"Putin will call up 500,000 draftees" I would say TRY TO CLL UP...

TED, i WOULD SAY YOU ARE CORRECT, until there is breakthrough and mobile warfare results in deep penetration. Probably all the way to Mariupol or Melitipol. Them the western & Crimean portions should fall.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Tuesday, October 20, 2026 - 12:20 pm: Edit

As a note: this would not constitute a formal change of alliances, inasmuch as that can only happen between the Fall and Spring turns per (652.12); such an announcement would have to wait for January (and in theory after the Russian make any such announcements, given the Order of Precedence).

[Yes, I'm desperately trying for some humor here, because... yeah.]

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Tuesday, October 20, 2026 - 01:05 pm: Edit

According to the New York Times, as of the middle of October 2026, Russian Casualties exceeded 1.4 million (of which 450,000+ were killed in action. No break down on the numbers of wounded & treated then returned to combat, or wounded and evacuated. It is possible some soldiers have been wounded more than once, so possible the number of wounded includes some duplicates.)

Russia is still experiencing more casualties than the Ukrainian forces

I expect that there will be a breaking point eventually, no telling how soon that will be.

By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Tuesday, October 20, 2026 - 03:48 pm: Edit

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Tuesday, October 20, 2026 - 04:27 pm: Edit

Ooh!

A blatant call to provoke discussion on Politics!

Better look behind yourself… the twin ‘A’ reptiles are making a beeline for you. Best guess is they are planning to each take an ankle and whichever of them gets more than half of you, wins.

By MarkSHoyle (Bolo) on Tuesday, October 20, 2026 - 06:45 pm: Edit

Ran across a reel this morning, don't know what their point was (something about maps)...

It pointed out the small country of Bangladesh has a larger population than Russia...
Didn't go far enough into it, to see when that happened...

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Tuesday, October 20, 2026 - 07:49 pm: Edit

Ayup. 179 million in Bangladesh, to 143 million (and dropping) in Russia. Bangladesh passed Russia back in 2010.

By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Tuesday, October 20, 2026 - 10:13 pm: Edit

"Ukrainian soldiers have become the first in the world to evacuate a wounded fighter from the front line using an aerial drone. This was reported by the 92nd Assault Brigade. They deployed a heavy hexacopter manufactured by Ukraine's Gurzuf Defence." - Wartranslated.bsky.social on Bluesky


The real video is on Telegram but i found it on YouTube too;

https://youtu.be/OlRbGLoxDxk?is=k2GnFg8RHoI61by_

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, October 20, 2026 - 10:56 pm: Edit

Go Ukraine, Go!

Boring Ukrainians interrupted Putin's speech and then droned on and on.

By MarkSHoyle (Bolo) on Wednesday, October 21, 2026 - 08:41 am: Edit

Decades ago, the U.S. developed a wheeled vehicle to evacuate wounded from the battlefield, not sure if they ever got the autonomous issue worked out....
Lots of good things come off the drawing board, few make it to operational status...

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, October 21, 2026 - 02:41 pm: Edit

Warplanes: The Israeli F-35 Upgrade
October 20, 2026: Israeli use of imported American weapons has usually included Israeli improvements that the U.S. forces later implement. A recent example is what the Israelis have done to their F-35s. Because of these Israeli changes, they end up with the F-35I, which includes numerous modifications.
First, the Israeli app stack enables quick, continuous software modifications and upgrades, especially to the Threat Library, a continually updated database of threats and enemy capabilities. Custom threat libraries include the latest capabilities of Russian and Iranian air defense systems. This is a feature made possible by F-35Is’ access to Israeli intelligence.
For example, Israel developed its own family of Spice guided glide bombs as well as new drop tanks that enable strikes deep inside Iran without compromising stealth capabilities.
Israel has also developed underwing pylons to carry additional weapons, even those that diminish stealth, and can mount four external missiles on underwing pylons when stealth is not required. The F-35I fire control software was modified to accommodate Israeli weapons, including Python 5 and Derby air to air missiles. By the end of this year, Israel will have fifty F-35Is in three squadrons. More F-35s are arriving by the end of the decade.
The F-35 is a 31-ton single-engine, single-seat aircraft that entered service in different versions between 2015 and 2019. The first F-35s were built in 2006 for development purposes. The aircraft has stealth characteristics and is equipped with the most modern avionics (aircraft electronics), sensors, and capabilities. The F-35 has a maximum range of 2,800 kilometers for repositioning missions to another country. For destinations more than 2,500 kilometers away, the F-35 must refuel along the way. Combat range for ground-attack missions is 1,200 kilometers while carrying eight tons of missiles and bombs. Its combat range against other aircraft is 1,400 kilometers. The F-35 can carry 2,600 kg of weapons internally and 6,800 kg externally. Its max speed is Mach 1.6, and its max altitude is 15,000 meters. The F-35B is a STOVL (short takeoff and landing) version that carries a third less fuel because of the STOVL modifications. The F-35C carrier version is like the F-35A but has a tail hook and more rugged landing gear. The wings have larger control surfaces, and the outer wing sections can fold so the aircraft takes up less space on the hangar deck.
Missiles and bombs that the F-35 is equipped to carry include air-to-air missiles like the AIM-9X Sidewinder, AIM-120 AMRAAM, AIM-132 ASRAAM, AIM-260 JATM, and MBDA Meteor. Air-to-surface missiles include AGM-88G AARGM-ER, AGM-158 JASSM, AGM-179 JAGM, SPEAR 3, and the hypervelocity Stand-In Attack Weapon. Anti-ship missiles include the AGM-158C LRASM and Joint Strike Missile. Bombs include the Joint Direct Attack Munition, Paveway Precision-guided glide bomb, AGM-154 JSOW, GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb, GBU-53/B Stormbreaker, and the B61 Mod 12 nuclear bomb.
Pilots benefit from several features that make their job easier and much more effective. The cockpit features a bubble canopy that provides excellent views of the outside. Cockpit controls have been reduced and made easier to see and use. This is done by using a 50 by 20 cm (20 by 8 inch) touch display that shows flight instruments, stores management, CNI information, and integrated cautions and warnings. Pilots can customize the information layout. Below the main display is a smaller stand-by display. Pilots also have a helmet-mounted visor, a display that lets them look at an enemy aircraft and fire a missile at it. This point-and-shoot capability is an enormous advantage in air-to-air combat. The F-35 electronics also provide a better view of ground targets and the ability to quickly select and use the most suitable carried ground-attack weapon.
The cockpit has a speech-recognition system but no heads-up display. Instead, a helmet-mounted display system projects flight and combat information onto the pilot's visor. The one-piece tinted canopy is hinged at the front and has an internal frame for structural strength. The Martin-Baker ejection seat launches via a twin-catapult system housed in side rails. It has a right-hand side stick and a hands-on throttle-and-stick system. For life support, it has an OBOGS (onboard oxygen-generation system) powered by the Integrated Power Package, plus an auxiliary oxygen bottle and backup oxygen system for emergencies.
The radars and electronic countermeasures provide the pilot with an integrated view of the surrounding airspace. This situational awareness gives the pilot an enormous advantage in combat because the F-35 pilot can see, either with his eyes or through his sensors, more about what is in the area, and in much greater detail, than any enemy pilot.
Currently, 1,300 F-35s are in service, with a third of these used by American allies. Eventually, by 2044, at least 2,500 will be available. Production numbers will increase as more export customers order aircraft. So far, Britain, Australia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway, and the Netherlands have ordered F-35s. Israel was the first export customer to receive F-35s because it was the only export customer that was regularly involved in combat, including air strikes. Israel was also the only export customer allowed to modify and upgrade their F-35s. For this reason, the Israeli aircraft is known as the F-35I. The United States initially opposed Israeli requests to make modifications and upgrades, but Israel had a record of doing this with F-16s and F-15s obtained from the United States, so F-35 manufacturer Lockheed Martin agreed to cooperate by making some modifications to the F-35Is before Israel received them. These changes included command, control, and communications systems, including computers, and the full integration of intelligence collection, electronic warfare, and weapons systems. Israel agreed not to change anything inside the aircraft but could add capabilities on top of the existing infrastructure. Israel Aerospace Industries, for example, was already working on such systems for the F-35I. The F-35I was designed to allow software updates to electronic warfare and weapons systems. F-35I power and cooling systems were modified to incorporate Israeli-developed weapons. Israel has developed its own air-to-air missiles and GPS-guided bombs.
Since 2021, Israel has conducted many more joint exercises with foreign F-35s. Details of these exercises have not been publicized, but it apparently involves testing current and new F-35 capabilities and sharing that knowledge with other F-35 users. After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, a lot of European nations sought to obtain F-35s while canceling plans to buy older models of American and European combat aircraft. F-35s are meant to eventually replace all F-16, F-15, and F-18 aircraft.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, October 21, 2026 - 02:41 pm: Edit

Air Weapons: Drone Jungle Warfare in Ukraine
October 20, 2026: Despite their success in Ukraine, many believed drones would be far less effective in other environments, such as jungles or high altitudes where the air is thinner. Those using drones in these environments found ways to overcome the challenges of dense vegetation and tree canopies. In such combat zones, like Myanmar (Burma) and several sub–Saharan African nations, drone users adapted to the obstacles and reduced range of operator-controlled drones because of all the vegetation. In high-altitude environments, like Afghanistan and the Himalayan border between India and China, various equipment and operational changes were made to maintain usable surveillance and attack drones. The American Army and Marines have been using drones in jungle environments in the Philippines and South America. China and India have been using drones along their mountainous border, as have India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Experiments with Ukrainian-designed ground transport drones show they can still operate in jungles and at high altitudes. The operators have more work to do to make that happen.

