Archive through September 03, 2025
Star Fleet Universe Discussion Board: Non-Game Discussions: Real-World Military:
Archive through September 03, 2025
If the Russians could target a specific address of a factory, why not do it all of the time?
This is an illustration of propaganda, not a demonstration of military superiority.
For a comparable illustration, look at Israel and the targeting of Iranian Nuclear Scientists and the means by which MOSAD was able to sabotage the centrifuges.
They managed to get “free” memory sticks (which also coincidentally contained precisely the virus needed disable the equipment ) into the hands, literally, of the technicians, scientists and other staff of all of the facilities involved in enriching uranium.
Far more impressive than accidentally hitting a single building with a munition once.
Yeah, if this was deliberate why don’t they hit every drone factory in one month?
I could see Ukraine doing something like:
"Russia has 127 oil refineries. We have bombed 27 of them. Wait a second, counting last night that would be 32." Then a week later it's 39, then 47, and so forth.
I could see Russia saying "Ukraine has 37 major drone production facilities. We bombed 3 of them last night." The next day they report they bombed two more, then five more, then...
Set a ticking clock, or several ticking clocks.
Ukraine might report "Russia had 27 armed warships in the Black Sea. They are now down to 11. Woops, 10."
If Russia started announcing that, the one the other night would mean something. They could even give a list of the ones they bombed with specific locations so reporters could independently verify these. You could see the Guardian reporting "We checked those last three drone factories Russia hit. Two were indeed drone factories but the third one was an empty warehouse."
Murphy's Law: Russian Navy Crippled by Corruption
August 24, 2025: By the end of 2023, the Russian Black Sea Fleet was largely destroyed by Ukrainian airborne and naval drones, as well as land-based anti-ship missiles. About a third of the Russian ships survived and took refuge 488 kilometers away in the Sea of Azov. There, the Black Sea Fleet remains while repairs are carried out on damaged ships and crews undergo training. This did not resolve the issue, as a larger problem emerged: sailors were being sent to Ukraine as infantry. This practice extended beyond the Black Sea Fleet, with Russian generals also mobilizing sailors from the Baltic, Northern, and Pacific fleets. The army even conscripted shipyard workers. Compounding these issues is persistent corruption. Even during wartime, corruption persists among shipyard workers, managers, and equipment suppliers. Russian government and military officials often view the war not as a national emergency but as an opportunity to enrich themselves by misappropriating funds intended for the war effort.
This situation is not new. The poor performance of Russian troops in Ukraine stems significantly from endemic corruption within the Russian military. These wasteful practices, longstanding in Russian military tradition, contribute to its historical underperformance. Young men from wealthy families can pay approximately $500 to avoid military service or deployment to Ukraine. Those in combat zones can pay over $10,000 for a certificate of combat injuries, accompanied by a medical discharge from the military. For those remaining in service, bribes secure extended leave to visit family and friends (costing nearly $1,000), promotions, certificates of physical fitness, or even a military driver’s license for those unqualified to drive. Bribes also help soldiers avoid punishment for using cellphones in combat zones.
Most Russian soldiers lack the financial resources to bribe their way out of trouble or danger. Consequently, poorer soldiers face higher risks of death, while those with wealthy families often survive and return home with purchased certificates of honorable combat service.
Bribes are also used to suppress uncomfortable discussions. A decade ago, efforts to modernize the military included initiatives to reduce corruption. However, these efforts failed because too many individuals in the military and the ineffective defense industries profited from bribes, and many paid to have their offenses overlooked.
Corruption and poor management have created significant problems. Many officers are either incapable of or uninterested in implementing suggestions to improve combat capability. Senior officers often prioritize personal wealth over building modern, post-Cold War armed forces. Defense industry officials have consistently demonstrated incompetence, resulting in poorly developed or shoddily constructed weapons. Troops have voiced complaints about these issues for years, yet reform efforts have achieved little. Critics advocate for greater realism in addressing military corruption and the deficiencies of Russian defense industries.
