Winning: The Next Generation of Warfare
October 12, 2026: How will warfare change in the next 30 years? Military leaders and the people they protect are always trying to figure this out. There's an easy way to get some good insight into the future. Go back 120 years (1906), note the state of warfare and military technology, then advance 30 years at a time until you reach 2026. At that point, making an educated guess about what 2056 will be like will be, if not easy, at least much less daunting.
In 1906, most infantry had completed the transition from late-19th-century black powder rifles. America and most other nations had smokeless powder. By 1894, American troops had replaced their black powder rifles with a smokeless powder model (the Krag-Jorgensen). The modern machine gun was invented in 1883, but armies took about two decades to adopt it widely. Most artillery was still short-ranged, inaccurate, and could only fire at targets the crew could see. Horses pulled or carried supplies, and infantry marched long distances when they were not moved by railroad or steamship. Modern, quick-firing artillery had recently been introduced and remained unproven in battle. Communication still relied on the telegraph, an 1840s invention that, within a few decades, revolutionized how commanders communicated over long distances. They could now do it in minutes. This was a big change for warfare. Very big. At this time, telephones were all local and not portable. Cavalry was still important for scouting, although less useful for charging infantry, a trend that began when infantry got muskets with bayonets two centuries earlier.
By 1936, 30 years of unprecedented changes had an enormous impact on warfare. This was largely because the Industrial Revolution was unleashing even more new technology in much less time. This process continues at an increasing rate. By then, all troops had smokeless-powder rifles. This made the infantry much more lethal and made the modern sniper possible. These new rifles, many of which are still in use, fired faster, more accurately, without a cloud of smoke, and were far more effective than many 1906 models. The modern machine gun had arrived, and every infantry battalion had many. Some even carried light machine guns. Artillery was much more accurate and capable due to hydraulic recoil systems. Armies were beginning to use trucks to replace horses, a process that would take another half century to complete.
Aircraft were now available, proving to be the perfect scouts, able to see what distant enemy troops were up to. Wireless telegraphy (radio) also revolutionized warfare more than the telegraph. This was especially true at sea. Ships were no longer out of touch with their governments for long periods. On land, armies now rapidly laid temporary telephone lines in the field. The critical problem was that the major armies had not figured out exactly what to do with this new technology. This produced years of stalemate and millions of casualties in World War I (1914-18). But that conflict also saw the development of chemical weapons, assault rifles, paratroopers, and tanks. Nothing speeds up weapons development like a major war. In the early 1920s, military experts were still trying to figure out what to do with all this new stuff.
By 1966, the enormous changes of World War I had been overtaken by even more dramatic technological advances of the1939-45 World War II. By 1954, nearly all major military technologies of the 20th century were in place. This included electronic warfare, smart bombs, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, wire-guided missiles, antibiotics (which greatly reduced the death rate in combat), modern assault rifles, radar, aircraft carriers, modern sonar, portable radios, modern body armor, a large variety of armored vehicles, jet aircraft, portable anti-tank rocket launchers, commandos, operations research, heavy bombers, computers, self-guided torpedoes, bottom mines, land mines, chemical warfare, nuclear weapons, and much more. The transformation was more dramatic than anything in history. In less than a century, warfare became unrecognizable to any pre-20th-century soldier. While 19th-century soldiers would be recognizable to someone from the 16th century when firearms were introduced, change had been relatively slow for those three centuries. Military and political leaders now had to deal with the speed of change, as well as the changes themselves. It was an entirely new situation in human history.
Thus, 1906, compared with 1936 and 1966, saw less dramatic change. This was principally due to one new technology: nuclear weapons. The nukes discouraged wars between the major powers. Without a major war to spur rapid military-technology development, new military tech developed much more slowly and at a higher cost. By 1996, many World War II technologies had been perfected or at least made cheaper and more reliable.
There were some new developments. Guided missiles, night vision devices, spy satellites, laser rangefinders, weapons guidance systems, large drones, remote sensors, ICBMs, SLBMs, composite armor, stealth aircraft, nuclear submarines, all-weather aircraft navigation systems, miniaturized electronics, heat sensors, and more. Basically, all the neat new stuff from World War II was now smaller, cheaper, deadlier, and more reliable. But the biggest change had not been noted until the 1973 Arab Israeli War. During that conflict, the speed at which modern weapons and other systems could destroy the enemy and accelerate combat shocked generals everywhere. From there, everyone began to ponder how this transformation would change the way wars were fought.
When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, there was an unprecedented amount of innovation. This is what happens when forces from two comparably industrialized nations fight each other. The Korean, Vietnam, and Middle Eastern wars were relatively low-tech compared to Ukraine, where the defender was backed by NATO while Russia could only depend on meager support from North Korea, Iran, and China. Ukraine saw the evolution of drone warfare, in which these inexpensive weapons, flown by operators many kilometers to the rear, turned the combat zone into a nightmarish environment where movement had to be slow and stealthy to avoid the ever-present death from above. The Ukrainians adapted by developing ground combat drones. That and other innovations meant that for every Ukrainian casualty there were eight or more Russian losses. Russia is losing in Ukraine, but the Russian leadership has not come up with an adequate, for the Russian people, explanation for this sorry situation.
In 2026, radical new technologies like GPS, the Internet, bulletproof body armor, drones, combat robots, and personal, extremely portable computers transformed warfare more than anyone expected. World War II technologies continued to mature, especially when combined with later technologies like miniature computers. Improvements in communications and night-vision sensors made it possible to operate around the clock and attack with greater accuracy and deadly effect. Speed had always been a powerful weapon, but now it meant moving quickly anywhere on the planet and striking with enormous firepower. That was seen dramatically in Afghanistan in late 2001. World War II's maturing technologies had become a form of warfare with unheard-of speed and destructive power. While a 2026 infantryman would have looked like one from 1936, weapons and equipment had changed dramatically. Pundits claimed that the war on terror foiled a lot of this new tech, but the terrorists had the same impact that irregular forces had had in the past. Even the roadside bombs were nothing new, and their use by the Islamic terrorists was an admission of defeat, not a clever counter to military tech.
So, what does this mean for 2056? Faster and deadlier for sure. By then, information war will be more than a buzzword because better sensors and data-processing technology will make situational awareness (knowing where you and your enemy are, knowing it first, and acting before the other guy does) more decisive than ever.
If the expected breakthrough in batteries (fuel cells) evolves as reliably and cheaply as expected, the 2050s infantryman will be something of a cyborg. Beyond carrying several computers and sensor systems, he might wear body armor that also provides air conditioning. Satellite communications, of course, and two-way video. Exoskeletons are already in the works and may mature by then. Much depends on breakthroughs in battery tech, though engineers are also finding ways to do more with less juice. Historians tend to underestimate the cleverness of engineers and inventors.
But the big new development will be the continued evolution of robotic weapons. The World War II acoustic torpedo, used by the Germans and the Allies from subs as well as the air, was the first truly robotic weapon. You launched it, and it hunted down its prey and attacked. There may be a lot of public uproar over land-based systems with sensors that can hunt and weapons that can be used without human intervention. But those systems will be easy and cheap to build by 2056, and as soon as one nation builds them, others will have to follow. By 2056, machines will fight other machines more often than they look for stray humans on the battlefield.
But other developments will be harder to anticipate. In 1906, most of the 1936 technologies were already known in theory. The same was true for the 1966 technologies in 1936, and so on. What's hardest to predict is exactly how new tech will be used. Imagination and ingenuity will be involved, and that sort of thing is, by its very nature, resistant to prediction.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 13, 2026 - 03:04 pm: Edit

Information Warfare: System Controls Drone Activity
October 12, 2026: What technology makes drones operate? Each drone, regardless of type, has key technologies. These include onboard flight control systems, sensor data, and external regulatory or operational devices that ensure stability, safety, and compliance with applicable regulations.
Drone FCS (Flight Control Systems) primarily integrate sensors, processors, and actuators to interpret pilot commands and environmental conditions in real time. The FCS relies on accelerometers, gyroscopes, GPS, magnetometers, barometers, cameras, and lidar to provide position, orientation, and environmental data.
The processing unit is a flight controller that runs algorithms to stabilize the drone, adjust motor speeds, and execute maneuvers. Motors and propellers adjust thrust to change altitude, speed, and direction. These systems enable stability, precision, and autonomy, from auto-hover and return-to-home to GPS-guided navigation and obstacle avoidance.
Beyond the drone itself, external systems control when and how drones can operate. FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) Drone Integration Concept of Operations directives describe a process for safe, scalable drone use in American airspace, including BVLOS (Beyond Visual Line of Sight) operations, airspace class rules, and safety standards. Drone operators must comply with registration, flight permits, and airspace restrictions to ensure public safety and lawful operation under the Federal Aviation Administration.
The military uses ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) systems to manage drone activity through command-and-control networks, satellite links, and secure communications. These systems manage multiple drones, integrate data across domains, and enforce operational security.
A layered system manages drone operations, incorporating onboard sensors, a flight controller, and actuators for real-time flight management. The FAA and other organizations establish operational boundaries and safety rules. Civilian and military command-and-control platforms define drone missions and monitor compliance. Altogether, these systems ensure drones can perform complex tasks safely, legally, and effectively.
An example of how this works in wartime can be seen in Ukraine, where Ukrainian F10 drones, which cost about $600 each, are in use by ground forces. The F10 weighs about 10 kg and carries a 2 kg explosive payload. Endurance is 30 minutes, and the top speed is over 100 kilometers per hour. Max range is more than 40 kilometers, and the operator can be up to 20 kilometers away. Most current drones include targeting software that lets them continue their mission when they are out of range of the controller. At that point, the drone continues toward an operator-selected target. If no target is selected, the drone self-destructs or crashes.
On the plus side, very few drone operators have been lost in the Ukraine War. That’s because the operators have a safe space to operate uninterrupted. An operations team usually consists of one or more operators, plus support staff to track the local combat situation and find targets. After combat units request targets, the assistant checks his tablet or laptop, where data is stored on how many drones they have in the bunker and what type they are. Most surveillance and attack drones are FPV, or first-person view. Operators wear goggles with a video screen showing what an FPV or surveillance drone’s camera can see. The other team members direct the operator to the target. The drone attack often fails because of electronic jamming. When that happens, the operator is given a drone that can home in on the jammer and destroy it. These drone teams have dozens of drones in their bunkers.
On a busy day, the team can use dozens of drones. That means the drone team requires constant resupply. That is the most dangerous job because out in the open, everyone is a target. The Russians are not as adept at this form of drone warfare, but Russian drones are still a threat. Not just for the drone transport crew but for the drone teams on their way to equip another bunker. Some of these are in partially destroyed buildings or bunkers initially built by frontline combat troops. When the troops move on, their bunker becomes available for drone teams. Since the drones can attack targets ten to twenty kilometers from their bunker, they only must move to a new bunker if frontline troops move or retreat a significant distance. This is when the drone teams suffer most of their losses.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 13, 2026 - 03:04 pm: Edit