Meanwhile, Ukraine has been using more ground combat and transport drones to reduce Ukrainian casualties and scare Russian troops who find themselves fighting armed amphibious drones. That last event happened recently when Ukrainian forces sought to retrieve a wounded comrade from an area still under fire by Russian troops and drones. The Ukrainians landed the combat drone from a naval drone to clear the area of Russian soldiers. Then a transport drone came in to take the wounded soldier back to safety and eventually to a military aid station. The supply drone was built to accommodate supplies or a soldier, wounded or otherwise. On the way back, the transportation drone was attacked by a Russian FPV drone, which detonated near the transport drone but did not disable the transport or further injure the wounded soldier it was carrying.
Ground combat drones can carry a variety of weapons, but most have a 7.62mm machine gun with several hundred rounds of ammunition. A remote operator controls the weapon and the drone, wearing goggles or looking at a flat-screen display and operating a controller based on, or even a version of, a popular game controller.

Only about five percent of ground drone missions involve combat; the rest are for supplying the troops or retrieving wounded soldiers. Only about two percent of Ukrainian ground drone operations involve the armed drone using its machine gun.
The growing use of these ground drones has reduced Ukrainian combat losses and improved morale among Ukrainian soldiers. These drones assure troops that no matter how deep into the combat zone they are, the drones will get them out if wounded. These drones have already shown that they can travel more than ten kilometers to retrieve a casualty or supply a remote outpost under constant fire.
In one case, a soldier was stuck near Russian positions for 33 days. The rescue attempt destroyed six drones. The seventh drone made it and completed a 64-kilometer trip to bring the soldier back. Before drones, a soldier in that position would have to be abandoned because too many more soldiers would be killed or wounded trying to carry out a rescue.

This extensive use of ground drones to supply, transport, and retrieve wounded soldiers is demoralizing to Russian troops. Russia has not implemented such a drone resupply and casualty evacuation system because Russia never took good care of its wounded, and often simply leaves wounded men behind, or even kills such soldiers who are in a lot of pain. Ukraine believes this use of ground drones has reduced its casualty rate by 30 percent. That means that there are more than eight Russian casualties for each Ukrainian one.
Currently, nearly 90 percent of the personnel losses are due to drones, which are everywhere in the combat zone, with Ukrainian drones outnumbering what the Russians can get into the air. On one day last July, Ukraine recorded and reported all its drone activity. There were 311 Russian personnel killed or wounded. Drones detected and attacked nearly 1,600 enemy targets. In addition, drones pursued about 4,500 Russian personnel as well as over 21,000 other targets. On the water, in ports, or on rivers, Russian forces hit 15 vessels. Other land targets destroyed included drone launch sites, 9 guns and howitzers, 337 shelters, 130 dugouts, 46 small drones, 8 land combat drones, 18 electronic warfare systems, 3 radar systems, and 98 crew antennas.

Ukrainian innovation and support for entrepreneurship have repeatedly overwhelmed Russian forces. The response was slow at first but soon had an enormous impact. Perplexed by Ukrainian tactics, the Russians persisted, thereby keeping the war going.
Drones were an unexpected development that dramatically changed how battles were fought. Drones were successful because they were cheap, easily modified, and expendable. Forces could implement modifications and upgrades quickly and cheaply. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces soon used cheap quadcopter drones, with soldiers a few kilometers away controlling them via First Person View (FPV) goggles to see what the drone's camera saw. These drones cost a few hundred dollars each, with the most complex models going for about $1,000. Most of these drones carry a small number of explosives, so they can instantly become flying bombs that can strike a target and detonate. Some drones carry more explosives, depending on what is needed to take out a target.

These drones are awesome and debilitating weapons when used in large numbers. A major limitation on expanding drone operations is the need for trained drone operators. Ukraine found that many soldiers frequently played video games and were quick to adapt to drone operations, especially because they could use commercial game controllers.
The war has led to massive losses for Russian forces. So far, nearly a million Russian troops have died, deserted, or avoided military service because of Ukraine. Russia has lost most of its modern tanks along with many other armed vehicles and artillery systems.
For Russia, the most damaging Ukrainian innovation in drone warfare is their use of AI/Artificial Intelligence for drone targeting systems. The AI drone contains a targeting system that finds targets. The AI drone operator confirms which targets are real, and once a target is confirmed, the AI targeting system needs no further communication. It resists all forms of jamming.

FPV drones have radically changed modern warfare. These drones are an omnipresent aerial threat to all vehicles and infantry on foot. Each FPV drone costs less than $1,000. Operators use the drone's video camera to see what is below and locate targets. Armed FPV operators are several kilometers away to decide when their FPV drones will drop explosives on an armored vehicle, which has thinner armor on top, or on infantry in the open or in trenches. To do so, drone operators often work in pairs, with one flying behind the other and focusing on the big picture while seeking a likely target. When the reconnaissance drone finds such a target, the armed drone is directed to it. The two FPV drone operators are usually in the same room or tent and can take control of new drones lined up outside for launch when needed. The reconnaissance drones are often unarmed, so they can spend more time in the air searching for a target.

The Ukrainians developed the FPV drone in 2022, when only a few FPV drone attacks were recorded. The Ukrainian Army was the first to appreciate the potential of FPV drones. By the summer of 2023, the Russian Army also began to use FPV drones in greater numbers. Since then, the number of FPV drone attacks has grown exponentially on both sides. Only 12% of those attacks destroyed the target, whether a vehicle, a group of infantry, or even a sniper firing through a window from inside a building. In this case, the armed FPV drone would fly through the window and explode into the room the sniper was in. The only defense is having a nearby open door the sniper can run to or dive through as the FPV drone approaches. Sometimes that isn’t possible because the armed FPV drone comes down from above the window and then in. You don’t see those coming until it’s too late.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, October 21, 2026 - 03:29 pm: Edit

Logistics: Resupplying Warships in the Iran War
October 21, 2026: Recently, more than a dozen guided-missile destroyers supported the GW Bush and the George Washington aircraft carriers, along with an Amphibious Ready Group, in the Indian Ocean and adjacent waters. Two destroyers, Spruance and McFaul, had been in the area for nearly a year.
The American Navy had fifteen warships in the combat zone, and supplying them was difficult. As the old saying goes, amateurs study tactics while professionals concentrate on logistics. The closest supply source was Diego Garcia, an Indian Ocean island. Worse, Diego Garcia was 4,000 kilometers from Iran. To keep the ships off Iran-supplied, the navy relied on the hundred-or-so Military Sealift Command ships.
Precedents exist for what is now taking place off the Iranian coast. Servron, or Service Squadron, supply techniques developed out of necessity during World War II because the vast Pacific lacked sufficient forward bases. These service squadrons became a permanent fixture in the U.S. Navy. Ships now normally stay at sea for up to six months at a time, being resupplied at sea by a Servron. New technologies were developed to support the effective use of the seagoing supply service. Few other navies have matched this capability, mainly because Servron ships are expensive and at-sea replenishment requires extensive training. Western naval experts took note of the Chinese Navy's expansion when Servron-type ships appeared in the late 1990s. That trend has accelerated because China wants to eventually challenge the U.S. Navy throughout the Pacific and needs efficient Servrons to do it.
Meanwhile, the Military Sealift Command/MSC is still having problems recruiting sufficient personnel to man the growing number of ships used by MSC to support American military and diplomatic missions overseas. MSC currently has 140 civilian-crewed ships that replenish U.S. Navy ships, carry out special dedicated operations, preposition combat cargo at sea worldwide, and move military cargo and supplies for deployed U.S. forces and allied nations.
That won’t mean much if MSC can't solve the personnel shortage. So far, at least a dozen ships have been sidelined because no crews were available. MSC needs to fill at least 95 percent of its 4,500 jobs to function fully. To operate at that level, MSC needs 5,500 personnel to provide enough crew so merchant sailors can have one month off duty every four months at sea. This plan became less attractive to MSC sailors. The solution is to change the work routine to four months at sea and two months of downtime.
MSC has faced manning problems since 2020, and the two-month downtime policy is another attempt to address them. Meanwhile, MSC continues to expand and evolve.
Back in 2018, the U.S. Navy completed the conversion of a cargo ship into a Maritime Support Vessel/MSV for Special Operations Command/SOCOM. The ship was built in 2011 for commercial service with Maersk Lines. The U.S. Navy quietly purchased it, and in early 2014 an American shipyard began converting the 20,000-ton roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) cargo ship MV Craigside into a seagoing base for SOCOM commandos and support troops. This included renaming the ship to Ocean Trader.
The conversion cost about $ 80 million and included turning the deck into a landing pad for at least two helicopters, plus a forward hangar to house three helicopters for maintenance or to keep them out of bad weather. The ramp for RO/RO of vehicles is in the rear and remains. The Ocean Trader had special windowless communications and planning areas built, as well as spaces for launching and recovering Scan Eagle UAVs. There was a dive locker/chamber for U.S. Navy SEALs to quietly slip into the sea, as well as storage and launch facilities for Rigid Inflatable Boats/RIB like the 11-meter RHIB used by SOCOM and the 12.8-meter Combat Craft Assault/CCA for more difficult insertions of SEALs to a hostile shore.
The CCA is built from composites and shaped for stealth in coastal and riverine operations. Carrying up to eleven personnel, the CCA can be airdropped from a C-17 but is usually launched from larger ships like the Ocean Trader. The Ocean Trader still has a large vehicle deck and can carry a wide variety of vehicles used by SOCOM personnel. It also has climate-controlled storage for a wide range of supplies and a small hospital area, including an operating room and recovery areas.
In 2015, Craigside was renamed Ocean Trader and by 2016 was spotted in the Mediterranean. Commercial ships can be easily tracked using the Automatic Identification System (AIS), and Ocean Trader appeared in Crete for a while in May 2016, in Gibraltar on May 14, 2017, and in Amsterdam on August 16, 2017. Since then, the AIS has been turned off most of the time, as it is with warships. Without AIS, you must rely on visual spotting, which has put Ocean Trader in the Baltic, Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, and Black Sea in 2017 and 2018.
The Ocean Trader has a top speed of 36 kilometers per hour, even in heavy seas. Its internal fuel allows it to travel about 14,000 kilometers, and it is equipped for at-sea resupply, including fuel. The ship's crew consists of 50 civilian personnel. These ship handlers require security clearances and lots of experience running cargo ships. At least two crews rotate periodically to give crews time at home and allow the Ocean Trader to remain at sea for long periods. The ship has berths for about 200 special operations personnel or contractors who operate specialized electronic or transport equipment, and when it docks, personnel and some equipment rotate out, and supplies come on.
What’s interesting about the Ocean Trader is that it’s an old idea. In 2004, SOCOM asked the U.S. Navy to investigate modifying a container ship for use as a seagoing base for Special Operations troops. This idea was apparently inspired by incidents in the past decade when SOCOM forces were temporarily based on Navy ships. Off Haiti in 1996 and Afghanistan in 2001, the Navy provided an aircraft carrier, with most of its air wing withdrawn, and replaced it with Army or Special Operations helicopters and personnel. While this tactic demonstrated tremendous flexibility, the Navy could not do it regularly because it tied up carriers and their crews, the Navy's most valuable assets. Then in 2001, the Navy began converting four Ballistic Missile Firing Nuclear subs/SSBNs to carry 154 cruise missiles as well as SOCOM commandos. This included commando equipment and special boats to get them ashore. But these SSGNs lacked the capabilities of an MSV like the Ocean Trader. The SSGNs have proved useful for some largely classified SOCOM missions but not for all the missions SOCOM needed an MSV for.
The 2004 SOCOM proposal was to buy or lease a container ship, paint it gray, and fit it out with crew quarters like those used by oil platform crews, for up to 800 SOCOM operators and 200 support troops, and it got some serious consideration. The facilities on board would include command, medical, recreation, and storage for weapons, ammunition, and explosives. All would all be built into standard modular containers, as the U.S. later did extensively in Iraq and Afghanistan. Container ships have power-generating capability to support refrigerated cargo, so they have plenty of power for military needs, especially communications.
Modified onshore containers could also provide bolted-together structures to serve as a helicopter hangar and flight deck. With this setup, the ship could operate over a dozen SOCOM helicopters, especially the larger MC-47s and V-22. Other containers could hold at least half a dozen RHIBs, launch-and-recovery equipment, and drones.
The concept had several major advantages over the traditional approach of building a new type of military ship. Commercial vessels, even ones the size of aircraft carriers, like large tankers and container carriers, typically require crews of fewer than fifty, rather than the thousands needed for military ships of the same size. A large container ship used for military purposes could be operated by fewer than 100 sailors, compared with 1,100 on an LHD or 3,200 on a Nimitz-class carrier. It would also be easier to upgrade, as the modules could be removed and replaced independently.
MSC would own and operate these ships using civilian crews. The Navy would keep one or two of these ships always ready, plus a reserve of special containers ashore for use on additional MSC-owned ships or those leased from commercial users. The container ship conversion never happened, but some MSC ships quietly moved SOCOM personnel and equipment around, though nothing as customized as the Ocean Trader. While the Ocean Trader was created quietly, it wasn't kept secret. The Ocean Trader made frequent port calls and was often photographed by anyone with a smartphone. People took photos often, and they made their way onto the Internet, and suddenly a lot was known about the Ocean Trader. While SOCOM remains quiet on the subject, the Ocean Trader has been at sea almost constantly for over two years, with only brief stops in foreign ports, suggesting the ship is being used regularly.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, October 21, 2026 - 03:30 pm: Edit

