Leadership: How to End A Corrupt War
May 14, 2025: Since 2024 more and more Ukrainian generals and military analysts have been predicting the collapse of the Russian military by mid-2025. Now their Russian counterparts are agreeing that the end is near. One Russian general was so dismayed at this that he killed himself. Increasingly Russian men are not just evading military service, but helping those in the military to walk away.
It’s not just the soldiers. Russian industry, starved by increasingly harsh economic sanctions since 2014 sanctions, is no longer able to produce military equipment. Worse, the capability to repair or refurbish existing equipment has disappeared. Since the 1990s most state owned firms have become western style enterprises. These companies put paying customers first, especially export orders. Foreigners pay in hard currencies like dollars, Euros or Yuan. The Chinese economy is now the second largest in the world and willing to do business with Russians, if they can pay in hard currency. The Russia ruble is considered worthless for foreign trade and most Russian consumers don’t trust their own currency.
Over two million Russians were sent to Ukraine and so far over a million have been killed, disabled or deserted. By early 2025 there were about half a million Russian troops in Ukraine, facing nearly twice as many Ukrainian soldiers. By April 2025 a growing number of Russian soldiers are simply changing into whatever civilian clothes they can find and walking way. Officers are supposed to shoot deserters, but that rule no longer applies because the troops will shoot back.
The departing soldiers walk because the military has few working vehicles. The Ukrainians always concentrated on destroying Russian trucks and other transport. With the Russian railroads collapsing because of sanctions, trucks and automobiles are all you have left. Russian soldiers will seize vehicles at gunpoint. This exodus from the war zone is expected to escalate until there are no armed Russians left in Ukraine. Ukrainian and Russian commanders believe the Russian war effort will collapse by late 2025. That means no Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine and hardly any Russian production of weapons and other military supplies.
The crippled Russian industries and transportation system means starvation for many civilians. This is finally forcing leader Vladimir Putin to face reality. Historically starving Russians have gone after their leaders and replaced them with someone who will take care of basic needs like food, fuel and transportation. Throughout the war Putin had the support of the oligarchs, the men who controlled the largest business enterprises. With the war lost and the economy a shambles because of the war Putin is going to lose his job as well. The oligarchs are fed up with empty promises that the war would be won and Russia would prosper. When the war is over, the NATO nations are not promising a return to peacetime economic relations with Russia.
In early 2025 Putin announced that the semi-annual conscription would call up 160,000 men. He was told that there were not enough weapons and equipment for these recruits. They would get uniforms and dilapidated barracks to live in but not much to eat. Hungry, idle soldiers lead to unrest and rebellion. That happened a century ago when the monarchy collapsed. Russians have long called their leader Tsar Vladimir and now the Tsar must go. Armed and angry soldiers take care of this.
The anger comes from a lack of heavy weapons like artillery and armored vehicles. The remaining tanks, artillery and munitions in the reserve depots were found to be useless. Tanks that won’t run, artillery with worn out barrels and munitions that are unreliable because of age related decomposition. Communications equipment was always unreliable but now there is no one to repair them because there are no replacement parts. The cause of all this was lack of maintenance, which the government assured everyone was being provided. The government ran out of viable assurances and the troops ran out of patience. Too many broken promises breeds contempt and desertion.
Russians remember that before the war several Ministers of Defense assured everyone that reforms were under way and working. They lied and when it became obvious in Ukraine, Russian civilians and soldiers responded with anger and apathy. That is why industrial production is collapsing and soldiers are deserting.
Ukrainians believe the collapse of the Russian war effort will arrive in the next three or four months. The signs are already there and when the end comes it will be glorious for the Ukrainians and disillusioning for the Russians. Ukrainian leader Zelensky will be praised while Vladimir Putin will be looking for any excuses that might still work.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, May 13, 2025 - 02:30 pm: Edit

It was asked: Will the trade deals compensate for the economic damage to the US? The coming brain drain and the reduced foreign investment in the next four years will not be trivial.

Answer: The economic damage is trivial and transitory; in a year you won't be able to find it, but you will find the benefits to the US, so I would say that the trade deals would compensate for the "damage" by about 1000 times.

There is no brain drain.

So far there has been five trillion dollars in foreign investment in the US so I think it's fairly clear that there is no "reduced foreign investment". Quite the opposite.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Tuesday, May 13, 2025 - 03:13 pm: Edit

Perhaps there should be more concern for the future of the European Union and specific European nations member state.

The United States has increased LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) sales to various nations as Russia deliveries of pipe line Natural Gas have declined.

