Donbas and Luhansk are an issue. They were mostly Russian before 1920 and when Stalin created USSR he gave them to Ukraine to help control Ukraine by making sure that ethnic Russians held all the power in Ukraine. Over 1920-1990 more and more Russian surplus population moved in. It seemed obvious to many that they needed to go to Russia as they were historically always part of Russia not Ukraine anyway. It's like Trump taking over Mexico and then forming the Union of American Republics with an "independent Mexico" being part of the UoAR but putting Texas-NM-AZ-California into Mexico to be sure that all "presidents of Mexico" were actually gringos. Then in 2090 the UOAR collapses and the now totally independent Mexico finds itself with four "gringo" provinces that are increasingly rebellious.

The reason this is not straightforward is that a LOT of the ethnic Russians in Don/Luh would just as soon be "Russians in Ukraine" than "Russians under Putin." One might assume that California would rather than "Gringos in Mexico" than "Gringos under Alexander Trump IV."

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, August 18, 2025 - 12:35 pm: Edit

While I doubt that all 1000 or so Russian ICBMs have working nuclear warheads (or working engines) I would bet that the Russians did everything they could to keep a dozen or two missiles with warheads fully functional.

By Douglas Lampert (Dlampert) on Monday, August 18, 2025 - 02:09 pm: Edit

You can reasonably assume that ICBMs will be one of the less reliable systems in a military. Simply because the builders and maintainers do not expect to ever have to face an after action review questioning how well their systems actually worked.

US test shots are out of Vandenburg rather than a normal silo, have the missile inspected while being instrumented and having the warheads replaced, and do not fly over the pole or through any megaton blast EM pulses. I would not expect anything close to 100% success from our systems, and I suspect even the high maintenance Russian systems are worse.

All that said, to shoot Europe they do not need an ICBM and their first volley would not be flying through any EMPs unless they deliberately blasted one high (which would be senseless for them).

And even without the tritium a nuke is still a blast that scatters lots of radioactive •••• over the area.

Even sitting very near a major target in the USA, I'd give myself a noticable chance of surviving an all out Russia-USA exchange, simply because all the missiles and bombs aimed at me might fail or squib. But my guess is that Europe is toast if it ever comes up. (I do not know about now, but during the cold war, there were about 50,000 nukes in the combined NATO/USSR arsenals, 10,000 or so for the USA, 10,000 or so for Russia, and 30,000 or so for the much smaller actual land area of non-Russia Europe. There's a reason Europe had a lot more "peace at any price" types. But even in the USA and even with current Russian maintenance, we really do not want a nuke war.)

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, August 18, 2025 - 04:52 pm: Edit

I live less than 20 miles from Pantex, where all US nuclear weapons are assembled. My survival chances are very low, which is fine, who wants to live in that kind of world. Besides, at 74, I've had my run and the rest of it won't be much fun.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, August 18, 2025 - 05:15 pm: Edit