Marines: Amphibious Assault Drone
October 11, 2026: Three months ago, Ukraine released a video showing a naval surface drone landing at a beach, dropping its ramp, and releasing a ground drone, which moved inland and opened fire with a remote-controlled machine gun. That land drone could carry other weapons, like an automatic 40mm grenade launcher or a launcher for FAE (Fuel-Air-Explosive) projectiles. Landing dozens of these amphibious drones in the first wave of an amphibious invasion would decimate enemy defenses and reduce casualties among soldiers or marines landing in subsequent waves. Another innovation was using thousands of FPV (First Person View) drones operated by sailors and soldiers on ships offshore or in landing craft near or on the beach. The enemy might also use many drones, so the amphibious force would have interceptor drones to reduce the impact of the enemy drone attack.
Ukraine is already parachuting dozens of its FPV wheeled ground combat drones into a Russian rear area. The drones proceed to destroy many weapons, equipment, supplies, and Russian soldiers in a surprise attack. In the recent past, these drones, used on the front line, have captured dozens of Russian soldiers who preferred captivity to fighting drones equipped with machine guns and very accurate target acquisition systems.
Ukraine has been using more ground combat and transport drones to reduce Ukrainian casualties and scare Russian troops who find themselves fighting armed amphibious drones. That last event happened recently when Ukrainian forces sought to retrieve a wounded comrade from an area still under fire by Russian troops and drones. The Ukrainians landed the combat drone from a naval drone to clear the area of Russian soldiers. Then a transport drone came in to take the wounded soldier back to safety and eventually to a military aid station. The supply drone was built to accommodate supplies or a soldier, wounded or otherwise. On the way back, the transportation drone was attacked by a Russian FPV drone, which detonated near the transport drone but did not disable the transport or injure the wounded soldier it was carrying.
Ground combat drones can carry a variety of weapons, but most have a 7.62mm machine gun with several hundred rounds of ammunition. A remote operator controls the weapon and the drone, wearing goggles or looking at a flat-screen display and operating a controller based on, or even a version of, a popular game controller.
Only about five percent of ground drone missions involve combat; the rest are for supplying the troops or retrieving wounded soldiers. Only about two percent of Ukrainian ground drone operations involve the armed drone using its machine gun.
The growing use of these ground drones has reduced Ukrainian combat losses and improved morale among Ukrainian soldiers. These drones assure troops that no matter how deep into the combat zone they are, the drones will get them out if wounded. These drones have already shown that they can travel more than ten kilometers to retrieve a casualty or supply a remote outpost under constant fire.
In one case, a soldier was stuck near Russian positions for 33 days. The rescue attempt destroyed six drones. The seventh drone made it and completed a 64-kilometer trip to bring the soldier back. Before drones, a soldier in that position would have to be abandoned because too many more soldiers would be killed or wounded trying to carry out a rescue.
This extensive use of ground drones to supply, transport, and retrieve wounded soldiers is demoralizing to Russian troops. Russia has not implemented such a drone resupply and casualty evacuation system because Russia never took good care of its wounded and often simply leaves wounded men behind, or even kills such soldiers who are in a lot of pain. Ukraine believes this use of ground drones has reduced its casualty rate by 30 percent. That means that there are more than eight Russian casualties for each Ukrainian one. More Russian casualties die than are wounded.
Currently, nearly 90 percent of the personnel losses are due to drones, which are everywhere in the combat zone, with Ukrainian drones outnumbering what the Russians can get into the air. On one day last July, Ukraine recorded and reported all its drone activity. There were 311 Russian personnel killed or wounded. Drones detected nearly 1,600 enemy targets and attacked them. In addition, drones pursued about 4,500 Russian personnel as well as over 21,000 other targets. On the water, in ports, or on rivers, Russian forces hit 15 vessels. Other land targets destroyed included drone launch sites, 9 guns and howitzers, 337 shelters, 130 dugouts, 46 small drones, 8 land combat drones, 18 electronic warfare systems, 3 radar systems, and 98 crew antennas.
Ukrainian innovation and support for entrepreneurship have repeatedly overwhelmed Russian forces. The response was slow at first but soon had an enormous impact. Perplexed by Ukrainian tactics, the Russians persisted, thereby keeping the war going.
Drones were an unexpected development that dramatically changed how battles were fought. Drones were successful because they were cheap, easily modified, and expendable. Forces could implement modifications and upgrades quickly and cheaply. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces soon used cheap quadcopter drones, with soldiers a few kilometers away controlling them via First Person View (FPV) goggles to see what the drone's camera saw. These drones cost a few hundred dollars each, with the most complex models going for about $1,000. Most of these drones carry a small number of explosives, so they can instantly become flying bombs that can strike a target and detonate. Some drones carry more explosives, depending on what is needed to take out a target.
These drones are awesome and debilitating weapons when used in large numbers. A major limitation on expanding drone operations is the need for trained drone operators. Ukraine found that many soldiers frequently played video games and were quick to adapt to drone operations, especially because they could use commercial game controllers.
The war has led to massive losses for Russian forces. So far, nearly a million Russian troops have died, deserted, or avoided military service because of Ukraine. Russia has lost most of its modern tanks along with many other armed vehicles and artillery systems.
For Russia, the most damaging Ukrainian innovation in drone warfare is their use of AI/Artificial Intelligence for drone targeting systems. The AI drone contains a targeting system that finds targets. The AI drone operator confirms which targets are real, and once a target is confirmed, the AI targeting system needs no further communication to destroy the targets. It resists all forms of jamming.
FPV drones have radically changed modern warfare. These drones are an omnipresent aerial threat to all vehicles and infantry on foot. Each FPV drone costs less than $1,000. Operators use the drone's video camera to see what is below and locate targets. Armed FPV operators are several kilometers away to decide when their FPV drones will drop explosives on an armored vehicle, which has thinner armor on top, or on infantry in the open or in trenches. To do so, drone operators often work in pairs, with one flying behind the other and focusing on the big picture while seeking a likely target. When the reconnaissance drone finds such a target, the armed drone is directed to it. The two FPV drone operators are usually in the same room or tent and can take control of new drones lined up outside for launch when needed. The reconnaissance drones are often unarmed, so they can spend more time in the air searching for a target.
The Ukrainians developed the FPV drone in 2022, when only a few FPV drone attacks were recorded. The Ukrainian Army was the first to appreciate the potential of FPV drones. By the summer of 2023, the Russian Army also began to use FPV drones in greater numbers. Since then, the number of FPV drone attacks has grown exponentially on both sides. Only 12% of those attacks destroy the target, which could be a vehicle, a group of infantry, or even a sniper firing through a window from inside a building. In this case, the armed FPV drone would fly through the window and explode into the room the sniper was in. The only defense is having a nearby open door the sniper can run to or dive through as the FPV drone approaches. Sometimes that isn’t possible because the armed FPV drone comes down from above the window and then in. You don’t see those coming until it’s too late.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 13, 2026 - 03:05 pm: Edit

