Special Operations: Russian Ship Sabotage
April 8, 2025: Incidents of Russian sabotage are increasingly occurring in Europe. One recent incident involved metal shavings found in an engine component of a new German corvette. The shavings were discovered and removed before they could do any damage. Russia is believed behind multiple sabotage incidents in the last year. Russia, unable to subdue Ukraine with military force, concluded that the most vulnerable aspect of the Ukrainian war effort was the support received from NATO countries. For over a year Russia has been attacking NATO nations clandestinely with disinformation and sabotage using a combination of specialized diplomats and sleeper agents who have long been living in Europe. The sleeper agents usually don’t carry out the sabotage themselves but hire criminal networks in Europe to do it.
European police and security agencies were aware of these plans and, when these sabotage activities were detected, the criminals were sought and some were arrested. Some of these men confirmed the Russian source of these attacks. With these Russian efforts no longer secret, Russian recruiting efforts were crippled, but not halted, because of fears that anyone who worked for Russia would be quickly identified and arrested. Since Russia invaded Ukraine, public opinion in Europe has been hostile to Russia. Undeterred, the Russian sleepers faded deeper into the background and used one or more levels of intermediaries to identify criminal groups who were willing to carry out the sabotage if the financial rewards were high enough.
There have been a few railway accidents that are now being reexamined to see if they were acts of sabotage. Russian jamming of GPS signals continues to be a problem in several European countries. Russia denies any involvement but the evidence of Russian complicity grows with each incident. In this respect Russia is at war with European nations and these attacks have led to economic sanctions against Russia. Russia sees this as an attack on their economy and their sleeper coordinated sabotage campaign in Western Europe is their response.
Russia had sleeper agents in Ukraine since the 1990s, after Ukraine became an independent state in 1991. The sleepers were not fully activated until Russia realized their 2022 invasion was faltering. There was no public announcement of this but by 2024 the Ukrainian security service, or SSU, detected several Russian agents operating in Kherson, which is near the Black Sea northwest of Crimea. Three Russian spies were arrested and apparently none of these men admitted to being sleepers or knowing anything about sleepers. That was not unusual, as sleepers and the agents they hire locally know that as long as they disclose nothing, Russia will do whatever they can to free these loyal agents.
Russia believes that conventional warfare waged in Ukraine and the unconventional warfare carried out worldwide complement each other. Russian efforts to destabilize Africa are supposed to divert attention and resources headed to Ukraine. To make this happen, Russian spies, assassins, and propagandists continue their efforts.
Revolution and subversion efforts worldwide have long been used by the Soviet Union and later Russia to exploit whatever opportunities were available to disrupt and diminish support for groups hostile to Russia, while encouraging local leaders that support Russian objectives. For example, in 2016, Russian operatives recruited criminal gangs to cause trouble in the tiny Balkan state of Montenegro and disrupt efforts by that country to join NATO. That attempt failed when several foreign agents and pro-coup Montenegrin politicians were detected, arrested, prosecuted, and imprisoned.
In February 2022, Russian agents tried to organize widespread protests in Ukraine that would justify Russian military intervention, aided by pro-Russian factions in the Ukrainian government. These factions were supposed to make it possible for pro-Russian groups belonging to the Ukrainian parliament and government to seize power. That effort failed because the Russians overestimated the number of pro-Russian officials in the Ukrainian government and the Russian invasion did not immediately succeed, as the Russians expected. There were too many Ukrainians willing and able to fight and defeat the Russian invaders.
The Russian FSB is the post-Soviet version of the KGB but has demonstrated a shortage of skills and ability to match the performance of the KGB in its prime. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was made possible, in part, because the KGB had also lost its ability to get things done. By the end of 2022, the military failures in Ukraine gave the FSB more political and financial support to move forward with spending more time, money and effort on their sleepers program. The FSB has to call on retired agents who had served during the pre-1991 Soviet Union era. Many Russian sleepers were exposed in the 1990s because Soviet archives were open to foreign historians, some of them secretly working for Western intelligence agencies. Many Russian sleepers were identified and arrested. That put an end to Western researchers studying KGB archives. Russia considers arresting their sleepers in Europe and North Americans a hostile act. The Russians quietly began rebuilding and expanding their sleeper network. Meanwhile the Russians arrested innocent Western visitors to Russia and kept them in prison until they could be exchanged for arrested Russian sleepers.
Western intelligence agencies now spend a lot of time trying to identify sleepers and pay more attention to acts of sabotage. These acts are often disguised as accidents of the result of a local feud. For the last two years, sleepers have become prime suspects. When pursuing whoever was responsible for acts of sabotage, sleepers are often at the top of the list of possible perpetrators.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 08, 2025 - 03:00 pm: Edit

Leadership: Coping With Ukrainian Corruption
April 7, 2025: Several senior Ukrainian officers and military specialists are being prosecuted for corruption. Currently most such cases involve officers or recruiting officials accepting bribes to authorize soldiers to leave the military. Many of the corrupt officials do not hide their new wealth and their sudden affluence draws the attention of the corruption investigators. Arrests are made and the culprits jailed. In many cases, wives or children of the jailed men have left the country with the bribe money. From their foreign exile they will finance efforts to get their corrupt father freed.
Since the first year of the war, corruption has been a common problem on both sides. In late 2022 Volodymyr Zelensky fired the head of the Internal Security Agency/SBU and the chief prosecutor along with over sixty other officials, and brought treason and collaboration charges against 651 SBU members and local officials. Most of those charged worked for the SBU.
The large number of people charged is the result of more Ukrainians reporting information leaks and collaboration with the Russians in Ukraine as well as the occupied territories, especially the ones that were seized in the first week of the Russian invasion. There were also complaints from more recent members of the SBU that there were still a lot of SBU veterans who openly criticized government policy and condoned corruption, especially within the SBU.
The SBU is the successor to the Ukrainian branch of the KGB. After Ukraine became independent in 1991, obvious KGB loyalists were fired but many veterans remained. These officials perpetuated a culture of corruption along with the formidable deception and operational skills the KGB excelled in. The SBU is a large organization, with 35,000 employees. That is the same size as the American FBI, for a country with seven times more people. Equivalent European agencies, like DST in France and MI5 in Britain are equally small, relative to population, as the FBI. On a per-capita basis Western internal agencies have about 109 agency personnel per million population. For the Russian FSB it is 591 and for the SBU it is about 850. For the Soviet KGB it was 1,600.
The SBU, like its predecessor the KGB, demands high performance and discipline. In return, KGB personnel were free to make a little extra on the side, The KGB was literally above the law as the only ones who could arrest KGB personnel were other KGB personnel. The post-Soviet FSB and SBU have similar immunities.
A growing number of the post-199os SBU hires were personnel who, like those who voted Zelensky into office in 2019, saw corruption as a major obstacle to Ukrainian prosperity and independence from Russian influence. Then came the 2022 invasion and NATO military aid and assistance, especially in intelligence collection. NATO, mainly the U.S., monitored and decrypted Russian communications relevant to Ukraine and shared data with the Ukrainians. That revealed evidence that turned suspicions of SBU treason into indictments. With leaky SBU members identified it was possible to identify many of their Ukrainian sources. It also sent a message to the SBU that the long sought culture shift in the organization was happening.
In Russia opinion polls revealed that most Russians accepted corruption as a basic element in Russian culture and unlikely to be eliminated any time soon. Most Russians also complain that the prevalence of corruption hurts the economy and is another unpleasant aspect of life in Russia. While the government generates a lot of publicity about anti-corruption efforts, it is widely understood that, when some major government official or former official is arrested and charged with corruption there is more to the story. First, the official is probably guilty as charged and the details make interesting reading. The other part of the story is generally not published and involves the details of which other senior officials the corrupt official offended. Issues over sharing are the usual reason for a senior politician or military officer being prosecuted for corruption. While there may be no honor among thieves, there is a code of conduct and those who misbehave are publicly spanked, lose a lot of money and often spend some time in prison.
Another unique aspect of Russian corruption is that it is more prevalent in the military because theft of state property has been the Russian national pastime for centuries. This corruption is seen as a major factor in Russian combat disasters. Even military leaders accept that, but in peacetime the opportunities are too abundant and the discipline too inadequate to prevent corruption. Government prosecutors estimate that military corruption costs the military over $500 million a year and disrupts the operation of units, major programs and everything else. Despite the frequent prosecutions it is believed corruption in the military is increasing. There were 2,800 officers and officials prosecuted in 2018, an increase over previous years despite so many of those prosecuted getting convicted and imprisoned.
In 2013 Russian prosecutors announced that they had arrested three army officers and accused them of stealing seven tons of fuel. To make matters worse, this was not a gang operation but three officers each operating independently and stealing diesel from large tanker trucks sent to support the first annual tank gunnery and driving competition. This event got a lot of publicity. Despite all that attention, these three officers thought they could divert about $5,000 worth of diesel fuel to the black market. Such fuel thefts are not unusual in the army, and most perpetrators are not caught. But these three officers were bold, or stupid, and tried to flitch the fuel at a high-profile event. The actual theft occurred while fuel and other resources were stockpiled for the event. Such criminality is all too common and Russian corruption investigators believe that about 20 percent of the military budget is lost to corruption and outright theft. Despite more frequent arrests and prosecution of offenders, the stealing continues.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 08, 2025 - 03:02 pm: Edit