Winning: Islam is Disappearing
October 21, 2026: It all began with Islam, a problem that lasted over a thousand years. Millions died as Islam spread, killing people who did not accept Allah as their god. Eventually, many people pretended to accept Islam and went along with its practices. These were the Muslims who did not kill non-believers and pitied those who did. Then, in the 21st century, thanks to the Internet and the growing number of educated Muslim women, children were brought up to believe religion was not that important, and that trend in free thought, like UK Muslims becoming non-believers, led to more Muslims believing they would free themselves from the irksome burden of Islam. They could do this by emulating what happened in Iran. It would begin with the current Iranian government's unconditional surrender. This would be easier with fewer Muslims in Iran. It’s been noted that fewer Iranian mosques are being used. The new Iran allowed freedom of speech, religion, and the right to bear arms. Many Iranians had seized weapons or been given them by soldiers or police men who had access to more weapons than they needed. The Ayatollahs stockpiled weapons to protect themselves and found that those weapons could be used against them.
What happened to the IRGC? Most of them just faded away, while those who resisted were outgunned and died or surrendered. The religious leaders also fled, died, or sought mercy for themselves and their families. Some were arrested and punished for crimes they committed or helped commit. Some Iranians sought to revive the death penalty, as it would save a lot of time and money and give many Iranians the justice they never thought they would see. But the new Iran saw justice as something that did not need to be horrific. There would be some executions, but not as many as some expected. The Muslim Imams, or religious leaders, would also be arrested and examined to see who committed crimes against Iranians or foreigners.
After this, the economic sanctions against Iran ended, and foreign trade resumed. This would bring many exiled Iranians home, including the descendants of Iranian Jews. As it was before 1979, Iran and Israel would once more have diplomatic, cultural, and economic relations. Free, unrestricted Internet access would reconnect Iranians with the world.
While this may sound impossible and outrageous to some, it isn’t. If good men and women do the right thing to the best of their ability, all this will happen. Many will oppose these measures. They must be ignored and not allowed to interfere with the work of making Iran a free and equitable nation to do business with.
That was Iran, but what about the other Islamic nations? Many will follow Iran's example. Even the Saudis would as well after the Kaaba disappeared in a mysterious explosion.
FYEO

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Wednesday, October 21, 2026 - 08:40 pm: Edit

To affirm the FYEO report, Global Christian Relief (an international charity that assists Christians ) confirms the fall in Mosque attendance and the closure of significant numbers of Mosques in Iran.

A year ago, it was reported that Iran led the world in conversions from Islam to Christianity. Haven’t seen a more recent update, so don’t know if that trend has continued.

What I find curious, is the trend of Iranian expatriates converting to Christ mirrors what is happening in Iran to a number of countries (France, England, United States, etc.)

If the rate of conversion continues, Iran may indeed, cease being an Islamic nation.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, October 26, 2026 - 12:39 pm: Edit

Space: Russian Starlink
October 26, 2026: While Russia does not have access to SpaceX Starlink, Russian forces have used smuggled Starlink terminals. Meanwhile, Russia is creating a similar Starlink system called Rassvet. Russian soldiers in Ukraine use black market Starlink equipment, which is in short supply. To deal with Starlink, Russia created a jammer, VKG, or Volna Kupol Grant (Грант «Волна-Купол). A new ground-based EW (electronic warfare) system, Russia’s latest attempt to disrupt Starlink satellite communications, has each VKG unit allegedly capable of jamming up to eight transmission bands simultaneously. Each VKG system provides 360-degree coverage and weighs about 120 kg. One soldier can operate a VKG unit, which protects vulnerable electronics within a four-kilometer radius.
According to its creators, the jammer saturates the satellites’ antennae, blocking the signal and letting VKG operators disrupt communications without damaging the Starlink satellite. Unlike conventional EW (Electronic Warfare) systems that disrupt signals near the receiver, VKG uses narrow-beam, high-frequency transmissions to target the satellites themselves. It can also be used in multiple ways: if VKG beams a Starlink bird, it may damage that satellite. The developer also claims the disruption can persist beyond the initial attack, as affected satellites may require maintenance before returning to normal operation.
A VKG system consists of six trailer-mounted containers, each with two steerable satellite antennas housed in protective, radio-transparent domes. Each VKG unit can block Starlink signals in an area of up to 20 square kilometers. VKG signals operate in the 14- to 14.5-gigahertz frequency range and can disrupt signals up to 16 kilometers away.
A Starlink receiver and antenna on a drone lets it be guided precisely to its target, if it isn't shot down, and stay in contact until the last split second. Russian forces in Ukraine realized that if they didn’t find a solution to this satellite constellation problem quickly, there would be higher losses from more accurate Starlink-assisted Ukrainian drones.
The latest Starlink modification, in addition to the communication channel, provides alternative navigation which, unlike GPS, has very high interference immunity. It also has an extremely narrow communication beam that is hard to detect and virtually impossible to jam with conventional electronic warfare systems.
Moreover, such a terminal costs far less than a four-ton Reaper surveillance drone. The Americans can integrate it into many of their weapons systems, including Tomahawks, JASSMs, and the new Precision Strike Missile, which has a range of 150 kilometers and is launched from a HIMARS vehicle.
This revolutionary evolution in military affairs has had an extraordinary impact on the war in Ukraine. SpaceX, the firm that created and controls the Starlink satellite network, can block Russian access to its black-market Starlink systems and diminish the effectiveness of Russian forces.
The Russians aren’t the only ones having misadventures with Starlink equipment. Last year, Starlink was suspected of playing a role in the outcome of a Red Sea conflict. Yemen’s Shia Houthi rebels had been devastated by weeks of intense Israeli and American airstrikes. These attacks continued with increasing accuracy. The Houthis couldn’t do anything about satellite or aerial surveillance, so they turned to nearby suspects. That meant searching for and seizing Starlink terminals owned by Yemeni families and businesses. Starlink is a simple, inexpensive system that connects anyone to thousands of Starlink satellites orbiting Earth. This gives users access to electronic media worldwide. Much of it is free or easy to steal. Starlink's widespread use in Yemen led the Houthis to believe it was the key means for disloyal locals to let the enemy know where Houthi weapons and other assets were.
Starlink played a small role in finding and identifying targets for airstrikes. All its satellites carry optical sensors, and software using multiple Starlink satellites converts them into VLA/Very Large Array cameras capable of picking out amazingly small details on Earth. This is invaluable for military targeting. Seizing all local Starlink terminals only made locals angrier at the Houthi response and more willing to use cellphones and other devices to let the outside world know where Houthi targets were.
The Houthis are a radical clan militia from the Shia minority in northern Yemen. For over a decade, the Houthis have been disrupting life and the economy in Yemen. Houthi control in Yemen is diminishing because of the recent air strikes.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, October 26, 2026 - 12:39 pm: Edit