Since the 1990s, a military modernization effort has been underway as the government recognized the need to address rapidly aging equipment. In many cases, new purchases were essential because, with few exceptions like ballistic missiles, acquisitions of new equipment and weapons ceased during the 1990s. As a result, most armed forces continued using Cold War-era weapons and equipment from the 1970s and 1980s. Fortunately, older equipment from the 1950s and 1960s was scrapped as the armed forces shrank by 80 percent in the 1990s. Since Russian defense industries were never world-class, the military was often left with updated Cold War equipment that could not compete with the new generations of weapons and accessories adopted by Western forces.
By the end of the 1990s, it was believed that at least a third of Cold War-era equipment would be replaced. In categories requiring new technology, over 80 percent of older equipment needed replacement. The government promised the military significant modernization, but when these plans failed to materialize, morale suffered. This was particularly evident in the navy, where officers and sailors were told funds would be available to maintain more ships for increased sea time. However, existing ships could not handle heavy use due to corruption-crippled repair efforts, necessitating either new ships or costly refurbishments of existing warships. After the 1990s, the air force resumed long-range patrols over areas off the Russian coast, which had seen little activity since the 1980s. From 1991 until recently, Russian warships spent most of their time docked, leaving an entire generation of naval personnel with limited operational experience.
The new equipment received has been underwhelming. Troops, with access to the internet, can compare Russian equipment to contemporary Western ships and systems, and the Russian equivalents rarely measure up. However, this is an improvement over aging Cold War-era equipment that rarely functions.
The Russian armed forces have accepted that they will never return to the Soviet Union’s glory days, which ended with its dissolution in 1991. During the Cold War, the Red Army and the Red Fleet were formidable, with over five million troops and military spending consuming 10–20 percent of a roughly $2 trillion GDP. Exact figures are uncertain, as the Soviet system lacked accurate financial reporting. Currently, Russia adheres to Western European standards, allocating 3–4 percent of its $2.1 trillion GDP to the military. While this growing economy provides more funds, most are spent replacing outdated Cold War-era weapons, which were already considered obsolete and of limited use in the 1990s.
FYEO
Intelligence: FSB Evolves Into KGB Clone
August 21, 2025: Since Vladimir Putin took control of Russia over twenty years ago, he has sought to recreate the Soviet Union—not only its socialist government with him in charge but also the territory it once controlled. He began with Ukraine, which proved far more challenging than anticipated. The invasion of Ukraine triggered crippling economic sanctions and a collapsing Russian economy.
To address this crisis, Putin realized strong measures were necessary. Drawing on his KGB background, he enlisted many friends and associates from those days to serve in his new government.
Russia is increasingly becoming a full police state. New laws reinstate many of the arbitrary powers once held by Soviet police and intelligence officials. While post-Soviet Russia remains a democracy in name, elected officials are restoring the surveillance and control capabilities their Soviet predecessors relied on. The primary vehicle for implementing this new police state is the FSB, the successor to the Cold War-era KGB. This organization is regaining many of its Soviet-era powers and personnel.
Before the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the KGB was the most powerful organization in the country, operating as a law unto itself as long as it focused on keeping the Communist Party in power. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the KGB lost much of its influence but did not disappear. It was fragmented into several organizations, with the FSB, a counterintelligence agency with police powers, as the main successor. The SVR, responsible for overseas espionage, was another. Since the late 1990s, the FSB has been steadily reclaiming its Cold War-era authority and personnel, including control over the border police and various specialized technical organizations. While this pleases the law-and-order community, it alarms Russians who recall the KGB’s role as the primary enforcer of the communist dictatorship.
The FSB’s expanded powers allow it to operate with near impunity, reminiscent of the communist era. The FSB now directly controls over 100,000 personnel and has authority over many more in other government departments, including the national police force. The Communist Party has been replaced by an oligarchy of wealthy men who amassed fortunes through business acumen, corruption, outright theft, and personal ties to Putin. In effect, this group is a more efficient version of the Communist Party bureaucrats who ruled and terrorized Russians for 70 years. While less lethal than their communist predecessors, the new elite is no less intolerant of criticism.