Electronic Weapons: Nvidia Goes to War
October 11, 2026: The Nvidia War is more about how much Nvidia should be worth and competition from Chinese AI chips like the Ascend 950PR, a 1.56-petaflop chip that delivers nearly three times the performance of the Nvidia H20. In 2024, Nvidia had about 95 percent of the Chinese market. Currently, that is only eight percent, and Chinese chipmaker Huawei has more than half the Chinese market. Despite this, Nvidia remains highly profitable, with gross margins approaching 80 percent and continued growth forecast. This isn't the first time tech firms like Nvidia have provided high-performance gear for the armed forces.
PlayStation and other game controllers, like Xbox, have revolutionized how military personnel carry out operations, especially those involving drones and RWS/Remote Weapons Stations. Another example came when the U.S. Navy polled its sailors to determine what worked, what didn't, and to solicit suggestions for improvement. In response to sailor complaints, the Navy decided to replace the $38,000 handheld controller for the submarine photonics mast periscope with the lighter, cheaper, and easier-to-use Xbox game controllers. This wasn't the first time the military turned to the Xbox controller. In 2001, when the Xbox console launched, the Navy developed electronic photonics masts to replace submarines' traditional optical periscopes. With the photonics masts, you put what the periscope could see on a large flat screen in the control room (or anywhere else in the sub). The photonics mast did not pierce the hull like the old optical periscope, so sailors and officers controlled it remotely with a relatively large, clunky custom controller.
While the photonics mast controller was unpopular, the Xbox game controller was quite the opposite. The Xbox system was wildly popular from the start, with over two million sold in its first 24 hours. Microsoft, the manufacturer, constantly improved the Xbox and its controller. At the same time, the U.S. Army was developing a highly realistic video game called Full Spectrum Warrior (FSW), featuring infantry combat. FSW appeared in 2004 in commercial and more realistic military versions. It was highly popular on Xbox, and around that time the Army also discovered that most of its new recruits were very familiar with the Xbox controller. It didn’t take long for developers of new Army equipment that needed a hand controller to either use a modified Xbox controller or one very similar to it. That saves the Army lots of training time and makes operators of remotely operated vehicles (ground and air) more effective much sooner.
In 2008, the Xbox controller was used for the ARSS/Autonomous Rotorcraft Sniper System, a remotely controlled sniper rifle with a stabilized mount, aimed and fired remotely using the Xbox controller. Xbox controllers became the standard for controllers for all manner of remotely controlled weapons and UAVs, as well as the small ground vehicles used to deal with roadside bombs and other high-risk tasks.
Since 2001, over a hundred million Xbox game controllers have been sold, and most new recruits, male and female, are familiar, often very familiar, with them because they spent thousands of hours using Xbox controllers before they joined. The only losers were the defense equipment manufacturers that were paid big bucks to design and build far less effective controllers. Many of these custom controllers resembled Xbox controllers, but they couldn't copy Xbox without getting sued by Microsoft. At the same time, Microsoft didn’t mind Xbox controllers being bought and used for something besides Xbox games or that some military equipment controllers borrowed heavily from the Xbox design. Microsoft also didn’t make an issue of it because a large segment of Xbox customers were military personnel or veterans who often praised Xbox for making life easier and more survivable in a combat zone. You could often use an Xbox controller with military equipment by creating new software drivers. Moreover, at about $30 each with a bulk purchase, you could afford to lose many Xbox controllers in a combat zone, since replacements were readily available, including those troops brought with them to play Xbox games while off duty. The most recent use of Xbox controllers has been in the Ukraine War, where both sides favor the Xbox controller to control their drones.
Computer gaming equipment plays a major role in many other situations. At one point, American intelligence agencies developed tools to make it easier to extract useful data from video game consoles like Xbox, Wii, and PlayStation. This enabled intelligence to be obtained from the growing number of used consoles available, or those captured during raids of terrorist hangouts.
These consoles were specialized personal computers with hard drives that let users do many PC-type functions, like email, chat, and web browsing. The files containing these communications aren't displayed as obviously as on PCs, and most users don't care. Console manufacturers have made it difficult to get user data without the proper password. But counter-terror forces do care and find ways to access potentially useful data quickly. They were certain they would find useful information because that has been the case with the many PCs captured from terrorists in the past. The intelligence agencies already had data-grabbing tools for PCs and built similar tools for consoles.
The American military is a major user of supercomputers, which are some of the fastest computers on the planet. Like the first computers, these machines were developed for military applications. These ultra-powerful computers are used for code-breaking and for designing weapons, including nukes, and equipment, especially electronic items. The military also needed lots of computing power for data mining. This involves pulling useful information about the enemy from ever-larger masses of data.
Because there's never enough money to buy all the supercomputers needed, military researchers have found cheaper ways to do it. In the late 1990s, military researchers figured out how to use GPUs (Graphics Processing Units) from high-end PC graphics cards for non-graphics computing. GPUs do something like supercomputers. This means doing lots of simple math calculations, and eventually GPU manufacturers realized there was commercial, not just military, demand for GPUs as supercomputers.
Twenty-five years ago, the Tesla supercomputer add-on for PCs appeared on the market. This was basically an Nvidia graphics board tweaked to act like a supercomputer, rather than a device that put 3-D photo-realistic game graphics on your computer screen. Soon, a version of this system provided a teraflop of computing power for $10,000.
The Cell Processor on the PlayStation 3/PS 3 was also a GPU, and that GPU alone was used to build several of the fastest supercomputers on the planet. But military researchers quickly noted that some PS 3 models could be tweaked to run Linux, and that the software was needed to get supercomputer results from the PS 3's Cell processor. Because the PS 3 sold at a loss, buyers purchased many highly profitable games; the U.S. military bought thousands of PS 3s and used them as inexpensive supercomputers.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 13, 2026 - 03:06 pm: Edit

Surface Forces : New Swedish Lulea-class Frigates
October 19, 2026: Sweden is spending over five billion dollars to have a French defense contractor build four 4,500-ton Lulea-class frigates. The first won’t be delivered until 2030, and the second in 2035.
This comes in the wake of Sweden’s 2024 decision to join NATO because of the war in Ukraine. With these four new frigates, the Royal Swedish Navy’s normal role of defending coastal waters will escalate to operations in the Baltic, North Sea, and High North. The four ships will be named Luleå, Norrköping, Trelleborg, and Halmstad
The Luleå class is based on the French FDI (Frégate de Défense et d’Intervention) design. These ships are 122   meters long, with two diesel engines and four more powerful gas turbine engines, providing a max speed of 48 kilometers an hour and a range of 9,000 kilometers at a cruising speed of 27 kilometers an hour. The crew of 225, plus up to 28 specialists, commandos or whatever, operates the usual air, surface, and subsurface sensors, along with fire-control systems.
Weapons include up to three 8-cell VLS cells with anti-aircraft missiles with a range of 150 kilometers, and 24 CAMM ER anti-aircraft missiles with a range of 45 kilometers. It also has two four-cell Gungnir anti-ship missile launchers and three anti-submarine torpedoes. It has one 57mm and one 40mm gun, operated remotely from inside the ship. It also has electronic countermeasures and anti-missile decoys.
A decade ago, because of a military budget cutback and a sharp reduction in the number of young men conscripted each year, the Swedish military had to take extraordinary measures to get enough men to volunteer and provide adequate defense against the growing Russian threat. This came to light recently when an army recruiting team drove a CV90 armored vehicle into a supermarket parking lot on the island of Gotland to recruit enough locals to staff a new defense force for Gotland. The island once had a military garrison, but Sweden eliminated it in the 1990s as it dismantled its substantial Cold War-era defense forces.
Gotland is the largest (at 3,200 square kilometers) of many Swedish islands in the Baltic Sea. It had long been a key military target for any invaders, be they from Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is gone, but Russia is once again a threat, and parliament authorized a Gotland defense force consisting of a 168-man infantry company and a 70-man tank company. The infantry would be full-time soldiers, while the tank company would be manned by reservists (part-time soldiers). This small garrison is meant to make it impossible for the Russians to take control of Gotland quickly and without loss. The island has a population of 57,000, and during World War II and the Cold War, that meant over 4,000 local reservists were armed and organized to deal with any attack. Times have changed, and now the army must do some energetic recruiting to get less than 200 local men to volunteer.
The Swedish CV90 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) was an impressive prop. This 22-ton tracked vehicle has a three-person crew and room for eight passengers (usually infantrymen). The vehicle's turret carries a 40mm autocannon and a coaxial 7.62mm machine gun, plus a thermal imager for night operations.
Sweden needed the CV90 in Gotland because, by 2015, Swedish politicians agreed with their generals and admirals that over two decades of military reductions had left the country unable to do much about any aggressive Russian moves. This even though the Russian armed forces have been reduced 80 percent since 1991. That was still a million troops, while by 2016 Sweden had only 38,000 troops available. This includes 5,600 full-time workers, 10,500 reservists, and 22,000 Home Guard. Most troops, namely the Home Guard, are another form of reserve, but instead of reinforcing full-time troops in wartime, the Home Guard is organized into 70 infantry battalions (each with 2-5 companies) assigned to the areas where their part-time soldiers work and live. Created in 1940, the Home Guard relies on volunteers who are either former full-time personnel or reservists with at least three months of basic training, and who attend two four-day training exercises a year to practice mobilization and perform their wartime duties. In addition, most Home Guard companies (about 70 troops each) hold weekend training sessions ten times a year. The Home Guard take their training and readiness very seriously, especially when an obvious threat looms. In 1940 it was the Germans, but after 1945 it was the Russians, at least until 1991. Now the Russians are once more a threat.
After 2010, Sweden phased out mandatory conscription. But now opinion polls show that over 70 percent of Swedes wanted conscription revived. As a result of this shift in public opinion, the government is looking into how to do that. It won’t be the old type of conscription that took nearly all men who were physically, mentally, and psychologically able, but a form of conscription that, while seen as fair, did not take everyone. In particular, the new type of conscription aims to recruit the specialists the military needs but currently lacks. That means men who are experts in various types of electronics and software, as well as medical and other unique skills the armed forces need.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 13, 2026 - 03:06 pm: Edit

