Real spies and inncoent civilians??

I am guessing thats what the other side says - "they arrest our tourists and we have to release real spies...."

The first nation to say 'you captured our spy, can we have them back please,' - will not have many recruits to spy on your enemies (or friends!!!) moving forward.

Fair to say - the West will have far more spies (we can afford to pay more) than Russian, China or Iran.... so the other side probably caputures more spies than innocent civilians than we do - purely on a numbers basis.

By Mike Erickson (Mike_Erickson) on Saturday, August 03, 2024 - 02:09 pm: Edit

>> Real spies and innocent civilians??

Three of the Russians released, including Vadim Krasikov, have been *acknowledged publicly by the Kremlin* as being undercover Russian agents.

Krasikov is a professional assassin, convicted by a German court of murdering a Georgian national living in Berlin.

Which assassins are the West getting back in the swap?

--Mike

By Vincent Solfronk (Vsolfronk) on Saturday, August 03, 2024 - 04:59 pm: Edit

Thankfully there are very few Western assassination attempts these days (except for Israel against it's enemies). The Russians are just falling back to the Stalinist repression of the 1930s and 40s as they are becoming increasing isolated. Yes, some of these American citizens went to Russia knowing that there was growing repression, such as the journalist, but most are caught as Russia progressively stepped up it's anti-Western stance as the war in Ukraine failed.

The USA has been paying hostage takers since the Barbary Wars. A high-minded stance doesn't get people released, especially when hostage taking is done by state actors.

By Jeff Anderson (Jga) on Saturday, August 03, 2024 - 05:39 pm: Edit

Okay, maybe I'm being a little dense here (so what else is new), but what's to stop a "Bad Actor" on the State level from having a random innocent foreigner "Arrested for Espionage" solely for the purpose of having a barter tool to get a spy/assassin traded back from the foreigner's home country?

Oh, and why does it feel indistinguishable from State sponsored kidnapping?

By Terry O'Carroll (Terryoc) on Sunday, August 04, 2024 - 02:06 am: Edit

IMO the russians are engaging in kidnapping.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Sunday, August 04, 2024 - 02:48 am: Edit

If you arrested a random innocent Russian tourist, the Russians would just arrest ten random innocent American tourists to let us know we broke the rules.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Sunday, August 04, 2024 - 08:04 am: Edit

That is not just a supposition:

It is exactly what happened when Ronald Reagan became President, and changed the policy from what Jimmy Carter had previously had in place.

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Sunday, August 04, 2024 - 11:39 am: Edit

To be fair to Carter, modern (post FYOI releases) show Carter had successfully negotiated the release of the hostages from Iran, but part of the deal was the Mullahs insisted it had to occur AFTER the election.

Not that Carter had much chance of winning IMHO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Sunday, August 04, 2024 - 11:30 pm: Edit

Actually the mullahs insisted that the swap would be after the inauguration. The mullahs were terrified that Reagan would turn Iran into a parking lot (after the molten rock cooled).

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Monday, August 05, 2024 - 06:53 am: Edit

Quote: “Men go to far greater lengths to avoid what they fear than to obtain what they desire.” — Dan Brown, The Da Vinci Code”

By Paul Howard (Raven) on Wednesday, August 07, 2024 - 08:42 am: Edit

Well, British Armed Forces are being placed on alert to evacuate Britiish Citizens from Lebanon.

What are the chances that things will blow up on the Israeli/Lebanon broder to full war?


Accepting other nations are pulling the strings - Hezbollah can't think they can get a 'winning draw' against Israel if things get more violent?

By Terry O'Carroll (Terryoc) on Wednesday, August 07, 2024 - 12:20 pm: Edit

Reports of fighting in Kursk Oblast, russia. [An "oblast" is sort of like a province, named for the city that the oblast government is located in]. Apparently it's the russian volunteer legion of Ukraine, not Ukrainian army proper. Seems like a repeat of the shenanigans they pulled in Belgorod not long ago.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, August 07, 2024 - 07:47 pm: Edit

Israel doesn’t have the strength to start a ground war in Lebanon until it finishes in Gaza. Their plan seems to be “win in Gaza and hope Hezbollah quits.”