Logistics: World War II Bomber Bases Refurbished
April 7, 2025: Over the last decade China has been increasingly aggressive in the Pacific, claiming ownership of more and more Pacific islands. Many of these islands are far from the Chinese coast. China expects to eventually take possession of these islands as they continue building more warships and basing troops and weapons on islands they have already claimed or, in some cases, built by dredging up lots of sand to expand a reef into an island capable of supporting an airstrip, a dock and a garrison. Many World War II airfields were abandoned after Japan surrendered in September 1945 and have since become overgrown with vegetation. These airfields are still usable once you remove the vegetation, make some repairs, and add some support facilities.
Since World War II the main American airbase in the Pacific was on the island of Guam. This has turned Guam into a vulnerable target for long range Chinese ballistic missiles. Guam is still important, but additional bases are needed to supplement and possibly replace Guam in the event of a major war, so the U.S. government is creating some.
The island bases currently being revived include one on Tinian and another in the Philippines. One or more of the Northern Mariana Islands will also become an emergency airbase. These air bases have several uses. One is as a divert airbase, for aircraft that need to land somewhere and that is often difficult over the Pacific. Some of the divert fields would have fuel and other items needed to get an aircraft into the air again. Having many of these airfields makes it difficult for China or anyone else to paralyze Americans' land-based aviation by destroying or damaging just a few airbases. American allies in the region, like Japan, Australia, Philippines, and Taiwan can also use these remote Pacific Island bases. These allies already have their own bases that are available to allies.
Japan already has several smaller islands it can use for additional bases. Japan is expanding its military presence on and around Okinawa by building a radar station on Yonaguni Island. This is the westernmost inhabited Japanese island, although it only officially became part of Japan in 1879, along with Okinawa. Yonaguni island has a population of 1,500 and is a favorite tourist attraction for Japanese. The island is 2,000 kilometers southwest of Tokyo, 505 kilometers west of Okinawa, 300 kilometers southeast of China, 110 kilometers east of Taiwan and 144 kilometers southwest of the disputed, by China, Senkaku Islands. This new radar station produced a very loud protest from China who are not happy with Japanese hostility to Chinese threats over the Senkakus. Okinawa is als0 2,280 kilometers from Guam.
The Japanese are alarmed at increasing Chinese military activity in waters and airspace around their main islands and more distant smaller islands. It’s not just disputed areas, especially the Senkaku Islands, but around Okinawa and increasingly east of Japan, in the Pacific. Operating out there is what the Chinese would have to do for a blockade of Japan. There is growing support for expanding the Japanese military as a result of all this Chinese naval and air activity, especially obtaining long range drones for maritime patrol and ballistic missiles for hitting Chinese bases in the event of hostilities. This doesn’t bother China as much as constant Japanese chatter about developing nuclear weapons, but the Chinese believe that decades of anti-nuke militancy would prevent Japan from actually going down this road. If Japan did build nukes, it would make Japan once more dangerous to China and that could cause a really dangerous situation. A related issue is that South Korea is presently considering developing its own nuclear weapons as that will definitely affect Japan’s decision.
Back in 2012 China became particularly angry after the Japanese government purchased the Senkaku islands from the Japanese family that had owned them since the 19th century. China and Japan were also increasingly sending small warships to patrol contested parts of their disputed Senkaku Islands or Diaoyu in Chinese or Tiaoyutai in Taiwanese.
The islands are actually islets, which are 167 kilometers northeast of Taiwan and 426 kilometers southeast of Japan's Okinawa and have a total area of 6.3 square kilometers. Taiwan also claims the islands, which were discovered by Chinese fishermen in the 16th century and taken over by Japan in 1879. They are valuable now because of the 380 kilometer economic zone nations can claim in their coastal waters. This includes fishing and possible underwater oil and gas fields. For China, the islands are a valuable source of fish, with Chinese fishing boats taking over 150,000 tons a year from the vicinity of the Senkakus. China fears that Japan might try to prohibit Chinese fishing in the area.
A conservative Japanese political group built a lighthouse there in 1986, to further claims of Japanese ownership. The Japanese have the most powerful naval forces in the region and are backed up by a mutual defense treaty with the United States. China was long dissuaded by that, but no more. China is no longer backing off on its claims, and neither is Japan. So, these confrontations are becoming more serious. Taiwan is not considered a serious contender in this dispute but is showing up anyway.
China also has claims on Okinawa, but the Chinese government has not become aggressive about this yet, though they have with claims on Indian territory. Back in 2010, responding to Japanese media reports of menacing Chinese warships off Okinawa, China announced that these were Chinese navy ships engaged in training in international waters. Nothing special. Just training. Trust us.
Most Japanese don’t trust China. There has been growing evidence since 2000 that this distrust is warranted. For example, back in 2004 China admitted that a submerged submarine the Japanese navy had been tracking off the coast of Okinawa was indeed a Chinese boat. The Japanese had always insisted that the sub was Chinese. Apparently, American P-3 patrol aircraft, operating from Guam, were the first to pick up the location of the Chinese sub and then turned the tracking over to the Japanese navy. It was American technology that confirmed the identification of the sub. During the Cold War, the United States developed techniques for identifying individual submarines according to their shape, and by the noises they made. The American navy maintains electronic databases of submarine signatures. China apologized for the incident, which had their boat inside Japanese territorial waters for a short period of time. China said the cause was a navigational accident. China has been sending its subs to sea more often since 2000 in order to raise the skill levels of the crews.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 08, 2025 - 03:07 pm: Edit