Support: Wartime Resource Restrictions
August 25, 2025: The prospect of a war between China and Pacific Rim democracies increases as China seeks to acquire foreign natural resources by force or negotiations or intimidation. The signs are unmistakable now and have been evolving for over four decades. This Chinese strategy began to emerge as the growth of the Chinese navy began in the 1990s and really accelerated after 2000. This was made possible by China becoming the largest shipbuilder in the world by 2010.
In 2024 Chinese yards built more commercial ships, in terms of tonnage, than the American shipbuilding industry had since World War II. The Chinese navy currently consists of nearly 400 ships and that will grow to over 420 ships by 2030. At the same time the U.S. Navy currently has 296 ships and by 2030 will have only 294. There is such an acute shortage of naval shipyards in the United States that the U.S. Navy has begun sending ships needing maintenance and upgrades to South Korea, and possibly Japan as well. Both are within striking distance of the Chinese air force. The U.S. government and naval leadership dismissed the possibility of this catastrophe, preferring to spend most of their budget building new ships and upgrading old ones. This is no longer possible with the small remnants of the American ship building industry.
The main reason the American warship construction and repair industry faded away was cheaper and more efficient competition from Japan, South Korea and finally China. That was a problem because twenty years ago signs first appeared that China planned to have the largest navy in the word. They could do this because they had created the largest shipbuilding industry the world. The Chinese yards were cheaper and faster than anyone else. That was the main reason American shipyards went under. They could no longer compete.
The Chinese navy has been rapidly growing since the 1980s and currently has more ships than the U.S. navy. China has not yet caught up in total tonnage because American warships tend to be heavier. The eleven American nuclear aircraft carriers are something China may never match. China is also way behind when it comes to experience. China admits that it will take decades to match and then surpass the American fleet. China often mentions 2050 as the year Chinese naval power surpasses the United States. Meanwhile China is encountering a lot of expected, and some unexpected problems.
For example, Chinese leader Xi Jinping was shocked and surprised by the growing number of problems in his military. Xi has openly complained about corruption, poor work habits and lack of discipline. Xi ordered a purge of military personnel responsible for these problems and demanded that officials in charge of military combat and support operations make the changes, or else. Efforts to identify and eliminate corrupt practices and officials responsible for them have not been successful.
Over the last decade there have been multiple purges of corrupt officials, with over a dozen generals, nearly as many admirals and a growing number of senior aerospace and shipbuilding industry officials. This included officers and officials in charge of the rocket forces that maintain short and long range missiles. Many of these missiles were found to be, on closer inspection, inoperable. In late 2023 a former defense minister was removed from the national legislature because of corruption charges.
Xi has found that there are few officials he can trust to be free of corruption and accusations of incompetence. The dismissed senior officers obtained their positions by pretending to get things done but failing to do so in the belief that there would not be a war or threat of war to expose their misdeeds.
This is a serious matter because the government has spent hundreds of billion dollars to build the largest fleet in the world. This process began in 2012 and Xi expected the Chinese fleet to be the world’s largest modern force by 2050. This actually happened in 2025, when the Americans government and navy leadership were finally convinced that Chinese naval power was a serious threat in the Pacific and now the Chinese are seeking to become the dominant naval power in the Persian Gulf and waters between there and China.
The Chinese navy still has some serious problems. Corrupt shipyard officials and a navy commanded by corrupt admirals threatens to create an expensive and useless force. On paper the Chinese seem headed for success. Currently the Chinese navy has two aircraft carriers, 75 submarines and 300 other warships. The total number of ships is 743, including a large number of support ships so the navy can operate far into the Pacific or Indian Oceans. China has never had a high seas fleet like this before. This large naval fleet was made possible by China becoming the world's largest builder of commercial ships. Currently about half the world's supply of new cargo, tanker and specialized ships are built in Chinese shipyards. China has become the world’s largest importer of raw materials and exporter of manufactured goods, all of which is moved by ships through seas easily blockaded by ships and aircraft of the United States and Japan. China’s growing fleet is intended to deal with that if necessary.
Another problem with China’s naval expansion is obtaining the well-trained manpower to operate it. This is much truer of China’s navy than its other military services because China lacks a naval or even maritime seagoing tradition of the sort that the United States, Japan, Britain and a few other European nations have. Effective navies must drill at sea constantly, but that requires their ship crews to spend months at a time at sea away from their families. China has discovered a major problem recruiting the necessary well-educated young men willing to do this. The on-going collapse of China’s population size makes this recruitment problem even worse as the yearly pool of males coming of military age plummets.
If China seeks to disrupt the shipping of other nations there could be other problems. The rest of the world regards this new Chinese shipping fleet as a threat if the Chinese fleet is used to threaten merchant fleets of other nations. China decides what is offensive to them and other nations often disagree with the Chinese assessment. This could escalate to violence, as it already has in the South China Sea against the Philippines. Chinese and Filipino warships recently clashed over who could do what in the South China Sea and other nations in the region and worldwide fear this Chinese misbehavior will spread. By 2025 the other seafaring nations were aware of the threat and developing strategies to slow and then halt the expansion of Chinese naval control. The primary weapon for this task is nuclear and modern diesel electric submarines. Between the United States and its East Asian allies, they can muster nearly a hundred submarines, most of them nuclear. The modern South Korea and Japanese Air Independent