Russia: Sabotage Campaign in Europe
October 26, 2026: Russian sabotage efforts in European NATO countries include numerous operations across the continent. The saboteurs have carried out several clandestine operations to undermine support for Ukraine while demoralizing NATO countries. The attack methodology includes vandalism, arson, CyberWar, and sabotage of critical infrastructure such as power plants, fuel and LNG networks, telecommunications, energy supplies, and underwater cables. In the last few years, sabotage efforts have increased more than fivefold, and unless NATO brings this Russian effort to heel, the damage will grow.
This is nothing new; during the last decade, a growing number of sabotage efforts have targeted economic, military, and infrastructure targets. Police and intelligence investigators are finding more evidence that Russia is behind this. Russian operatives, either diplomats or freelancers, have been discovered hiring anyone needing cash and seeming to have the skills to do the dirty work. Some of these saboteurs have been caught, but none could provide conclusive evidence that they were working for Russia.
While Russia has increased its sabotage and destabilization efforts against the NATO nations, the results have been meager. Successes have been few and disappointments many. The invasion caused formerly neutral Sweden and Finland to join NATO. Now Russia faces a wall of NATO nations from the Arctic to the Mediterranean. Russia’s only allies are threadbare North Korea and a dying Iran. Russia is expected to obtain more missiles from Iran, but now the missiles Iran has left are being fired, without much effect, at Israel and American forces seeking to end nearly half a century of Iranian sponsorship of Islamic terrorists and mischief in general.
Meanwhile, Russia, unable to subdue Ukraine with military force, concluded that the most vulnerable aspect of the Ukrainian war effort was the support received from NATO countries. For the last three years, Russia has been attacking NATO nations clandestinely with disinformation and sabotage using a combination of specialized diplomats and sleeper agents who have long been living in Europe. The sleeper agents usually don’t carry out the sabotage themselves; instead, they hire criminal networks in Europe to do it. European police and security agencies were aware of these plans and, when they detected the sabotage, they sought the criminals and arrested some. Some of these men confirmed that the attacks originated in Russia. With these Russian efforts no longer secret, Russian recruiting efforts were crippled, but not halted, because of fears that anyone who worked for Russia would be quickly identified and arrested. Since Russia invaded Ukraine, public opinion in Europe has been hostile to Russia. Undeterred, Russian sleepers faded deeper into the background and used one or more layers of intermediaries to identify criminal groups willing to carry out the sabotage if the financial rewards were high enough.
Russia now depends more on legitimate channels like its embassy personnel and overseas members of the Russian Orthodox Church to assist, often involuntarily, to help Mother Russia complete its mission to self-destruct by 2027. That’s not an official mission, but the one Russia has earned. The economic sanctions and continued resistance by Ukrainian forces have crippled the Russian military and led its economy on a path that eventually leads to collapse.
Undeterred, Russia continues its sabotage and destabilization efforts in NATO Europe. There have been a few railway accidents that, upon reexamination, turned out to be Russian-sponsored acts of sabotage. Another favorite is jamming GPS signals; this remains a problem in several European countries. There was also a thwarted plot to assassinate the head of German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall. Russia denies any involvement, but the evidence of Russian complicity grows with each incident. In this respect, Russia is at war with European nations, and these attacks have led to economic sanctions. Russia sees this as an attack on its economy, and its coordinated sabotage campaign in Western Europe is its response.
Russia had sleeper agents in Ukraine since the 1990s, after Ukraine became an independent state in 1991. Russia did not fully activate the sleepers until it realized its 2022 invasion was faltering. There was no public announcement of this, but by 2024 the Ukrainian security service, or SSU, detected several Russian agents operating in Kherson, which is near the Black Sea northwest of Crimea. Three Russian spies were arrested, and apparently none of these men admitted to being sleepers or knowing anything about sleepers. That wasn't unusual, as sleepers and the agents they hire locally know that if they say nothing, Russia will do whatever it can to free these loyal agents.
Each arrested man appeared to operate independently, without knowing about other agents. This was true, but these men also knew the sleeper network existed and said nothing about it. The Russian sleepers and spies worked jobs, like driving a cab, that let them move around without raising suspicion. Interrogators did discover that the Russian agents were currently seeking locations and the status of Ukrainian air defense systems and other military targets, especially those difficult to identify using aerial reconnaissance. Earlier, the SSU had disrupted an espionage network seeking the location of Ukrainian HIMARS missile launcher vehicles. These are kept hidden because the Russians fear these mobile missile launchers and the damage they do to Russian artillery units and supply storage sites.
Eastern Ukraine always had a large Russian population because during the 1930s Russians were brought into eastern Ukraine to replace all the Ukrainians who died during the Holodomor or Great Famine. The Soviet government caused the famine by exporting nearly all grain produced in that part of the country for several years. This was part of a Soviet plan to raise additional foreign currency to pay for importing Western machinery needed to industrialize Russia. This plan worked, and leader Josef Stalin saw the dead Ukrainians as necessary to enable Russia to build factories for producing commercial and military products, including tanks and the new multiple-cell rocket launchers they had recently invented.
Now, nearly a century later, there is another war because Russian forces invaded independent Ukraine in 2022. Stalin would have seen this as a civil war, but times have changed. Some things going on today Stalin would see as familiar. For example, the post-1991 Russian government lost most of its destabilization skills. A century ago, the new communist government in Russia came to power because of the communists’ ability to subvert their opponents and eliminate opposition without a lot of bloodshed. A more recent destabilization effort involved an effort to destabilize countries in Africa to distract attention from the mass media coverage of the Russian campaign in Ukraine. Russian mercenaries and spies are busy trying to cause as much distracting chaos as possible in the rest of the world. This includes covert operations in Europe, mercenaries operating throughout Africa, establishing links with Moslem organizations in Central Asia and Europe, and blowing up Western airliners.
Russia believes that conventional warfare waged in Ukraine and the unconventional warfare carried out worldwide complement each other. Russian efforts to destabilize Africa are supposed to divert attention and resources headed to Ukraine. To make this happen, Russian spies, assassins, and propagandists continue their efforts.
Revolution and subversion efforts worldwide have long been used by the Soviet Union and later Russia to exploit whatever opportunities were available to disrupt and diminish support for groups hostile to Russia, while encouraging local leaders who support Russian objectives. For example, in 2016, Russian operatives recruited criminal gangs to cause trouble in the tiny Balkan state of Montenegro and disrupt efforts by that country to join NATO. That attempt failed when several foreign agents and pro-coup Montenegrin politicians were detected, arrested, prosecuted, and imprisoned.
In February 2022, Russian agents tried to organize widespread protests that would justify Russian military intervention, aided by pro-Russian factions in the Ukrainian government. These factions were supposed to enable pro-Russian groups in the Ukrainian parliament and government to seize power. That effort failed because the Russians overestimated the number of pro-Russian officials in the Ukrainian government, and the Russian invasion did not immediately succeed, as the Russians expected. Too many Ukrainians were willing and able to fight and defeat the Russian invaders.
The Russian FSB is the post-Soviet version of the KGB but has shown a shortage of skills and an inability to match the KGB's performance in its prime. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was made possible, in part, because the KGB also lost its ability to get things done, mostly because its most effective personnel began focusing on how to obtain hard currency instead. By the end of 2022, military failures in Ukraine gave the FSB more political and financial support, allowing it to devote more time, money, and effort to its sleeper program. The FSB had to call on retired agents who had served during the pre-1991 Soviet Union era. Many Russian sleepers were exposed in the 1990s because Soviet archives were open to foreign historians, some of them secretly working for Western intelligence agencies. Many Russian sleepers were identified and arrested. That ended Western researchers' access to KGB archives. Russia considers arresting their sleepers in Europe and North America a hostile act. The Russians quietly began rebuilding and expanding their sleeper network. Meanwhile, the Russians arrested innocent Western visitors to Russia and kept them in prison until they could be exchanged for arrested Russian sleepers.
Western intelligence agencies now spend a lot of time trying to identify sleepers and are paying closer attention to acts of sabotage. These acts are often disguised as accidents or local feuds. For the last two years, sleepers have become prime suspects. When investigators pursue the person responsible for the acts of sabotage, sleepers often top the list of possible perpetrators.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, October 26, 2026 - 12:40 pm: Edit