The KGB gained most of its power just before World War II, after dictator Joseph Stalin purged much of the army leadership to prevent a potential military takeover. The KGB became a powerful state secret police, combining the roles of the FBI, CIA, and more. It was omnipresent, tasked with keeping the communist leadership in power, and maintained a network of informants within the military.
When Stalin died of natural causes in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev and close Communist Party associates assumed control. One of their first acts was to execute the head of the KGB, Lavrentiy Beria, a Stalin loyalist responsible for large-scale massacres within the Communist Party and KGB. Less ruthless KGB officers were promoted to lead the organization. Until the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, the KGB remained at the top of the social, political, economic, and legal hierarchy. In the late 1980s, reformers like Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power with the support of senior KGB officials who recognized the need for change. The KGB, a relatively small group compared to the military and Communist Party, was prepared to survive the next revolution, as their tsarist predecessors had survived the 1917 Revolution. The KGB endured, and its successors are now being rewarded for their loyalty and effectiveness in addressing terrorism, corruption, and crime.
While the FSB has regained control of the border police, this force is a shadow of its Soviet predecessor. During the Soviet era, the KGB maintained 200,000 border troops, equipped with armored units, naval ships, and combat aircraft. These forces served functions similar to the United States Coast Guard and Border Patrol but with far greater power and nearly twice the personnel. The 25,000 sailors in the Maritime Border Guards (MBG) answered only to the head of the KGB. A lieutenant commanding an MBG patrol boat could order any Russian warship to halt and arrest its captain, a key function to prevent mutiny or defection by Soviet Navy or merchant fleet personnel.
Smuggling was a minor issue, as Russian currency was worthless abroad, and few Soviet products were valuable or compact enough to smuggle profitably. Moreover, much of Russia’s coastline lies in Arctic waters, with the remainder bordering other communist nations. The MBG’s primary task was preventing Russian citizens from fleeing, a criminal offense that filled prisons with those caught attempting to escape.
MBG personnel were carefully selected. Although two-thirds were conscripts, they were chosen from the most reliable Slavic candidates and received special benefits and privileges for serving three years instead of two. These benefits extended into civilian life, marking them as loyal government supporters worthy of job assignments and other privileges. With only a quarter of personnel replaced annually due to the three-year term, the MBG maintained high levels of training and effectiveness. Less than a third of the 25,000 MBG sailors served on ships’ crews; the majority worked in support roles on land, guarding MBG bases, monitoring suspicious foreign merchant ships, and surveilling Russian personnel suspected of disloyalty. Today, the Russian Coast Guard oversees far more than the coast, though Russia no longer restricts emigration as severely.
The FSB continues to rely on conscripts for many low-level security roles. As in the Soviet era, being drafted into the FSB is an attractive prospect for young Russian men. Excelling in roles such as guarding nuclear weapons or other critical assets marks individuals as candidates for further opportunities within the security services.
Many Russians are troubled by the FSB’s ultimate purpose. The KGB was known as the Communist Party’s primary protector. The FSB is increasingly seen as the enforcer for wealthy oligarchs who leveraged KGB connections and powers after the Soviet collapse to seize state-owned assets. The current Russian government behaves more and more like the autocratic rulers Russia has endured for centuries. The FSB acts as a palace guard, not as public servants.
FYEO
Winning: Peculiar Russian Problems in Ukraine
August 20, 2025: Many pundits assert that Russia maintains the initiative in Ukraine and is poised for victory. One American university professor insisted that the United States, the West, and Ukraine have been defeated and will not prevail. Russian officials agree, claiming that Ukraine will eventually be defeated. Additionally, some U.S. policymakers have concluded that Russia holds “all the cards.”
