governments followed. The current one staged a coup against the preceding military government. That is another example of how dysfunctional Mali governments are.
The government forced the French and G5 peacekeepers out by the end of 2021. Mali wanted to keep the 13,500 UN peacekeepers that maintain government control over the rebellious north. These peacekeepers are supplied by AU (African Union) nations, and some are withdrawing support. A few percent of the peacekeeping force consists of troops from NTO nations that supply specialized services, especially transport helicopters and other services.
Opposition among UN members has grown over maintaining the expensive peacekeeping force, which is the most dangerous UN operation it is currently involved in. The Mali peacekeeping operation costs about half a billion dollars a month, and that is about the only foreign aid Mali gets now that the military government is in control. Most foreign aid was halted because the government was stealing so much of the aid. It is difficult to steal money spent on peacekeepers, but the government seems to be trying.
Once the UN voted to maintain the Mali peacekeeping force for another year, the military government began harassing the peacekeepers and threatening to expel all of them. The peacekeepers serve on contracts (with the UN) for varying periods, usually between two and six months.
While the military government feuds with the UN, the Islamic terror groups continue advancing south towards the capital, which is near the southern border with Guinea, which provides access to the sea. In the southwest is Burkina Faso, which also has a military government and growing problems with Islamic terrorists.
Without the French-led counterterrorism effort in Mali, the Islamic terrorists are expanding the territory they control while also terrorizing civilians and killing soldiers and peacekeepers. The Islamic terrorists are also fighting each other. The larger Islamic terror group, an al Qaeda coalition called JNIM (Jamâ’ah Nusrah al Islâm wal Muslimîn, or Group for the support of Islam and Moslems), is gaining control over more of Mali and even making more frequent attacks near the capital, Bamako, down south.
In the north, ISGS (Islamic State in the Greater Sahara) Islamic terrorists near the Niger border have taken advantage of the departure of French counterterrorism forces in 2021 by seizing and holding territory in Mali. This began with more attacks on the Niger border. The departing French and G5 counter-terrorism forces had kept the Islamic terrorists out of Mali. The Mali army and a small number of Russian (Wagner Group) military contractors have been unable, or unwilling, to carry on with that effort or prevent the Islamic terror groups from crossing the border and advancing into Mali. ISGS is one of the two ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) groups in the region. When it emerged in 2018, ISGS operated mainly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, especially where the three borders meet.
Since late 2022, ISGS has been working to take control of the Mali-Niger border. Mali responded with soldiers and a handful of Wagner Group mercenaries, but that was unsuccessful. After that, Mali did nothing, as its security forces and the UN peacekeepers were needed elsewhere. The Niger government also couldn't respond and sought to negotiate a deal with ISGS. Appearing in 2015 as an affiliate of ISIL and part of ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province), it changed in 2021 when ISGS declared itself separate from ISWAP and declared northern Mali and some areas in Niger and Burkina Faso its future caliphate. The ISIL-affiliated Islamic terrorists are far more violent than the more numerous al Qaeda. This also means casualties for the 12,000 UN peacekeepers. ISGS violence involves attacks on Islamic terror groups that refuse to take orders from ISIL.
The tri-border (Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso) area has been a terrorist hotspot since 2018 because Islamic terror groups can just cross the border to escape any effective counterterrorism efforts. For that reason, this area has been called the Menaka Region. Previously, this area was just part of the larger Gao Region, centered on one of the few cities in the north. The area being fought over is near where the borders of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso meet. Menaka has become ungovernable because so many Islamic terrorists and bandits now operate here. The French counterterrorism forces regularly searched for and attacked specific Islamic terrorist targets. The Mali government underestimated how important the French forces, with their airmobile troops, UAV surveillance, and ground attack aircraft, were in keeping the Islamic terrorists from establishing themselves inside Mali. The current Mali military government has no clear plan for dealing with this situation and is withdrawing its counterterrorism forces south to protect the capital and the more prosperous and populous south.
The neighbors see the reliance on Russian mercenaries as the main cause for more Islamic terrorists operating in Mali and spreading to neighboring countries. This includes Algeria, which has been largely Islamic terrorism free for over a decade. Now Algeria is seeing a return of Islamic terrorist activity because of the growing number of active Islamic terrorists across the border in northern Mali. Despite this, Mali does not want the French back because that makes it easier for foreigners to document the growing corruption of the military government. These corruption reports have led more countries to impose individual sanctions on officers running the military government and profiting from it. So far, the strategy of the Mali military officers running the government is to abandon northern and portions of central Mali to the Islamic terror groups. They ignore complaints from neighbors, even though that means less foreign aid for Mali. Corruption drives these problems, and Mali is the most corrupt and ineptly governed nation in the region.
Because of that, the French and AU counter-terrorism forces expelled from Mali have regrouped in neighboring countries that want protection from the growing Islamic terrorist activity in Mali. During all this, ambitious Malian politicians continue to blame all the problems on African and non-African foreigners, as well as neighboring countries that cooperate with these evil foreigners and their schemes to destroy Mali. Russia is seen as a friend of Mali because Russia is one of the few countries with veto power in the UN. This is not the same as control of the UN, but it does allow Russia to disrupt some UN efforts to interfere in Mali, especially criticism of the military government or publicizing the corruption and brutality of the Mali generals.
Mali has become a dangerous place for foreign journalists and local journalists who criticize the government or the Russian presence. The Islamic terrorists continue advancing south towards the capital Bamako and the nearby gold mines. Bamako contains about twelve percent of the national population and an even larger proportion of the national GDP. For over a year, there has been growing Islamic terrorist activity near Bamako. Most of this is attacks on police checkpoints or ambushing police or soldiers. Some of the attackers were later discovered to be locals who were recruited by Islamic terror groups and put to work. Most (95 percent) Malians are Moslem.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 06, 2026 - 02:34 pm: Edit