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, August 18, 2025 - 05:15 pm: Edit

Logistics: The Evasive Dark Fleet
August 18, 2025: The Russian economy and war effort in Ukraine is financed by oil and other energy exports. Russia is operating under severe economic sanctions imposed to reduce that income and create economic conditions for Russia that make it difficult to impossible to continue their war in Ukraine.
The key to Russian oil exports is the use of foreign tankers to smuggle their petroleum and coal from Russia to overseas customers. Eighty percent of the of the oil for China goes by pipeline and cannot be disrupted. China accounts for nearly half of Russian petroleum and other energy exports. It’s the other half that is at risk because of a growing list of sanctions.
Current estimates are that nearly 900 tankers are smuggling sanctioned Russian petroleum to customers in China, India, the European Union/EU, Turkey and Myanmar. Most refined petroleum products go to Turkey, China, Brazil, Singapore and India. The rest goes to nine countries, in the Middle East, Africa and Taiwan. China has been buying 47 percent of the crude oil while India takes 37 percent followed by Turkey and the EU with six percent each. China, India and Turkey account for about 90 percent of Russian income from the sale of oil, natural gas and coal. The U.S. is imposing additional tariffs on countries that import Russian oil. India is already subject to these tariffs, which increases what they have to pay for imports from the United States. The Americans are negotiating with China and Turkey over what tariffs are being imposed to discourage Russian oil imports. Meanwhile, Russia has been bringing in up to $700 million a month from these exports.
The economic sanctions were imposed on Russia because of its 2022 invasion, in an effort to reduce its hard currency income from exports of oil and natural gas. These are the main Russian exports and the major source of income for the Russian government and war effort. To evade these sanctions, Russia created a growing shadow fleet of oil tankers purchased and/or leased abroad and obtained unrestricted access to a Chinese smuggler haven maintained in Hong Kong.
The nations enforcing the sanctions, particularly the United States, have tracked the routes of the Russian shadow fleet and noted the key role Hong Kong plays in arranging the movement of sanctioned Russian oil to its primary customers in China and India. Hong Kong is also a major source for supplying sanctioned nations with weapons and munitions. A current customer is Russia. Hong Kong does this by allowing Russian tankers and cargo ships, operating with fake credentials to disguise their Russian affiliation, to bring in Russian oil and other raw materials. The Russian ships then leave Hong Kong carrying weapons for their war in Ukraine.
Another major player in the Russian smuggling effort is North Korea. For years North Korea has been buying small, secondhand cargo and tanker ships and using them for smuggling. A favored evasion technique consists of taking on or transferring cargo at sea in its own territorial waters. The North Korean merchant fleet consists of about 150 ships, with most purchased from Chinese firms.
North Korea is a notorious and persistent maritime smuggler. Because of North Korean smuggling, the United States expanded its maritime smuggling and sanctions enforcement program in 2018 when a new multi-national enforcement organization was created. Initial members were the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Britain, France, South Korea, and Japan. The Enforcement Coordination Cell, or ECC, is enforcing the UN sanctions that curb North Korean smuggling related to items needed for their nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In addition, the ECC allowed member nations to also enforce whatever other sanctions or naval missions their government put a priority on. The U.S. has since invited India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines to join and assist with monitoring growing Chinese violation of offshore water rights, especially in the South China Sea and other areas of the West Pacific.
The ECC concentrates on the 2,000-kilometer-long shipping lane from the Indian Ocean, through the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea to North Korea. Along this route there are not only North Korean flagged ships participating in smuggling, but even more Chinese, Taiwanese, Liberian, Sri Lankan, and ships that are independent and fly whatever flag they believe will keep them from getting seized for smuggling. Earlier U.S. efforts had already identified many North Korean and Iranian owned tankers and cargo ships that were often engaged in smuggling. This led Iran and North Korea to use their own ships less and willing foreign ships instead. These third-party ships are the ones the ECC sought to identify. These ships can be identified, along with their owners and the owners can have banking and other sanctions placed on them. Many nations, not part of the ECC, but economic partners with ECC members, will cooperate if a smuggler ship visits one of their ports. At that point the captain can be arrested and th
The ECC member warships do not depend on inspecting suspicious ships while at sea but confirming who is where and when. This is especially useful for spotting smugglers who often turn off their location beacons and continue in running dark mode. These location beacons transmit current ID and location to any nearby ships and often, via satellite, to their owner and international shipping organizations. The location data, past and current, can be found on several public websites. The beacons exist mainly as a safety measure for ships operating at night or in bad weather in heavily used shipping lanes. Smugglers have learned how to turn off their beacons near a port where, it is assumed, they have docked or anchored off the coast waiting for an available dock.
Some smugglers are using spoofing, a form of jamming that just modifies the beacon signal to present a false location. This is where warships and maritime aircraft come in as these can identify ships visually or using radar followed by visual inspection. This is more damaging to the smugglers because it provides more evidence that their ship was involved in smuggling and with enough evidence you can go after the ship owners and seize the ship whenever it enters coastal waters, within 22 kilometers of land belonging to a nation that will seize outlaw ships.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, August 18, 2025 - 05:16 pm: Edit