Weapons: New Japanese Anti-Ship Missile
October 19, 2026: Japan recently developed two new missile systems: a New SSM (island defense missile) and a subsonic, long-range cruise missile designed to evade modern defenses; it can perform barrel rolls and spiral trajectories in the terminal phase to avoid close-in gun systems and radar-guided interceptors. It is powered by a single XKJ301 1 turbofan engine, offering fuel economy and a 360-kilometer range, which will be upgraded to more than 1,000 kilometers. Pop-out main wings in three sections provide lift and stealth. This new SSM is the first step in a series of modular advanced cruise missiles to address foreign threats, particularly China. Regional threats, especially from China.
The Type   25 Anti-Ship Missile is an upgraded Type   12 with a range of about a thousand kilometers. It features a redesigned airframe to reduce its radar signature and improve survivability. A compact turbofan provides propulsion, optimized for low-altitude, long-endurance cruise. These missiles will be based on Japanese islands like Kyushu and other nearby islands, making possible attacks throughout the East China Sea, waters around Taiwan, as well as the Chinese coast.
Japan is also developing an upgraded Type   12 air-launched variant with a thousand-kilometer range, a stealth design, satellite-based navigation, and target updates from Japanese controllers. The ASM 3ER supersonic air-launched anti-ship missile with a range of over 400 kilometers is due next year. This missile can be used against ships and aircraft. These missiles are meant to deal with threats from China and North Korea
Over a decade ago, Taiwan revealed that it is developing yet another land-attack (against China) cruise missile, the Yunfeng. This one doesn't just cruise; it will use ramjet engines that can reach speeds of up to 3,000 kilometers per hour. The new missile will have a 1,200-kilometer range and can reach most key Chinese industrial and military targets in northern and central China. The Yunfeng is expected to enter service next year, and an advanced version will have a 2,000-kilometer range.
Taiwan already has several subsonic cruise missiles. The Hsiung Feng 2E is a 6.1-meter (19-foot-long) cruise missile that weighs a ton (with a 450-pound warhead) and has a top speed of 800 kilometers per hour. Its max range is 600 kilometers. It uses inertial and GPS guidance. The Hsiung Feng 2E was developed from the Hsiung Feng 2 anti-ship missile. It was smaller (0.685 tons) and had a 160-kilometer range. It entered service in the early 1990s, and by the late 1990s, developers were working on turning it into a cruise missile. The Hsiung Feng 2E can be launched from ships or from land and can threaten Chinese targets several hundred kilometers inland.
Then there are the Hsiung Feng 2 and Hsiung Feng 3 anti-ship missiles. Two years ago, Taiwan admitted that its warships were already equipped with the new Hsiung Feng 3 anti-ship missile. The weapon was in development for over a decade, and rumors suggest production began four years ago. Some 300 of these missiles are believed to be in service (aboard ships or in land-based launchers).
Then there is the other fast missile. The 6.1-meter (19-foot) long Hsiung-feng 3 weighs 1.5 tons (with an 181 kg/400-pound warhead) and reaches a top speed of 2,300 kilometers per hour. Its max range is 300 kilometers. It uses inertial and GPS guidance to reach the general vicinity of the target, then uses other sensors to lock onto a specific ship and hit it. The smaller Hsiung-feng 2 has a 160-kilometer range and less advanced electronics.
Taiwan tends to develop its new weapons quietly and then suddenly reveal them. The Hsiung Feng 3, for example, suddenly began showing up in military parades, with little official comment, several years ago. One reason for keeping quiet about new weapons is to keep the press away from embarrassing development problems. The Hsiung-feng 3 also faced additional difficulties after it entered production. The worst of these involved the very high speeds and the damage they caused to some components. For a period, teething problems also reduced the max range to only 150 kilometers.
The Hsiung-feng 3 was installed on destroyers and frigates and later the new 500-ton stealth corvettes. For these ships, designers were asked to fit as many large (for a 500-ton ship) Hsiung-feng 3s as possible (up to eight). They will also carry eight smaller Hsiung-feng 2s. These new corvettes continue a trend in the Taiwanese Navy, which sees small ships carrying many anti-ship missiles as the key to success against the Chinese navy.
These ships and the land bases for cruise missiles will be prime targets for over 1,400 Chinese ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. For that reason, Taiwan has developed mobile launchers for land-based missiles and keeps its missile-armed warships at sea as much as possible.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 13, 2026 - 03:07 pm: Edit

China: Patriotic Overseas Chinese
October 9, 2026: The term “Patriotic overseas Chinese” refers to those who migrated centuries ago but still maintain strong ties to China and support its cultural and political connections and the global Chinese community. Chinese President Xi Jinping has strongly urged overseas Chinese to assist their motherland and, at times, return to support growth and progress in the country they came from. Xi maintains that patriotism and support for the motherland are obligations for overseas Chinese. Xi encourages them to participate in national projects, promote cultural exchange, and support peaceful reunification with Taiwan. While many mainlanders consider Taiwanese overseas Chinese, the residents of Taiwan consider themselves a separate country and are arming themselves to protect that independence.
Meanwhile, China has other ways to exploit overseas Chinese. For decades, China has been using an espionage system called "a thousand grains of sand." It is nothing new. Other nations have used similar systems for centuries. What is unusual is the scale of the Chinese effort. The Chinese intelligence bureaucracy inside China is huge, with nearly 100,000 people working just to keep track of the many Chinese overseas, and what they could, or should, do to try to grab for the motherland.
Chinese intelligence officials try to talk with Chinese students and businesspeople before they leave the country to study or do business, and after they return. They ask those going to the West to bring back anything that might "help the motherland." Most of these people were not asked to act as spies, but simply to share whatever information they obtained with Chinese government officials (who are not always identified as intelligence personnel).
Of course, China and Western intelligence agencies soon learned what was going on. Quiet diplomatic efforts over the years to get the Chinese to back off were politely ignored. Another problem is that China has never been energetic at enforcing intellectual property laws. If a Chinese student returned with valuable technical information (obtained in a classroom, at work, or simply while socializing), they often passed it to Chinese companies or military organizations that could use it. Because few individuals brought back large amounts of data or material (memory cards full of technical data, or actual components or devices), foreign counterintelligence agencies found it hard to catch Chinese "spies." Thousands of them went back to China with secrets in their heads. How do you stop that?
Some of the more ambitious spies, like the Mak family, were caught red-handed with actual objects. But most of the swarm moved back to China unhindered. Naturally, the Chinese pushed their system as far as they could. Why not? There was little risk. The Chinese offered large cash rewards to Chinese who could bring back particularly valuable items. Chinese intelligence looked on these "purchases" as strictly commercial transactions. If the Chinese "spies" got caught, they were on their own. The Chinese involved knew the rules. If they succeeded, they won favor with the government, or even made a pile of money, and the Chinese government was willing to approve whatever business deals these "patriotic" Chinese tried to put together back in China. This kind of clout is important in China, where a "friend in the government" is more valuable than in the West. But more of these ambitious Chinese agents are getting caught as the Western business and academic community becomes aware of what is going on. Over ten million Americans and Europeans have Chinese ancestry. Many are recent immigrants, or simply students or people working in Canada temporarily for Chinese companies. They all have family back in China and are thus vulnerable to recruitment, usually unwillingly, as one of the "thousand grains of sand" who provide any information they can to Chinese intelligence officials, who use it to improve the economy, military, foreign relations, or intelligence services.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 13, 2026 - 03:07 pm: Edit