Infantry: Ukrainian Airborne Amphibious Drone Infantry
October 4, 2026: This year, Ukraine has continued to expand its use of airborne transport, naval amphibious, and ground combat drones. Last month, Ukrainian drone forces carried out an airborne operation in Russian-occupied territory ten kilometers behind the front line. Airborne transport drones parachuted ground combat drones into Russian territory. These drones were armed with machine guns and several hundred rounds of ammunition per wheeled drone. Operators back in Ukrainian territory maneuvered the armed drones and opened fire on the surprised Russians, killing or wounding most of them. These drones are equipped with explosives that the operator detonates after the ammunition is expended. The drones can drive into a Russian facility before doing this. Ukraine has been using a similar tactic on the front line, where old Soviet era armored transports are loaded with a ton or so of explosives and then driven, by remote control, into a Russian bunker complex and detonated.
Ukraine has been using more ground combat and transport drones to reduce Ukrainian casualties and scare Russian troops who find themselves fighting armed amphibious drones. That last event happened recently when Ukrainian forces sought to retrieve a wounded soldier from an area still under fire by Russian troops and drones. The Ukrainians landed the combat drone from a naval drone to clear the area of Russian soldiers. Then a transport drone came in to take the wounded soldier back to safety and eventually to a military aid station. The supply drone was built to accommodate supplies or a soldier, wounded or otherwise. On the way back, the transportation drone was attacked by a Russian FPV drone, which detonated near the transport drone but did not disable the transport or the wounded soldier it was carrying.

Only about five percent of ground drone missions involve combat; the rest are for supplying the troops or retrieving wounded soldiers. Only about two percent of Ukrainian ground drone operations involve the armed drone using its machine gun. The growing use of these ground drones has reduced Ukrainian combat losses and improved morale among Ukrainian soldiers. These drones assure troops that no matter how deep into the combat zone they are, the drones will get them out if wounded. These drones have already shown that they can travel more than ten kilometers to retrieve a casualty or supply a remote outpost under constant fire.
In one case, a soldier was stuck near Russian positions for 33 days. Six drones were destroyed during the rescue attempt. The seventh drone made it and completed a 64-kilometer trip to bring the soldier back. Before drones, a soldier in that position would have to be abandoned because too many more soldiers would be killed or wounded trying to carry out a rescue.

The increased use of drones instead of soldiers has greatly reduced Ukrainian casualties. This extensive use of ground drones to supply, transport, and retrieve wounded soldiers is demoralizing to Russian troops. Russia has not implemented such a drone resupply and casualty evacuation system because Russia never took good care of its wounded, and often simply leaves wounded men behind, or even kills such soldiers who are in a lot of pain. Ukraine believes this use of ground drones has reduced its casualty rate by 30 percent. That means that there are more than eight Russian casualties for each Ukrainian one.

Currently, nearly 90 percent of the personnel losses are due to drones, which are everywhere in the combat zone, with Ukrainian drones outnumbering what the Russians can get into the air. On one day last July, Ukraine recorded and reported all its drone activity. There were 311 Russian personnel killed or wounded. Drones detected nearly 1,600 enemy targets and attacked them. In addition, drones pursued about 4,500 Russian personnel as well as over 21,000 other targets. On the water, in ports, or on rivers, 15 Russian vessels were hit. Other land targets destroyed included drone launch sites, 9 guns and howitzers, 337 shelters, 130 dugouts, 46 small drones, 8 land combat drones, 18 electronic warfare systems, 3 radar systems, and 98 crew antennas.

Ukrainian innovation and support for entrepreneurship have repeatedly overwhelmed Russian forces. The response was slow at first but soon had an enormous impact. Perplexed by Ukrainian tactics, the Russians persisted, thereby keeping the war going.

Drones were an unexpected development that had a huge impact on how battles were fought. Drones were successful because they were cheap, easily modified, and expendable. Forces could implement modifications and upgrades quickly and cheaply. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces soon used cheap quadcopter drones, with soldiers a few kilometers away controlling them via First Person View (FPV) goggles to see what the drone's camera saw. These drones cost a few hundred dollars each, with the most complex models going for about $1,000. Most of these drones carry a small number of explosives, so they can instantly become flying bombs that can strike a target and detonate. Some drones carry more explosives depending on what is needed to deal with a target.

These drones are awesome and debilitating weapons when used in large numbers. A major limitation on expanding drone operations is the need for trained drone operators. Ukraine found that many soldiers frequently played video games and were quick to adapt to drone operations, especially because they could use commercial game controllers.

The war has led to massive losses for Russian forces. So far, nearly a million Russian troops have died, deserted, or avoided military service because of Ukraine. Russia has lost most of its modern tanks along with many other armed vehicles and artillery systems.
For Russia, the most damaging Ukrainian innovation in drone warfare is their use of AI/Artificial Intelligence for drone targeting systems. The AI drone contains a targeting system that finds targets. The AI drone operator confirms which targets are real, and once a target is confirmed, the AI targeting system needs no further communication. It resists all forms of jamming.

FPV drones have radically changed modern warfare. These drones are an omnipresent aerial threat to all vehicles and infantry on foot. Each FPV drone costs less than a thousand dollars. Operators use the drone's video camera to see what is below and locate targets. Armed FPV operators are several kilometers away to decide when their FPV drones will drop explosives on an armored vehicle, which has thinner armor on top, or on infantry in the open or in trenches. To do so, drone operators often work in pairs, with one flying behind the other and focusing on the big picture while seeking a likely target. When the reconnaissance drone finds such a target, the armed drone is directed to it. The two FPV drone operators are usually in the same room or tent and can take control of new drones, which are lined up and brought outside for launch when needed. The reconnaissance drones are often unarmed, so they can spend more time in the air searching for a target.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 06, 2026 - 02:35 pm: Edit