With tariffs in place, Sweden and other nations will have to dig deep for the hard currencies they will need to pay for it.

With the prospects of declining economic activity in Europe, the smartest and brightest may start to consider immigration to the United States to maintain their lifestyle.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Tuesday, May 13, 2025 - 04:09 pm: Edit

SVC, I sure hope that is right, and that Ukraine is not forced into some idiotic deal that lets Putin keep ill-gotten gains.

However, with such predictions, one has to wonder to what degree evidence may have been confused by wishful thinking.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Tuesday, May 13, 2025 - 04:48 pm: Edit

William:

There are signs that the Russian economy is far from healthy.

There was a time no Russian leader would have ever considered (much less, invite) North Korean involvement in a Russian war.

No one, would have ever considered purchasing sixty year old munitions given the dangers involved. The Western Powers figured out that using old munitions is more dangerous to their own people, than the possibility of it actually inflicting casualties on an enemy. (And really, it becomes dangerous much sooner than sixty years .)

If Putin had actually wanted to damage Russia, you would have a tough time finding more ways to accomplish that task, than Vladimir Putin has actually already done.

By Mike Erickson (Mike_Erickson) on Tuesday, May 13, 2025 - 04:57 pm: Edit

>> purchasing sixty year old munitions given the dangers involved

Admittedly, it is not just the age of the munitions but also the poor storage practices.

--Mike

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Tuesday, May 13, 2025 - 05:33 pm: Edit

Jeff, I agree with that. Russia is in trouble. The USSR collapsed under similar strains.

In the case of the USSR, the collapse came after Reagan pursued a comprehensive strategy to hurt their economy.

The previous Russian collapse came under the strain of WW1.

My point is simply that collapses are notoriously difficult to predict. They happen when you don't expect them, and they can fail to happen when you do expect them.

The West should pursue a maximum pressure strategy against Putin in order to maximize the probability of such a collapse. Unfortunately, we aren't doing that.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Tuesday, May 13, 2025 - 08:48 pm: Edit

A Mainstream Media Network just posted a report that the Putins personal guard regiment has been ordered to Ukraine for combat operations.

We were talking about the signs that the Russian economy was in trouble.

In sending in the Russian leaders personal Guards Regiment, there is no way to take this except as a desperate act.

We could argue that the political optics’s are simply terrible.

The security issues are actually worse. Unless Putin fears his own security troops, sending the regiment to Ukraine, at this point of the fighting amounts to a death sentence. (For the troops.)

As a morale boost to the general public, it is sorely lacking in message terms. The general Russian population having survived two world wars, the fall of the czar, the fall of the communist regime, and having been around to see yeltzen, and Putins assumption of power, the sending of a single regiment of ceremonial soldiers to the war zone is not likely to have any lasting effect.

These actions are not terribly different than what some of the late empire Roman Emperor’s during the third and forth centuries tried.

To be fair, most of those efforts failed.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, May 13, 2025 - 09:55 pm: Edit

The Liebstandarte Putin has gone to the front?

Maybe we're seeing the last 90 days.

By MarkSHoyle (Bolo) on Tuesday, May 13, 2025 - 10:18 pm: Edit

Supposedly Putin will be in Turkey on Thursday...
Maybe he will do to Zelensky, what lil Kim did in the 90s when he challenged Bush II to a duel in fighter planes...

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Tuesday, May 13, 2025 - 10:25 pm: Edit

Might do better than using main battle tanks.

Way things are going, the Russian depots might be able to scrape up a 1943 vintage t-34 with chicken wire netting to ward off drones.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Tuesday, May 13, 2025 - 11:23 pm: Edit

The Istanbul talks history thus far is . . .

1) Europeans, Zelensky and Trump said Putin should agree to a ceasefire by May 12 or else.
2) Putin did not agree but proposed talks in Istanbul on May 15
3) Zelensky said only if there is a ceasefire
4) Putin did not agree to a ceasefire
5) Trump said Zelensky had better go
6) Zelensky said he would go
7) Putin probably isn't going

It just highlights the uselessness of talks without sufficient military pressure on Russia.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 14, 2025 - 02:45 am: Edit

I am getting a post office box at the The Amundsen–Scott South Pole Station. Jessica can send my winnings there when Putin has been pushed too far. Send them in the form of trail mix, Milady, if you please.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 14, 2025 - 02:51 am: Edit