Not surprisingly, Russian President Vladimir Putin boasted that Russia is decisively winning in Ukraine, stating, “It is obvious what is happening at the moment. Russia has the strategic initiative along the entire contact line.” He continued, “We have reason to believe that we are set to finish them off. Ukrainians need to realize what is happening in the combat zone.” Andrei Kartapolov, head of the defense committee in the Duma, Russia’s lower legislative chamber, followed Putin’s comments with threats, warning that if Ukraine does not accede to Russia’s maximalist demands in peace negotiations, Ukrainian leaders would be forced to heed “the language of the Russian bayonet.”
To better understand the state of the war and Russia’s battlefield performance, this analysis asks: How successful has the Russian military been in achieving the Kremlin’s objectives? What factors have contributed to this outcome? To answer these questions, this assessment examines several indicators of Russia’s battlefield performance: the relative rate of advance of Russian forces, the size of Russian territorial gains, the scope of equipment losses, and fatality and overall casualty rates. The evidence suggests that Russia has largely failed to achieve its primary objectives and has suffered high costs.
First, Russian forces have advanced an average of only 50 meters per day in areas such as Kharkiv, slower than during the Somme offensive in World War I, where French and British forces averaged 80 meters per day. Russian rates of advance have also been significantly slower than during offensives such as Galicia in 1914 (1,580 meters per day), Gorizia in 1916 (500 meters per day), Belleau Wood in 1918 (410 meters per day), Leningrad in 1943 (1,000 meters per day), and Kursk-Oboyan in 1943 (3,220 meters per day). Even Russia’s rate of advance in parts of Donetsk Oblast, averaging 135 meters per day, has been remarkably slow.
Second, Russia’s seizure of approximately 5,000 square kilometers of territory in Ukraine since January 2024 has been minimal—amounting to less than 1 percent of Ukrainian territory—and has occurred mainly in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv Oblasts. Russia’s marginal gains are particularly noteworthy whencompared to its conquest of 120,000 square kilometers during the first five weeks of the war and Ukraine’s recapture of 50,000 square kilometers in the spring of 2022.
Third, Russia has lost substantial quantities of equipment across land, air, and sea domains, highlighting the severe matériel toll of its attrition campaign. Since January 2024, for example, Russia has lost approximately 1,149 armored fighting vehicles, 3,098 infantry fighting vehicles, 300 self-propelled artillery pieces, and 1,865 tanks. Notably, Russian equipment losses have been significantly higher than Ukrainian losses, with ratios ranging from 5:1 to 2:1 in Ukraine’s favor.
Fourth, Russian fatalities and casualties have been extraordinary. Russia is likely to reach the 1 million casualty mark in the summer of 2025—a stunning and grim milestone. As of now, approximately 250,000 Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine, with over 950,000 total Russian casualties, a sign of Putin’s blatant disregard for his soldiers’ lives. For historical context, Russia has suffered roughly five times as many fatalities in Ukraine as in all Russian and Soviet wars combined between the end of World War II and the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Moreover, Russian fatalities in Ukraine (in just over three years) are 15 times greater than those in the Soviet Union’s decade-long war in Afghanistan and 10 times greater than those in Russia’s 13 years of war in Chechnya.
Russia’s poor performance is likely due to several factors: the Russian military’s reliance on dismounted infantry and mechanized forces to capture Ukrainian territory, its failure to use operational fires in a coordinated way to enable maneuver, and Ukraine’s effective use of defense-in-depth strategies. For the United States, increased sanctions on Russia and continued U.S. and European military assistance to Ukraine would likely raise the costs for Moscow of a protracted war and could facilitate peace talks.
The rest of this analysis is divided into three sections. The first examines Russian objectives and the Russian way of war in Ukraine. The second section analyzes four indicators of Russian military performance: the average rate of advance, the amount of territory seized, the amount of equipment destroyed, and total fatalities and casualties. The third section provides broader implications.