Russia: Russian Invasion Flawed
October 4, 2026: Years of Russian threats to invade NATO Europe have led to European nations rearming and preparing for the worst. NATO analysts believe that Russia will continue to be a threat even after the Ukraine War is over. The invasion of Ukraine proved that the post-World War II creators of NATO were correct. While Russia was a threat from 1947 to 1991, that 74-year Cold War turned hot in 2022 when Russia invaded neighboring Ukraine. Vladimir Putin, a former secret police officer, gained control of Russia in 1999 and made no secret of his desire to reassemble the Soviet Union. This would involve persuading or conquering the other fourteen nations that emerged in 1991 when the Soviet Union was disbanded.
The largest of the fifteen states was the Russian Federation. The next largest was Ukraine, and that made Ukraine the first nation Russia needed to subjugate and absorb. The 1991 Soviet Union had 300 million people. By 2022, Russia had 142 million and Ukraine 46 million. None of the other post-Soviet states wanted to rejoin the Soviet Union.
While NATO didn’t want to fight Russia, it was willing to supply Ukraine with over $200 billion in weapons, munitions, and economic aid to defeat the Russian invaders. NATO also backed international sanctions on Russia, which crippled the Russian economy and made it difficult for Russia to continue its war against Ukraine.
Russia, frustrated that its conventional forces could not conquer Ukraine, threatened to use its nuclear weapons. That was not a real threat because three NATO nations had nuclear weapons. In addition to the United States, France and Britain had nuclear weapons that could be delivered by aircraft or missiles fired from submarines. The nuclear threat was a phantom, and Russia insisted its conventional forces would keep fighting in Ukraine until NATO got tired of the expense of supporting Ukraine. NATO nations believed Russia would give up first because the war was making life difficult for the Russian people, who were increasingly hostile to the war.
Some NATO members are suggesting that NATO members be allowed to send troops to assist the Ukrainians in expelling the Russian forces. It is pointed out that the NATO coalition has a population of nearly a billion people. Adding Ukraine would bring the total to a billion. Russia does not want Ukraine in NATO, but Ukraine sees NATO membership as its only long-term protection from Russia. A 1994 treaty had Ukraine give up its nuclear weapons in return for Russian promises to forever respect Ukrainian independence. Britain and the U.S. pledged to assist Ukraine if Russia violated the treaty. This is why the NATO threat to send troops to aid Ukraine is frightening. Russia reneged on the 1994 promises, and the Americans and British agreed to support Ukraine if that happened. It happened, and Russia faces war with the largest economic coalition on the planet.
Other NATO members may join the U.S. and Britain, if only to ensure that NATO's ability to retaliate involves more than two of the 32 NATO members. By providing massive support for Ukraine and NATO membership after the war, NATO serves as a warning to China that threatening NATO members is risky. China needs trade with NATO nations more than a military stalemate or war. China disagreed with the Russian decision to invade Ukraine and has been circumspect and stingy in providing economic aid to its neighbor and economic partner.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 06, 2026 - 02:35 pm: Edit

Procurement: Varieties of Economic Warfare
October 3, 2026: Economic warfare is a strategy warring nations use to weaken an enemy's economy. For thousands of years, this took the form of invading enemy territory and destroying crops and grain reserves. Farming implements were destroyed along with any improvements like irrigation works. Farmers and their families were enslaved, with adult men and teenage boys often slaughtered before they could generate any resistance.
Economic warfare is most apparent in large-scale modern wars. These conflicts include mobilized, well-armed, and well-equipped armies backed by national economies that can keep replacement troops, munitions, weapons, and much else coming to the combat zone. Whichever side can produce these necessities faster has a considerable edge.
This first became apparent in antiquity when the best-prepared armies of spearmen, archers, horsemen, and whatnot prevailed, especially if reinforcements and resupply were available. In ancient times, most armies lived off the land, consuming local food supplies, which often left civilian populations facing famine and dwindling numbers until the next good harvest.
Some 2,500 years ago, the Roman Republic and the later Empire were unstoppable because they paid close attention to supplying their legions. Each of these was the equivalent of a modern combat brigade. About five percent of the armed legionaries had secondary jobs as clerks. They tracked supplies, potential sources of supply, and the status of everything when a legion built a camp after a day’s march. These practices made the Romans immune to surprise attacks on their camps or interruption by an enemy who destroyed all crops and food supplies as they retreated. Such foes were rare, because Rome usually made war on prosperous kingdoms that could be fatally weakened by too much food and crop destruction. Whatever was thrown at them, the Romans were prepared to withstand and deal with.
The Roman Empire eventually fell, at least the Western portion governed from Rome, when Roman forces could no longer use the ancient methods or adapt to new forms of warfare introduced by German invaders. The Eastern Empire, based in Constantinople (Istanbul), lasted another thousand years because the Easterners adapted and sustained the ancient Roman military practices.
Through the 19th century, ancient practices of securing, maintaining, and moving supplies evolved. Most wars and battles took place near waterways, as shipping supplies and troops were most efficient along coasts and up rivers. This was accompanied by another innovation: sailing ships that could handle any kind of weather and carried 40 to 80 cannons. Each cannon had up to 80 cannonballs and powder. These ships could severely damage or destroy enemy waterside port facilities. The warships also captured enemy cargo vessels and added them to their own fleets. Because seaborne trade had become such a vital part of European economies, trading nations needed large fleets and agile diplomats to keep their trade functional and profitable.
This didn’t change, even though an early 20th-century development, the submarine, created a new and more lethal form of economic warfare. World War II subdued the submarine threat through a combination of new technologies and carrier-based anti-submarine aircraft that could cover areas of the Atlantic land-based warplanes could not reach.
At the end of World War II, the United States cut Japan off from essential food supplies from the mainland by deploying naval mines from submarines and long-range bombers. During World War I, large fields of naval mines were used to blockade Germany.
After World War II, it was discovered that economic sanctions didn’t work. The sanctioned nation could always find alternative, more expensive ways to get what it needed. This was, and is, happening recently with Russia. Over four years of economic sanctions because they invaded Ukraine have hurt the Russian economy, but not enough to get the Russian forces out of Ukraine.
The ultimate form of economic warfare is to have a stronger economy. In this respect, the Americans are supreme. The U.S. is not only the largest exporter, accounting for 30% of world trade, but also the world's largest economy. America and its European NATO allies account for nearly half of global GDP.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 06, 2026 - 02:36 pm: Edit