Leadership: European NATO Must Spend More
April 4, 2025: American political and military leaders agree that European NATO countries should spend more for their own defense. To encourage that the Americans plan to remove U.S. forces from Europe and tell the locals that if the Russians invade, European forces will have to deal with the initial attacks. It takes weeks for the United States to fly or ship significant forces to Europe.
For over three years, invading Russian forces have been fighting in Ukraine. One reason Russia gave for invading was Ukrainian efforts to join NATO and gain the protection of the NATO alliance, which includes the United States in addition to well-armed nearby states like Poland, Germany and France. Russia did not want to fight the NATO alliance. While NATO could not justify sending troops to Ukraine, they could and did send over $100 billion worth of weapons and munitions plus as much or more in economic aid. The Americans were the largest contributor but, as the war continued, European contributions increased while U.S. shipments declined.
NATO continues to support Ukraine because that was what NATO was established in 1949 to do. The threat then was the aggressive Soviet Union, which never attacked. When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the largest and most aggressive successor state was the Russian Federation, led by men who wanted to rebuild the Soviet empire and decided in 2014 to start with Ukraine.
The Russian invasion reminded other NATO states that Russia was still a threat which was very real. At the same time, Russia is aware that NATO countries can muster more military forces than Russia and possess far larger economic resources than Russia. NATO nations are planning to increase the number of soldiers in their peacetime forces and that means a return of conscription. Without the Ukraine War, European voters would not have approved the return of conscription as a necessary step to increase the size of their armed forces. NATO nations have large enough populations of military age men to do this, in addition to enormous economic resources. Recent opinion polls show that most military age European men are not enthusiastic about military service.
NATO members accounted for 45 percent of $2.24 billion in global defense spending in 2022. NATO spending continued increasing faster than global spending because of the war in Ukraine. For example Denmark announced that it would gradually increase defense spending over the next ten years until it reached about $21 billion. At that point defense spending would be three times what it was in 2022 and would meet the NATO suggested two percent of GDP. Denmark had long spent much less, safe in the knowledge that the United States and larger NATO members met or exceeded the spending goal applicable to all NATO members. This annoyed the United States, but America had the largest economy in the world and military commitments worldwide.
The U.S. has long had the largest defense budget in the world. During the 1948-91 Cold War, European NATO governments believed their job was to keep the Americans in, the Germans down and the Russians out. After 1945 Germany was divided, with West German eventually joining NATO and prospering economically while East Germany stagnated economically and was controlled by Russia. Germans had had enough of militarism and preparing for war. West Germany joined NATO in order to keep the Russians out and spent what was necessary to meet NATO goals. West Germans knew that if Russia attacked, they would be the main target. West Germany was where other NATO members stationed most of their troops assigned to defend Europe. After the Soviet Union collapsed and a much smaller Russia became a democracy, defense spending by NATO members plummeted. The newly reunified Germany had huge costs associated with the merger of West and East Germany, and even more reason to reduce defense spending.
This post-Cold War peace bonus turned out to be temporary. By 2000 Russia was rearming and becoming more aggressive. One thing led to another and now we have the Ukraine War. This is the largest conflict NATO has ever had to deal with. Russia accused Ukraine of planning to join NATO. That wasn’t true, at least until 2014 when Russia seized Crimea and portions of two eastern Ukraine provinces. Not content with that, Russia invaded in 2022, seeking to absorb Ukraine back into a Greater Russia. Despite all the previous Russian defense spending and military reorganization, the invasion failed. This was due to Russian incompetence and corruption, huge reforms in the Ukrainian military, a spike in Ukrainian patriotism, ferocious Ukrainian resistance, and over $100 billion in military and economic aid sent to Ukraine by NATO members. This means that, 37 months after the invasion, Russian forces are significantly outnumbered, on the defensive and the Ukrainians are attacking but not winning.
All that aid to Ukraine caused most NATO members to reconsider their own annual defense spending. This was nothing new. After Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, NATO members realized that the Cold War threat was back and Cold War level defense spending would be required to deal with it. In September 2014 NATO members met and set specific commitments regarding defense spending. These commitments forced NATO members to halt declines in defense expenditure. Another annoying mandate was to keep spending in line with GDP growth. Members who currently spent less than two percent of their GDP on defense, were supposed to reach two percent within the next decade, preferably in ways that improved their ability to meet NATO obligations.
The 2015 budgets of many countries told a different story, often in contrast to what politicians are saying about recent events in Ukraine being a game changer in NATO military thinking about all threats. This included continuing military action against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/ISIL in the Middle East and elsewhere. By 2025 Islamic terrorists were showing up in Europe because some countries allowed large numbers of Moslems to move in and act like Moslems.
U.S. military spending was the only one consistently above the 2 percent mark with the 2015 budget being at 2.7 percent GDP, which was stable in inflation-adjusted real terms but lagged behind GDP growth and slowly became a lower GDP percentage. America, Greece and Estonia were the only NATO countries meeting or exceeding the two percent GDP recommendation, representing more than 75 percent of NATO military spending. An examination of military budget changes for 14 select NATO member countries does not look good for NATO.
The three most powerful, in military and economic terms, European NATO members of France, Germany and Britain, despite all their talk about necessity to deal with recent events in Ukraine and Middle East, instead reduced their defense spending even though they were already spending less than two percent GDP on defense.
The Germans spent $41.72 billion in 2015, six percent less than in 2014. The 2105 spending was 1.09 percent of GDP versus 1.3 percent in 2013. By 2025 Germany is spending two percent of GDP or $55 billion on defense. Such a state of affairs resulted in severe readiness issues for the German military, including cuts in training, equipment shortages, maintenance issues and generally low readiness levels.
France was better off, at $41.2 billion, or 1.5 percent GDP in 2015. This was the same as in 2014. France did make big cuts earlier but its role in dealing with ISIL and sentiment after a recent major Islamic terrorist attack in France didn't seem to have much effect on its NATO-related spending. By 2025 France is spending two percent of GDP or $55 billion on defense. France plans to eventually spend 3.5 percent of GDP on defense.