Special Operations: Ukrainian Record Setting Naval Drones
August 18, 2025: When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, their Black Sea fleet dominated the Black sea and threatened Ukrainian grain exports, which account for 41 percent of its export income. The Russian Black Sea Fleet sought to block those exports. Most of these grain products went to Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey, Pakistan and Bangladesh. These countries could switch to other suppliers, but the food imports would cost more because with Ukrainian grains off the market there would be shortages and prices would rise, making it more costly for nations dependent on Ukrainian grains to feed their populations.
Ukraine needed to deal with the Black Sea Fleet and do it quickly. The initial problem was that Ukraine did not have much of a navy. They had some patrol boats, which were a nuisance, not an obstacle to continued Russian control of the Black Sea.
Ukraine did have something of a secret weapon of sorts, naval drones, especially the Magura naval drone. About a hundred of these drones defeated the Black Sea fleet. When the war started, the Magura V5 was just a concept, a preliminary design for a one ton 5.5 meter long naval drone. Magura initially used a fishing boat that had a solid waterproof cover added, along with batteries for propulsion. There were sensors and a compartment for 300 kg of explosives or weapons. These include a machine-gun protruding above the drone top while two Sidewinder anti-aircraft missiles are in launch tubes, ready to be fired at Russian aircraft or helicopters. Magura has a substantial number of electronic components, including several day/night video cameras that give the remote operator a view of what is around the drone. There is also an autopilot, so the remote operator does not have to personally maneuver the drone over long stretches of open water. Magura is equipped with contact fuses at the front of the boat. When th
Most Magura missions are one-way, but those equipped with machine-guns and surface to air missiles are used to attack Russian aircraft. Three months ago a Magura V7 used those two missiles to shoot down two Russian SU-30 jet fighters. This was the first time a naval drone had shot down warplanes. Earlier a Magura had used Ukrainian R-73 heat-seeking missiles to take down one Mi-8 helicopter and damage another.
In 2025 Ukraine introduced the Magura V7, which weighs about 1.2 tons and can carry 650 kg of weapons. Its operational range is a thousand kilometers. The V7 can also be equipped with an electricity generator, enabling it to stay at sea for up to seven days. This model can move at speeds of up to 72 kilometers an hour. Cruising speed is 43 kilometers an hour.
The Ukrainian experience using naval drones to defeat the Russian Black Sea Fleet was unique. Ukraine had only surface-to-ship missiles when the war started, but eventually shifted to three new naval drones, Sea Baby, Mother, and MAGURA, or Maritime Autonomous Guard Unmanned Robotic Apparatus.