Weapons: US Army Rifle Revolution
October 3, 2026: The 21st-century American Army underwent a revolution in how it designs and uses rifles. The US Army’s 21st century rifle revolution means moving from the M16s and M4s using the 5.56   mm round to the XM7/M7 6.8   mm NGSW (Next Generation Squad Weapon) using a heavier 6.8mm cartridge.
Over the last few years, the U.S. Army has begun equipping troops with the new M7 6.8mm assault rifle and M250 6.8mm Light Machine Gun, or LMG. In 2023, the Army placed its first mass-production orders for the M7 and M250. These new weapons replace 1960s-era 5.56mm ammunition that also required a new generation of assault rifles and LMGs. The M-16/M-4 assault rifles and M248 LMGs will remain in service, but the infantry and Special Operations Command (SOCOM troops will be equipped with the new 6.8mm weapons. SOCOM accepted the 6.8mm ammo and the new weapons and conducted the initial combat tests between 2001 and 2003.
The Army received 17,000 M7s and 3,000 M250s in 2024. The Army initially distributed these to Army troops. SOCOM has options because SOCOM has always been free to buy and use whatever weapons it believes it needs. That means SOCOM troops have several assault and automatic weapons available, and the M7 is now part of the collection.
The current plan is to buy enough 6.8mm weapons for all Army combat troops. That’s about 60,000 shooters. The Marines and SOCOM also use the 6.8mm weapons, which means about 30,000 more M7s are required. The Army plans to eventually acquire 107,000 M7s for infantry and SOCOM, combat engineers, and several other combat specialists.
Weapons manufacturer Remington began working on the new round in 2002. The new round used the case from the old Remington .30-.30 rimless round with a new 6.8mm bullet. SOCOM supported the 6.8mm round and began testing it in M-16s and M-4s modified to accommodate it. The 6.8mm round is more accurate at longer ranges and has more hitting power than the 5.56mm round the M-16 was originally designed for. Out to about 600 meters, the 6.8mm round has about the same impact as the heavier 7.62mm round used in sniper rifles and medium machine-guns. Designing and building a new 6.8mm rifle and LMG took longer. The new ammunition and weapons are the first developed for American infantry in over 60 years. This continues a trend that began nearly a century ago.
In the 1930s, the Germans studied their World War I experience and concluded that a less powerful, lighter rifle round would be more effective. This led to research on a smaller 7mm round but, with World War II fast approaching, the effort eventually produced a shortened regular 7.92mm rifle round. During that war, the Germans developed the first modern assault rifle, the SG-44. This weapon looked a lot like the AK-47, and that was no accident. The SG-44, like the AK-47, used a shortened rifle cartridge that was developed before the war. This was the 7.92mm for the Germans and 7.62mm for the Russians, which is still used in the AK-47. This gave the infantryman an automatic weapon that could still fire fairly accurate shots at targets 100-200 meters away. The SG-44 and AK-47 rounds had about the same stopping power as the new 6.8mm at those shorter ranges.
The AK-47 didn't have the accuracy of higher-powered bullets, but the Russians didn't see this as a problem because most troops using it had little marksmanship training. If they had to kill someone, they could fire at full auto. The U.S. M-16 and its high-speed 5.56mm round were more accurate than the AK-47 at shorter ranges when firing individual shots. But the wounding power of the 5.56mm bullet fell off rapidly at ranges over a hundred meters. The American military, and especially SOCOM, trains their troops to fire individual shots, and do it with great accuracy at any range. Several new rifle sights have made it even easier to do so and make first-round hits at longer ranges. This made the shortcomings of the 5.56mm round at longer range more obvious.
SOCOM tested the 6.8mm round in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the users liked it. But senior non-SOCOM generals resisted proposals to replace the 5.56mm round with the 6.8mm. To further complicate matters, a new 6.5mm Grendel round was also being tested, and some troops preferred it to the 6.8mm. This was because the 6.5mm round was more accurate than the 6.8mm one at ranges beyond 500 meters. The 6.8mm round won that dispute as well. In part, this was because the 6.8mm round was more effective against the body armor enemy forces, including irregulars, are increasingly using.
The M7 weighs 3.8 kg. Add the optional sound suppressor, and that’s 4.46 kg. The heaviest 5.56mm rifle is about 4 kg, but most 5.56mm rifles weigh a little less than the M7. With a suppressor, the M7 is 914mm long. The barrel itself is 330mm long. The larger and heavier 6.8mm round means the 30-round magazine is no longer used. Instead, it uses a 20- or 25-round magazine.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 06, 2026 - 02:37 pm: Edit

Air Defense: Pulsar Lite Downs Drones
September 21, 2026: The U.S. Marine Corps’ new AAVs (Amphibious Assault Vehicles) will be equipped with Pulsar Lite EW (Electronic Warfare) signal jammers to defeat drone navigation systems. Deliveries of the Pulsar Lite system will begin in a few months. Some are expected to show up in Ukraine next year, if not sooner. Pulsar Lite will join dozens of other jammers and EW systems already used in Ukraine. Pulsar Lite differs in that it weighs only 11 kg and can be used on drones, mounted in vehicles or helicopters, or carried by infantry and placed on the ground, then turned on when needed.
The Marines appreciate that Pulsar can detect and jam drones over three kilometers away. Most of these drones are FPV (first-person view) models that let the operator see where the drone is going. Another surveillance drone records the attack by an FPV drone, which destroys itself along with its Russian target. Because drone operators and their assistants operate from bunkers, they suffer few casualties. This makes it possible for women soldiers to operate drones. Women also serve on the front lines as snipers and medical personnel. Public opinion is hostile to women getting killed in combat, even though many women volunteer for these assignments. About 200 female soldiers have been killed so far. Women currently comprise ten percent of Ukrainian military personnel.
Some drone operators work from civilian vehicles because they must move their drone control equipment to different points on the front line to stay within radio range of their drones. In some sectors of the front, drones inflict 90 percent of the casualties, but overall drones are responsible for about 80 percent of Russian casualties.
Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are sending in quadcopter drones controlled by soldiers using FPV goggles to see what the drone's day/night camera can see. Most FPV drones carry half a kilogram of explosives, so they can instantly turn into flying bombs that fly into a target and detonate. This is an awesome and debilitating weapon when used in large numbers over the combat zone. If a target isn’t moving or requires more explosive power than the drones can supply, one of the drone operators can call in artillery, rocket, or missile fire, or even an airstrike. Larger, fixed-wing drones are used for long-range operations against targets over a thousand kilometers inside Russia.
A major limitation to expanding drone operations was the need for trained drone operators. These operators need dozens of hours of training before they can operate these drones, and even more hours of actual use before they can make the most of the system.
These small drones can complete their missions most of the time, whether it is a one-way attack or a reconnaissance and surveillance mission. Recon missions are usually survivable, allowing the drone to be reused. These drones constantly perform surveillance, meaning both sides commit enough drones to maintain constant surveillance over a portion of the front line, extending at least a few kilometers into enemy territory.
This massive use of FPV-armed drones has revolutionized warfare in Ukraine, and both sides are producing as many as they can. Ukrainian drone proliferation began when many individual Ukrainians, or small teams of them, designed and built drones. These drones became candidates for widespread use and mass production. This proliferation of designers and manufacturers drove rapid evolution in drone capabilities and uses. Those who could not keep up were less successful in combat and suffered higher losses. Each month, Ukrainian factories and home workshops build several hundred thousand drones, along with substantial imports from European nations that have begun producing Ukrainian-designed drones.
Military leaders in other nations have noted this and are scrambling to equip their own forces with drones. Not having enough to match the enemy's numbers in a part of the front puts you at a serious disadvantage there. These drones are still evolving in design and use, and they're becoming more effective and essential.
One countermeasure that often works for a while is electronic jamming of the drones’ control signals. Drone guidance systems are constantly modified or upgraded to cope with this. Most drones have flight control software that sends them back to their takeoff point to land for later use when control signals are jammed. Drones programmed to home in on the jamming signal can attack ground jammers. Countermeasures can be overcome, and the most popular current one is to control a drone via a fiber-optic cable.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 06, 2026 - 02:37 pm: Edit