Britain also faced defense spending cuts, from $55 billion in 2014 to $54 billion in 2015. This was even worse in GDP percentage terms, in part due to changes in GDP calculations by adding narcotics, prostitution and charitable spending to the definition of GDP. This produced a decrease in defense spending as a percentage of Britain’s GDP, from 2.07 percent to 1.88 percent of GDP. That was the lowest British defense spending as a GDP percentage in the previous 25 years.
By 2025 Britain is spending 2.3 percent of GDP on defense and planning t0 reach three percent by 2034.
Canada and Italy, two other NATO members with rather large economies, also decreased their defense spending. Canada spent $14.2 billion in 2014 which was just one percent of its GDP and planned to reduce it by $2.1 billion in coming years, to an extremely low 0.85 percent of GDP. Italy's already low 2014 defense spending of 1.2 percent GDP amounted to $13.68 billion but fell to $12.91 billion in the 2015 defense budget. Some smaller countries did take their military situation and NATO commitments seriously. The Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were the most rattled by the Ukraine crisis among NATO countries because of their borders with Russia, small size, and often issues with a large Russian minority. Estonia, one of the very few NATO countries that reached the 2 percent GDP defense spending target, has decided to exceed it by 0.05 percent GDP in 2015. Lithuania, which spent just 0.9 percent of its GDP on defense in 2014, reached 1 percent in 2015, and has committed to increase it by 0.2 percent of GDP every year, until it reaches the recommended 2 percent GDP mark. Latvia, much like Lithuania, has decided on a quick expansion of its military, its defense spending rising from 0.78 percent GDP in 2014 to 1.11 percent GDP in 2015. Unfortunately, the significant increases in military spending of Baltic countries is not a big one in real terms. Their economies are small, and as such, the biggest military budget of those three, Lithuania's, is just barely above $0.5 billion.
Poland, one of few NATO countries taking the Ukraine crisis as seriously as the Baltics, spent $10.4 billion (1.95 percent of GDP) in 2014 and got it up to the required 2 percent of GDP in 2016, with a specific focus on procurement of modern equipment. Romania followed Poland's example, with its military spending rising from 1.4 percent in 2014 to 1.7 percent in 2015 and reached 2 percent in 2017. Because of the Ukraine War next door, Poland is now spending five percent of GDP on defense. Poland has increased the size of its military to half a million troops and is in the process of receiving over a thousand South Korean K2 tanks. Added to the hundreds of modern tanks, including Leopards and M1s they already have, Poland will have the most powerful military in Europe and the largest force of modern tanks.
It is different elsewhere in Central Europe. Bulgaria and Hungary who, despite promises to increase their relatively small military budgets in 2015, actually reduced them as a portion of GDP share, by 0.15 percent and 0.04. Norway and Netherlands slightly increased their defense budgets, both of them reversing long running downwards trends.
The 2022 Russian invasion was not a surprise to many east European NATO members. Less than a year before the invasion, Poland announced it was doubling the size of its military to 300,000 troops, giving it the largest active-duty force among the European NATO nations. The Polish military currently consists of 216,000 troops. Poland already spends more on defense than any other NATO member. The goal for NATO nations is two percent of GDP but even in 2021 only a few had reached or exceeded that, including the United States with 3.7 percent, Britain 2.2 percent and France 2.1 percent. Russia was spending 4.3 percent. Elsewhere in the world Saudi Arabia spent 8.4 percent, Israel 5.6 percent, India 2.9 percent, South Korea 2.8 percent, Australia 2.1 percent and China somewhere between two and three percent. North Korea spends about a quarter of GDP on the military but has a GDP that is only about five percent the size of South Korea’s. Global defense spending is about two trillion dollars and 2.4 percent of global GDP. U.S. spending accounts for 39 percent of that, which is equal to the next fourteen nations combined.
Polish defense spending has increased enormously since it joined NATO in 1999, when it was spending $3.2 billion a year. To be a NATO member they had to bring all their military equipment up to NATO standards. While some of the Cold War era Russian equipment qualified, or could do so with some modifications, Poland wanted to replace most of the Cold War gear with modern Western weapons and equipment. Fortunately for Poland and other East European nations that joined NATO after 1991, the Cold War era NATO nations were reducing their armed forces and offered a lot of modern NATO weapons to the new members at very low cost or for free. Poland was able to upgrade its forces with German and American tanks and is also buying F-35 fighters, guided rockets, more effective electronics and modern military logistical equipment. Poland was a major manufacturer of ships, aircraft, and military vehicles while part of the Russian Warsaw Pact that dissolved in 1991. At the same time the Soviet Union was disintegrating. Poland is now producing NATO standard ships, aircraft, vehicles, and all manner of modern weapons. For that reason, most of the cost for expanding the military will be spent in Poland and make it possible to complete the expansion by the end of the decade or sooner.
After 2014 many East European nations feared Russia had gone from former occupier to current threat and all decided to speed upgrades to their armed forces, as quickly as limited budgets allowed. For example, in 2015 Lithuania increased the 2016 defense budget by 35 percent. This made defense spending 1.48 percent of GDP. All this is eerily like what happened after World War I when France and Britain tried to help equip newly created, from the wreckage of the Russian and Austrian empires, countries like Poland and the Baltic States with cheap World War I surplus weapons and promises of aid if Russia should seek to rebuild its fractured empire. The Russians did attack in 1920 and 1939, lost in 1920 and won in 1939, and now that bit of history repeated itself in Ukraine. In 1989 the newly liberated nations of East Europe sought some solutions to avoid repeating old history. What is happening in Ukraine demonstrates that NATO itself is one solution because Ukraine was considering NATO membership before the invasion, and wants to consider joining once the fighting with Russia is over. The NATO rules do not allow a nation at war to join. That has not stopped NATO members from sending Ukraine over $100 billion in assistance since the invasion and continuing to send more. NATO nations also suffered economically by enforcing the economic sanctions imposed on Russia. This has cost some NATO members billions of dollars because they could no longer trade with Russia.
The war has made it clear to Russia, NATO and Ukraine that Russia could not handle a war with the NATO alliance that involved NATO troops as well as large quantities of NATO weapons. The fighting so far has provided NATO nations with a growing list of improvements needed for their weapons and equipment. NATO weapons have generally outperformed their Russian equivalents and modifications are being made to address any problems encountered. Russia has a more extensive list of needed fixes and upgrades but lacks sufficient money to deal with more than a few of them.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 08, 2025 - 03:09 pm: Edit