The Presidential Regiment is a brigade strength unit. It is being attached to the 98th Parachute Division and will be used to capture the strategically important eastern Ukrainian town of Chasiv Yar, which is in the Donetsk region and held by Ukraine. It is located 10 kilometres west of Bakhmut.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 14, 2025 - 02:52 am: Edit

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kremlin_Regiment

The unit has two battalions, each with four companies of 150 soldiers.
The unit has a third battalion, with only two companies plus an automotive company.
The unit has a cavalry battalion, with two horse and two infantry companies.
There is another battalion, with only the reserve training company and the personal protection (bodyguard) company.
There are no tanks or artillery; the troops are trained for parades and honor guards, not infantry combat.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Wednesday, May 14, 2025 - 07:35 am: Edit

SVC, failure to oppose Putin is the reason we are in this mess in the first place.

By Jason E. Schaff (Jschaff297061) on Wednesday, May 14, 2025 - 07:48 am: Edit

Horsed cavalry makes its return!

By MarkSHoyle (Bolo) on Wednesday, May 14, 2025 - 10:39 am: Edit

In Saudi, the Beast was escorted to the palace by a Horse Guard....
Not seen any videos, reportedly (maybe back to AF-1) or arrival in Qatar, there was a Camel escort....

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Wednesday, May 14, 2025 - 10:40 am: Edit

Steve: in the event that Putin takes the unthinkable option, I'll be busy driving as fast as possible to Whiteman AFB, where I can be reasonably certain of a very expeditious exit from what would soon be an unbearably miserable mortal coil.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 14, 2025 - 10:55 am: Edit

The living will envy the dead.

Just mail the trail mix before you start driving.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 14, 2025 - 10:57 am: Edit

William, I have said the same thing myself. Putin would never have moved against Ukraine if Trump, or Tulsi Gabbard, had been President.

By MarkSHoyle (Bolo) on Wednesday, May 14, 2025 - 12:38 pm: Edit

Always lived by the:

"When it's your time to go" meme...
Could be a fall down the stairs or fall in the tub...


Ran across a story/joke (sic), guy in a future land, after a war, they brought prisoners forth for sentencing (Death in all cases)....
There was an entity that would create whatever death the person picked...
The guy narrating, picked a 8mt nuclear explosion,
neat way to get revenge on your death bed....