Surface Forces : China Invades Taiwan's EEZ
September 21, 2026: China continues its efforts to take control of offshore areas bordering China, the Philippines, South Korea, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, and any other islands or coastal areas it considers worth going after. Currently, China is placing a 16MW wind turbine barge 80 kilometers from Taiwan-controlled Pratas Island. This comes after decades of Chinese efforts to build military bases in the South China Sea, many of them in waters that are recognized as within the Filipino EEZ.
One of the oldest disputes is in the South China Sea, where China claims large areas of the Philippines' EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone), which extends 360 kilometers from the nearest land area . The Philippines lacks the military power to effectively oppose Chinese territorial claims.
Three of the most contested areas are the Spratly Islands, Lincourt Rocks, and the Diaoyu/Senkakus Islands
The Spratlys are a group of about 100 islets, atolls, and reefs that total only about 5 square kilometers of land but sprawl across about 410,000 square kilometers of the South China Sea. Set amid some of the world's most productive fishing grounds, the islands are believed to have enormous oil and gas reserves. Several nations claim overlapping parts of the group. China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam currently occupy about 45 of the islands with small numbers of military personnel. Brunei has established a fishing zone in the area but has made no territorial claims. From time to time, small-scale confrontations and occasional clashes have occurred between some of these countries over ownership of the islands. In November of 2002, most of these countries signed the "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea," a vague agreement that has eased tensions but is not actually legally binding. In March of 2005, the national oil companies of China, the Philippines, and Vietnam signed a joint accord to cooperate in exploring for oil in the islands. Called Taiping Island by the Taiwanese, Ita Aba is one of the largest of the group, at about 489,600 sq. meters. Taiwan has controlled it since the mid-1950s, and it has largely served as a way station for fishermen. Vietnam also claims the island, calling it Thai Binh. Taiwan has long maintained a small military presence on the island and eventually built an airfield. Vietnam, which controls the largest group of islands, has lodged protests, as has the Philippines, since it also claims the island. The Vietnamese, who have refurbished an old South Vietnamese airstrip on Big Spratly Island, have protested the action, citing it as a violation of the 2002 declaration. Taiwan is not a signatory and is likely to ignore the protest. China, which claims the entire archipelago, either keeps quiet or backs Taiwan.
Koreans call the Liancourt Rocks the Dokdo Islands, and the Japanese call them the Takeshima Islands. They comprise two rocky islets and about 32 rocky outcrops, with a total land area of 175,000 sq meters, and lie in the Sea of Japan (known as the East Sea to the Koreans), about 140 kilometers off Korea and roughly the same distance from Japan. South Korea occupies the islands and maintains a small coast guard station and a lighthouse there. Dokdo sits in the middle of a rich fishing ground, and thus its ownership determines who gets to harvest the fish. The situation is complicated by the extreme hostility Koreans traditionally feel toward Japan. Recent assertions by Japanese leaders - including their ambassador to South Korea - that the island is Japanese (and continued Japanese insensitivity about its colonial role in Korea) have led to periodic massive street protests across Korea since February of 2005. The next month, the South Korean Air Force scrambled four F-5 fighters to intercept a Cessna from a Japanese newspaper that was approaching the islands. In June, South Korean and Japanese patrol boats played chicken around the islands, and recently the Chief of Staff of the South Korean Air Force, Gen. Kim Sung Il, personally flew an F-15K fighter out to the islands to assert Korean sovereignty. Japan has not yet responded to this move but is expected to send several aircraft shortly.
The Diaoyu/Senkakus Islands. Japan has a similar dispute with China over a group of uninhabited islets in the East China Sea, known to China and Taiwan as the Diaoyu Islands and to Japan as the Senkaku Islands. As with Dokdo, the area is rich in fish, and, as with Spratlys, is reputed to have extensive natural gas reserves. The Japanese Coast Guard has detained over a dozen Taiwanese fishing boats in the area, releasing them only after stiff fines. This has led to massive demonstrations by Taiwanese fishermen, including, in one instance, a massive flotilla of over 60 fishing boats that brazenly violated the Japanese claim. In addition, the Taiwanese government, normally very reluctant to criticize Japan (a potential ally against China), dispatched its defense minister and a delegation of members of parliament aboard two missile frigates on a tour of the disputed area.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 06, 2026 - 02:38 pm: Edit