By Ryan Opel (Ryan) on Wednesday, August 07, 2024 - 09:18 pm: Edit

All from X


25m • 23 tweets • 5 min read • Read on X
Now that we have had a couple of days to observe the new Ukrainian cross-border attack into Kursk, I wanted to offer a quick assessment of what we know, as well as Ukraine's potential objectives and the challenges it faces. 1/23 🧵( (Image: @DefenceU)
Image
2/ Surprise is an important continuity in human competition and warfare. The aim is to shock an adversary and overwhelm them when they are their weakest or when they least expect it. That shock, and the accompanying break down in enemy cohesion & ability to effectively respond, can then be used to seize ground and destroy enemy formations.
3/ It appears that yet again, the Ukrainians have surprised Russia, and observers in the west, with their latest operation. Over the past 72 hours, we have watched as Ukraine has launched a significant cross-border assault into Russia’s Kursk region.
4/ Initially viewed as another raid into Russia, similar to the previous Ukrainian operations in May 2023 and March 2024, it has become clear that this is something different. Despite our ability to only see a small part of what is occurring in Kursk, there are several aspects of this new Ukrainian operation which are apparent.
5/ First, this is a multi-brigade operation. At least two Ukrainian brigades have been identified so far: the 22ndMechanized Brigade and the 82nd Air Assault Brigade. These are both quality formations. It appears that unlike in the 2023 southern counteroffensive where fresh brigades were employed, the Ukrainians have allocated experienced formations to this attack.
6/ Second, the Ukrainians have attacked with a highly mobile, mechanised force. This is different to the Russian dismounted attacks into Kharkiv in recent months. A high level of mobility is essential to creating or exploiting gaps in enemy defences, and rapidly exploiting such gaps. Speed and shock action are vital.
7/ Third, the Ukrainians appear to have deployed a significant amount of air defence capability. At least one Russian fighter aircraft and two helicopters have been claimed to have been shot down by the Ukrainians. There has been, as of this point, limited reports of Russia being able to use glide bombs or even large numbers of drones to counter the Ukrainian assault. This is indicative of a more effective air defence environment for the Ukrainians than was created for their 2023 counter offensives.
8/ Fourth, Ukraine has penetrated a good distance into Russia on at least two axes of advance. Main and supporting efforts are unclear. However, the situation remains very unclear and Ukrainian forces could be much deeper into Russia than we know. This constitutes the biggest advance by any side in this war since late 2022.
9/ Fifth, Ukraine has achieved surprise. This is an important theme to note given the obsession of some with describing this war as a ‘transparent battlefield’. This, again, shows that the battlefield is far from transparent, and that deception activities, good intelligence, and surprise are crucial elements of modern war.
10/ More importantly, the Ukrainian cross-border attack shows that surprise is still possible, and that offensive operations are also possible despite the prevalence of the defence in the past year.
11/ So, what might Ukraine's objectives - tactical, operational, strategic and political - be for their Kursk operation?
12/ At the most basic tactical level, this operation will be about seizing ground and destroying Russian ground and aerial forces. That is the central role of ground forces in war. But it is the operational and strategic purpose of conducting operations to seize ground and destroy the enemy that is interesting.
13/ There are a couple of possible operational objectives for this Ukrainian attack. First, Ukraine may be seeking to draw Russian forces away from its attacks on the Niu-York and its advances on Toretsk and Pokrovsk. This might be possible, but given Russia’s advantage in manpower, one would have to assess that this outcome is probably unlikely.
14/ Another operational objective, which is more likely to be realised, is to force the Russians to reconsider their force dispositions elsewhere on the front line. The Russians will have to respond, and even they do not have a bottomless pit of resources to do so. To respond to the Ukrainian attack on the Kursk region, they will have to stop defending somewhere else.
15/ Ukraine may have some specific operational objectives in mind which are related to ground. The Kursk nuclear power station may be one objective, but that still lies 60 kilometres from the border with #Ukraine, well beyond where Ukraine is currently thought to be operating. Key road and railway lines might also be interrupted.
16/ The strategic objectives of this attack can only be estimated at this early stage. First, the attack might be an attempt to slow or kill Russian momentum in its offensives which have lasted for the duration of 2024. Ukrainian planners will understand that even Russia can’t remain on the offensive forever.
17/ A 2nd strategic objective might be to shift the narrative on the war to one more positive for Ukraine and counter Russian misinformation about their ‘inevitable victory’ in Ukraine. The 2022 offensive in Kharkiv not only stunned the world but shifted the narrative on Ukraine’s ability to prosecute the war and resulted in a significant change in the west’s approach to providing aid.
18/ A 3rd strategic objective may be to boost morale in the Ukrainian population. Given the past 8 months of defensive operations, constant aerial attacks on infrastructure and ongoing power shortages, the will of the people will be at the forefront of the Ukrainian government’s considerations about the trajectory of the war.
19/ A 4th strategic objective for Ukraine might be to do what the Russians are doing in eastern Ukraine at the moment – grab as much territory as possible in case Ukraine is forced into some kind of negotiated settlement at the end of 2024 or in early 2025. Negotiating with some of your enemy’s territory is much better than negotiating without it.
20/ Ukraine faces a daunting array of issues as it moves forward with this operation. These include tactical, operational, strategic and political challenges. I explore these in detail in my new (free) article at Futura Doctrina, which can be read at the link. mickryan.substack.com/p/the-battle-o…
Image