FYEO
We have a little more information. Just what hit the drone factory is unclear but it was probably a glide bomb. Those things aren't very accurate; one source described the hit probability as "within six buildings of the one you want to hit." If that's the case it might have been a lucky success on the actual target or a random hit in a general industrial area. Not likely the kind of thing you would do if you wanted to send a personal message to Trump.
Now, the Russians MIGHT have an actual cruise missile or two they haven't used yet and they might have use this more accurate weapon to send a personal memo to Trump. We haven't seen one of those missiles in a while and assumed they ran out of stock.
Trump released the shipment of 850 of the new ERAM powered glide bombs to Ukraine. These weapons are new designs created just for Ukraine and the Ukraine War. They are air-launched by any kind of fighter/bomber and have a range of 400km (240 miles). They are seriously accurate and jam resistant. They can be used to target bridges, buildings, ships, docks, or whatever you want. They are 500 pound weapons with a warhead of about 100 pounds. Not really that useful against hard targets like bunkers. These weapons will arrive 1 Oct and could rip apart the Russian supply/command system for the Ukraine War. Every headquarters, truck terminal, railyard, communications relay post, depot, or ammo dump within range is an easy target. However, due to the ceasefire efforts, they cannot be fired into Russia without US approval, something Trump could turn on and off like to spigot if he wanted to nudge Putin toward some kind of deal.
On some A-10 planes, I've seen this fin-like device sticking out of the top center of the fuselage. It's a flat horizontal shape mounted on a flat vertical stel sticking straight out from the top of the Fuselage. It almost like it's retractable and pulls down into the fuselage but I can't be sure.
I want to think it's some kind of antenna (which it may be), but it would still be nice to know specifically what it's for. Can anyone tell me what this is and what it does.
Here are two great photos showing what I'm referring too.
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https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/80/Fairchild_Republic_A-10_Thunderbolt_II_-_32156159151.jpg
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/68/A-10C_Warthog_pilot_reflects_on_completed_mission_150714-F-GK926-208.jpg
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I think that might be a SatCom antenna. Remember seeing the A-10 at a live fire demo in Warminster - the 30mm cannon sounded truly terrifying!
That is indeed a SatCom-capable antenna: an AN/ARC-210 BLOS antenna to be specific. It does not, however, retract into the fuselage.
I just watched a You tube videoprofile of a Mongoose model drone interceptor.
Reusable, jet powered, but what makes it different is its armaments.
The drone is armed with a reloadable (during flight on a mission), shotgun.
Cost estimate at $20,000USD, each drone is supposedly capable of shooting down multiple Russian drones. The technology is where Ukraine excels, the targets exhaust is what the shotgun pellets are targeted at, disabling the drones.
Depending on the exact type of Russian Drones that are targeted, this is a true game changer.
Russia is now importing (and has for some time) Iranian drones, reportedly costing up to $700,000 each (yes, there are cheaper drones, not all cheap drones are able to complete all missions.)
If true, Ukrainian defense that supposedly kills three enemy drones per mission, and is reusable with refueling and reloading a magazine , in the field, and then can launch and kill three more Russian-Iranian drones (again, with a cost of $700,000 each).
We already know Russian economy is in fragile state, now Putin is going to have to find a new supplier of high tech drones or risk losing a long war of attrition.
And, he needs those supposed new high tech drones to cost less than $20,000 USD.
Oh , and it better be from a country willing to accept contraband Russian oil in payment because Russia’s supply of western hard currencies is about exhausted.
Jet powered, reusable, and with a reloading shotgun for $20,000 sounds implausibly low to me. You're not just paying for a jet engine, but also an airframe and control and landing system that can all stand both the jet flight and the firing shock, and a military secure radio link.
That's the sort of price you get when you count surplused gear as free or some similar trick.
But, even if it's substantially more, or if the maintenance cost per mission is quite high, it may still be a very good deal.
Ukraine was averaging a million drones produced annually (2023-2024) of all kinds.