Air Defense: Russia-Ukraine Missile War
October 2, 2026: Early in the war, Russia used many S-400 SAM (Surface-to-Air Missile) systems to protect its forces and the bases located on the Russian side of the Ukrainian border. In theory, S-400 should be able to protect itself from any aerial threat, including high-speed ballistic missiles. Ukrainian tactics against S-400s involve using the ATACMS missiles they received from the United States. Most ATACMS have a range of 300 kilometers, while some have a range of 165 kilometers. Ukrainians are using the 300-kilometer version, which can change its trajectory after launch and deploys hundreds of bomblets over the target.
The ATACMS long-range version’s mid-flight trajectory change breaks any target lock Russian SAM radars, including the S-400, have on it, leaving them too little time to reacquire the ATACMS warhead and lock on. Plus, the S-400 radar does not detect ATACMS bomblets because they are too small. The bomblets land in a large area and manage to destroy the S-400 radar, the fire control operator's truck as well as several missile launchers, each containing four missiles, The ATACMS also manages to avoid getting shot down by an S-400 missile by at least a dozen drones being sent in first and, as the S-400 was shooting down drones, at least five ATACMS were launched to release 300 or 800 bomblets over the target area, where the S-400 battery was deployed. These tactics destroyed an S-400 system situated too close to the Ukrainian border. Normally, S-400 batteries are based further to the rear, but the Russians wanted to take out aerial targets farther inside Ukraine and positioned this S-400 battery too close to the front line to protect itself from Ukrainian tactics.
Russia began the war with fifty S-400 batteries. By mid-2024, about a quarter of those batteries were destroyed or severely damaged. Russia has had to remove S-400 batteries protecting areas deeper inside Russia and move them closer to prevent Ukrainian warplanes, especially the new American F-16s, from being a problem, and to shoot down the growing number of missiles being fired at Russian targets. This led the Ukrainians to develop tactics that destroy operational S-400 batteries, making Ukrainian airspace dangerous for Ukrainian aircraft or Ukrainian missiles fired at Russian targets.
Ukrainians were not the first to discover how to deceive and destroy S-400 air defense batteries. In 2018, Russia announced that the last component of the S-400 SAM system, the 40N6 long-range 400-kilometer missile, had been accepted into service and that it planned to build a thousand of them. Russia currently has 41 battalions/batteries; both terms are used, with at least 330 operational truck-mounted launchers. What makes a group of launchers, usually 4-8, a battery is the search radar and command center. After twenty years of development, all the initially specified components of the S-400 system are in service.
The S-400 is advertised as the most modern and cost-effective SAM system available. An S-400 battery sells for about half the price of a comparable American Patriot battery. The major difference between the Patriot and the S-400 is not price or specifications, but combat experience. The S-400 has none, and the Patriot has lots and is gaining more every month in Saudi Arabia and Israel. The S-400 is attractive to buyers because it looks good and costs a lot less than combat-proven systems. Another major factor is crew quality and the training they receive, as well as the capabilities of air defense commanders who decide how SAM systems are used, and the ability of commanders and their crews to quickly adapt to enemy capabilities and tactics.
Patriot export customers get experienced and demanding instructors. If their students don't try or aren't trainable for one reason or another, Americans will make an issue of it because Patriot performance depends on crew effectiveness. Russia is more understanding of such problems. Russia can provide skilled, exacting instructors but will back off if the customer isn't willing to pay for that level of instruction. If crews end up poorly prepared to handle S-400 in action, Russia will also quietly provide Russian crews who will be called something else, like maintenance advisors, but stand ready to take charge if the S-400 must perform well. Russia is also accommodating when it comes to paying large sales commissions as bribes to get the sale and handle follow-up training and maintenance support. So, for many reasons a buyer would want to be publicized, the S-400 is a more attractive purchase than the Patriot. These sales tactics are nothing new for Russia and were common during the Cold War, especially when Russia was offering high-tech weapons to corrupt dictatorships who appreciated a supplier who understood their needs.
Historically, the ineptest users of Russian SAMs have been the Assad Syrians, while the most effective users of similar Western systems are the Israelis and Americans. The Saudis are building quite a record with their use of Patriot systems against Iranian-supplied ballistic missiles fired by Yemeni Shia rebels. The Saudi Patriots have shot down nearly all 100 or so Iranian and some older Russian ballistic missiles fired at Saudi Arabia. The only success the Syrians have had with the older S-200 system is shooting down a slow four-engine Russian maritime reconnaissance aircraft off the coast. The S-200 entered service in the 1960s and has been updated since. The S-300 entered service in 1978 and has had no combat experience with the Russians, though Ukraine has in this war, using Soviet-era equipment left in Ukraine after the Soviet Union collapsed. The S-400 entered service in 2007. The Syrians didn’t mean to shoot down the Russian aircraft. They were aiming at Israeli aircraft that were already back in Israel. Russia, to demonstrate how attentive it is to customer needs, agreed with the Syrians and blamed Israel even though the Russians knew exactly what happened.
Syria also holds the dubious distinction of having its Russian air defense system wiped out in 1982 by the Israelis, who suffered no losses while doing so. Those Russian air defense weapons are not really that ineffective. In 1999, Serbian crews, using some of the same systems the Syrians had, avoided destruction and even shot down an F-117 stealth aircraft by being more adaptive and imaginative than the Syrians in 1982. Two other factors are important. After the Cold War ended in 1991, the United States purchased some S-300 systems, tore some down, and got others operational for realistic testing. The U.S. shared this data with the Israelis. This showed that the S-300 was potentially effective, but much depended on the crew and their commanders.
The Russians have also learned from experience; as a result, the S-400 and later post-Cold War S-300 systems use much more automation, making them less dependent on crew skill. But the question of commander quality and commanders' ability to adapt to combat conditions remains. Finally, it is no secret that post-Cold War Russian weapons suffer from serious quality-control problems during manufacturing, and several new Russian missile and electronic systems have suffered embarrassing failures in use. No wonder the S-400s are so cheap. They are priced to sell, not actually work in combat. But in the hands of competent, adaptive users, the S-400 and other Russian systems can be far more effective than those operated by poorly trained and led operators.
An S-400 battery has eight launchers, each with two or four missiles, plus a control center and radar, and 16 missiles available as reloads. All equipment is mobile. The S-400 was originally known as the S-300PMU3, SA-21, and was renamed S-400 because it proved to be far more than another upgrade of the S-300 and was considered sufficiently different to warrant a name change.
The S-400 entered service in 2007 when the first units were deployed around Moscow. Russia claimed the S-400 could detect stealth aircraft, implying that the hypothetical enemy was the United States. Russia also claims the S-400 can knock down short-range ballistic missiles with reentry speeds of up to 5,000 meters per second, like the U.S. Patriot system. Russia immediately offered the S-400 for export, but the system's lack of combat experience hampered that effort. Patriot has knocked down aircraft and ballistic missiles; S-400 has not. Moreover, Russia's anti-aircraft missile systems have a spotty history, especially when confronted by Western electronic countermeasures. The first S-400s were based around Moscow as part of a project to rebuild the Soviet-era air defense system, which had fallen apart since the early 1990s.
During the first six years of use, between 2006 and 2012, Russia put 12 S-400 battalions into service. Before the crash in oil prices and sanctions over attacking Ukraine hit in 2014, Russia was planning to have 56 S-400 battalions in service by 2020. Budget cuts didn't hurt much, as about 40 battalions were in service by mid-2017. Even before then, the Defense Ministry ordered more older S-300V systems in 2012. This suggests the S-400 had problems; it certainly faced many delays, but those were apparently resolved. The S-400 appears to have not only matured technically but has also undergone frequent upgrades and modifications. Nevertheless, the S-400 had not yet seen combat, although it had performed well in tests.
The S-400 claims to be superior to the U.S. Patriot and is expensive by Russian standards. By 2012, Russia was pushing the S-400 as an export item, despite its advanced technology. Most S-400 missiles weigh 1.8 tons each, are 8.4 meters long, and about 50cm in diameter. The system has four missiles, each with a different range: the 9M96E is 40 kilometers, the 9M96E2 is 120 kilometers, the 48N6 is 250 kilometers, and the 40N6 is 400 kilometers. The missile has a 145.5 kg warhead. The target acquisition radar has a range of 700 kilometers. S-400 missiles can hit short-range ballistic missiles up to 60 kilometers away. Belarus and Algeria already had some S-400 equipment delivered and active. China ordered six battalions, India five, and Turkey four. Several other countries were negotiating purchase deals.
The S-400 has more range than the American Patriot's 160 kilometers, weighs twice as much, and claims far more capabilities. The S-400 anti-missile capability is limited to shorter-range ballistic missiles with incoming speeds under 3,500 kilometers per hour. That would mean a warhead coming in at about 5,000 meters per second. The longer the ballistic missile's range, the higher its re-entry speed.
The S-400 system has two types of missiles: a smaller type with ranges of 40 and 120 kilometers, and two larger missiles with much longer ranges of 250 and 400 kilometers. The 40/120-kilometer-range missiles are deployed four to a launcher, like S-300 systems. The S-400 has no experience against Western countermeasures, but U.S. intelligence believes tests these systems have undergone indicate they are capable air-defense weapons. Its true capability won't be known until it's used in combat. None of the S-300 series systems have any combat experience either, but some models have performed well in tests.
The S-400 is to be complemented and eventually replaced by the S-500. This system was perpetually stuck in development and faced several embarrassing delays. In 2009, the S-500 was declared on track to enter service in 2012. It missed that deadline, and the service date moved to 2014, then 2015; the system finally entered service in 2021. NATO knew the original S-300 during the Cold War as the SA-10. This system entered service in the late 1970s and was subsequently upgraded several times. One major upgrade was the SA-12, which entered service in the late 1980s.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 06, 2026 - 02:39 pm: Edit