China: South China Sea
March 31, 2025: During January 2025 Chinese and Filipino coast guard ships collided ships in the South China Sea near Second Thomas Shoal. Four Filipino crewmen were injured. China also employed 40 fishing trawlers and other ships to block Filipino coast guard operations.
In February 2025, Chinese ships interfered with Filipino coast guard vessels trying to carry out a medical evacuation. China deployed about 40 ships during this effort to capture and destroy a Filipino LST that had long been used as an outpost to establish the Filipino claim to Second Thomas Shoal.
During early 2024 there were several clashes between the Chinese and Filipino coast guard ships. During December 2024 there were several collisions and clashes between Chinese and Filipino boats.
During November 2024 there clashes between Chinese and Filipino coast guard ships over who controlled the Spratly Islands. There was more of the same in October and September.
During July and August 2024 China used 40 ships to block Filipino access to Second Thomas Shoal. In July there was also another ruling by the International Court in The Hague affirming Filipino rights in the South China Sea. China ignored a similar ruling made in 2016.
In June 2024: There was a clash in the South China Sea between naval forces of China and the Philippines. The cause of this largely non-lethal battle was a Filipino attempt to resupply Filipino marines stationed on an old Landing Ship Tank/LST deliberately run aground on Second Thomas Shoal in 1999 to asset Filipino ownership of the Shoal and much of South China Sea. There have been several similar clashes in the last year. The most recent ones in May and June involved a large number of Chinese ships that physically blocked Filipino Coast Guard and supply ships from reaching the grounded LST. Several of the Filipino RIBs (Rigid Inflatable Boats) were sunk by Chinese sailors in speedboats who came alongside and used knives to puncture the RIBs’ hulls and cause them to sink. A Filipino sailor lost a thumb when his boat collided with a fast moving Chinese speedboat. China seized materials meant for the LST and used loud sirens and strobe lights to disorient Filipino sailors trying to get their boats close to the LST. Among the seized materials were additional weapons for the LST crew. China has refused to return the weapons or any other cargo they seized. Technically this is piracy but even if an international court agrees with that, the Chinese will ignore the courts as they did several years earlier when a court ruling confirmed that portions of the South China Sea were under the control of the Philippines. China is one of the many nations that signed agreements governing the law of the sea, but the Chinese later ignore any agreements they signed if these agreements get in their way. This is what continues to occur in the South China Sea.
The Chinese Navy and Maritime Militia musters dozens of Coast Guard and commercial fishing trawlers that are paid by the Chinese to serve as a naval militia and, when called upon by the government, cease fishing and assemble for whatever the navy wants them to do. Usually it is to congregate in large numbers near disputed, with the Philippines, islands, reefs and shoals to keep Filipino fishing boats out and claim these areas for the exclusive use by Chinese fishing trawlers. In one recent case Chinese ships equipped with water cannon hit Filipino fishing boats with large quantities of sea water to keep them from operating in traditional Filipino fishing areas.
The June clashes were the largest and most violent yet. In one case a Filipino helicopter dropped supplies near the LST and as the marines were retrieving them, Chinese speedboats arrived and seized some of the air dropped parcels and ripped open the waterproof packaging and scattered the contents on the ocean surface. Apparently, the Chinese government has ordered its naval forces to use any means necessary to deprive the grounded LST of any supplies and try to starve out the marines stationed on the LST.
Increasingly more Chinese coast guard ships are patrolling Second Thomas Shoal, First Thomas Shoal, and Half Moon Shoal, all within the Filipino EEZ or Exclusive Economic Zone, waters 380 kilometers from the coast but now claimed by China. The Philippines EEZ in the South China Sea is where Filipinos have been fishing the reefs and other shallow waters for centuries, long before there was a Philippine state and without interference from Chinese fishermen, who only occasionally showed up. That’s because fishing boats with refrigeration, a 20th century invention, only recently made it possible for Chinese fishermen to scour the entire South China Sea for fish to profitably catch, refrigerate and carry back to China. The 20th century also meant the possibility of finding oil or gas deposits in the South China Sea as well as controlling key shipping routes via the Malacca Strait.
Aerial and satellite photos indicate that Chinese military construction efforts on Woody Island, one of the disputed Paracel Islands closer to China, are complete. The garrison consists of a battalion of naval infantry and a 2,300 meter long air strip. This is long enough to support warplanes and commercial transports as large as Boeing 737s, which China has a lot of. A school building was completed in 2013 for the 40 children of officials and their families stationed there. There is an artificial harbor that can handle ships of up to 5,000 ton displacement. This harbor is heavily used because there is no local water supply and much of the water still has to be brought in along with fuel for all the land, sea and air vehicles as well as the generators. While there is some recreational fishing going on, the two thousand people on the island require regular food deliveries from the mainland.
In addition to the military garrison there is also a civilian rescue detachment equipped with helicopters and small boats. This detachment is largely for the waters around Woody Island and a few smaller islands that amount to about 13 square kilometers of land. China recently used dredging to increase the land area by about 20 percent.
Construction is largely complete for facilities in the capital of Sansha, a new Chinese municipality or city. Sansha is actually Woody Island and dozens of smaller bits of land, some of them shoals that are under water all the time, in the Paracels and the Spratly Islands to the south. In fact, the new city lays claim to two million square kilometers of open sea, which is 57 percent of the South China Sea. China has completed similar construction projects in the South China Sea and satellite photos reveal this to be true.
China claims the South China Sea and all islands and near islands like reefs as Chinese property. To reinforce these claims of sovereignty China is occupying uninhabitable islands and creating new ones by dredging sand from reefs and shoals to create new uninhabitable islands. Like Woody Island, these new islands are staffed with troops and government employees and supplied, at great expense, from the mainland. China even built two special supply ships to make regular deliveries to their many island bases in the South China Sea.\
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 08, 2025 - 03:10 pm: Edit