Some of these naval drones were used for a mid-2023 Kerch Bridge attack. One of the drones varied 850 kg of explosives and inflicted enough damage to halt use of the bridge. The Mother drone carried 450 kg and MAGURA 320 kg. In addition to attacking targets, these drones can also be used for reconnaissance and surveillance using video cameras that broadcast what they see back to the drone operator. Some drones have been armed with small rocket launchers. The Mother drone has a range of over 700 kilometers and can operate on the high seas. Endurance is about 60 hours, and top speed is over 70 kilometers an hour. Mother was used for an attack on the Russian naval base at Novorossiysk, which is a thousand kilometers from Crimea.
Ukraine has been developing subsurface drones and in early 2023 the first one, the Toloka2 TK-150 was introduced. This drone was 2.5 meters long and equipped with a sensor mast that remained above the surface for navigation and to identify targets. Toloka2 can also carry a small explosive warhead. Later, Ukraine developed the larger Marichka drone that is six meters long and one meter in diameter. Ukraine plans for a Western manufacturer to build and weaponize Ukrainian drones.
Ukrainian drones have been quite successful in attacking and sinking or disabling Russian navy ships. So far there have been over a dozen attacks which resulted in sinking or damaging about twenty ships.
Ukrainian drone operations in the Black Sea forced the Russian Black Sea Fleet to withdraw to the eastern shore of the Black Sea. Sevastopol was no longer a safe place to be, and Russian ships could no longer launch their Kalibr cruise missiles without risking attack by Ukrainian drones. The presence and aggressive use of the drones meant that Ukraine’s grain corridor was kept open despite Russia’s threats to interfere. Beyond symbolic significance, the corridor holds critical economic importance for Ukraine and is expected to contribute up to seven percent to GDP growth in 2024 because of the grain shipments.
Russian countermeasures to Ukrainian naval drones included using aircraft and helicopters to destroy slow-moving drones before they attack, and expanding use of jamming to disrupt drone control signals. These changes made it much more difficult for Ukrainian naval drones to reach and destroy targets. But by 2025 the Russians had already lost control of the Black Sea and were not getting it back.
This left Russian warships dependent on bases in the north, near the land border with Norway, and in the Far East, near Japanese and South Korean naval bases. In a post-Cold War development the Japanese and South Korean fleets are now far larger than the Russian Far East fleet. Before the 1990s, the South Korea fleet was largely non-existent and the Japanese fleet tiny and purely defensive. Chinese naval power began to emerge by the late 1990s but took another decade to become a significant force. Then as now, the American western Pacific fleet was a major naval power in the region.
The lessons learned by American, Chinese, Taiwanese, Ukrainian and Russian naval commanders is that these drones have changed the rules for naval warfare. If China tries to invade Taiwan, they have to prepare countermeasures for numerous naval drones blocking the way. Everyone continues to observe Black Sea operations for details on what new tactics, techniques and drones designs appear. The U.S. has an edge because they are a major supporter of Ukraine and are seeking to make the most of their insider knowledge of the Ukrainian naval drone effort.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, August 18, 2025 - 05:16 pm: Edit