Murphy's Law: What If the Palestinians Were Christians
October 2, 2026: There would be little violence between Palestinians and Israelis if the Muslim Palestinians had not systematically driven Christian Palestinians out of the region over the centuries. The Palestinians don’t just hate Israelis and Christians; they will threaten or kill any Palestinian in or near Israel with violence or death if they disagree with or criticize the Palestinian campaign to drive all non-Muslims from the Middle East.

Most Palestinian Christians agree that the existence of Israel gives Muslim radicals an excuse to attack any non-Muslims in the region in the cause of driving all non-Muslims from the region. The violence in the region is not about Israel as much as it is about driving all non-Muslims out. After all, the goal of Islam is Islamic rule for the entire planet. Islamic radicals have made this objective non-negotiable in the Muslim world.

Before Islam arrived in the 600s, most of the Arabs in what is now Israel and the Palestinian territories were Christian. It wasn’t until Israel was established in 1948 that secular violence became common. Another problem is that a group called “Palestinian” did not exist until the 1960s, when the various Arab groups trying to drive Israel out of the region decided to declare that the Arabs living near Israel were “Palestinians”. The original meaning of the word Palestinian was a variation on Philistines, a people who originated in the Mediterranean and became successful traders and raiders. They eventually landed and settled on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean and fought the locals, including the ancient Israelis. The Philistines were gradually absorbed into other groups and largely disappeared from the historical record.

Violence in this region was generally rare until Israel was founded. This was largely antisemitism and an effort to blame local problems on the newly established Israel. Gradually, all the nations in the region made peace with Israel, which had become the wealthiest, most economically productive, scientifically advanced, and militarily strongest nation in the region. Fundamentalist Muslims decided that it was an affront to Islam, or something like that, and that Israel must be destroyed.

Any group describing itself as Palestinians resisting Israel would receive money from groups in the region or beyond who wanted to cripple or embarrass Israel. That never worked, and the violence made the Israelis more militarily effective. The Israeli defense industry became a major source of combat-tested modern weapons and military equipment.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 06, 2026 - 02:40 pm: Edit