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 14, 2025 - 02:33 pm: Edit

Air Defense: Budget Drone Exterminator
May 12, 2025: The success and proliferation of drones in the Ukraine War has transformed modern warfare. One side effect has been a desperate search for a weapon to intercept or disable attacking drones.
One of the more recent DDS or Drone Defense Systems is the Norwegian Cortex Typhon. This system is mounted in a German Dingo armored truck, and has a drone detection system combining a Remote Weapons System/RWS armed with a 12.7mm machine-gun to destroy hostile drones. The system can be used in fully automatic mode, to fire on any drone within range, or with the operators having the option to decide which target is hostile or friendly and not fire on friendlies. The 12.7mm machine-gun has an effective range of two kilometers, which is about half the range of the 70mm guided rocket used in an earlier AUD system. The machine-gun bullet is much faster than the guided rocket.
In 2022 the American Vampire DDS system was sent to Ukraine. Vampire is palletized with all components secured on a shipping pallet that can be mounted in a pickup truck or a military vehicle like the hummer. Vampire consists of a telescoping mast mounting an electro-optical/infrared modular sensor ball and laser designator, plus a generator for power and Fletcher launcher that carries four APKWS 70mm laser guided rockets. These weigh only 15 kg each and have a range of about a thousand meters when fired from the ground. Vampire can be used to detect and fire APKWS laser guided rockets at air and even ground targets. Any drone, cruise missile or helicopter within range is vulnerable. Vampire is designed to be reconfigured, which is the kind of system Ukrainians prefer. The Fletcher launcher is designed to use the new, longer range APKWS rockets that gain additional range by having a larger rocket motor which makes the APKWS longer. Ukrainians are expected to modify Vampire to better suit their needs or simply to obtain longer range while carrying more rockets ready to fire.
In 2024 APKWS was adapted for use by aircraft. Seven APKWS are carried in LAU-131A rocket pod. Warplanes can carry two, four or more pods per mission and deal with the drone swarms the Russians often use to overwhelm existing ground-based DSSs. LAU-131A can be ground based but that reduces the rocket's effective range to a few hundred meters.
Last year Ukraine developed another DDS. This one works by using First Person Viewing/ FPV operated drones to detect an enemy drone and destroy it by collision. This is made possible by using drones controlled by FPV operators. While the first FPV drones were quadcopters, the interceptor drones are faster fixed wing models that look like remotely controlled model aircraft. The soldier operating the FPV is a kilometer or more away and uses FPV goggles to see what the day/night video camera on the drone can see. Adding night vision doubles the cost for each drone, so not all of them have that capability. Each of these drones carries half a kilogram of explosives, so it can instantly turn the drone into a flying bomb that can fly into a target and detonate. This is an awesome and debilitating weapon when used in large numbers over the combat zone.
The interceptor drones are used to take down Russian reconnaissance and surveillance drones that locate targets for Russian artillery and for air strikes by manned aircraft or explosives-armed FPV drones that can go after a moving target. Unlike manned aircraft, drones are smaller and slower with top speeds of 100 to 150 kilometers an hour, and only operate at low altitudes under 1,600 meters. Note that these drones are still unable to catch helicopters, which they could damage. Fixed wing aircraft, like jet fighters, are another matter as they rarely fly low enough for the drones to reach, much less hit such a fast moving aircraft. The Ukrainians have been able to incorporate the new killer drone capability into their air defense systems, which means the air defense radars and fire control systems recognize drones large enough, or metallic enough, to show up on radar. Modern aircraft tracking radars are not designed to detect, much less track, small slow and low flying drones.
The Russian solution to this Ukrainian interference is to send more surveillance drones accompanied by attack drones as a way to overwhelm Ukrainian DDSs. Sometimes this works, for a while, but the Ukrainians are generally faster to improvise and modify systems that don’t work until they do. Russian forces rely more on massive use of whatever they have. This sometimes works because, as the Russians like to point out, quantity has a quality all its own. That worked until it didn’t as the Ukrainians found ways to quickly overwhelm Russian defensive measures and destroy more of their artillery target spotting and reconnaissance drones in several areas. If the Ukrainians can continue to manufacture lots of these interceptor drones that simply collide with their targets, the Russians are in big trouble because Ukrainian artillery can operate more freely and effectively and suffer lower losses.
So far, the Ukrainians have not demonstrated they can mass produce enough of these attack drones to become a major problem for the Russians. Ukraine does have access to large manufacturing facilities in NATO countries. The problem is whether or not NATO countries move quickly enough to provide more manufacturing for new drone designs Ukraine needs. The Ukrainians have become accustomed to innovating and then manufacturing new drones quickly. Manufacturers in the United States, Europe, and Russia are not accustomed to going that way. They might be if, like Ukraine, they were fighting for survival.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 14, 2025 - 02:34 pm: Edit

Artillery: HIMARS Cluster Munitions
May 12, 2025: In 2024 Ukraine used HIMARS missiles equipped with cluster munitions. Each 300 kg missile contains 644 submunitions. When a submunition explodes, it will wound or kill anyone within three or four meters. One cluster missile warhead will kill or injure anyone in a roughly circular area of 30,000 square meters (@173 meters across).
In 2023 the U.S. decided to send cluster munitions to Ukraine. In late 2017 the U.S. decided to reverse a 2008 decision to phase out the use of cluster munitions by 2019 and that meant the weapons were available to Ukraine in 2023.
Cluster bombs are a technology developed sixty years ago. In the 1990s they were declared obsolete because of GPS guided smart bombs and bad publicity. During the Vietnam War Cluster bombs were usually a one thousand pound bomb that released up to 200 or more smaller bomblets. About 285 million bomblets were dropped on Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos during the war. The cluster bombs ability to cover a large area with lethal bomblets had great appeal to the air force. Unfortunately about five percent of the bomblets did not detonate. If they were delayed action bomblets, they did not self-destruct when they were supposed to. This meant that there were at least 14 million of these bomblets lying around. Many, no one is sure how many, were really duds. But others would, if handled, explode, killing or maiming whoever was nearby.
There have always been dud munitions, be they bombs, shells, mines or hand grenades. These lethal duds are still being encountered after being used in wars over a century ago. But the 20th century put the most dud munitions into the ground. The problem with cluster munitions, which are now used in artillery shells and rockets as well, is that there are more of them. These bomblets are on the surface rather than buried like dud bombs and shells. They are smaller, harder to spot, and easier for children to pick up and turn into a lethal plaything.
You can reduce the dud rate to less than one percent, but this doubles the price of the bomblets and you still have duds out there. These dud bomblets are a risk to your own troops as well. After the 1991 Gulf War, over sixty coalition troops were killed or injured by dud bomblets. The trend is away from lots of bomblets, towards larger, smarter and more reliable submunitions. The SADARM submunition was used for the first time in Iraq and was very successful. This anti-vehicle weapon is delivered by artillery shell with two SADARM per 155mm shell. An MLRS missile carries six SADARM while a bomb contains a dozen or more SADARM.
But the army still likes cluster bombs because of their effectiveness against enemy troops and their cost. SADARM costs over a hundred times as much as a bomblet. But the downside of cluster bombs threatened to bring about their demise. Just like chemical weapons were dropped for psychological, not military, reasons, the same was expected to happen with cluster munitions.
It didn’t happen. While condemned and reviled in peacetime, every time a war breaks out the combatants want the most effective weapons and one of those is cluster munitions. In Ukraine, both sides use cluster munitions regularly. Ukraine has found the HIMARS missiles the most effective way to deliver cluster munitions.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 14, 2025 - 02:34 pm: Edit