Counter-Terrorism: The Hamas Eternal War
October 9, 2026: Hamas, a militant and aggressive Palestinian terrorist militia, has been around since the 1980s. Hamas is a perennial loser in its battles with Israel, including the one it is currently engaged in. One exception was the October 2023 surprise attack that had three thousand armed Hamas members leave their Gaza hiding places and attack unprepared Israelis. Over a thousand Israelis and foreigners in the area for a music festival were killed. This was the largest number of Jews killed in a single incident since the World War II Nazi German efforts to eradicate all Jews.
Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank were long-time rivals for Palestinian leadership. Neither could overcome the other and form a united Palestinian government. That changed with the October 2023 attack, when Hamas took the initiative but failed to overcome Fatah’s nominal government in the West Bank. The Gaza population is 2,229,000 Palestinians compared to 9.7 million for Israel. Gaza is 365 square kilometers compared to 22,145 for Israel.
How many Palestinians belong to Hamas has always been a guessing game. October 2023 confirmed at least three thousand active Hamas members. The problem is that Hamas recruiting is very informal and effective. Any Palestinian can walk into a known Hamas location, which can be a café or some retail establishment, announce their willingness to join Hamas and offer, if necessary, to fight and die for the cause. Hamas will often hand the recruit a weapon. These are usually AK-47 assault rifles and RPG rocket launchers. Both weapons regularly appear in Arabic-language movies, TV shows, and propaganda films. By the time Palestinian children are teenagers, they know all about these weapons and how to use them. If there is a crisis, the Palestinians on the Hamas membership list go to a location and get their rifle or rocket launcher.
This enables Palestinian leaders to call up many armed members on short notice. More organized operations, like the October 2023 attack, required extensive planning. Many of these Palestinian gunmen had received some specialist training, just in case. Hamas leaders did their work and then used the standard Hamas mobilization system to quickly organize a force of armed Hamas members from the local Palestinian population. Many of the Palestinian gunmen for the October 2023 attacks were not aware of a major attack until they were called out by their Hamas leaders. Some Hamas fighters had been assigned to get vehicles to take down fences and get Hamas gunmen somewhere fast.
Hamas turned pre-planned improvisation into a formidable tactic that caused a lot of Israeli casualties but ultimately failed when the better-trained, armed, and led IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) showed up. The IDF quickly killed a lot of the Hamas irregulars, and the October 2023 offensive faded away.
Surviving Hamas members back in Gaza spent more time in the tunnel network they had built during a more than a decade-long effort. Hamas used foreign aid sent by the United States and other nations to build and then rebuild their tunnel system under Gaza. Years of effort have produced hundreds of kilometers of tunnels. Many of the tunnels were wired for electricity. They got power from above-ground generators or by plugging into home or commercial business supplies. Many Palestinians made a career of working in and on the tunnels.
When the IDF recently set out to destroy the tunnel system, they were shocked at how extensive it was and how resistant it was to attack. In some tunnels, there were blast doors to protect against the IDF's use of explosives to reach a blocked portion of a tunnel. The Israelis were also surprised at the comfortable quarters for Hamas personnel and leaders. Some tunnels were equipped as administrative offices, while others served as meeting rooms or offices for senior Hamas leaders.
The Israelis soon realized that there was a Hamas town and military installation under Gaza. The IDF is, as of late 2026, still fighting its way through the Hamas tunnel network under Gaza. IDF troops were trained for house-to-house fighting and adapted those tactics to underground tunnel battles.
Hamas is but one of many Arab Palestinian groups seeking the destruction of Israel. The Arabs have come up with some novel ways to divert foreign aid money into their self-destructive cause. During the last fifteen years, the Palestinian Authority has spent over $5 billion on pay-for-slay – providing death benefits to the families of Arabs who are imprisoned or die killing, or trying to kill, Jews. At one point, the Americans threatened to halt $336 million in aid to the PA/Palestinian Authority if the Palestinians did not halt their Pay-for-slay program. Recent payments were substantial, with some Palestinian terrorists receiving over a million dollars. The most recent payment totaled $142 million for 738 Palestinian terrorists. That averages $193,000 per terrorist.
In 2025, the PA continued using its Pay for Slay program to reward Palestinian terrorists. Since October 2023, the PA has declared nearly 10,000 imprisoned Palestinian and Hamas terrorists as eligible for Pay for Slay money. The PA also recognized an additional 39,000 families of dead terrorists as eligible for Pay for Slay payments. While the PA agreed to the American demands, it is believed it would find a way to make the payments.
The Palestinians responded by establishing a foundation to handle the money. The foundation is still run by Palestinians who simply deny any involvement with the Pay for Slay effort. The foundation purportedly dispenses money to needy Palestinians, but all of them just happen to be needy terrorists. The Americans have been through this before, and this time the PA's deceptions may not work.
The PA has long used foreign aid money to run its pay-for-slay program. Since the 1970s, the PA has diverted nearly half a billion dollars in foreign aid to pay Palestinian terrorists for killing Israeli civilians and soldiers. There is an elaborate system for paying the families of dead Palestinian terrorists as well as lesser payments for those imprisoned for attacks on Israelis.
Foreign donors eventually learned of this program, which used money donated for the welfare of Palestinian civilians. Donors tried to enforce rules prohibiting cash payments for pay-for-slay programs. The PA keeps finding ways to circumvent these restrictions and continue making terrorism profitable for Palestinians. PA leaders take a portion of the aid for themselves as a reward for continuing to deceive foreign donors.
In 2019, the Palestinian Fatah government threatened to cause an economic catastrophe by refusing partial payments from Israel and donor nations unless everyone stopped deducting the money Fatah spends on supporting and encouraging terrorist activity. In 2018, Israel passed a law to deduct Pay for Slay payments from the $130 million a month it collects in taxes and fees for the Palestinians in the West Bank. Despite that, Fatah paid over $20 million to Palestinian terrorists in prison or to their families for deceased terrorists. The Americans had already enacted a similar law and was deducting a similar amount from the $300 million it currently gives to the West Bank Palestinians. Other foreign donors have taken similar measures.
Fatah complains that America, Israel, and other donors are being unfair. Yet it is no secret that many Palestinians become terrorists because they are attracted to the financial rewards, which are considerable for many impoverished Palestinians impoverished by Fatah corruption and incompetence. Palestinians who are jailed, injured, or killed while trying to kill Israelis receive large payments from Fatah. For example, families of dead terrorists get an immediate payment of $1,700 from Fatah plus monthly payments for the life of the immediate family. These monthly payments range from $400 to over $1,000, depending on the number of wives and children, and can make a family relatively affluent and open new opportunities, like enough cash to afford a smuggler who can get one or more family members to the West. Fatah also pays legal residents of Israel an $86 monthly bonus, and a similar bonus to residents of Jerusalem. Fatah currently pays about $200 million a year to the families.
Monthly payments to jailed Palestinians vary according to how long they have been in jail, how many dependents they have, and so on. There are also bonuses for how many Israelis the prisoner killed or injured. Some of these convicts get over $50,000 a year. Fatah currently spends nearly $200 million a year to reward over 6,000 jailed terrorists. Fatah considers this payment program a success even though hundreds of Palestinians have died in the Fatah-promoted violence. These attacks also left a growing number of Israelis dead, and for Fatah that is political gold as far as Arab language media is concerned.
With this approach, Fatah and Hamas together currently spend over $400 million a year to make murder economically attractive to many young Palestinians. Most of it comes from Fatah, although Hamas is trying to make more payments to Palestinians in the West Bank who support Hamas and attack Israelis in the name of Hamas. The Arab language media throughout the Middle East take for granted that these payments are just and necessary for the war against Israel.
In response to the current American and Israeli efforts to penalize Fatah for what is spent to encourage terror attacks, Fatah made it clear it would not halt payments to families for dead or jailed terrorists. Instead, it cut pay to Palestinians who worked for the West Bank government. But by refusing foreign aid money still being offered, Fatah caused shortages of food and other necessities in the West Bank. The ensuing Palestinian outrage and resulting damage were blamed on the efforts to halt pay-for-slay terrorism support.
Fatah is pleading with Russia and Arab oil states for help. Russia is broke and prefers to be on good terms with Israel. The Arab oil states are fed up with the Palestinian preference for self-destructive behavior. When the PA can't get the needed Pay for Slay cash from its usual sources, it records missed payments as debts it must eventually pay. Pay for Slay is an essential PA program because it brings in more Palestinian men willing to die for money. Families receiving the money honor their dead benefactors for a long time.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 13, 2026 - 03:08 pm: Edit

Logistics: Keeping the Malacca Strait Safe
October 8, 2026: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have agreed to do whatever it takes to keep the Strait of Malacca safe and available for international shipping. Currently, the Straits are safe to use, but it wasn’t always that way. Twelve years ago, the international effort to suppress Somali piracy halted and reversed the increased piracy off the coast of Somalia, but at the same time there was a major increase in attacks in the Straits of Malacca. Big as in a sevenfold increase from 2009 to 2013 (when there were 150 attacks). There was also a jump (to 50 attacks a year) off Nigeria. The big difference is that it was only off Somalia that ships and crews were taken and held for ransom for long periods. Everywhere else, the pirates were usually only interested in robbing the crew and stealing anything portable that they could get into their small boats. Off the Nigerian coast, pirates occasionally take some ship officers with them to hold for ransom. Another tactic is to turn off tracking devices and force the crew to move small tankers to remote locations, where most of the cargo (oil) can be transferred to another ship and later sold on the black market. But that sort of thing requires a lot of organization, nerve, and luck. So, most attacks are armed robbery. Given the amount of portable electronics on a seagoing ship (both company and personal), a half dozen armed pirates can get several thousand dollars per ship hit. Fences on shore pay cash for this stuff and quickly move it out of the country. In the last year there has been a minor resurgence of piracy off the Somali coast.
What worries shipping companies using the Malacca Strait isn't the theft; it’s the possibility of terrorists using pirates, or pirates causing an accident that blocks these vital straits. Piracy in the vital Strait of Malacca (where most of the world's oil exports pass through) has worsened and so has the risk of catastrophe.
For the pirates, there are lots of targets, with over 50,000 large ships moving through the Strait of Malacca each year. That’s 120-150 a day. Lots of targets. The 800-kilometer-long strait runs between Malaysia and Indonesia, is 65 kilometers wide at its narrowest, and is generally 27-37 meters deep. The strait's shallow, tricky waters force large ships to slow down (under 30 kilometers an hour) so speedboats can catch them. But if there’s a collision, especially one involving a loaded oil tanker, the oil spill could be huge, and a large ship sinking in the strait could block or throttle traffic for months.
There’s no easy solution to piracy in the Strait of Malacca. Pirates usually operate on the margins of society, trying to get a cut of the good life when options are limited. This is usually in areas where state control is weakest or absent, in failing and flailed states. A flailing state is something like Nigeria, Indonesia, or the Philippines, where the government manages to keep things together but faces serious problems in regions that are sometimes out of control. In a failed state, areas have little government, and pirates can do whatever they want most of the time. In the Strait of Malacca, the problem is that many poor (or not so poor but very ambitious) people have access to boats and experience using them at sea. Speeding next to a huge tanker or container ship at night in the Strait of Malacca and using a grappling hook or very tall ladder to get aboard is not for the faint of heart or anyone with no experience on the water. But as more of these attacks succeed, more people are tempted to try, and more are doing so.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 13, 2026 - 03:08 pm: Edit