Winning: The Leave Islam Movement
September 29, 2026: Israel is one of the world’s leading arms exporters, with nearly $200 billion in exports in 2025, which was a third more than in 2024. Israel has had five years of growing arms exports. Israel’s share of the global arms market between 2021 and 2025 made it the world's seventh-largest arms exporter. Air defense systems, missiles, and rockets accounted for 29% of exports in 2025, while surveillance and optoelectronics rose to 22%.
These combat-proven weapons went to more than three dozen nations worldwide. About twelve percent of Israeli exports are weapons. That’s a substantial contribution to the economy and provides jobs for over 100,000 people. And then there’s the population factor. In 2025, exports were $263 per Israeli, six times that of the Americans and 19 times that of Russia. Adjusted for GDP, Israel’s arms-export economy is over eight times larger than the United States.
Major Israeli arms manufacturers like Elbit Systems, IAI (Israel Aerospace Industries), and Rafael produce a wide range of military technologies, including missile defense systems, drones, precision-guided munitions, and cyber-defense equipment. Their rapid growth stems from nearly 80 years of frequent combat experience. Government support and the efforts of hundreds of thousands of Israeli soldiers, weapons producers, and government support played a role. Collaboration with foreign partners, particularly the United States, in designing and manufacturing new weapons.
Europe has been the largest customer for 36–41% of exports. Asia-Pacific accounted for 32–40% of exports, with India as a major client, purchasing drones, air defense systems, and other advanced technologies. Middle East and North Africa, including the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, represented 12–15%. This was made possible by the Abraham Accords peace treaty between Israel and a growing number of Arab nations. Americas and Africa accounted for around 2–13%.
Individual nations purchased weapons to protect themselves. Germany, for example, wanted the Arrow-3 missile defense system to deal with potential Russian missile attacks. India spent about $10 billion on air defense systems and drones
Cyber and electronic warfare systems: Advanced radar, signal intelligence, and jamming technologies, as well as Command, control, communications, and computing systems. These increasingly use AI, optics, and targeting systems using these technologies
Exports also provide Israel with strategic leverage, locking countries into long-term defense relationships. At the same time, the Americans play a critical role in Israel’s arms industry through Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and co-development of weapons systems, such as the Arrow-3 missile. Germany and Italy also supply components and technology, while Israel maintains a robust domestic production base to reduce reliance on imports. These partnerships enhance Israel’s global competitiveness and allow it to expand into new markets despite political controversies
Israel has established itself as a global leader in arms exports, combining advanced technology, operational experience, and strategic partnerships. Its exports are concentrated in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, with a growing emphasis on high-tech missile defense, large surveillance drones and smaller attack drones, and other precision munitions. Despite international criticism and regional conflicts, Israel’s defense industry continues to expand, making it a key player in the global arms market.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 06, 2026 - 02:41 pm: Edit

Israel: More Arms Exports
September 29, 2026: Israel is one of the world’s leading arms exporters, with nearly $200 billion in exports in 2025, which was a third more than in 2024. Israel has had five years of growing arms exports. Israel’s share of the global arms market between 2021 and 2025 made it the world's seventh-largest arms exporter. Air defense systems, missiles, and rockets accounted for 29% of exports in 2025, while surveillance and optoelectronics rose to 22%.
These combat-proven weapons went to more than three dozen nations worldwide. About twelve percent of Israeli exports are weapons. That’s a substantial contribution to the economy and provides jobs for over 100,000 people. And then there’s the population factor. In 2025, exports were $263 per Israeli, six times that of the Americans and 19 times that of Russia. Adjusted for GDP, Israel’s arms-export economy is more than eight times that of the United States, with European arms exports showing similar figures.
Major Israeli arms manufacturers like Elbit Systems, IAI (Israel Aerospace Industries), and Rafael produce a wide range of military technologies, including missile defense systems, drones, precision-guided munitions, and cyber-defense equipment. Their rapid growth stems from nearly 90 years of frequent combat experience. Government support and the efforts of hundreds of thousands of Israeli soldiers, weapons producers, and government support played a role. Collaboration with foreign partners, particularly the United States, in designing and manufacturing new weapons.
Europe has been the largest customer for 36–41% of exports. Asia-Pacific accounted for 32–40% of exports, with India as a major client, purchasing drones, air defense systems, and other advanced technologies. Middle East and North Africa, including the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, represented 12–15%. This was made possible by the Abraham Accords peace treaty between Israel and a growing number of Arab nations. Americas and Africa accounted for around 2–13%.
Individual nations purchased weapons to protect themselves. Germany, for example, wanted the Arrow-3 missile defense system to deal with potential Russian missile attacks. India spent about $10 billion for air defense systems and drones
Cyber and electronic warfare systems: Advanced radar, signal intelligence, and jamming technologies as well as Command, control, communications, and computing systems. These increasingly use AI, optics, and targeting systems using these technologies
Exports also provide Israel with strategic leverage, locking countries into long-term defense relationships. At the same time, the Americans play a critical role in Israel’s arms industry through Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and co-development of weapons systems, such as the Arrow-3 missile. Germany and Italy also supply components and technology, while Israel maintains a robust domestic production base to reduce reliance on imports. These partnerships enhance Israel’s global competitiveness and allow it to expand into new markets despite political controversies
Israel has established itself as a global leader in arms exports, combining advanced technology, operational experience, and strategic partnerships. Its exports are concentrated in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, with a growing emphasis on high-tech missile defense, large surveillance drones and smaller attack drones, and other precision munitions. Despite international criticism and regional conflicts, Israel’s defense industry continues to expand, making it a key player in the global arms market.
FYEO

By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Wednesday, October 07, 2026 - 02:15 am: Edit

Number of Baryaktar lost in combat in Ukraine: 26


Source: www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-ukrainian.html?m=1
(Based on photographic evidence only)
Updated oct 1st 2026

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, October 07, 2026 - 07:09 am: Edit

That is the disputed claim that was debunked.

By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Wednesday, October 07, 2026 - 12:16 pm: Edit

That is not a claim. That is a count of the destroyed drones of the type that have appeared online in various media. Since they only count those the real number is somewhat higher.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Wednesday, October 07, 2026 - 12:53 pm: Edit

oryxspioenkop , according to Wikipedia, is a pro-Ukrainian bias site.

By Michael F Guntly (Ares) on Wednesday, October 07, 2026 - 01:45 pm: Edit

Just started reading first FYEO posted October 06. The first sentence of second paragraph set off warning lights. “Nigeria is the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa by area and population….” Population - yes by wide margin. Area - not even close. A 15 second search showed:

Algeria – 2,381,741 km²
Democratic Republic of the Congo – 2,344,858 km²
Sudan – 1,861,484 km²
Libya – 1,759,540 km²
Chad – 1,284,000 km²
Niger – 1,267,000 km²
Angola – 1,246,700 km²
Mali – 1,240,192 km²
South Africa – 1,219,090 km²
Ethiopia – 1,104,300 km²
Mauritania – 1,030,700 km²
Egypt – 1,002,450 km²
Tanzania – 945,087 km²
Nigeria – 923,768 km²
Namibia – 825,615 km

Items in red are not sub-saharan.

Do FYEO reports frequently have these types of errors? I have not been watching that closely.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Wednesday, October 07, 2026 - 03:45 pm: Edit

What Wikipedia actually says about the veracity and bias of Oryx Blog:

On 11 July 2022, the Warsaw Institute stated that, "The data from Oryx is regarded as one of the most accurate sources, however, there are concerns that there is a pro-Ukrainian bias as there might be more photos published about Russian destroyed equipment."