Leadership: Russian Military Rebuilding Plan
March 30, 2025: Russian media specialists seek to minimize the damage done to their military’s reputation. At the same time military leaders are pondering what to do next. In 2022 Russia used its new, reorganized, modernized and highly regarded army to invade Ukraine. Russia lost and discovered that its reforms, reorganization and modernization were colossal and very expensive failures.
Russia seeks to learn from the failures of its 2021 armed forces as it creates an improved 2030 military. Russian ground, air and naval forces all proved to be flawed in Ukraine. The army lost over a million men to casualties, desertion and military age men fleeing the country. For a nation of 142 million, the losses in Ukraine had a significant impact on the economy. The war-related sanctions did noticeable damage to the economy. The combat losses contributed to a labor shortage. The cost of the war depleted the national cash reserve and the government budget for several years.
Because of this rebuilding the military will have to be done with a low budget. That means returning to a million man version of the simpler but massive Soviet Union’s Red Army. This force had two million troops and more divisions than the United States and Europe combined. After 1991 most of that turned to dust. For most of the 20th century the Soviet Union had the largest number of tanks in service. By the end of the 1990s the Russian tank force was much diminished while the U.S. force was holding steady and the Chinese force was growing. It was no surprise when, in late 2020, Russia revealed that the army had further reduced its tank force to 2,685 vehicles. About 45 percent of these tanks were manufactured or refurbished after 2000. The U.S. and China each had larger and more modern tank fleets. So did India, but many of its tanks were older models and all Indian tanks are Russian models. In fact, India had more of the T-90 tanks, the most modern Russian model, than the Russian army did.
Russia also had about 10,000 older tanks listed as in reserve but few are operational and most are ready to be scrapped. This is one of the few times the government has admitted that the once mighty Red Army is indeed no more. In 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved, their Cold War military had about 53,000 tanks. At the time the much-feared Red Army had over 200 active duty and reserve divisions. That force quickly shrank to a force a fifth that size, and much less ready for combat. In terms of actual troops, the Russian army is smaller, and much less capable, than the United States Army. While some troops and pilots have gained valuable combat experience in Ukraine, Chechnya and Syria, the only reliable troops the Russians had before the 2022 Ukraine war were about a hundred thousand men, organized into special army, navy, air force and interior ministry units composed of commandos, paratroopers, marines and those that guarded the capital.
Russia still relies on conscription, and these conscripts serve for only one year. Because of this most army combat units, prior to the 2022 Ukraine war, lost nearly 40 percent of their troops each year and replaced them with new conscripts. Combat units then left most of the training to turn conscripts into soldiers, and not much of that before the conscripts left when their year was up.
Conscripts were not supposed to be sent into combat unless Russia was invaded, due to dangerous protests during Russia’s attacks on Chechnya, but were included in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. This produced more civilian attacks on conscription and the government mostly stopped sending them into combat, assigning them to either non-combat duties in units in the Ukraine, or using them only outside the Ukraine. It didn’t help that most everyone whose families could afford bribes to conscription officials paid them to ignore their children. This has gotten worse since the Ukraine war started. The yearly intake of conscripts had drifted down to only 260,000 before then, and it is not known how much it has dropped since then.
Back in 1991, the Soviet Union armed forces had five million troops. By 2020 there were about a million. Three decades of starvation budgets, little training and less procurement left the Russian armed forces demoralized and, well, defeated. Part of the reason for this debacle was the army generals resisting efforts to shrink the Cold War force in an efficient manner. After the 1990s army leadership was forced by dire necessity to carry out needed changes.
The overdue reforms of the Russia Army that began in 2008 soon reduced the number of army units from over 1,800 to fewer than 200. Many of the disbanded units were part of the reserve or organizations that had become irrelevant but continued to exist anyway. The army strength was soon about 350,000, including Special Operations Forces, or Spetsnaz. The combat forces comprised 55 combat brigades; 33 mechanized infantry, four tank and 22 Spetsnaz/commando, airborne or air assault. These brigades were about half the size of American combat brigades and over a third of the personnel were conscripts who served for one year. The skill levels of troops in these Russian brigades was much lower than for comparable troops in American or British brigades, and elite brigades in French, German and some other Western forces. There are also 28 combat support brigades, eight armed with multi-barrel rocket launchers like the U.S. MLRS, nine with short range ballistic missiles, ten with anti-aircraft missile systems and one engineer brigade.
The reforms basically dismantled the Soviet era reserve system that had maintained over a hundred divisions and hundreds more support units that had equipment but less than ten percent of their troops in peacetime. In wartime these units were quickly manned by reservists, who were conscripts who had recently completed their two years of active service. In the half century since World War II the reserve system fell apart and discarding it was a smart move because it was not worth the cost of maintaining. There was a lot of resistance within the military to ditching the old reserve system, so getting rid of it was a major accomplishment. By 2020 Russia still maintained dozens of mobilization centers manned by a few troops and civilians. This skeleton crew looked after the older tanks and other weapons. These centers also contained uniforms and other equipment to equip reservists. The reservists were local men who had been in the army during the previous ten years. Not all were physically fit for duty but those who were, or were fit enough, were equipped and assigned to reserve combat brigades or as replacements for active duty units. This was all that was left of the old Soviet era reserve system that, after about sixty years, evaporated in the early 1990s.
The pre-1991 reserve system worked well enough to rapidly create several hundred divisions the invading Germans weren’t expecting in 1941. Those reserve divisions were a key factor in Russia surviving that initial invasion. After World War II the reserve system slowly degraded so that by the 1980s it existed more on paper than in reality.
Russian leaders were intensely proud of having the largest tank fleet in the world for over fifty years. While the Red Army largely disintegrated in the early 1990s, the army sought to keep as many of those 53,000 tanks as they could. That did not work out and it wasn’t until the 2008 reforms that there was any official recognition of that.
The 53,000 tanks available in 1991 were less impressive when you consider what they were and how they were maintained. About 40 percent of these 1991 tanks were relics from the 1950s, or earlier. At the start of the 2008 reforms there were only about 12,000 tanks, and less than ten percent of them were modern. Back in 1991, about half of the tanks were of questionable serviceability and usefulness. This still left the Russians with 25,000 modern tanks ready to roll west. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, 80 percent of the troops were sent home, and during the 1990s, only a few hundred new tanks were purchased. Most of those 53,000 tanks ended up as scrap.
The 2008 tank force had about 500 T-90s and T80s. These are roughly equal to early model U.S. M-1s. Most remaining tanks were late model T-72s, some of them upgraded with excellent electronics (fire control systems and thermal sights). Of the 12,000 tanks the Russian army said it still had in 2008, only a few thousand were ready to move and go into combat. In effect, Russia has lost use of some 90 percent of its tanks since 1991. Back then, nearly all those 53,000 tanks were assigned to a combat division. OK, most of those were reserve divisions, but if most of the reservists showed up in wartime, they would know how to get their tanks operational. That reserve system collapsed along with the Soviet Union and by 2006 the Russians could get about 5,000 tanks operational on short notice. That was a big drop from the 1980s. During the first year of the 2022 Ukraine War, it lost most of its tank force and has been slowly rebuilding ever since.
Worse, a lot of the tanks listed as modern and ready for service were not. So during an early 2010 incident the army insisted that the 200 T-72 and T-80 tanks found in the woods next to a railroad station in the Urals were part of a normal movement of military equipment, and the vehicles were under guard. But people living in the village of Elanskaya outside the city of Yekaterinburg noticed that the vehicles were unguarded, and unlocked, but without ammo or ignition keys. Local kids began crawling in and out of the tanks. Videos of all this began showing up on local news programs as well as the Internet. The government controlled national media tried to ignore it at first. Eventually the troops showed up, and then the tanks began disappearing, as trains with flat cars came by at night to pick them up.
This situation raised, once more, the issue of the military wasting resources by trying to retain obsolete equipment. That may have made sense at one time, when military technology didn't change as rapidly as it has for the last few decades. Keeping over 12,000 tanks in service, when less than 6,000 were needed, was seen as a waste of resources. In 2007 the army explained that it had sent most of those 53,000 Cold War tanks to the smelters. But as the 2007 episode demonstrated, the military was still spending a lot of money on tanks it doesn't need or can even care for. The army would not comment on why those late model tanks were temporarily dumped in the woods next to the Trans-Siberian railroad. But one can surmise that Russia was building up its tank strength out east, or just looking for some place to hide the fact that it could not care for all its relatively modern tanks.
Even during the Cold War Russia did not have the resources to maintain those 53,000 tanks. This could be seen by the way the Red Army was organized. Although all the Cold War divisions used the same organization, they still came in three different grades of readiness. This system persisted for some years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and still persists today, at least on paper.
The highest grade of Cold War divisions were in the group of forces that, until the mid-1990s, was stationed in various Eastern European nations. These comprised 15 tank and 15 mechanized infantry divisions. These divisions were kept at full strength and were the first to receive new equipment, aside from units in western Russia and Ukraine that tried out new weapons and equipment prior to large-scale distribution. When these divisions returned to Russia after 1991, they lost some of their capability. They no longer got the pick of each year’s conscripts, and the morale of the troops during the early 1990s was quite low because living conditions in Russia were, and still are, quite a bit lower than enjoyed in Eastern Europe. Some of the divisions brought home from Europe were disbanded and some officially put on a lower level of readiness. Despite this, the remaining divisions remained among the best that Russia had available.
The next grade were the category 1 and 2 divisions within Russia and the former Soviet Union. These comprised 43 divisions, 11 tank and 32 mechanized infantry. In the early 1990s many of them were due for disbanding or downgrading. They are next in line for new equipment. Generally, they had about ten percent fewer troops and similar reductions in tanks and artillery pieces as well as generally lower equipment levels. Peacetime manning was only 50 to 75 percent, although half a dozen were at full strength. Local reserves, men released from service in the past three years, could nominally bring these units up to strength in a few days and be combat ready in less than a month.
Overall combat value of these category 1 and 2 units varied, but would likely be 10-20 percent lower than the remaining elite divisions formerly stationed in Europe. A case could be made that their value was even lower, as the Russians tended to reward the best officers with assignments in better full strength divisions. Those who didn't make the cut were not expected to do these second-string divisions a lot of good. Moreover, there was a substantial disadvantage when a division was mobilized and you find half its men are strangers to each other, and the military. One advantage of the end of the Cold War and subsequent disarmament was the disposal of a lot of older equipment, replacing it with a lot of the newest material. At this point, few of the category 1 and 2 divisions had older equipment than the former first class divisions.
Last, there were the category 3 divisions. There were 20 tank and 72 infantry or mechanized infantry divisions. Their equipment levels were similar to category 2 divisions, but they not only had the oldest equipment, but the worst maintained. A lot of the older equipment was replaced with more recent versions in the wake of the arms reduction treaties signed as the Soviet Union was breaking up. Moreover, the category 3 divisions were the first to be disbanded because of the arms reduction treaty and dispersion of many divisions among the successor states of the Soviet Union. Most of these divisions just disappeared. Much of their equipment was not even under the control of the divisions, but kept in centralized storage areas. It is from this stored equipment that many post-1991 arms smugglers stole the many weapons that mysteriously showed up in Africa, Asia and South America for about two decades after the Soviet Union collapsed. Manning levels on these category 3 divisions ranged from 10 to 30 percent. Although sufficient weapons and combat equipment were present or assigned to all Category 1 and 2 divisions, transport vehicles for higher formations and Category 3 divisions on mobilization was to be taken from the civilian economy. Considerable specialist equipment was either obsolete or not present in the 1990s. The reserve troops to be called up to fill out Category 1 and 2 units were those who had been out of the service no more than five years. Most of the equipment was unfamiliar to them. These units required three or four months to become combat ready. The effectiveness of these units was about half that of the group of forces units, if that.
In 2020 the Russian army has the equivalent of about 18 combat divisions and, on paper, about as many reserve divisions of uncertain utility. The same reality applies to the tank force and now the government admits it. This is the force that was destroyed when they invaded Ukraine in 2022.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 08, 2025 - 03:11 pm: Edit