Forces: Comparing Russian and Ukrainian Forces
August 25, 2025: Russian military strength in 2020 was third to China and the United States. Russia had nearly a million active duty troops and about 12,000 tanks. Most of them are older models. By 2025 Russia was still number 3, but three years of war in Ukraine had destroyed most of Russia’s tanks, killed about a million soldiers and caused over a million Russian military age men to flee the country. Ever-growing Western economic sanctions have weakened the economy and by 2025 nearly all the national cash reserves had been spent keeping the economy going. Between now and 2030 Russian and Western economists agree that the Russian economy is in bad shape, a condition made worse since the government has converted it to a war economy, meaning civilian and infrastructure needs are neglected to support the war effort.
Even Russian government and business leaders agree that another five years of sanctions and war in Ukraine will do substantial and possibly long term damage to the economy. The West wants the Russians out of Ukraine for sanctions to be lifted. Putin cannot afford not to have them lifted. He is trying to determine how much of occupied Ukrainian territory he will have to surrender to get his economy running. The Ukrainians want it all back and the only concession they are willing to consider is a reduction in the hundreds of billions in reparations they are demanding for property destroyed and Ukrainian lives lost. So far about 75,000 Ukrainian soldiers have died, along with at least 12,000 civilians.
Economically, the Ukrainians can outwait the Russians. Several hundred billion dollars in military and economic investment have come from the West, and the amount of investment money continues.
The Ukrainian economy never faltered during the war. During the first six months of the invasion the Ukrainian GDP grew 29 percent. In 2023 the growth was 3.9 percent, followed by 2.9 percent in 2024 and between 2.5 and 3.5 percent in 2025. After that annual growth is expected to be 3-4 percent a year.
The Western investments will keep coming because Ukraine and its NATO supporters agree that continued economic and GDP growth is best for Ukraine as is visible defeat and continued sanctions on an economically ravaged Russia. The sanctions will be lifted as Russian forces withdraw from Ukrainian territory and stand by as Ukraine joins NATO. That makes another Russian attack on Ukraine unlikely as, if your attack one NATO member, every other NATO member is supposed to join in the defense. Russia has already seen this in action as NATO came to the aid of a nation that was preparing to join NATO.
Russia justified the invasion because it felt threatened by more of its neighbors joining NATO. Russia demonstrated the effectiveness of NATO in combat for the first time as NATO support proved vital in the Ukrainian victory. This was the first time NATO came to the aid of a member, or rather a candidate member. It’s a lesson all NATO members hope Russia absorbs and understands.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, August 18, 2025 - 05:18 pm: Edit