Intelligence: The Terrorist Intel Liability
October 25, 2026: Terrorist intel liability concerns the legal and insurance exposure that emerges after individuals, organizations, or platforms are held responsible for the distribution of terrorist propaganda, encouraging individuals to become Islamic terrorists, or failing to report and possibly prevent terrorism. Since the late 1990s, when Internet technology became widely available, Al Qaeda has found the Internet to be an enormous intelligence liability. While the web helps spread messages and attract new recruits, it also gives intelligence and police agencies an excellent opportunity to gather information. This is largely unavoidable. Only a small percentage of active Islamic radicals are trained in the tradecraft of counterintelligence, such as preventing police infiltration.
Naturally, neither al Qaeda nor any security organizations will discuss this openly. But it is known that intelligence agencies constantly advise against shutting down the pro-terrorism websites, especially those with message boards. It is possible to monitor who uses these websites, and it's gotten out that many active terrorists have been caught because of information obtained from monitoring who visits and uses pro-terrorist websites.
Al Qaeda has issued warnings to jihadis on the web to be careful what they say and to be aware that when they visit a website, the computer they are using can be tracked. Most visitors are unaware of these warnings or ignore them. Core al Qaeda operatives know to avoid revealing themselves so easily, but there are so many volunteers and helpers who are sloppy that the careful terrorist operatives are constantly put in danger of getting caught.
For recruiting, al Qaeda relies on people it knows to get some face time with promising prospects and check their references. This puts the pressure on intelligence agencies to create "legends" (believable backgrounds) if they want to keep an Internet persona active. Legends are expensive to create and maintain, but apparently a few of them have been used to smoke out more senior Islamic terrorists.
Most of the Islamic radicals encountered on the web are posers and wannabes. But some are serious, and there's always a risk that some of the many you write off as harmless turn out not to be. What is scary is the large number of young Muslims who see themselves as victims of Western aggression. Playing the victim is one thing, but many of these kids spout a vile message of hate and aggression. Among many young Muslims, it's become fashionable to either agree with this bile or at least tolerate it.
A lot of young Muslims don't go along with all the jihadi fantasies, and they are often the intel agents cruising the terrorist websites, looking for information and potential terrorists. When the current outburst of Islamic terrorism has run its course, there will be opportunities to reveal more details of the hidden war that was played out on the Internet, and how important it was to keep the terrorists impotent.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, October 26, 2026 - 12:41 pm: Edit

Surface Forces : Japanese ABM Ships
October 25, 2026: Three years ago, Japan wanted to build two seagoing BMD (ballistic missile defense) ships and was faced with two options. The first, which Japan discarded, was a ship design that carried only the Aegis BMD radar and Aegis BMD missiles. These ships would have had only that purpose. Instead, Japan decided to build two more Maya-class destroyers with additional BMD capabilities. Japan is calling these modified destroyers ASEVs (Aegis system-equipped vessels). This is part of the Japanese effort to expand its ballistic missile defenses. Most of these will still be based on the Aegis system, which is normally installed on large (8,000 tons and up) warships. Japan has eight Aegis anti-missile system destroyers but has not placed Aegis Ashore in Japan. Local civilian opposition was too strong. Civilians do not object to Aegis-equipped ships.
Not all the Japanese Aegis destroyers are the same. There are two Maya-Class ships, two Atagos, and four Kongos. By 2030, Japan plans to have twelve Aegis-equipped warships. ASEV ships are 12,000-ton vessels, 282 meters long and 37 meters wide, armed with 128 VLS cells, each containing an anti-aircraft or BMD missile. They also carry a dozen or so cruise or anti-ship missiles. ASEV has a crew of 240 and a top speed of 58 kilometers per hour. It has an Aegis radar and fire-control system that quickly launches the right missile at detected targets. The radar is supported by ECM (Electronic Countermeasures) that detects electronic threats, and an electronic jammer that disrupts them if chaff and decoys fail. There is one five-inch gun and a helicopter flight deck with a hangar for one helicopter.
While the Japanese destroyers are smaller than the ASEV, their armament is more diverse and their capabilities more extensive, which requires larger crews, usually 300 sailors. Destroyers are faster, can travel farther from Japan, and cost more to build and operate than the ASEV. Despite that, the first two ASEVs will cost more than a destroyer because of development costs. If Japan builds more ASEVs, they will be cheaper than destroyers. The Navy would rather have more destroyers because the ASEV is more of an Aegis system platform than a traditional destroyer.
The Maya class destroyers are improved versions of the earlier Atago class. The Mayas also borrow heavily from the first four Japanese Aegis-ABM ships, the 9,500-ton Kongos, built in the 1990s and modeled on the American Burke-class Aegis destroyers. The Kongos have 90 VLS (Vertical Launch System) cells for anti-aircraft/missile missiles, as well as ASROC anti-submarine rockets that carry an anti-submarine torpedo, effectively extending the torpedo's range by 22 kilometers. Japanese Burke-type destroyers also carry a five-inch gun and eight Japanese-designed anti-ship missiles, like the American Harpoon. The Maya class has 96 VLS cells (as does Atago) and more advanced electronics that let the Mayas link with the U.S. Navy CEC (Cooperative Engagement Capability), enabling real-time sharing of sensor and other data between other CEC-equipped ships and even shore-based systems like Aegis Ashore.
The two land-based Aegis Ashore anti-missile systems were not expected to enter service until 2024, but popular opposition ended the ashore program. The ASEV was developed to do what Aegis Ashore was intended to do, but it won’t enter service until 2027 and 2028. ASEV can operate in coastal waters, harbors, and on the high seas to protect the fleet. ASEV is a more flexible but more expensive substitute, at $2.6 billion each, than the $1.6 billion Aegis Ashore now operational in Romania and Poland.
Japan’s eight destroyers armed with Aegis anti-missile systems (four Kongos, two Atagos, and two Mayas) and the proposed two ASEVs will give Japan ten Aegis systems, all operating from ships. North Korea continues to be a threat, and how much more of a ballistic missile threat China becomes is still considered less of a problem now but could escalate in the future. China has a long history of threatening but not acting. North Korea has demonstrated an ability to attack without warning and did so in 2010. North Korea has always been less cooperative than China, though China remains a threat.
Japan's 2017 decision that it didn't need the more expensive THAAD anti-missile system prompted the original Aegis Ashore concept, after realizing two land-based Aegis systems on the main island could do the same job more cheaply. That, plus Aegis-equipped destroyers armed with the SM-3A anti-missile missile, would let those two land-based Aegis systems protect all three home islands. Local civilians protested because the missile launches were noisy and the Aegis radar generated a lot of microwave radiation. This forced government officials to oppose the Aegis Ashore, and Japan lost the cost savings of a land-based system. The expensive ASEV was developed to replace Aegis Ashore.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, October 26, 2026 - 12:41 pm: Edit

Intelligence: Seizing Russian Assets for Ukraine
October 24, 2026: Russia has over half a trillion dollars of frozen assets in European countries. The money consists of cash, bonds, and securities held outside Russia, as well as private assets such as yachts and real estate owned by Russian oligarchs (billionaires). About a third of these assets are held by Euroclear, a major financial-market infrastructure firm and securities depository.
Euroclear is concerned that seizing Russian funds will damage its reputation among international investors and could even lead to lawsuits by the affected Russians; Russia's Central Bank is already suing Euroclear for $250 billion. Most NATO nations want Russia to pay for the damages it has caused by invading Ukraine. NATO countries believe the money should be used to rebuild the country.
At the same time, the Ukraine War has bankrupted Russia, and it can no longer pay all war-related expenses. Earlier this year, an attempt to sell a trillion rubles ($11.44 million) worth of government debt failed. No bank, foreign entity, or wealthy Russian oligarch was willing to participate. The Russian budget deficit in the first half of 2026 was $77 billion, driven mainly by war-related expenses. Military expenses for the rest of the year are estimated to be more than $60 billion. Wealthy Russians have noted this and have moved more of their assets into cryptocurrencies and foreign investments. This has forced the government into a risky “pay-as-you-go” approach to funding the war. This method depends on what Russia can get for its sanctioned oil exports. NATO nations are cracking down on the Russian fleet of shadow tankers.
Economic sanctions have made it difficult to export petroleum. This is Russia's main export and a major source of income for the Russian government and its war effort. To evade these sanctions, Russia created a shadow fleet of 112 tankers purchased and/or leased abroad and gained unrestricted access to a Chinese smuggler haven in Hong Kong.
The nations enforcing the sanctions, particularly the United States, have tracked the Russian shadow fleet's routes and noted Hong Kong's key role in moving sanctioned Russian oil to its primary customers in China and India. Hong Kong is also a major source of weapons and munitions for sanctioned nations. A current customer is Russia. Hong Kong does this by allowing Russian tankers and cargo ships, using fake credentials to hide their Russian affiliation, to bring in Russian oil and other raw materials. The Russian ships then leave Hong Kong carrying weapons for their war in Ukraine.
Another major player in the Russian smuggling effort is North Korea. For years, North Korea has been buying small, secondhand cargo and tanker ships and using them for smuggling. A favored evasion technique involves taking on or transferring cargo at sea within its territorial waters. The North Korean merchant fleet has about 134 ships, most of which it bought from Chinese firms.
North Korea is a notorious and persistent maritime smuggler. Because of North Korean smuggling, the United States expanded its maritime smuggling and sanctions enforcement program in 2018 by creating a new multinational enforcement organization. Initial members were the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Britain, France, South Korea, and Japan. The Enforcement Coordination Cell, or ECC, is enforcing the UN sanctions that curb North Korean smuggling related to items needed for their nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In addition, the ECC allows member nations to enforce other sanctions or naval missions their governments prioritize. The U.S. has since invited India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines to join and help monitor growing Chinese violations of offshore water rights, especially in the South China Sea and other areas of the West Pacific.
The ECC concentrates on the 2,000-kilometer-long shipping lane from the Indian Ocean, through the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea, to North Korea. Along this route, not only North Korean-flagged ships participate in smuggling, but also Chinese, Taiwanese, Liberian, and Sri Lankan ships, as well as independent ships that fly whatever flag they believe will keep them from being seized for smuggling, including false flags. Earlier U.S. efforts had already identified many North Korean- and Iranian-owned tankers and cargo ships that were often engaged in smuggling. This led Iran and North Korea to use their own ships less and to use foreign ships instead. These third-party ships are the ones the ECC sought to identify. The ECC can identify these ships and their owners and impose banking and other sanctions on the owners. Many nations outside the ECC, but economic partners with ECC members, will cooperate if a smuggler ship visits one of their ports. In that case, authorities can arrest the captain and impound the ship.
ECC member warships do not rely on inspecting suspicious ships at sea; they rely on confirming who is where and when. This is especially useful for spotting smugglers who often turn off their location beacons and continue running in dark mode. These location beacons transmit the ship's ID and location to nearby ships and, often via satellite, to the owner and international shipping organizations. You can find past and current location data on several public websites. The beacons exist mainly as a safety measure for ships operating at night or in bad weather in heavily used shipping lanes. Smugglers have learned to turn off their beacons near a port where they are assumed to have docked or anchored off the coast, waiting for an available dock.
Some smugglers use spoofing, a form of jamming that modifies the beacon signal to present a false location. This is where warships and maritime aircraft come in, as they can identify ships visually or by radar, then conduct a visual inspection. This is more damaging to smugglers because it provides stronger evidence that their ship was involved in smuggling; with enough evidence, you can pursue the ship owners and seize the ship when it enters coastal waters within 22 kilometers of a nation's land, which can seize outlaw ships. The US also seizes such ships at sea.
There are other problems. Not long ago, Russian leaders, especially the president, were determined to eliminate corruption that had delayed new-weapon procurement and driven prices up. The president's move led to a criminal investigation into the management of the Severnaya Verf shipyard. This yard builds Steregushchy-class corvettes and Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates. But investigators weren't looking into delays on these shipbuilding projects; they were looking into how management took $212 million meant to build the ships and instead used it to shore up a bank in which they held a stake. The bank still went under, taking the $212 million with it. Now the yard lacks sufficient funds to complete the ships the government contracted it to build.
Later, the Russian president grew increasingly critical of the Defense Ministry for delays in spending on new weapons and equipment. This led to finger-pointing and accusations. For example, one of the leading ballistic missile designers told a reporter that missiles could not be built as fast as the government wanted, because the Defense Ministry would not sign purchase orders on time. An official explained to the procurement bureaucrats that some missile components took longer to manufacture and had to be ordered earlier to assemble finished missiles on schedule. But the bureaucrats either didn't comprehend that or didn't care.
Some officials took enormous risks by going public with this, but that's what the Russian president had been calling for. When the President heard of these accusations, he ordered an investigation. But the defense minister said the purchase orders hadn't been signed because prices had risen sharply, and the suppliers wouldn't explain why. Officials had been ordered to root out corruption in the Defense Ministry, and now the defense minister may face a perfect storm of incompetence, corruption, and pressure from above to "make things happen." This isn't the first time the Russian president has had problems with Defense Ministry leadership and senior officers who rose during the Soviet era. The message doesn't seem to be getting through. So the President ordered prosecutors to investigate defense manufacturers' finances, and they're finding a lot of dirt.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, October 26, 2026 - 12:42 pm: Edit