If they say $20,000 per unit. Cost to produce, perhaps it might be wise to listen? (And note:cost to produce is by definition, always less than MSRP. Ukraine is. NOT buying these drones in the market, they are producing them in their own factories.)
My second thought, is, if they adapt the suicide drones/frame (the one with a built in bomb that they detonate when in close proximity to a target) to carry a magazine fed shotgun that can be targeted on a heat source using existing technology, why wouldn’t it work as advertised?
The suicide drones are already killing individual Russian soldiers across the theater of operations (and numbers of Russians have surrendered to drones rather than face certain death), why doubt the Ukrainians when they claim the ability to shoot down one of the very few effective weapons systems used by the Russians?
Experience has taught me to be skeptical of claims during war (from one side OR the other).
Especially in this war. ESPECIALLY from news outlets.
Fair enough.
If the Ukrainians can shoot down significant numbers of Iranian designed/built drones, the results will be readily apparent to us all.
They've been shooting down many of the Iranian drones, with anti-aircraft missiles.
These drones, if as advertised, would be a much much cheaper way to do it, but the simple fact of a shootdown doesn't prove anything much.
Doug,
Do not underestimate the power of economics.
If, as advertised, the so called mongoose drone can in fact shoot down three Iranian missiles, which cost Russia $700,000 USD individually (collectively, (3*$700,000.00=$2,100,000.00)) during a single sortie/mission, and, again, it is claimed the same Mongoose drone can be recovered, refueled and reloaded, relaunched to shoot down three more Russian/Iranian drones, at a per unit cost of $20,000.00 USD, the conclusions should be clear.
1. Russia Does not have enough financial resources to expand purchases of Iranian drones.
2. Russia, might not even be able to break Ukrainian air superiority to inflict even civilian casualties, much less have any impact on the battlefield.
3. Even attempting to expand the number of such missiles would be tantamount to risking bankruptcy.
Ask Petrick about what happens to Russian leaders who screw up the Russian Economy to the point they can’t even afford to pay security payroll.
Better yet, go talk to the ghosts of the Czars and families. It wasn’t pretty.
The Ukrainian interceptors are most likely to be used against the swarms of Shaheds the russians keep throwing at them in an effort to saturate defenses and sow terror. Still worth it IMO
Artillery: Tube Artillery Trumps Drones: Ukraine’s Battlefield Lesson in Speed and Lethality
When speed of engagement and area lethality count, the Ukrainian Army has learned tube artillery is often a better solution than drones. Consider the facts. An artillery shell is a drone of sorts—an unsmart, intentionally self-destructive, one-way drone, but a drone that can get to the target quickly and is available 24/7, even in the worst weather. A Ukrainian officer recently told Western reporters that 12 Russian soldiers might take 12 drones to engage, which leads to several other things for Ukrainians and observant U.S. Army tacticians to think about. How often can an infantry company have a dozen drones constantly loitering over an enemy axis of advance? Have you got the drones and battery power to go 24/7? If the drones aren’t loitering, then it takes time—as in multiple minutes of precious time, as the enemy probe turns into an attack—to fly the drones to the suspected area of enemy advance. This scenario assumes recon drones have correctly identified the advance and not a feint. Even an average logistician ought to conclude that having one recon drone scout an area is much more cost-effective. So, the solution: support the recon drone with tube or rocket artillery. Five or six 155mm arty rounds just obliterate soft targets—as in the bodies of probing infantry soldiers. Standard high-explosive arty shells are cheaper than drones—smart shells can get very expensive, but drones capable of carrying tank-disabling warheads and with batteries big enough to enable them to loiter and ambush armored vehicles can cost over $10,000. Cheaper drones (circa $1,000) don’t have the power to loiter for long or carry payloads capable of killing heavy armor. 155mm arty shells cost from $2,800 to $3,200. No, high-explosive arty shells aren’t heavy armor killers, but they are mass infantry killers, and a volley will rattle tankers. 155mm arty shell fragments can kill exposed soldiers for 50 meters in every direction. Most drones are point-target killers—essentially First Person View (FPV) sniping at one or two enemy soldiers. Yes, that definitely has its place. But high-quality RUMINT says Ukrainian soldiers swear the “big guns,” properly employed, are still the God of War. (AB)
FYEO
NBC Weapons: U.S. and South Korea Eye Tactical Nukes to Counter Rising Threats on Korean Peninsula
The U.S. and South Korea are once again publicly considering deploying a small number of U.S. air-delivered nuclear bombs (non-strategic tactical nukes) on South Korean territory. Advocates contend that forward-deploying low-yield tactical nuclear gravity bombs to U.S. airbases within South Korea will strengthen nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.