Leadership: How Russia Fights in Ukraine
August 16, 2025: Russia, despite their best efforts to do otherwise, ended up fighting in Ukraine the same they have for over a thousand years. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 revealed that the Russians could change, because the linguistically and culturally similar Ukrainians did. These differences enabled the more adept Ukrainians to successfully resist the Russians for over three years. There was a reason for that.
Until 2014, when Ukraine received military assistance from Western nations, the Ukrainian armed forces were based on the Russian model. After all, Ukraine had been part of the Soviet Union until the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. The Russian military was and still is based on the principle that quantity had a quality all its own. Russia was never able to adequately train all the men it conscripted into the military. The Russians adapted by selecting and training about ten percent of their troops to give this group a high degree of skill. Compared to the less-trained troops, the select group were more effective in combat and suffered far fewer casualties than the untrained troops. The Western approach was somewhat different in that Western nations believed that quality would generally defeat quantity. To obtain that qualitative edge you had to know how to train new recruits to a high level of competence in the shortest possible time. Each soldier received one or two months of basic training.
After the Russians invaded in early 2022, the Ukrainians quickly realized that they could not sustain higher casualties among untrained troops and had to increase their training standards to survive. The veteran as well as newly conscripted or enlisted Ukrainian troops appreciated this and eagerly accepted the additional training.
Russia was unable to provide as much training and suffered higher losses because of it. As the training levels of the Ukrainian forces continued to rise, the difference in loss rates between Ukrainian and Russian forces became an embarrassing reality for the Russians. Ukraine was able to bring in a large number of trainers from NATO countries, most of them former or retired NATO soldiers who could operate in Ukraine without causing an international incident. These men were not mercenaries but foreign professional trainers who often had experience training troops of other countries. Ukraine also brought in a lot of foreign professionals for skilled jobs Ukraine could not fill. This included aircraft maintenance and several other military specialties, and here Westerners had almost fifty years of providing such services to foreign militaries, chiefly in the Middle Eastern oil states who needed, and could pay for, these services. There are a number of Western firms that specialize in providing all manner of pro
Putin and his generals also noticed the growing difference in casualties between better trained Ukrainian troops and relatively untrained Russian soldiers. The Russians missed what happened when NATO personnel served in Ukraine between 2014 and 2021 and taught Ukrainian officers how to become a NATO-compatible force. That included much more training for new troops and more flexible and effective combat leadership methods. This turned out to be a major advantage because the Russians were still using their rigid Soviet-era command and troops control procedures. By 2021 the Ukrainians had adopted more flexible Western methods where junior commanders were trained to improvise when necessary. The only Russian troops who did any of that were the special operations spetsnaz forces. Most Russian troops follow detailed orders and, when they encounter something not covered in their orders, they halt and wait for further instructions. Ukrainian forces regularly exploited this. After nearly a year of fighting the Russia
Ukrainians appreciated this training effort and it made a difference on the battlefield. This was especially true because Russia was sending more troops to Ukraine with little or no training. That meant the Russians suffered continued higher casualties and the Ukrainians lost far fewer soldiers. After a few months of fighting in 2022, Russia had lost most of its trained soldiers and officers. Since then most of the new Russian troops have little training or advanced tech and suffer from low morale and poor leadership. That sort of thing makes a big difference in combat but is often discounted during peacetime.
Ukrainians could find out how this came to be because the current NATO tactics began emerging in the late 1970s when the United States, NATO’s most powerful member sought a new combat doctrine to make the best use of new weapons, an all-volunteer force and growing air superiority. West Germany was then urging the United States to adopt tactics that would mean losing less German territory in the opening stages of a war. In 1982 this led to the American AirLand Battle doctrine, which emphasized meeting a mainly Russian Warsaw Pact invasion by attacking as well as defending. West Germany was reassured as were those who had studied the 1972 Arab Israeli war. This conflict began with a surprise attack by Egypt and Syria which was quickly defeated by an Israeli active defense that emphasized attacking as well as defending. The Americans had already adopted an active defense doctrine in 1978 but AirLand Battle was a refinement of that, and evolved to the present with improved versions of these tactics.
The Russians interpreted AirLand Battle as the result of how much post-Vietnam military reforms had turned NATO defense plans into an offensive opportunity for NATO that made any Russian attack less likely to succeed and vulnerable to a NATO invasion of East Europe. The 1991 Iraq war certainly confirmed this, but Russians attributed that to poor quality Iraqi officers and troops.
After the East European Soviet satellite governments collapsed starting in 1989, it was revealed that the Soviets had become less confident of the ability and willingness of East European Warsaw Pact armies to assist Russian forces in attack or defense. Part of this was due to the aftereffects of the crackdown in East Europe after the uprisings of the 1950s and 1960s. Western intelligence officials interviewed many of East European civilians getting out and thought the refugees were exaggerating. They weren’t and that became obvious in 1989, and again two years later when the USSR itself collapsed. Once the Ukraine War has ended, the Russian military may accept that the NATO tactics were a major reason for their failure in Ukraine. Russia will have a difficult but not impossible time implementing a version of the NATO tactics for their forces. It would mean changing how their officers are trained and finally getting serious about reviving the use of NCOs, something the communists eliminated in the 1920S.
FYEO