Naval Air: German Navy Gets Israeli Missiles
October 24, 2026: The German Navy recently tested an Israeli Lora ballistic missile and decided to buy more to equip its frigates. For more than fifty years, Israel has been developing ballistic and air-to-surface missiles for its own military as well as for export. These include ballistic missiles that can be launched from fighter-bombers.
For example, Rampage is a 14.7-meter-long, 570 kg air-to-surface missile with a 150 kg warhead. It has a range of 150-250 kilometers. The missile includes GPS/INS navigation systems. It is subsonic, with speeds ranging from 700 to 900 kilometers per hour. Rampage is based on Elbit’s EXTRA ground-to-ground missile.
Delilah is an 187 kg helicopter, fixed-wing aircraft, or surface-launched loitering cruise missile (LACM) with a range of 250- 300 kilometers. The missile costs about $500,000. The surface-launched version uses a rocket booster to get airborne. A small turbojet enables several hours of loitering to search for enemy radars, other ground targets, or moving ships at sea. A remote human controller decides which target to attack. The US developed Delilah in the 1980s and put it into service in the 1990s.
EXTRA (Extended Range Artillery) is a 570 kg, 306mm GPS-guided missile with a 150 km range and a 120 kg warhead. Each missile costs about $120,000. EXTRA entered service in 2016, uses a variety of launcher vehicles, and is like the American HIMARS and its GMLRS missile.
Gabriel is an anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM). The latest version, Gabriel 5, entered service in 2020. The first version of Gabriel appeared in 1973 as a 430 kg anti-ship missile like the later (1977) American Harpoon but with a shorter range of 20 kilometers. Gabriel 2 appeared in 1976, and Gabriel 3 in 1978, with a range of 36 kilometers and a 30 percent heavier weight than Gabriel 1. Gabriel 3 was also available for aircraft use, with a 60-kilometer range. These early models sank nine enemy ships in the 1970s and were rightly feared by Israel’s enemies.
Israel did not need an anti-ship missile with a long range, like Harpoon, which could travel 120 kilometers, because Israel had a coastal navy that might have to fight neighbors like Egypt to the south or Lebanon to the north. From the start, Gabriel had a system that kept the missile a few meters above the water, making it hard to detect.
Gabriel 4 was different: it had a 200-kilometer range and a small turbojet, like cruise missiles, for sustained flight. Gabriel 4 weighed 960 kg, making it like a cruise missile. The Gabriel 4 warhead was much larger, but it kept the same multiple guidance systems as the earlier Gabriels. It took nearly two decades for the larger and much more capable Gabriel 5 to appear. The three guidance systems were upgraded but remained fire-and-forget, or fire-and-update, via an encrypted data link, midway to the target. Finally, they switched to fire-and-update as they approached the target area. The guidance system could detect the desired target and head for it. Gabriel 5 has more countermeasures for enemy electronic defenses, and each missile costs $5 million. Gabriel has been exported to 14 countries and has survived because a country under constant threat of attack developed it and could quickly modify its weapons to counter a threatening neighbor.
LORA is a 1.6-ton ballistic missile with a 430-kilometer range and a 570 kg warhead. Its guidance system includes GPS, INS, and a TV camera to ensure it hits the intended target. With just GPS/INS, the missile will land within five meters of the aiming point. LORA can be fired from various truck-mounted launchers. Israel does not use LORA, but two export customers, India and Azerbaijan, do. India recently began manufacturing LORA under license.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, October 26, 2026 - 12:44 pm: Edit

China: Arming Taiwan
October 23, 2026: America has long been Taiwan's primary source of weapons. The order backlog is currently nearly $30 billion. Six months ago, a meeting between U.S. and Chinese leaders led Americans to reconsider their commitment to defending Taiwan. The current U.S. leader has expressed doubts that Taiwan could withstand a Chinese attack. The Americans are negotiating with China for concessions on its cooperation with Iran, Russia, and other nations. China will do just about anything to prevent the $30 billion arms sale to Taiwan. In the 21st century, Taiwan has obtained nearly 90% of its weapons from the United States. The rest came from Russia, Israel, and a few European nations. Russian exports have halted, except for spare parts. The Israeli contribution is largely technology transfers between the two nations.
Even when the sales program resumed, some U.S. items are delayed because of aid to Ukraine and the need to maintain American strength to counter a possible Chinese move in the western Pacific. Yet an American law, the Taiwan Relations Act, obliges the U.S. to provide Taiwan with all the defensive weapons it can afford. The current deal includes $8 billion worth of the latest F-16 model, including recon and surveillance pods; $4 billion worth of M109A7 self-propelled 155mm howitzers; 60 ammunition carriers; 13 recovery vehicles; and more than 4,000 precision-guidance fuze kits that turn unguided shells into guided ones. Another $4 billion funds HIMARS vehicles that fire multiple guided rockets.
The plan also includes $2.3 billion in Harpoon anti-ship missiles and land-based launchers, plus over $1 billion in NASAMS (National Advanced Surface-to-Surface Air Missile Systems). Another $1,1 billion is for 1,554 ALTIUS-700M loitering munitions and 478 ALTIUS-600M ISR drones. Nearly a billion is for Patriot PAC-3 ballistic missile interceptors.
Orders also include Javelin fire-and-forget anti-tank or bunker missiles, many TOW anti-tank missiles, and the Volcano Anti-Tank Mining System. The order also includes Switchblade 300 Loitering Missile Systems, AGM-84H SLAM-ER anti-radar missiles, Mk 48 Heavyweight Torpedoes for the Taiwanese-built submarines, AGM-154C air-launched long-range missiles, and AIM-9X heat-seeking air-to-air missiles. Several hundred million dollars went toward command-and-control upgrades as well as detection/tracking/fire control radars.
Increased Chinese aggression is the reason for all this. Over the last few years, China has been unusually active, carrying out air and naval operations near or around Taiwan. At the rate of about once a month, Chinese forces move menacingly near Taiwan. For example, China carried out military exercises that encircled Taiwan using 111 aircraft and 46 warships. This was seen as practice for a rapid blockade of Taiwan. There was no sign of how Taiwan would deal with an actual encirclement and blockade.
Taiwan has a powerful ally and protector in the United States. The Americans passed laws obliging them to continually supply Taiwan with new weapons and direct military assistance if Taiwan is attacked. American allies South Korea and Japan, together with the American Pacific Fleet, match, and probably exceed the capabilities of the new Chinese fleet.
Taiwan has a small navy of four destroyers, 22 frigates, three corvettes, 37 patrol boats (some armed with anti-ship missiles), and four submarines. The U.S. Navy always has two or three carrier task forces in the Western Pacific. Each Task force is based on a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN), plus three or four escort ships and an unseen nuclear attack submarine (SSN) that periodically sends a communications float to the surface to send and receive encrypted messages about the SSN's status and any useful information it has recently obtained. Incoming information includes new orders for the SSN and when it should surface next.
SSNs carry passive/listen only sensors that let them track activity on the surface. These sensors can distinguish between warships and commercial ships and even identify warship types. While SSNs are largely invulnerable to attack if they move slowly and keep quiet, the carrier task forces have several types of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles aimed at them.
If China attacked Taiwan, they want to avoid war with the United States if possible because a prolonged US naval blockade of China would weaken the Chinese Communist Party's control over China. A blockade would halt oil imports, which are essential to keeping Chinese industries operational. Food imports are not essential to prevent starvation, but they do let Chinese people enjoy a more varied and pleasing diet. Returning to a bland diet after decades of much better cuisine would cause some anger, but no serious anti-government action.
On the other hand, food rationing will be necessary within a month of the invasion of Taiwan. Such a rationing program is problematic because of the Communist Party’s size (8-9% of the total population) and corruption. They’ll immediately steal far more than their fair share and, worse, not merely to eat more themselves, but to sell on the black market to offset the loss of their normal peacetime corruption income. That will be both obvious and create real hunger among ordinary Chinese, who are exceptionally fearful of mass starvation due to China’s history. National food rationing systems require public acquiescence to work. That won’t be present in China within a year of rationing's onset, and the food rationing system will quickly collapse as nearly everyone tries to grab more just to survive. This is the most likely scenario for the Chinese Communist Party's collapse.
During the last few years, Xi has made mistakes that caused economic problems. His anti-corruption campaigns had mixed results, as did his efforts to reform the equally corrupt armed forces.
Despite these problems, the Chinese navy has become increasingly aggressive in the South China Sea. The Philippines is taking most of the punishment from aggressive Chinese naval activities. There have been injuries among Filipino sailors. The Philippines and the United States have a mutual defense treaty, but Filipinos have told Americans they want to handle China themselves. China knows about the mutual defense treaty and doesn't want to trigger it. The Filipinos consider their treaty with the Americans as a last-ditch option. The threat to implement the treaty means the Chinese must be careful how far they push the Philippines over control of the South China Sea,
While Chinese naval and air forces are a major presence in the West Pacific, the US Navy could intercept almost all Chinese sea trade from well beyond Chinese naval and air range. A war would halt that trade, hurting China more than the rest of the world. Taiwan knows this and understands that China wants to avoid disrupting seaborne trade, because even a few months of blockade would cause significant economic and internal political problems. While China is still a communist dictatorship, the government is not as all-powerful as it once was and fears widespread violence if there are widespread and intense economic problems.
Any Chinese attack on Taiwan would have to win quickly so the Chinese could declare a ceasefire and demand that the United States negotiate. To avoid that fate, Taiwan has developed tactics that employ thousands of small, armed drones with explosives attacking the Chinese fleet closing in on Taiwan. These drones would navigate autonomously until they encountered Chinese warships, then switch to an attack guidance system. China is seeking ways to disrupt such attacks, but Taiwan is always developing new countermeasures. For example, Taiwan initially discovered that the manufacturer of the small drones it needed was Chinese, so it had to find another supplier. It did, but the supplier needs time to ramp up production to deliver the large number of drones required for the armed swarm.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, October 26, 2026 - 12:44 pm: Edit