Nuclear deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and throughout Northeast Asia is threatened. Over the last two years, China’s diplomatic relations with the U.S., South Korea, and Japan have deteriorated. Four years ago, North Korea began a new round of nuclear threats against South Korea. Tokyo, Honolulu, and Los Angeles are on Pyongyang’s public target list. Earlier this year, Western government sources confirmed that North Korea has a ballistic missile base near China, and several of the missiles may have intercontinental range. There are indications North Korea is also building more sophisticated nuclear weapons, possibly with Russian assistance.
FYEO
Forces: Germany Revives Conscription to Strengthen Military
The German government is once again considering compulsory military service—a draft to address current recruitment shortfalls and anticipated military personnel needs over the next several years (three to five years is the likely planning range). The government has made it clear that providing Ukraine with security guarantees requires increasing military manpower. The conscription bill, approved by the German government in mid-August, would draft 110,000 men and assign them to Bundeswehr reserve units. The bill must still be approved by the German parliament. German media indicate that the government would prefer to rely on volunteers. However, it is clear that a draft will be politically unpopular among young Germans. Germany ended compulsory military conscription in 2011—though “suspended” is how the government refers to the 2011 decision. Defense officials have concluded that voluntary recruitment will not meet Germany’s current defense requirements and definitely doesn’t meet NATO and EU defense requirements. In 1991, after the Cold War ended and West Germany absorbed East Germany, the reunited Bundeswehr had nearly half a million troops. Currently, Germany has about 175,000 to 180,000 active-duty military personnel, supported by 50,000 trained and qualified reservists (though one source estimates the number of trained and ready reservists at 30,000). Germany has the EU’s largest economy and population. In an EU-led Ukraine Security Guarantee scenario, German military forces should reflect Germany’s economic and demographic capabilities. They don’t, and raw numbers matter. The German defense ministry’s mobilization plan calls for 260,000 active-duty personnel and 200,000 to 250,000 reservists (who train annually to maintain military skills). The German government knew military expansion was necessary but, until this year, was slow to make the economic and military commitments. After Russia’s February 2022 all-out attack on Ukraine, then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz said Germany would expand its military forces. Current Chancellor Friedrich Merz has stated that Germany should have Europe’s largest conventional army. OK. The idea of a large German army may concern some Europeans, and Turkey may object, arguing that Merz means the largest conventional military in EU Europe. However, Europe is now 25 years into the 21st century. Sweden and Finland are NATO members, and Switzerland supports a Europe-wide air and space defense program. Since 1991, Germany has lagged in meeting NATO spending and modernization requirements. Europe now depends on collective defense. To protect Europe from Russian aggression, Germany must rearm. (AB)
FYEO
Air Defense: Saudi Arabia’s THAAD Goes Operational
September 02, 2025: In July 2025, Saudi Arabia’s first Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile unit achieved full operational status. The Saudi Ministry of Defense attributed this milestone to years of strategic planning, meticulous procurement, and rigorous testing and training. Saudi military personnel now operate the battery, and the nation takes great pride in this advanced defense capability.
Before the July activation, Saudi air defense officers and crews completed months of intensive training at the U.S. Army’s Fort Bliss air and space defense facility in Texas, the primary training site for THAAD operators.