Winning: War Against Black Sea Shipping
October 8, 2026: Two months ago, Ukraine won a significant victory in the Sea of Azov, an extension of the northeastern Black Sea. This began earlier when Russia assembled 38 tankers in the Sea of Azov near the damaged Kerch Strait bridge. Operating under international sanctions, the Russian shadow fleet tankers were attempting to deliver fuel to the remaining Russian bases on the Crimean Peninsula. Ukrainian drones attacked these ships, and by the end of July, about 40 of these ships had been sunk or so damaged as to be unfit for service. The Ukrainian drones continue searching for Russian freighters, ships, and tankers, and by the end of the year, Russian ships will no longer operate in the Sea of Azov. That means little Russian commercial shipping will be able to operate in the Black Sea.
In response, Russia has carried out drone strikes on commercial shipping heading for Ukrainian ports. All this violence against foreign cargo ships, Russian tankers, and others in the Black Sea has caused maritime insurance rates to increase by two percent. Those rates will climb higher if the attacks continue.
It was only two years ago that the Russian Black Sea Fleet was largely destroyed by Ukrainian airborne and naval drones, as well as land-based anti-ship missiles. About a third of Russian ships survived, and they took refuge 488 kilometers away in Black Sea ports on the east coast. The Black Sea Fleet remained there until Ukrainian drones came for all Russian shipping in the area. Other problems remained in repairing damaged ships.
Since the 1990s, Russia has pursued military modernization, recognizing the need to address rapidly aging equipment. In many cases, these purchases were essential because new equipment and weapons purchases stopped in the 1990s, with a few exceptions such as ballistic missiles. As a result, most armed forces still used Cold War-era weapons and equipment manufactured in the 1970s and 80s. Fortunately, even older 1950s- and 60s-era equipment was not discarded after the armed forces shrank by 80 percent in the 1990s. Since Russian defense industries were never world-class, the Russian military was usually stuck with Cold War-era equipment that was not competitive with the newer generations of weapons and accessories that Western forces were receiving.
By the end of the 1990s, it was believed that at least a third of the Cold War-era equipment would be replaced. In some categories, especially those requiring new technology, over 80 percent of the older equipment needed replacements. The government told the military about these plans, and when they didn’t deliver, morale suffered. This happened quickly in the Navy because officers and sailors had been told that money would be available to maintain more ships, allowing them to spend more time at sea. It turned out that existing ships couldn’t handle heavy use and workload because corruption crippled repair efforts. That meant they needed either more new ships or expensive and extensive refurbishments of existing warships. After the 1990s, the air force resumed long-range air patrols over areas off the Russian coast, which had not seen Russian Navy or Air Force activity since the 1980s. From 1991 until recently, Russian warships spent most of their time tied up at dock, meaning an entire generation of sailors lacked at-sea experience.
The big problem so far is that the new equipment we have received is unimpressive. The troops can go online to find videos and technical specifications for many contemporary Western ships and equipment. The Russian equivalents rarely look good in comparison. But at least they aren’t stuck with aging Cold War-era equipment that rarely works.
The Russian armed forces have already come to grips with the fact that they will never return to the glory days of the Soviet Union, which dissolved in 1991. The army was called the Red Army back then, and the mighty Soviet naval force was known as the Red Fleet. During the Cold War, the armed forces had five times as many troops, over five million of them. Before 1991, the military received 10-20 percent of the national GDP, estimated at about $2 trillion. No one knows the exact amount, as the communists were not big fans of accountants or accurate financial reporting. Today, Russia tries to follow Western European rules on military spending, with no more than 3-4 percent of GDP going to the military. With a $2.7 trillion economy that continues to grow, generals and admirals can expect much more cash. But most of this money went to replace Cold War-era weapons, which were considered outdated and of limited usefulness in the 21st century. At that point, the war in Ukraine and the widespread use of air, land, and naval drones emerged to change everything.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 13, 2026 - 03:10 pm: Edit

Israel: Ukraine Learns from Israel
October 7, 2026: Ukraine’s success against Russian tanks and armored vehicles again revived predictions that tanks are obsolete. Tanks are still relevant, but Russia's losses stemmed from poor deployment of armored units and design differences that make Russian tanks far more vulnerable than Western tanks like the American M1, German Leopard, and Israeli Merkava. Most Russian armored vehicles were lost without adequate infantry support. The first Russian armored units going into Ukraine were told the population would be friendly or neutral. The reality was that the Ukrainians were well armed, hostile, and using tactics the Russians were unaware of and unprepared to deal with. Thousands of Russian vehicles were destroyed in the first month, most of them armored, including some of the most modern Russian tanks plus a few that may have been taken from museums.
Ukrainian tanks have effective protection against missiles and RPG armor-piercing rockets. Trophy is considered the most useful and combat-proven Armored Protection System (APS). So far, over 3,000 systems have been installed or are on order for Israeli Merkava, American M1, and Leopard 2 tanks, as well as other Israeli and American armored vehicles. For example, in mid-2020 American M1 tanks arrived in Europe equipped with Trophy APS. The Israeli manufacturer began delivering 261 M1 APS kits in late 2019. These equip all the M1 tanks in four combat brigades. A few Trophy-equipped M1s are also available for testing and training.
The United States was late in adopting APS, mainly because few American-operated M1 tanks seemed to need it and the Army procurement budget was shrinking. By 2012, APS was seen as a necessity. In 2018, the Army finally got the money to upgrade M1 tanks with Trophy. This came after the Army tested Trophy on the M1. At the same time, 62 Abrams Reactive Armor Tiles/ARAT were installed to cover the running gear and tracks, adding protection against RPGs, which are often fired at this area to cripple tank mobility. The ARAT tiles add another two tons, plus about a ton for Trophy.
Trophy has been around since 2009 and has spent much of that time exposed to ATGMs and RPGs. Between testing and combat, Trophy has been fired over 6,000 times and has successfully defeated every attack. Trophy has accumulated over a million operating hours so far, and no vehicle equipped with Trophy has had a crew member injured. Like earlier active defense systems such as the naval Phalanx, you cannot leave the system on if there is no threat. That wears out the electronics, and there is always a small risk the system could be accidentally triggered by something other than a threat.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 13, 2026 - 03:10 pm: Edit

Russia: The Youngsters Protest
October 7, 2026: As a result of personnel, fiscal, and emotional losses during the war in Ukraine, the Russian government has been struggling to deal with angry civilians. The government is blacklisting writers, movie producers, and entertainers who fled the country because of the failed invasion of Ukraine. Putin is particularly angry because of a new film, Minotaur. This film depicts the deceptive methods local officials used to get young men into the army and then into Ukraine, where half of them have been killed, wounded, deserted, or simply gone missing. The film won awards in the West, including the Grand Prix and the Cannes Soundtrack Award, and was popular among Russians who could see it. The same thing happened with the 2025 film, “Mr. Nobody Against Putin”. The film showed how a rural school was transformed into an army recruitment center by training children and having some of them build drones. The film sent a message to Russian parents that Vladimir Putin did not appreciate.
Putin has supported filmmakers who create works that justify the war. There have been few takers. He can order such videos, but he can’t always get the results he wants. Rather than risk more anti-war protests by jailing filmmakers, he uses his uneasy control over social media and the internet to generate support using bots and foreign operatives to create favorable messages. This is quickly seen as astroturfing and ignored. Putin has also shut down internet access in parts of the country where opposition is most active. These shutdowns cannot last too long because the Russian economy cannot operate without internet access.
Before 2022, Russia had a small but vibrant independent media. Once Ukraine was invaded, that media fled rather than face shutdowns or assassination. Many of these Russian journalists established an online presence from exile. From there, they provided honest news in Russian and Ukrainian. The Ukrainian media did the same thing, and Russian families often found out what had happened to their missing sons by consulting Ukrainian internet sites that maintained photos of dead Russian troops and whatever information they had about them. Many videos were also posted. The age of cellphones makes it impossible to hide what is going on anywhere.
With the war now in its fifth year, most Russians are trying to ignore it. The war has crippled the Russian economy, and there is growing unemployment. The forcible kidnapping of young men for the army still produces the occasional fistfight between the kidnappers and angry Russian civilians. But the kidnappers are armed, and a few shots into the air halt the fight and scatter the protesters.
The growing war fatigue has left exiled Russian journalists with an audience that wants news about anything but the war. When a Ukrainian drone hits their town or neighborhood, locals turn to social media for news and explanations. Most Russians oppose the seemingly endless Ukraine war. Then the government decided to ban the only political party that urged Russians to vote against the war and those who supported it. This sparked a sharp increase in interest in the peace party on social media.
Russia’s Supreme Court decision to remove the only registered party openly campaigning for peace, Yabloko, from the ballot for September’s State Duma election has revived the question of how many Russians oppose the Kremlin’s war and how much space remains to express that opposition. Some young Russians posted videos, including a famous actor, Alexei Yarmushchik, who posted a video online talking to Vladimir Putin and saying that he did not want Putin as President and did not believe that Crimea belonged to Russia. Yarmushchik feared retaliation, but there was none, just suggestions that he keep quiet for a while before continuing the criticism. James F Dunnigan
FYEO