Infantry: Building Ukrainian Ground Combat Drones
October 23, 2026: Ukraine is producing at least 50,000 ground combat drones this year. These wheeled vehicles operate using FPV (First Person View) control found on aerial and seagoing drones. If jammed, the guidance system defaults to pre-programmed instructions to hit certain targets, self-destruct, or return to base. The Delta command-and-control system, currently the best available worldwide, also monitors and supervises these new drones and coordinates land combat drones with other drones in the area. Three months ago, Ukraine released a video showing a naval surface drone landing at a beach, dropping its ramp, and releasing a ground drone, which moved inland and opened fire with a remote-controlled machine gun. That land drone could carry other weapons, like an automatic 40mm grenade launcher or a launcher for FAE (Fuel-Air-Explosive) grenades. Landing dozens of these amphibious drones in the first wave of an amphibious invasion would decimate enemy defenses and reduce casualties among soldiers or marines landing in subsequent waves. Another innovation was using thousands of FPV drones operated by sailors and soldiers on ships offshore or in landing craft near or on the beach. The enemy might also use many drones, so the amphibious force would have interceptor drones to reduce the impact of the enemy drone attack.
Ukraine has already landed dozens of its FPV wheeled ground combat drones into a Russian rear area. The drones proceeded to destroy many weapons, equipment, supplies, and Russian soldiers in a surprise attack. In the recent past, these drones, used on the front line, have captured dozens of Russian soldiers who preferred captivity to fighting drones equipped with machine guns and very accurate target acquisition systems.
Ukraine has been using more ground combat and transport drones to reduce Ukrainian casualties and scare Russian troops who find themselves fighting armed amphibious drones. That last event happened recently when Ukrainian forces sought to retrieve a wounded comrade from an area still under fire by Russian troops and drones. The Ukrainians landed the combat drone from a naval drone to clear the area of Russian soldiers. Then a transport drone came in to take the wounded soldier back to safety and eventually to a military aid station. The supply drone was built to accommodate supplies or a soldier, wounded or otherwise. On the way back, the transportation drone was attacked by a Russian FPV drone, which detonated near the transport drone but did not disable the transport or injure the wounded soldier it was carrying.
Ground combat drones can carry a variety of weapons, but most have a 7.62mm machine gun with several hundred rounds of ammunition. A remote operator controls the weapon and the drone, wearing goggles or looking at a flat-screen display and operating a controller based on, or even a version of, a popular game controller.
Only about five percent of ground drone missions involve combat; the rest are for supplying the troops or retrieving wounded soldiers. Only about two percent of Ukrainian ground drone operations involve the armed drone using its machine gun.
The growing use of these ground drones has reduced Ukrainian combat losses and improved morale among Ukrainian soldiers. These drones assure troops that no matter how deep into the combat zone they are, the drones will get them out if wounded. These drones have already shown that they can travel more than ten kilometers to retrieve a casualty or supply a remote outpost under constant fire.
In one case, a soldier was stuck near Russian positions for 33 days. The rescue attempt destroyed six drones. The seventh drone made it and completed a 64-kilometer trip to bring the soldier back. Before drones, a soldier in that position would have to be abandoned because too many more soldiers would be killed or wounded trying to carry out a rescue.
This extensive use of ground drones to supply, transport, and retrieve wounded soldiers is demoralizing to Russian troops. Russia has not implemented such a drone resupply and casualty evacuation system because Russia never took good care of its wounded and often simply leaves wounded men behind or even kills such soldiers who are in a lot of pain. Ukraine believes this use of ground drones has reduced its casualty rate by 30 percent. That means that there are more than eight Russian casualties for each Ukrainian one. More Russian casualties die than are wounded.
Currently, nearly 90 percent of the personnel losses are due to drones, which are everywhere in the combat zone, with Ukrainian drones outnumbering what the Russians can get into the air. On one day last July, Ukraine recorded and reported all its drone activity. There were 311 Russian personnel killed or wounded. Drones detected nearly 1,600 enemy targets and attacked them. In addition, drones pursued about 4,500 Russian personnel as well as over 21,000 other targets. On the water, in ports, or on rivers, Ukrainian forces hit 15 vessels. Other land targets destroyed included drone launch sites, 9 guns and howitzers, 337 shelters, 130 dugouts, 46 small drones, 8 land combat drones, 18 electronic warfare systems, 3 radar systems, and 98 crew antennas.
Ukrainian innovation and support for entrepreneurship have repeatedly overwhelmed Russian forces. The response was slow at first but soon had an enormous impact. Perplexed by Ukrainian tactics, the Russians persisted, thereby keeping the war going.
Drones were an unexpected development that dramatically changed how battles were fought. Drones were successful because they were cheap, easily modified, and expendable. Forces could implement modifications and upgrades quickly and cheaply. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces soon used cheap quadcopter drones, with soldiers a few kilometers away controlling them via FPV goggles or a flat-screen display to see what the drone's camera saw. These drones cost a few hundred dollars each, with the most complex models going for about $1,000. Most of these drones carry a small amount of explosives, so they can instantly become flying bombs that strike a target and detonate. Some drones carry more explosives, depending on what is needed to take out a target.
These drones are awesome and debilitating weapons when used in large numbers. A major limitation on expanding drone operations is the need for trained drone operators. Ukraine found that many soldiers frequently played video games and were quick to adapt to drone operations, especially because they could use commercial game controllers.
The war has led to massive losses for Russian forces. So far, nearly a million Russian troops have died, deserted, or avoided military service because of Ukraine. Russia has lost most of its modern tanks along with many other armed vehicles and artillery systems.
For Russia, the most damaging Ukrainian innovation in drone warfare is their use of AI/Artificial Intelligence for drone targeting systems. The AI drone contains a targeting system that finds targets. The AI drone operator confirms which targets are real, and once a target is confirmed, the AI targeting system needs no further communication to destroy the target. It resists all forms of jamming.
FPV drones have radically changed modern warfare. These drones are an omnipresent aerial threat to all vehicles and infantry on foot. Each FPV drone costs less than $1,000. Operators use the drone's video camera to see what is below and locate targets. Armed FPV operators are several kilometers away to decide when their FPV drones will drop explosives on an armored vehicle, which has thinner armor on top, or on infantry in the open or in trenches. To do so, drone operators often work in pairs, with one flying behind the other and focusing on the big picture while seeking a likely target. When the reconnaissance drone finds such a target, the armed drone is directed to it. The two FPV drone operators are usually in the same room or tent and can take control of new drones lined up outside for launch when needed. The reconnaissance drones are often unarmed, so they can spend more time in the air searching for a target.
The Ukrainians developed the FPV drone in 2022, when only a few FPV drone attacks were recorded. The Ukrainian Army was the first to appreciate the potential of FPV drones. By the summer of 2023, the Russian Army also began to use FPV drones in greater numbers. Since then, the number of FPV drone attacks has grown exponentially on both sides. Only 12% of those attacks destroy the target, whether a vehicle, a group of infantry, or a sniper firing through a window from inside a building. In this case, the armed FPV drone would fly through the window and explode into the room the sniper was in. The only defense is having a nearby open door the sniper can run to or dive through as the FPV drone approaches. Sometimes that isn’t possible because the armed FPV drone comes down from above the window and then in. You don’t see those coming until it’s too late.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, October 26, 2026 - 12:49 pm: Edit