THAAD is a sophisticated U.S.-made anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system designed to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles in their terminal phase using hit-to-kill technology. The latest THAAD model can engage targets at altitudes up to 150 kilometers and ranges of approximately 200 kilometers, with missiles rated at Mach 8 (hypersonic). The extended-range THAAD operates in both endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric environments. According to the Pentagon, THAAD is designed to counter short-range (SRBM, up to 1,000 km), medium-range (MRBM, 1,000–3,000 km), and intermediate-range (IRBM, 3,000–5,000 km) ballistic missiles.
The U.S. has deployed THAAD systems in South Korea and Guam, and temporarily stationed a battery in Israel.
In October 2017, Saudi Arabia signed a $15 billion contract with the U.S. to procure seven THAAD batteries, including 44 launchers, 360 advanced THAAD-ER (extended-range) interceptor missiles, 16 fire control and communication stations, and seven high-resolution AN/TPY-2 tracking radars. The agreement also covers support equipment, long-term maintenance, and critical training assistance.
As threats from Iranian missiles, drones, and proxies like Hezbollah and Hamas have intensified, Saudi Arabia’s defense needs have evolved. Unlike Israel, which relies on its multi-layered Iron Dome system to counter rockets and artillery in its compact geography, Saudi Arabia’s vast territory faces different threats. While field artillery and mortars pose little immediate risk, ballistic and cruise missiles and drones endanger Saudi oilfields, refineries, ports, urban centers, and strategic military assets like airbases. The September 2019 Iranian drone attack on the Abqaiq oil facility and Khurais oil field, involving an estimated 25 drones, disrupted over seven million barrels of daily oil production.
Iran and its proxies continue to target Saudi Arabia with SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs, and drones. Saudi Arabia already deploys Patriot PAC-3 ABMs, which are lower-tier systems with a range of 20–25 kilometers. Patriot launchers can also fire PAC-2 anti-aircraft missiles, effective against slower drones at ranges up to 70 kilometers.
The Saudis have had a lot of Patriot combat experience, primarily intercepting Houthi drones and short range ballistic missiles. No doubt that experience impressed their American instructors at Ft. Bliss. (AB)
FYEO
Quote:Advocates contend that forward-deploying low-yield tactical nuclear gravity bombs...
I think this quote from the FYEO artiocle posted above reflects a very common misconception about what is meant by "tactical" versus "strategic" as applied to nuclear weapons. A lot of people (including, apparently, whoever wrote that FYEO article) seem to think the difference has something to do with yield. It doesn't, or at least it didn't when I actually sat nuclear alert (in the F-111) back in the 1980s. Nor is it the definiton currently in use by the "New START" (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), which replaced the original START from the 1990s.
While the meaning of "tactical" versus "strategic" nuclear weapons varies somewhat with context, in general it designates a mission rather than weapon yield. Specifically for New START, the formal definition is based on range of the delivery system. Load a B-61 nuclear bomb onto a B-52 or a B-2 and it is classed as "strategic" and is subject to the limits of the treaty. Download that bomb from the bomber and load it onto an F-15E or F-16 and the exact same bomb is now a "tactical" weapon and doesn't count against treaty limits.
On Drones vs. Tube Artillery
Could a drone (an expensive one) flying at high altitude, perhaps making use of a terminal guidance control laser, direct tube fired artillery?
Again, I'm just an underinformed civvie, but I remember reading about a laser guided 155 shell. Between that and good... Well, let's say ADEQUATE GPS tracking, a 155 salvo can work for most soft targets, plus the occasional laser guided hefty shell for hardened targets feels like a workable combo.
(Admittedly, the "Feels" part does give me some doubt. How 'bout you pros? Have I accidently got an acceptable idea, or do I still have a serious case of cranial/rectal impaction? 
)
I'm pretty sure we've already got drones with targetting lasers. Spotting for artillery is a major use of drones.