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Wednesday, October 14, 2026 - 10:48 am: Edit

Yesterday, a group of 12 senators sent Pres. Trump a letter telling him that he must cancel the diesel deal he made with Russia. The signatories include six Democrats (Sen. Blumenthal, CT; Sen. Shaheen, NH; Sen. Durbin, IL; Sen. Whitehouse and Sen. Reed, both RI; and Sen. Coons, DE) and six Republicans (Sen. Tillis, NC; Sen. Collins, ME; Sen. Armstrong, OK; Sen. Murkowski, AK; Sen. McConnell, KY; and Sen. Cornyn, TX). The letter cites the the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, signed into law by Pres. Trump last month.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, October 14, 2026 - 03:08 pm: Edit

I should note that Jessica and I jointly and spiritually signed that letter.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, October 14, 2026 - 03:31 pm: Edit

Russia: The Many Tribes
October 14, 2026: As of January 2025, the Russian Federation had a total population of 146 million. Ethnic Russians accounted for 71.73%, while other ethnicities accounted for Tatars (3.20%). Chechens (1.14%), Bashkirs (1.07%), Chuvash (0.73%), Avars (0.69%), Armenians (0.64%), Ukrainians (0.60%), Dargins (0.43%), Kazakhs (0.40%), Kumyks (0.38%), Kabardians (0.36%), Ingush (0.35%), Lezgins (0.33%), Others (6.65%), Undeclared (11.27%). The Undeclared are those who are trying to mix with the ethnic Slavs because many of the Undeclared have intermarried with Slavs, and their children and grandchildren look like Slavs.
But there is another problem, as Russian leader Vladimir Putin believes it was a mistake to break up the Soviet Union in 1991, and many Russians agree with him. The fourteen new nations created or revived when the Soviet Union was dissolved believe otherwise. Opinion surveys and migration patterns indicate mixed attitudes toward the old Russian Empire. The big problem is that half the people in the old empire were not Slavs, although ethnic Russians were the majority among the Slavic half. Despite centuries of living in the same country, whether Tsarist Russia or the Soviet Union, these ethnic groups never developed much affection or tolerance for one another. Most ethnic Russians living in non-Slavic parts of the Empire, especially Central Asia and the Caucasus, returned to Russia after 1991.
Most of those who stayed in non-Russian areas did so for economic reasons. That was also why non-Russians stayed in Russia, because what is now Russia has always had the most economic opportunities. A wealthier, better-educated population was a major reason Russia conquered those other countries. But after 1991, those who never got used to the conquest left and do not want the conquerors back.
There’s also the racism factor. For example, about 40 percent of ethnic Russians thought other Slavs like Ukrainians or Belarusians could become Russians if they lived in Russia for a few years and switched their loyalty to Russia. But fewer than ten percent thought people from the Caucasus or Central Asia could do that. This xenophobia, or fear of outsiders, is nothing new for Russia. For 70 years, the communists sought to eliminate this trait but only managed to suppress it and delude themselves into thinking it was gone. This pattern is common in communist countries and throughout Eastern Europe.
Xenophobia returned in the 1990s because of the collapse of the communist governments in 1989. It was worst in the Balkans, where civil war erupted as the communist police states collapsed and optimists hoped for a democratic Yugoslavia. While that had long been a cherished goal in the region, it was not to be. Several years of vicious fighting between Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Albanians followed and was not halted until 1999. The Caucasus also erupted, and unlike Yugoslavia, NATO had no peacekeeping force to stabilize it. In the Caucasus, the usual Russian mix of carrots/bribes and sticks/violent suppression also failed. Eventually, in 1999, Russia had to reconquer parts of the Caucasus, especially Chechnya, to restore order.
Meanwhile, the Caucasus underwent a major ethnic shift. Russians and other people not native to the Caucasus were driven out of the region by terrorism, corruption, and a bad attitude towards outsiders. It was worst in Chechnya, where Russians made up 25 percent of the population in 1989 but only 2 percent in the 1990s. The decline was less severe in the rest of the Caucasus, but it was still massive, with more than half of the Russians living in the Caucasus having left by 2011. This trend began in the 1950s, right after tyrant Josef Stalin died in 1953, and Russia began to trim the power of the secret police. The departure of ethnic Russians from the Caucasus simply accelerated after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. In Central Asia, about half of the nearly ten million ethnic Russians living there in 1991 left.
The 2014 Russian operation to take the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine had a bracing effect on the other countries that, until 1991, were part of the ancient Russian Empire. The Crimean operation was the second such land grab Russia had undertaken since 2008. The first was against tiny Georgia. Many of these former Russian subjects feel that the Russians are trying to get their empire back. Ask many Russians that question and most agree that it would be a nice thing. Some Russians are more outspoken and bluntly call for the empire to be reassembled no matter what. Russian President Putin is one of those.
In response, the forlorn fourteen nations that were part of the Soviet Union until 1991, as well as many East European states that were subject to Russian control from the end of World War II to 1989, grew very nervous. Poland was particularly agitated because large parts of it had been part of the Russian Empire for most of the 18th and 19th centuries. Finland faced the same situation: it broke away after World War I, fought off a Russian invasion in 1940, and has faced many threats since then to stay independent. That makes the forlorn fourteen the scared sixteen. All these nations have noted what happened to Georgia and Ukraine with great trepidation and are responding in expected and unexpected ways.
The fourteen former Russian imperial possessions that regained independence are the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; Belarus; Moldova; Ukraine; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Georgia; and the five Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland escaped the empire after World War I, but only Finland remained free through World War II. The Baltic States were retaken during World War II, and Poland remained nominally independent but was occupied by Russian troops and took orders from Russia until 1989.
Poland and the Baltic States joined NATO after the Cold War ended and hope the alliance's mutual defense commitments will deter Russia. Nevertheless, all four, plus Finland, have increased their military readiness this year and are seeking assurances from the West that they will have help against Russia. Many Finns have called for Finland to join NATO, but a large minority has opposed it because they fear it would anger the Russians. That changed after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Russia justified the invasion because Ukraine, like most Finns, believed that NATO membership was preferable to trusting Russia to always behave. Even Sweden, never part of the Russian Empire and successfully neutral since the early 19th century, joined NATO for protection from an increasingly aggressive Russia.
The Stans of Central Asia have another option: China. The Stans have been very receptive to Chinese diplomatic and economic cooperation. This bothers Russia, but not enough to threaten its former imperial provinces to the west. The Stans also have a problem with never having been democracies. When the Russians conquered them in the 19th century, the local governments were monarchies or tribes. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, former Soviet officials held elections and manipulated the vote to get themselves elected president for life. But many people in the Stans want clean government and democracy, as well as continued independence from Russia. China is no help with that because the Chinese prefer dictators.
In the Caucasus, Georgia still seeks closer ties with the West. Armenia, because of disputes with Azerbaijan and long-term fear of Turkey, remains a close Russian ally. Azerbaijan maintains good relations with Russia mainly because Iran claims Azerbaijan was a lost province stolen by Russia in the 19th century.
Russia was quite open about wanting to rebuild the old Tsarist Empire that the communists lost in 1991 when the Soviet Union came apart, and half the population of that empire went off and formed 14 new countries. Russia proposed things like customs unions, military cooperation, and rebuilding the old Soviet air defense system that used to defend everyone in the empire. There’s been some progress, but most of the 14 nations want nothing to do with Russia.
Meanwhile, Russia must face the fact that when the Soviet Union broke up, half the population enthusiastically moved to the 14 new countries, and most of them were quite pleased with the Soviet Union's demise. Thus, if you asked all citizens of the former Soviet Union what they thought of the breakup, you would find that most had no regrets. That’s because the Soviet Union was basically the Russian Empire cobbled together by the old czarist monarchy over more than two centuries of conquest and expansion.
In the Soviet Union, more than half the population felt like conquered people, not part of any union. The Soviet Union dissolved quickly in 1990-91 because over half the population really wanted it to happen and had wanted it for a long time. Moreover, many ethnic Russians were tired of supporting a lot of the less affluent conquered people and were fed up with the economic failures of communism. Former Soviet Union citizens who regret the breakup tend to be older and disillusioned with how corruption and bad leadership made post-Soviet life less wonderful than expected.
Younger people are more realistic, having never lived as adults in the Soviet Union and being intimately familiar with the fact that freedom isn’t free and democracy is difficult. Younger Russians have more economic opportunities than under communism. While Russia lost half its population when the Soviet Union broke up, it kept most of its valuable natural resources, like oil and natural gas. The post-Soviet government was initially reluctant to increase state-supplied pensions, which were low during the Soviet period because there was little to spend on them and the state supplied housing and some health care; pensions did eventually increase. But not as much as the economy grew, and the working Russians were obviously doing better than the pensioners who had grown up under communism. In Soviet times, that meant little economic opportunity, and most everyone was equally poor. The old-timers never got used to the post-1991 changes, and most would prefer the communists to come back. That may continue for decades, despite the Russian defeats and losses in Ukraine.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, October 14, 2026 - 03:32 pm: Edit

Today is Defenders Day in Ukraine

By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Thursday, October 15, 2026 - 04:35 am: Edit

"A US military official, ‌speaking on condition of anonymity, confirmed that Tehran had changed tactics in one significant way. After the US destroyed much of Iran’s radar capabilities, the IRGC had started using unarmed spotters in small boats to ‌identify potential targets, including American naval vessels, the official said.