Leadership: Rules for Commanding Drones
October 22, 2026: The American military recently allowed commanders to buy drones and let their troops experiment with them. As a result, ROE (Rules of Engagement) were developed, allowing soldiers to use drones to identify and attack targets. Other questions remain, such as what technology enables drones to operate. Each drone, regardless of type, has key technologies. These include onboard flight control systems, sensor data, and external regulatory or operational devices that ensure stability, safety, and compliance with applicable regulations. Troops need commonality across drone types and models in these areas.
Drone FCS (Flight Control Systems) primarily integrate sensors, processors, and actuators to interpret pilot commands and environmental conditions in real time. The FCS relies on accelerometers, gyroscopes, GPS, magnetometers, barometers, cameras, and lidar to provide position, orientation, and environmental data.
The processing unit is a flight controller that runs algorithms to stabilize the drone, adjust motor speeds, and execute maneuvers. Motors and propellers adjust thrust to change altitude, speed, and direction. These systems enable stability, precision, and autonomy, from auto-hover and return-to-home to GPS-guided navigation and obstacle avoidance.
Beyond the drone itself, external systems control when and how drones can operate. FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) Drone Integration Concept of Operations directives describe a process for safe, scalable drone use in American airspace, including BVLOS (Beyond Visual Line of Sight) operations, airspace class rules, and safety standards. Drone operators must comply with registration, flight permits, and airspace restrictions to ensure public safety and lawful operation under the Federal Aviation Administration.
The military uses ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) systems to manage drone activity through command-and-control networks, satellite links, and secure communications. These systems manage multiple drones, integrate cross-domain data, and enforce operational security.
A layered system manages drone operations, incorporating onboard sensors, a flight controller, and actuators for real-time flight management. The FAA and other organizations establish operational boundaries and safety rules. Civilian and military command-and-control platforms define drone missions and monitor compliance. Altogether, these systems ensure drones can perform complex tasks safely, legally, and effectively.
An example of how this works in wartime can be seen in Ukraine, where Ukrainian F10 drones, which cost about $600 each, are in use by ground forces. The F10 weighs about 10 kg and carries a 2 kg explosive payload. It has a 30-minute endurance and a top speed of over 100 kilometers per hour. Its maximum range exceeds 40 kilometers, and the operator can be up to 20 kilometers away. Most current drones include targeting software that lets them continue their mission when they are out of range of the controller. At that point, the drone continues toward a target the operator selected. If no target is selected, the drone self-destructs or crashes.
On the plus side, very few drone operators have been lost in the Ukraine War. That’s because operators have a safe space to operate without interruption. An operations team usually includes one or more operators, plus support staff who track the local combat situation and identify targets. After combat units request targets, the assistant checks his tablet or laptop, where data on how many drones they have in the bunker and what type they are stored. Most surveillance and attack drones are FPV, or first-person view. Operators wear goggles with a video screen showing what the drone’s camera sees. The other team members direct the operator to the target. The drone attack often fails because of electronic jamming. When that happens, the operator is given a drone that can home in on the jammer and destroy it. These drone teams have dozens of drones in their bunkers.
On a busy day, the team can use dozens of drones. That means the drone team requires constant resupply. That is the most dangerous job because out in the open, everyone is a target. The Russians are not as adept at this form of drone warfare, but Russian drones are still a threat. Not just for the drone transport crew, but for the drone teams en route to equip another bunker. Some of these are in partially destroyed buildings or bunkers initially built by frontline combat troops. When the troops move on, their bunker becomes available for drone teams. Since the drones can attack targets 10 to 20 kilometers from their bunker, they only need to move to a new bunker if frontline troops move or retreat a significant distance. This is when the drone teams suffer most of their losses.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, October 26, 2026 - 12:50 pm: Edit

Warplanes: Ukraine Attacks Ground Russian Airliners
October 22, 2026: Ukraine drone attacks near major city airports have rendered many Russian commercial airports inoperable. At first, Ukraine pointed out that Russian airspace was no longer safe because of constant drone attacks near Russian cities. Most targets are military sites or factories that produce equipment vital to the war effort. Still, some of those drones could be diverted to attack airports. Ukrainian officials confirmed this and said Russians using commercial flights should act accordingly. That shut down a growing number of Russian airports. While Ukraine has not attacked any Russian airports or injured any Russian civilians awaiting flights, the damage was done. Ukraine told international organizations that oversee commercial aviation and pointed out that it had not done anything. No attacks hit airports or civilians.
The situation is different in Ukrainian airspace. Ukraine currently has 335 aircraft. A third are jet fighters, including 38 F-16s. Eventually, they will have more than sixty F-16s, but it takes time to train pilots and maintainers and prepare airbases to operate them. Ukraine’s French Mirage 2000 fighters have modern radars and electronic warfare systems and have proven very effective at detecting and destroying incoming Russian missiles and large attack drones. France has ordered 16 Rafale fighter-bombers, and Sweden has ordered over a hundred Gripen E, with 16 to arrive this year. Ukraine still operates Russian-made aircraft that Ukraine obtained before hostilities with Russia began in 2014. These aircraft include 42 MiG-29s and 22 Su-27 fighter-bombers.
The F-16s have some unique assignments in Ukraine. Because air defenses on both sides are so robust, neither side has air superiority and must keep its aircraft out of range of enemy air defense systems. The F-16s are most useful as another air-defense weapon to destroy Russian cruise-missile attacks. One F-16 destroyed six of these missiles in a single sortie in December 2024, which might make its pilot an ace, depending on the definition of ace, which historically meant downing five fighter aircraft.
The F-16s have proved invaluable as a last line of defense against cruise missiles that got past the air defenses. The Russian style of air control has jet fighters operating under orders from ground controllers. Ukraine uses the more flexible Western method, where pilots are briefed before takeoff on where to go and what to attack. After that, the pilot chooses when and how to carry out the attacks.
Ukrainian pilots found the F-16s easier to operate than the Russian-designed aircraft they previously used. The F-16s are more reliable and, with more NATO-standard aircraft electronics, pilots can detect and destroy targets much faster. This autonomy means Russian jamming has little impact. F-16s used American AGM-88 HARM missiles that detected Russian radars and destroyed them, even if the radar operators shut down the radars to save them. These suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) operations greatly reduced the number of operational Russian air-defense radars.
F-16s and other Western fighters are used to intercept Russian guided glide bomb and drone attacks. The F-16s often employ inexpensive laser-guided APKWS II missiles to down Russian targets. Ukraine also has NATO-supplied anti-aircraft systems like the medium-range NASAMS and IRIS-T SLS/SLM, and longer-range interceptors like the SAMP/T and Patriot. Because of the war with Iran, they are out of Patriot interceptors and probably won’t receive more until next year. Overall, Ukraine never has enough missiles for its NATO-supplied air defense systems. European nations have increased missile production and are flying them to Ukraine as soon as they come off the assembly line.
Against persistent Russian Saheed/Geran drone attacks, Ukraine uses a detection network based on ordinary Ukrainian cell phones, which transmit incoming attack locations and numbers and alert the nearest air defense systems to move to where the drones could be shot down. Truck-mounted heavy machine guns have proved remarkably effective. Russia is developing a jet-propelled Geran drone that will make interception more difficult. Current Gerans are low, slow, and loud.
The Russian air force has suffered heavy losses that are not easily replaced. Russian aviation manufacturers face growing maintenance and production challenges. For example, recently, an air force Tu-22M3 heavy bomber crashed during a training flight. A preliminary report indicates a technical malfunction caused the crash. This was the third Tu-22M3 loss due to malfunctions in three years. Similarly, last month, a Russian Boeing 737 nearly crashed over the Black Sea after an engine failed while en route to Arkhangelsk. At the last moment, the plane returned to its departure airport.
These incidents highlight the growing problems with aircraft maintenance in Russia. NATO sanctions have restricted access to essential parts, reducing efforts to maintain aircraft properly. Desperate to keep its aircraft in the air, Russia has resorted to cannibalizing some aircraft and relying on expensive smuggled parts. With fewer aircraft flying more often, the risk of accidents increases.
Problems first appeared in 2023, after a year of heavy combat. Then Ukraine used missiles and drones to attack airfields close to the Ukrainian border. This forced Russia to move many of its heavy bombers to airbases up to 6,000 kilometers from Ukraine. This made it more expensive and time-consuming for these bombers to carry and launch cruise missiles at Ukrainian targets. The added wear and tear reduced their useful lives.
NATO sanctions are also disrupting production of Russian fighters and fighter-bombers, such as the Su-30, Su-34, Su-35, and perhaps even the 10 new 6th-generation Su-57 aircraft. Production rates for these aircraft are only about 30 per year, which is not enough to replace losses from training, obsolescence, and combat. Russian plans for a new heavy bomber are on hold because of sanctions and the cost of the war in Ukraine.
Russian commercial aviation faces similar problems, and in many cases, worse. Russia eventually halted the development and production of Russian-designed and manufactured airliners. Russia can no longer obtain spare parts and maintenance support for its Airbus and Boeing airliners, which account for 70 percent of Russian commercial airliners, and over 90 percent of all commercial flights are operated by these foreign airliners. Boeing and Airbus had sold or leased these aircraft to Russia and demanded their return after Russia invaded Ukraine. Russia refused but is now cut off from manufacturer support and must rely on smuggled parts and whatever help it can get from China. About 20% of these Western airliners are currently grounded.
FYEO