Naval Air: Iran Gets an Aircraft Carrier
March 30, 2025: In February the first Iranian aircraft carrier, the 40,000 ton Shahid Bahman Bagheri, entered service. Top speed is 32 kilometers an hour and max endurance range is 39,000 kilometers. The carrier can stay at sea for 80 days.
The ship is operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps/IRGC NAVY. The only aircraft carried are two helicopters and 100 or more drones. The carrier has a curved ski jump deck to aid in launching larger drones weighing several hundred kg or more. The flight deck is 180 meters long and the carrier overall length is 240 meters.
The carrier is the result of spending two years to convert a cargo ship. This included installation of air and surface search radars as well as Signals Intelligence or SIGINT as well as electronic countermeasures. The carrier can also operate unmanned surface ships.
In 2023 commercial satellite photos revealed construction of the carrier. Iran is always building new small craft, some of them armed with anti-ship missiles but most of them much smaller and armed mostly with an aggressive attitude. The new ship under construction in the Bandar Abbas shipyard on the Straits of Hormuz was an aircraft carrier. This new ship was based on a the Perarin, a converted container ship built in 2000. As a container ship could carry 3,280 TEU 20 foot containers.
Such conversions are nothing new and were carried out in a big way during World War II when the United States and Britain built about 135 CVE escort carriers, often by converting existing cargo ships or tankers. CVEs were typically around 150 meters long, not much more than half the length of the CV fleet carriers of the same era, but were less than a third of the weight. A typical CVE displaced about 8,000 tons, compared to almost 30,000 tons for a full-size fleet carrier. The aircraft hangar typically ran only a third of the way under the CVE flight deck and housed a combination of 24–30 fighters and bombers organized into one single composite squadron. By comparison, a late model Essex-class CV fleet carrier could carry 103 propeller driven aircraft. All carriers built since World War II were built as carriers, not converted cargo ships or tankers. The post-war carriers were designed to handle fewer but larger jet-propelled warplanes that operated at higher speeds even when landing.
Converting a container ship to a carrier is difficult because the superstructure containing crew quarters, workspaces and offices stretches across the ship and is over a hundred meters from the rear of the ship. Using a container ship as a carrier means building an odd shaped flight deck. Satellite photos showed an angled flight deck that partially overhangs the hull. The area behind the superstructure is being used as a helicopter landing pad with anti-aircraft guns mounted at the rear of the ship.
The new carrier will carry and operate several types of drones, including the Shahed 129A. Iran has about three dozen of these and while they look like an American Predator, they are smaller, less than half a ton, and the tech was obtained from reverse engineering an Israeli Hermes 450 that crashed largely intact in a place the Iranians could recover it. The 129A entered service in 2013 and is not used as a cruise missile, like the smaller less than a quarter ton Shahed 136 used in Ukraine as a cruise missile. The 129a can carry four Sadid guided bombs. Each of these weighs 34 kg and has a max range of six kilometers. Accuracy is at several meters, not as precise as missiles like Hellfire which can hit within a meter of the target. Sadid was proved effective when used in Syria.
Operating relatively large drones like the 129A from a carrier deck may lead to a few accidents and possible loss of some 129As. This is less of a problem with the smaller drones used as cruise missiles on one-way missions. Most of the drones carried by the new carrier will be these smaller models. They are built in large quantities and Iran assisted the Russians in building a factory in Russia to produce several types of Iranian drones. The larger drones are often built in smaller quantities, often no more than 30 or 40. The exceptions are particularly successful models, like the more than 200 Mohajer-6s built since 2018.
Iran’s drone carrier can carry over a hundred drones if most of them are the smaller models used as cruise missiles. The larger drones are essential for reconnaissance and surveillance. Training operations will be monitored because they have to be held at sea under realistic windy with rough waters to be effective. Some Western navies operate large drones off carrier decks. Turkey has built an amphibious assault ship with a carrier deck designed for operating large, jet powered, drones. The only problem with the Iranian carriers is that they are easy to spot and track by nations like Israel with their own surveillance satellites and warplanes carrying long-range air-to-surface missiles that can be used against ships. Israel also has submarines operating in the region.
Iran appears to be converting a second ship, a tanker into a carrier and apparently has ambitious plans for these new ships. Iran lives in a dangerous neighborhood, made so largely by the mischief Iran creates, and the neighbors, especially the wealthy Arab oil states are heavily armed and well trained to handle whatever Iran aims at them.
Iran has not built many large warships, mainly because of the expense and lack of suitable shipyards. The last large warship built in 2020 was the Shahid Roudaki. This was not exactly a warship but a Roll on-Roll Off/RO-RO freighter built in 1992. RO-RO means the ship has ramps that make it easy for vehicles to get on or off the spacious deck and spaces below the deck. The 150 meter long, 22 meter wide, Galaxy F/Shahid Roudaki can carry up to 536 cargo containers in the hold and on deck. This ship is elderly by commercial shipping standards and Iran could have bought it cheap, given it a new paint job and filled a deck with various types of rockets, air-defense systems and drones, plus one 1970s vintage Bell 412 helicopter.
The Iranian RO/RO warship actually belongs to the IRGC Navy, which does not have any large combat ships. There are over a thousand armed speedboats plus five amphibious ships, three LSTs and two smaller LCTs, and three cargo ships. The 12,000-ton Shahid Roudaki has not seen any action and was apparently built to test new concepts, including the conversion of larger ships into aircraft carriers.
The actual Iranian Navy maintains a force of conventional warships, but not as many as it would like. Currently, the only major surface warships are three 1,500-ton frigates built in Britain during the 1970s. Between 2010 and 2021 Iran built four 1,500-ton frigates. There are three 1960s vintage under a thousand ton corvettes, two from America and one from the Netherlands.
There are about fifty smaller patrol craft, ten of them armed with Chinese anti-ship missiles. There are another few dozen mine warfare, amphibious, and support ships. The three most powerful ships in the fleet are three Russian Kilo class subs. There are about fifty mini-subs, most of them built in Iran.
There are some serious quality problems with Iranian built warships, and not just because of budget problems and sanctions. Iran's naval shipbuilding facility at the Bushehr shipyard has lots of labor problems. That includes strikes and lockouts as well as complaints of poor designs and sloppy management. Iran has, for the last two decades, announced many new, locally made, weapons that turned out to be more spin than substance.
Iran does have commercial shipbuilding firms which produce merchant ships that are larger than destroyers. It was believed that Iran could build something that looks like a destroyer. The Jamaran class ships have Chinese C-802 anti-ship missiles, but a lot of the other necessary military electronics are harder to get and install in a seagoing ship. Iran has coped by using commercial equipment. This does not make for a formidable warship but does enable high seas operations.
Iran is trying to expand its slowly growing naval power on its Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean coasts. Since 2011, Iran has had one or more of its few surface warships working with the international anti-piracy patrol off Somalia. They’re opposed to piracy unless they do it. This was the first time since the 1970s that the Iranian Navy has conducted sustained operations outside its coastal waters. Despite their own Islamic radical government, the Iranian sailors have got along with the other members of the patrol, including the United States, which is officially the Great Satan back home. Encouraged by this, Iran announced that it would send more of its warships off to distant areas, mainly to show the world that Iran was a naval power capable of such reach. These voyages often ran into problems and the Iranians learned to send a resupply ship along containing a large stock of spare parts and skilled ship techs to install them as needed.
The collapse of world oil prices in 2014, more than the numerous economic sanctions, crippled expansion plans for the Iranian Navy. Most of the sanctions were lifted in a 2015 treaty but that has not helped the navy much because a lot of the additional cash went to prop up the Assad government in Syria and finance the pro-Iranian Shia militias in Iraq and Yemen. Then the U.S. revived the sanctions in 2017 and that further depleted Iranian finances, leading to more cuts in defense spending. What it comes down to is that the navy is not nearly as high a priority as the ground and air forces. Iran has never been a significant naval power and that does not appear to be changing any time soon.