Attrition: Russia Murders Ukrainian Prisoners
May 11, 2025: Increasingly, Ukrainian drone operators are witnessing Russian soldiers executing Ukrainian prisoners of war. This is not unusual in any war, but in Ukraine the constant presence of drones allows the executions to be filmed and shown to the world. Less publicized is the Ukrainian revenge, when Russians who killed Ukrainian prisoners are themselves attacked by Ukrainian drones and killed. This doesn’t happen often enough to discourage the murder of prisoners.
Russian officers condone, encourage and sometimes order these executions. Since the Russian invasion in 2022 through the end of December 2024 there were 177 Ukrainian prisoners of war killed. In the first three months of 2025 at least 25 captured Ukrainian soldiers have been murdered. Since the end of August 2024 there were at least 29 incidents where Russian soldiers killed a total of 91 Ukrainian prisoners. The Russians don’t try to hide their behavior. In one case a Russian officer deliberately had the murder of Ukrainian prisoners filmed. This video showed up on worldwide social media. Ukrainian soldiers have murdered Russian prisoners a few times and the Russians didn’t seem to care. Early in the war Russian officers were told they could shoot any of their soldiers who refused to fight or tried to desert.
Part of the problem is the way the war has been going. The situation has gotten steadily worse for Russian forces. By early 2025 Russia has lost over a million men dead, wounded, deserted or fleeing the country to avoid military service. Russia recruited prisoners and anyone else using large cash payments. These men soon found that few of them would survive more than a few months in Ukraine. The bonus cash is still offered but there are fewer men willing to take money and die quickly.
By 2025 the war had a very bad and well-earned reputation as a failure. This started early, six months into the war, when Russian forces were on the defensive. Since then, Ukrainian troops were surprised by a rapid Russian revival and a slugfest began that continues to the present.
The Russian military turned out to be, to paraphrase a 1940s maxim, a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. At times Russian troops not only failed to defend themselves, but surrendered in large numbers or fled, leaving their undamaged armored vehicles behind. High resolution commercial satellite photos of the battlefield appeared regularly and allowed an international network of civilians to scrutinize the photos and pool their accurate accountings of vehicle losses on both sides. Russia lost most of the vehicles, especially the armored ones, they sent into Ukraine. Russian vehicle losses were four times those of the Ukrainians, and Ukraine actively recovered and repaired damaged vehicles belonging to both sides because it won most battles and controlled the battlefields afterwards.
A unique feature of this war was that both sides were using the same armored vehicles. That was because, until 1991 Russia and Ukraine were both part of the Soviet Union and Ukraine was a major center for Soviet armored vehicle design and production. About half the Russian armor losses were vehicles that were abandoned or captured intact. Because of a flaw in their auto-loader design, there were few damaged tanks because any armor penetrations usually caused the vehicle to explode, often with such force that the turret was separated from the tank. The Ukrainians had anti-tank missiles with top-attack capability, which usually destroyed the Russian tanks being attacked.
It was noted that 125mm tank gunfire was actually less lethal, especially when that 125mm shell was fired by a crew of poorly trained and inexperienced Russians. Worse, Russian troops quickly noticed their tanks were easily destroyed by the Ukrainians so most Russian tank crews would abandon their vehicles once they realized their unit was under attack. By the end of 2022 Ukraine was able to deploy a larger and more effective tank force than the Russians. Ukraine also came up with ways to defeat the Russian artillery and air force superiority. Seven months into the war it was clear that Ukraine’s counter-offensive was continuing and the Ukrainian mobile force of tanks and other armored vehicles expanded as the Ukrainians put their growing number of captured Russian vehicles into Ukrainian service. This usually took a few days, at most, as each vehicle was checked out, repairs made and the vehicle repainted to remove the prominent white Z that identified all Russian vehicles with the Ukrainian V, often with a Ukrainian flag on the radio aerial.
Ukraine used more effective tactics, maintained the vehicles better than the Russians did and suffered a sixth of the Russian casualties. The Ukrainians were operating in friendly territory, where the Russians were watched by Ukrainian civilians, who used their cellphone to report what was happening to Ukrainian commanders. The Ukrainians had developed better battlefield communications while Russian combat leadership and support services were very bad. Ukrainian troops received regular supplies of food, medical care and the support of local civilians. This was especially true in areas where the Russians had recently been driven out.