Last week, in a previously unreported incident, the US military determined that Iranian spotters were operating from a dhow, calling in targets to the IRGC, the official said. US forces confronted the vessel, told its occupants to abandon ship and then destroyed it. There were no casualties, the US official said." -The Guardian

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, October 15, 2026 - 02:00 pm: Edit

Procurement: Post-War Ukrainian Defense Industries
October 15, 2026: Since early 2022, NATO countries have provided Ukraine with several hundred billion dollars’ worth of weapons and military supplies. While the Ukrainians appreciate this, their most significant battlefield successes have come from weapons developed by Ukrainian individuals, small groups, and the small companies that these entrepreneurial efforts create. Also forgotten is that Ukraine was the Soviet Union's Silicon Valley. Most Soviet innovations and new designs for weapons and military equipment came from there. Ukraine was also the area where huge quantities of weapons and equipment were concentrated to support the second wave of Soviet forces invading Western Europe. The invasion never came, but Ukraine kept all that equipment after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Ukraine immediately began selling off weapons and equipment and also offered to modify weapons for a fee to suit buyers' needs.
After the Russians invaded in 2022, Ukraine produced weapons for its own forces and continued to develop new weapons, like drones. Drones radically changed how wars are fought. These included not only aerial drones but also naval and ground drones. Now the ground drones are armed and fighting and killing Russian soldiers who perish without ever seeing a Ukrainian soldier. The Ukrainians are involved, but they are ten or twenty kilometers away in a bunker where they look at their targets on flat screens or via head-mounted viewing devices. All this has reduced Ukrainian casualties to the point that for every eight or nine Russian casualties there is only one Ukrainian injured.
Naturally, armies around the world want this new technology, and Ukraine is willing to sell it or co-produce it abroad under licensing agreements. Rebuilding Ukraine will cost trillions of dollars, and selling its new technology to NATO allies and other nations will help pay for the reconstruction.
Defense firms in NATO nations struggle to understand how this works. Traditional defense production relies on orders for batches of expensive weapons. Larger weapons can take from weeks to years to build. Smaller weapons and munitions can be produced quickly, but only from a few factories. In wartime, it can take a few months or more than a year to establish new arms plants and begin production. No NATO nations are at war and producing in wartime mode, but Ukraine is. As for the use of all the NATO military aid, Ukraine has been winning its war largely with Ukrainian-made weapons. In response, Ukraine has built whatever it needs, quickly, driven by necessity and the will to survive. It has filled gaps where traditional weapons were unavailable or inadequate. Ukrainian-designed and manufactured drones have become essential.
Ukraine’s innovation was crucial to defeating Russia's efforts to seize more territory. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian defense industry is moving toward production on a scale that would have seemed impossible a few years ago. Rapidly expanding drone production is less a fixed system than an evolving one: initially primarily defensive, but steadily expanding across air, sea, and now ground combat zones.
What began as improvisation is increasingly hardening into a durable, technological defense system, as the country seeks to become an indigestible steel porcupine for its rapacious neighbor. Since the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s defense-industrial base has grown at an unprecedented pace, with annual production capacity increasing five times to $50 billion.
Chinese Mavic drones, for example, became emblematic of the war not because they were built for combat, but because Ukrainians adapted them to drop grenades when no better option existed. That was followed by Ukraine’s repeated examples of how quickly assembled, continuously adapted drones fielded at scale can have a major impact on the battlefield. For defenders, it’s been a race to build effective, low-cost systems that can be mass-produced quickly. Ukraine was soon assembling its own drones and eventually building drone components as well.
This is underlined by the 2025 and 2026 American-Israeli wars with Iran, which offer reminders that expensive and procurement-heavy systems do not guarantee a quick victory; see, for example, the reported destruction of 16 Reaper drones over Iran, each costing up to $30 million. Meanwhile, an opponent equipped with cheap drones can still impose disproportionate costs and disrupt forces in ways that traditional procurement models struggle to match. Russia was also slow to absorb some of the lessons. But bogged down in trench warfare in eastern Ukraine's Donbas, it was eventually forced to adapt, increasing its own drone capability with the help of partners such as China and Iran.
Ukrainian drones are not a revolution in physics or materials; rather, they are a revolution in application, scaling, and adaptability. They systematically changed the balance on the battlefield. Now Ukraine’s drone wall is expanding. Mid-range strike drones have wreaked havoc on Russian air defenses, aided by the increasing use of Starlink connectivity over occupied territories.
Ukraine’s drone production has resulted in the use of drones that can strike several thousand kilometers into Russia against major cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg, as well as oil production, export facilities, and factories supporting the arms industry. Russia is poised to cut oil output by a fifth following Ukrainian drone strikes on port facilities; tankers are meanwhile backed up in the Baltic Sea as they cannot fill up at damaged docks.
The most strategically significant development of this war is Ukraine’s ability to strike Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure across vast distances. Ukraine can now reach from the Arctic submarine bases to southern energy infrastructure. Russia cannot defend everything.
Ukraine is also pouring millions of dollars into missile development to match the success of its drones. Ukraine’s defense minister said the government is acting like a venture capital investor by giving large grants to local companies. Ukraine has now developed and built drones that can hit targets from 500 kilometers to several thousand kilometers inside Russia.
At sea, Ukrainian naval drones have effectively forced Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to retreat to Novorossiysk, more than a thousand kilometers from the Crimean Peninsula. Ukraine is using the drones to attack shadow-fleet oil tankers, including those operating near the Turkish Straits. Ukraine is adapting drone vessels to carry interceptor drones, extending its defensive reach across the Black Sea.
Units using ground combat drones initially reduced frontline infantry requirements by up to 30 percent and may reach 80 percent in the future. Recently, one machine-gun-equipped ground robot reportedly held a position for 45 days. In another situation, several machine-gun-armed drone vehicles were dropped into a Russian rear area by a cargo-carrying drone aircraft. The combat drones proceeded to open fire on Russian troops in the area. When the drones' ammunition was gone, they moved towards buildings used by the Russian forces and detonated. What was especially frightening to the Russians was that all this carnage was created by Ukrainian drones. The Russians suffered hundreds of casualties, versus none for the Ukrainians. Now Ukrainian engineers are working on ways to integrate land drones into the fortification network. While Russia has continued to pound Ukrainian cities with drones and missiles, Ukraine has developed low-cost interceptor systems that are attracting worldwide interest, including in the Middle East.
With young, technology-focused defense officials, many key elements are beginning to align. Across the battlefield, drones and other emerging systems are helping fill critical gaps, and Ukraine will continue using that unequal advantage to deny Russia the chance to achieve its goals.

FYEO

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Thursday, October 15, 2026 - 04:17 pm: Edit

In other news, the Navy Channel (a you tube channel) posted a story about the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy on October 13, 2026 landed two F-35C attack fighters.

It (according to the story) was the first time F-35A fighters had landed on a Ford Class Carrier.

F-35 fighters have been operating off of Nimitz Class Carriers for several years, but apparently have not been used on the U.S.S. Ford.

By MarkSHoyle (Bolo) on Thursday, October 15, 2026 - 07:05 pm: Edit

Is there a line missing...

Jumps from F-35C to F-35A

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Thursday, October 15, 2026 - 07:40 pm: Edit

Sorry, they were all F-35C.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Friday, October 16, 2026 - 10:07 pm: Edit

Pres. Trump signed an executive order today that waives elements of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, informing Congress (via the executive order) that the waiver "is in the national interests of the United States". Specifically waived per the executive order are the following:

Sec. 102. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons affiliated with or supporting the Government of the Russian Federation.
Sec. 103. Imposition of sanctions with respect to financial institutions affiliated with the Government of the Russian Federation.
Sec. 104. Imposition of sanctions with respect to other entities owned or controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation.
Sec. 105. Prohibition on transfers of funds involving the Russian Federation.
Sec. 106. Prohibition on listing or trading of Russian entities on United States securities exchanges.
Sec. 107. Prohibition on investment by United States persons in the Russian Federation.
Sec. 108. Prohibition on energy exports to, and investment in energy sector of, the Russian Federation.
Sec. 109. Prohibition on purchase of sovereign debt of the Russian Federation by United States persons.
Sec. 110. Prohibition on provision of services to sanctioned financial institutions by international financial messaging systems.
Sec. 111. Prohibition on importing, and sanctions with respect to, uranium from the Russian Federation.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Friday, October 16, 2026 - 10:14 pm: Edit

And now, my personal opinion on the above:

Putin must be dancing a jig (or, being Russian, a prisiadki) right about now. This lets Russia off the entire hook. To say I am unamused is an understatement.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Friday, October 16, 2026 - 11:12 pm: Edit

I am not unamused, I am horrified.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Saturday, October 17, 2026 - 08:47 am: Edit

The waived sanctions appear to be directed at recent legislation under the Linsey Graham Act.

Previous sanctions remain in place.

The intent of President Trumps executive order appears to be political. It addresses diesel Fuel, and it seems the motive is an attempt to reduce domestic fuel prices ahead of the midterm elections coming in November.

Same thing with the reduction of restrictions on Russian Shadow tanker fleet.

Again, the intent appears to be to reduce fuel prices before voters go to the polls in November.

I am not happy about this, but it seems like a cynical ploy to appease people.