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Monday, August 18, 2025 - 08:42 pm: Edit

Ukrainian civilian casualties are way more than 12k if one counts the dead in occupied areas. About 5% of the prewar population of an occupied area is a reasonable guesstimate, but much more than that in Mariupol.

By Gregory S Flusche (Vandar) on Tuesday, August 19, 2025 - 05:56 pm: Edit

Yet no outcry of genocide against Russia.

By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Tuesday, August 19, 2025 - 09:57 pm: Edit

Well, they are not shooting fish in a barrel. The civilians in Ukraine could be evacuated to other parts of Ukraine, or abroad.

By A David Merritt (Adm) on Tuesday, August 19, 2025 - 10:41 pm: Edit

Google Ukraine and genocide, then select news to eliminate previous Russian genocides.

By A David Merritt (Adm) on Tuesday, August 19, 2025 - 10:45 pm: Edit

The issue with automatically assuming that Russia is serious about nuclear threats, is they win, when you bend the knee.

At some point we will need to stand against Russia, and I would rather do it now, while most of the fallout will drift to Moscow, if Putin is serious, and the Russian Military will actually launch this time.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Wednesday, August 20, 2025 - 11:25 pm: Edit

12-hour Fire Aboard USS New Orleans Extinguished, 2 Sailors with Minor Injuries. LHD-18, a 25,000 ton displacement amphibious warfare vessel departed from Okinawa this morning, and reported an electrical fire in a panel. Three Japanese Fire fighting boats assisted the USS New Orleans.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Thursday, August 21, 2025 - 09:22 pm: Edit

Well, I think Trump has his answer from Putin: a Russian cruise missile slammed into a U.S.-owned electronics factory in the far western extreme of Ukraine today.

By Gregory S Flusche (Vandar) on Friday, August 22, 2025 - 04:45 pm: Edit

Someone is going to have to call the nuclear bluff are cause nuclear war.

By Robert Russell Lender (Rusman) on Friday, August 22, 2025 - 05:44 pm: Edit

I assume the factory was targeted for producing drone components etc.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Friday, August 22, 2025 - 06:05 pm: Edit

Ukraine has announced they will produce more than 4 million drones in 2025, which is less than they produced in earlier years.

The publicly announced numbers of suppliers, vendors and producers in the Drone industry exceeds 500 companies, so, expecting the loss of a single building producing drone components to materially affect total annual drone production might be a reach.

Given the attack occurred towards the end of August, one might expect 75% of that buildings annual contribution to have already been completed and shipped.

Plus, if the Russians are sophisticated enough to target individual buildings, they should have been able to do a better job fighting the war, than they have to date.

More likely, it was a random hit by an unguided weapon, just as over 90% of the missile and artillery strikes in Ukraine have been since the fughting started in 2022.

By Robert Russell Lender (Rusman) on Friday, August 22, 2025 - 06:30 pm: Edit

Well if it was indeed in the far western extreme of Ukraine, it would seem to have been intentionally targeted as that's mighty dang coincidental a random weapon would happen to land upon such a site.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Friday, August 22, 2025 - 06:47 pm: Edit

Lots of random weapons hit lots of random targets. Every now and then you get a good target by accident. How many other things got hit in the same wave? What were they?

Maybe this one was deliberate, maybe it was random. If Russia wanted to make a point, they could announce five minutes after the hit ( or before it) that they did it on purpose. That they did not proves nothing

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Friday, August 22, 2025 - 08:54 pm: Edit

The Russians are not above taking credit for a newsworthy target, it reinforces the superman narrative of Russian invincibility.

Also, a significant portion of the Ukrainian war effort is located in the western portions of their territory.

Launch enough ordinance, eventually some of it will hit something important.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Friday, August 22, 2025 - 09:51 pm: Edit

The factory is labeled on Google maps. Flex is publicly traded on the NYSE. Their products are easy to find. Not sure how the Russians could not have known.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Friday, August 22, 2025 - 11:20 pm: Edit

One would assume competence at that level, but that doesn't mean it was specifically targeted. I'll go with probably, but not definitively. Even at that, it’s difficult to establish this as a specific personal message to Trump..

By Michael F Guntly (Ares) on Friday, August 22, 2025 - 11:30 pm: Edit

aka:
Even a blind squirrel finds an acorn every now and then