The Battle of Kursk 2024
A quick assessment of what we know about the surprise Ukrainian assault into Russia, and what might be Ukraine’s strategic and operational objectives.
https://mickryan.substack.com/p/the-battle-of-kursk-2024
21/ Time will tell whether using these Ukrainian brigades to attack into Russia rather than defending eastern Ukraine has been the most strategically effective use of their forces.
22/ At a time when Ukrainian defenders in the east are being pushed back on several axes, the use of highly capable Ukrainian combat forces in Kursk is either a brilliant countermove to shift the momentum in the war, or a strategic error which compounds the challenges in Ukraine’s eastern Ukraine defensive operations.
23/ There is no way yet to make this assessment, however. As with all war, there is an abundance of uncertainty at the early stage of this Ukrainian offensive. Not only are we unsure about just how far the Ukrainians have penetrated, but we are also unsure of the strategic & political objectives of this operation. There is much more to learn in the coming days. End.
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More from @WarintheFuture
Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture
Mick Ryan, AM
@WarintheFuture
Aug 6
A good thread from @RALee85 on the new Ukrainian operation on the Kursk axis. Given defensive pressures elsewhere, particularly with Russia's advances towards Pokrovsk and Toretsk, the strategic rationale for this operation at this time is difficult to fathom. 1/5 🧵
2/ One potential driver is political. The government of #Ukraine want to shift momentum and the strategic narrative, and have directed such an operation.
3/ Another potential driver is operational. That is, to draw away Russian forces from the Donbas to defend on the Kursk axis. However, given Russian advantages in manpower, Russia can probably cover both with limited impact on its operations in eastern #Ukraine.
Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture
Mick Ryan, AM
@WarintheFuture
Jul 29
“The threats the United States faces are the most serious and most challenging the nation has encountered since 1945 and include the potential for near-term major war.” The report from U.S. National Defense Strategy Commission has been released. Some highlights. 1/11 🧵 rand.org/content/dam/ra…
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2/ On China - “The Commission finds that, in many ways, China is outpacing the United States and has largely negated the U.S. military advantage in the Western Pacific through two decades of focused military investment. Without significant change by the United States, the balance of power will continue to shift in China’s favor. “
3/ Russia - “Russia will devote 29 percent of its federal budget this year on national defense as it continues to reconstitute its military and economy after its failed initial invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia possesses considerable strategic, space, and cyber capabilities and under Vladimir Putin seeks a return to its global leadership role of the Cold War.”
Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture
Mick Ryan, AM
@WarintheFuture
Jul 29
In the last 48 hours, #Ukraine conducted one of its longest-range strategic strikes yet. Today, an update on what is occurring with Ukraine’s multiple strike campaigns, their key functions and the challenges that Ukraine will face in strike operations against Russia for the remainder of 2024 and into 2025. 1/18 🧵🇺🇦