FYEO

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Thursday, April 10, 2025 - 04:21 pm: Edit

Some contradictory statements are being released bu U.S. government officials and the government of Panama.

The U.k. Newspaper the Guardian posted a story that U.S. and Panama have agreed to joint operations for security of the Canal Zone.

The Guardian quoted “unnamed u.s. officials” who said that the u.s. military will reactivated former u.s. bases in the canal zone. The government of Panama says that the u.s. will not be allowed to reopen those bases.

U.s. Defense Secretary Hegseth (as reported by C.N.N.) said in a speech that it is a historic agreement with Panama that will materially improve defense of the Panama Canal, and strengthen the national security.

I expect there will be clarification, but it appears that while both sides were in meetings together, they didn’t coordinate the talking points.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Thursday, April 10, 2025 - 10:41 pm: Edit

Update:

Sec of Defense Hegseth was interviewed on Fox News, stated that the U.S. will reopen Fort Sherman, in the Canal Zone, an air field and a Navy base.

No confirmation on the Panama report that there will be no U.S. re-occupation of former U.S. military facilities or bases.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Friday, April 11, 2025 - 10:15 pm: Edit

The commander of the US military base in Greenland, Col. Susannah Meyers, has been fired after she reportedly distanced herself from Vice President JD Vance’s sharp criticism of Denmark’s handling of Greenland’s security. Meyers allegedly sent an internal email stating Vance’s views did not reflect the stance of Pituffik Space Base.

This report was posted ten hours ago by fox news on YouTube.

By MarkSHoyle (Bolo) on Friday, April 11, 2025 - 11:27 pm: Edit

I would think senior officers had a better understanding that inserting themselves into policy issues was a no no......

Wouldn't be hard to believe that a Jr NCO forwarded that to someone above her head....

By Alan Trevor (Thyrm) on Saturday, April 12, 2025 - 08:59 am: Edit

Maybe she did understand and took the stand on principle anyway. Senior officers wrecking their careers because they believe the political leadership is disastrously wrong does sometimes happen. In 1977 a Major General named John Singlaub was relieved from his position as Chief of Staff of U.S. forces in South Korea, and forced to retire, because he publicly criticized President Carter's proposal to withdraw all U.S. troops from Korea, which Singlaub believed would lead to war.

I have no idea whether anything similar happened with Colonel Meyers.

By Alan Trevor (Thyrm) on Saturday, April 12, 2025 - 09:30 am: Edit

Singlaub was an interesting man. During World War II he operated behind German lines as a member of a "Jedburgh Team". He basically devised the HALO (High-Altitude, Low-Opening) parachuting technique during the Korean war. U.S. Army Special Operations Command has a "John K. Singlaub/Jedburgh Award" for special operators.

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Saturday, April 12, 2025 - 10:49 am: Edit

As of yesterday there are ZERO female 4 stars. in 2024 there were 4.

By A David Merritt (Adm) on Saturday, April 12, 2025 - 10:51 am: Edit

Given that this is a joint base with Danes and Greenlanders, it may be a "lets all get along" type message.

This may have been a good idea for the base, but was clearly a bad idea for her career.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Saturday, April 12, 2025 - 05:49 pm: Edit

There have been a number of officers who have been “reassigned” (not to mention retired, fired etc.)

Part of the story is related to DEI.

DEI stands for Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion. It's a framework used by organizations to foster a workplace and community where everyone feels valued, respected, and has equal opportunities. DEI seeks to promote the full participation of all individuals, particularly those who have historically been underrepresented or discriminated against.

As the late Rush Limbaugh put it,

“The military has two missions, one is to kill people, and the other is to break things.”

Neither of those require career counseling, sensitivity training to encourage career officers to “feel the pain of others” or worry about hurting the feelings other people.

The other part of the story, is that both J.D. Vance and Pete Hegseth, are veterans of the U.S. military, both have said the purpose of the U.S. military forces is to win wars.

By Alan Trevor (Thyrm) on Saturday, April 12, 2025 - 09:38 pm: Edit

Jeff,

You say

---

Quote:

Part of the story is related to DEI.

---

---

Quote:

The other part of the story, is that both J.D. Vance and Pete Hegseth, are veterans of the U.S. military, both have said the purpose of the U.S. military forces is to win wars.

---

By Ryan Opel (Ryan) on Saturday, April 12, 2025 - 10:03 pm: Edit

She was fired because of this.

Uniformed Code of Military Justice:

Art. 88. Contempt toward officials
Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the Governor or legislature of any State, Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty or present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Saturday, April 12, 2025 - 10:14 pm: Edit

Col. Meyers is not, and was not the only officer removed since the last presidential election.

I am not disputing the UCMJ in Col. Meyers case.

Just pointing out that a number of other officers have left, (or been removed) as well.

To ignore all of the other cases is irresponsible.

By Alan Trevor (Thyrm) on Saturday, April 12, 2025 - 10:34 pm: Edit

Ryan,

I haven't heard anything about court martial proceedings against her. She was relieved of command, but at least so far, that seems to be all.

Jeff,

I regret I still don't understand your point. Yes, a number of other officers have been removed from their positions. Some of those may indeed have been due to "DEI issues". But I'm still unclear whether you believe DEI was a factor in Colonel Meyers' removal. If you do, than why do you believe that?

By Ryan Opel (Ryan) on Saturday, April 12, 2025 - 11:23 pm: Edit

Relieved for loss of confidence. Will be given the option to retire in lieu of court martial.

Senior officers get relieved all the time by incoming Presidents. Obama fired 197 senior officers in his first 5 years. Truman fired the 8th most senior officer in the US Military ever.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Saturday, April 12, 2025 - 11:41 pm: Edit

Alan, No.

I do not believe that DEI was a factor in Col. Meyers releif.

I was addressing Mike Graftons post concerning removal of four four star female officers from 2024 to date.

Just trying to point out, (and obviously, not clearly enough,) that and there have been male and female officers removed, some of which were for DEI.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Sunday, April 13, 2025 - 11:29 am: Edit

Some were hired for their willingness to impose DEI rather than for their capability as a commander. Some very good commanders were shunted to very secondary jobs by the previous administration so that all better jobs could be reserved for political supporters of the administration. This means that when 47 went looking for top command talent he did not find any of that in the usual corps and higher premier slots. It could well mean that 47 was not picking unqulified officers, but that the war machine has been run by less than stellar politically selected officers who are now all being fired.

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Sunday, April 13, 2025 - 01:37 pm: Edit

To be fair, pretty much anyone making General is fairly exceptional. HOWEVER Trump has shown a propensity to demand personal allegiance.

As for DEI, I think that elimination of discriminations due to stuff that shouldn't matter; is a valid leadership goal. NOT hire this one to fill a quota, but so that the best ones are promoted based on what they can achieve not due to skin color, race, religion, sex.

My Grandfather was a LtCol when they integrated the Military, my father was a cadet at VMI when they integrated... I don't think anyone is going to say Black people are less capable in the military. WHY should we care if the fighter pilots are women, the Admiral is gay, if they do their jobs.

The whole point is that the military is there to 1) Deter others, and 2) WIN if it comes down to fighting...

Willingness is what those in subordinate positions should ALWAYS exhibit. Which may mean a National Guardsman has to protect kids integrating schools, soldiers fighting in a war they disagree with, executing a strategy they think is the wrong approach...

By Paul Howard (Raven) on Sunday, April 13, 2025 - 02:38 pm: Edit

On DEI - isn't the issue, that the Military is 99% White and Male - most people promoted will be White and Male.... and if keeps being 99% White and Male.. you end up with 99% of Senior Offices being White and Male.

A White Male is more likely to promote someone similar - and so it is self perpetuating.

So people who may be Non-White and Non-Female may be far better than White and Male.... but never get a look in?

So occasionaly, you do need to mix things up to see if the Military is missing out on potentially superior Officers?