The Russians had a shortage of effective combat leadership from the beginning but it got worse year after year as Russian officers suffered higher losses than their reluctant troops. Two months after the war started Russia sent the instructor staff from all their junior officer training schools into the fighting. During the first year of the war Russian officers were too few, too inexperienced and too incompetent to provide effective leadership. There were a few exceptions, but over ninety percent of Russian troops and their officers were ineffective and often fled or surrendered, even if the Russians were on the defensive. This would occur even if Russian troops were inside fortifications and facing advancing Ukrainians.
Russia sought to force former soldiers to join, as well as anyone else the recruiters could catch. While still in Russia these men were given uniforms, assault rifles and, in many cases, only a few days of training. Those with previous experience were formed into tank crews or assigned to operate other armored vehicles. There were no longer enough trucks to support Russian forces, even with civilian trucks taken from firms idle because of the sanctions. Later in the war, Russian troops pilfered Ukrainian horses, donkeys and mules to move their supplies to the front line.
From the beginning of the war, the Ukrainians went after Russian trucks, especially fuel tankers. These trucks were carrying supplies and Russia has been unable to replace its truck losses or maintain the flow of supplies to its forces in Ukraine. When the weather turned colder in southern Ukraine, most Russian troops didn't have cold-weather clothing. They looted heavy coats and other items from Ukrainian civilians but that has been difficult because the civilians fled when the Russians got close, taking their warm clothing with them. In the end Russian officers realized that soldiers wearing civilian clothing was not a good idea.
A year into the war Russian troops had to face a new and unexpected terror. Ukrainians unleashed swarms of First Person View/FPV drones that revolutionized how wars are fought. There were few methods to defeat drone attacks. The primary defensive measure developed is electronic jamming of the control signal between the drone operator and the drone. Jamming is of limited effectiveness because active jammers are easy targets for drones programmed to detect, home in on and destroy jammers. Depending on how they are programmed, drones will either land if jammed or return to where they were launched.
Despite those defensive measures, and the small explosive payload drones carry, about half the armored vehicles damaged or destroyed in Ukraine were done in by armed drones. By the end of 2024 most Russian and Ukrainian casualties were caused by drones. This form of combat was increasingly common and dominating most combat zones. Tactics and techniques also evolved as Ukraine and Russia both experimented with new tactics, techniques, and drone designs. Both nations increased production of drones and the number of trained operators. Both Russia and Ukraine realized that drones provide unprecedented surveillance of the battlefield, but not all of it. That requires more drones and operators. One solution for this shortcoming is operator software that enables one operator to control several drones. The number one operator can handle simultaneously depends on operator experience. That cannot be manufactured but must be developed. Whoever can obtain the most and best trained operators has an advantage.
All these drone developments make combat more dangerous for the troops on the ground. Drones not only keep an eye on enemy troops but are always ready to go in and put them out of action, as in dead or wounded. Troops are still fighting each other on the ground, but now they have to worry about constant surveillance and attacks from the growing number of drones hovering above them.
In addition to operators there are the drone maintainers, who repair damaged or otherwise disabled drones and service those needing a battery recharge or simply a fresh battery. Drones were one of many surprising developments in the Ukraine war, and the Russian invaders eventually became demoralized and reluctant to fight. Their leader, Vladimir Putin, insisted he would keep fighting until Ukraine was part of Russia. When faced with reluctant soldiers, Putin imported several brigades of North Korea mercenaries. Unprepared for this new form of warfare, most of the North Koreans soon became casualties. Putin is currently desperate for a way out of the mess he created. While the Americans have offered to broker a peace deal, the Ukrainians smell victory and insist on continuing to drive all Russian soldiers out. That may work, if only because nothing else has.
FYEO