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2/ The weekend strikes are claimed to have damaged a Russian Tu-22M3 long-range supersonic bomber at the Olenya airfield, south of Murmansk. This particular airfield lies about 1800 kilometres from Ukraine and is close to Russia’s border with northern Finland.
3/ The Ukrainians have also recently struck key targets in Crimea. This included the significant damage to Russia’s last railway ferry in Crimea. This vessel has been used to transport military equipment to Russian forces in the occupied peninsula and thence to forces in southern Ukraine.
Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture
Mick Ryan, AM
@WarintheFuture
Jul 10
In the past 24 hours we have seen again the brutality of the Putin regime, and the murderous band of barbarians called the Russian military. The deliberate attack by a Russian precision missile on the Okhmatdyt hospital, despite its horror, is part of a wider Russian campaign to terrorise the people of #Ukraine. 1/10 🧵🇺🇦
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2/ This was not the action of a few bad apples. It is the outcome of a systemic, command-led campaign to terrorise and brutalise Ukrainians, just as the Russians did with Syrians and Chechens.
3/ Russian political and military leaders have nurtured a culture of indiscriminate killing in Ukraine and set the conditions for it to flourish. They bear full responsibility for the killings at Okhmatdyt hospital, Bucha and other atrocities across Ukraine in the past two and half years.
Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture
Mick Ryan, AM
@WarintheFuture
Jul 8
In the next 48 hours, NATO will hold its annual summit. This time it will be hosted by the U.S. in Washington DC. There will be a range of topics discussed, including the war in #Ukraine. But, China's role in supporting Russia may also be a subject of some discussion. 1/11 🧵
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2/In June, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO described how “China has taken a side; China has opted to support Russia through the provision of these dual-use components; and that if it opted to stop doing that, we believe it would have a major impact on Russia’s ability to conduct the war on the ground inside Ukraine.”
3/ But how does China benefit from supporting Russia, and indeed, benefit from a continuation of the war? I think there are three key areas where it does so: strategic, economic and ideological.
Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture
Mick Ryan, AM
@WarintheFuture
Jul 2
Back in May, I explored the likely Russian objectives for its military operations in 2024, and how it was progressing towards them. Russia has built strategic momentum with its assaults on Ukraine in the past six months. However, they have largely failed to exploit their opportunties. 1/12 🧵 🇺🇦
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2/ Russia has made some progress on the ground and yet even this has come at massive costs. For the gain of around 513 square km, they have lost around 180 thousand personnel. Losing 360 people for every km is a poor return on investment - in any war.
3/ And, as this graph from @ragnarbjartur shows, Russian casualties have only increased in the past six months during its 2024 offensives.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Wednesday, August 07, 2024 - 09:27 pm: Edit

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov assessed on August 7 that Russian offensive potential will culminate within one and a half to two months, generally consistent with ISW's assessment on current Russia's offensive capabilities. Budanov noted that the main Russian offensive "should end" in about two months, because it "has already dragged on." Budanov emphasized that Ukrainian troops will be proactive in the meantime and not simply let the Russian offensive run out of steam without doing anything, suggesting that Ukrainian forces will continue local tactical counterattacks in areas of the front where they deem such attacks to be the most promising. Budanov's statements are consistent with ISW's assessment that Russian forces are currently committing the breadth of their present materiel and manpower capabilities to pursuing offensive operations throughout the theater, particularly in Donetsk Oblast, and that Russian forces are unlikely to launch a new distinct offensive operation this summer due to mounting constraints to their capabilities. Even as Russian forces continue to make tactically significant advances towards Pokrovsk, the rate of their gain is not indefinite, and Russian forces will likely struggle to sustain their offensive efforts as they come up against more built-up urban areas along the line of settlements directly east of Pokrovsk. Russian forces are executing their summer offensive operation with mechanized assaults that often lead to high armored vehicle losses, and the Russian command's apparent willingness to accept these materiel losses on relatively small sectors of the front will eventually burden the Russian military in the long-term, pushing them closer to culmination.

By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Thursday, August 08, 2024 - 02:25 am: Edit

I recall reading the last open gas pipeline to europe lies in the oblast. Ah, yes: "The main operational gas pipeline into Europe runs near Sudzha, where a metering station monitors the reduced Russian supplies to countries such as Austria and Hungary. Ukraine has allowed gas to continue flowing through the pipeline as part of a contract that expires at the end of 2024."
THE Guardian (UK)

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Thursday, August 08, 2024 - 06:33 pm: Edit

Video is being posted to you tube, clip capture from Russian TV news.

Thousands of civilians are self deporting them selves from Kursk, a city in Russia.

The city has been targeted by Ukraine apparently (this is a guess), as Ukraine hasn’t AFAICT taken responsibility for the attack yet.

Up until now, the Russians have been targeting Ukrainian civilians by attacking cities with a variety of weapons, missiles, artillery and drnes.

I may be mistaken, but I thought it was the Ukrainian civilians who were supposed to panic and retreat in panic, not the Russian Civilians.

Does anyone think this is going to work out in favor of Putin?

By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Friday, August 09, 2024 - 02:42 am: Edit

A Marder 1 IFV has been seen on images from the operation. German panzers back at Kursk, who would have thought that ever happening?

By Terry O'Carroll (Terryoc) on Friday, August 09, 2024 - 08:35 am: Edit

I've heard unconfirmed reports that Ukraine is digging in around Sudzha, where the gas pipeline runs. russian sources state that gas is flowing through the pipeline at a reduced rate. If the gas is cut off completely, that's yet another problem for the russian economy, which is in bad shape.

The Kursk area was defended by conscripts, who had no stomach for a fight and either retreated or surrendered en masse; and also Kadyrov's Chechens, who do not seem to have done very much if anything to resist the Ukrainian invaders.

The russian government seems to be doing nothing at all to help russian refugees from Kursk, and one pundit has speculated that Ukraine may end up evacuating russian civilians from Kursk to Ukraine.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Friday, August 09, 2024 - 01:44 pm: Edit

Same source that posted Russian TV video feed has now posted video of a Russian troop convoy that allegedly was tasked with reinforcing Kursk defenses.

Fourteen trucks (all painted olive green, three axle, 2x4x4 ten wheels pattern) destroyed, either by artillery or some sort of area effect explosives.

Detailed views of the bodies was grayed out of the video, but Russian shoulder patches clearly visable.

If this is a misinformation propaganda operation, I have to say it appears realistic with good detail.

What I can’t figure out is why a Russian Federation TV station is broadcasting images/stories that do not reflect well on the Russian war effort.

Unless the powers in charge of that particular Russian Federation state don’t want Putin to win… or possibly build up public hostility to supporting the war with Ukraine.

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Friday, August 09, 2024 - 01:48 pm: Edit

If the Gas pipeline is cut off it is ALSO really bad news for Austria & Hungary...

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Friday, August 09, 2024 - 03:05 pm: Edit

If the gas pipeline is cut off, one of the last large sources of hard currency that has been very reliable for the Russian Economy ends.

There are reports of public unrest and demonstrations in Russia directly tied to domestic economic issues.

Some of the recently deceased advisors of Putin had been warning about the state of the Russian economy (which may have been a factor directly related to their life expectancy being ended unexpectedly.)

If Putin doesn’t have the money to pay his guards, look out…

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Friday, August 09, 2024 - 03:54 pm: Edit

Saw a report that Russia killed four himars missile trucks in one day.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Friday, August 09, 2024 - 03:58 pm: Edit

They're pretty desperate to do so; a HIMARS strike took out an entire Russian battalion in Ukraine's Kursk offensive.

By Mike Erickson (Mike_Erickson) on Friday, August 09, 2024 - 04:51 pm: Edit

The gas pipeline being cut off just puts additional pressure on the world gas market. It's so weird to be "waging war" against a major supplier of an essential commodity.

--Mike