Weapons: Demining Ukraine
November 25, 2025: Ukraine has a landmine and UXO/UneXplOded munitions problem. Over 140,000 square kilometers of Ukraine is contaminated with mines and UXO. These mines threaten agricultural production because the work of farmers and farming machinery is threatened by the mines. Farmers are killed and injured and their tractors and combines damaged by unseen landmines and UXO. Ukraine is asking for foreign aid in the form of demining teams, demining equipment and training for Ukrainian demining teams. Demining foreign aid in the form of cash is also welcome, The Ukrainian demining teams have to be paid and provided with medical insurance for Ukrainian demining casualties.
Three years ago the United States gave Ukraine $89 million for demining. Normally this means clearing landmines from what was once a combat zone. Ukraine is different. Few landmines were used but the Russians did leave many booby-traps behind when they retreated, they are still retreating, and that means more of these IETs/Improvised Explosive Traps are being placed in buildings, civilian vehicles, major appliances and under bodies of dead Ukrainians. There are also some naval mines to deal with in the Black Sea.
Even more numerous UXO munitions are out there because of the many Russian artillery shells and missiles that failed to detonate on impact. The percentage of Russian shells and missiles that become UXOs is much higher than for Ukrainian munitions. The Russians also use a lot more artillery and missile fire. Experience has shown that the fuzes of unexploded munitions sometimes function when anyone attempts to move them deliberately or accidentally, as in during construction or rubble clearance. Landmines are banned by the Ottawa Convention international treaty, but dud shells and improvised explosives UXO are not. Improvised explosive traps are a war crime and have always been. The hundred Ukrainian demining teams consist of local volunteers trained by Ukrainian and foreign experts with experience in landmine and UXO detection and removal. Current estimates are that nearly 160,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory are contaminated with mines and UXOs.
Finding and clearing landmines is relatively easy compared to non-landmine UXOs. These can be anywhere there was combat and have always been a more common problem. UXO from both World Wars and more recent conflicts are still a problem, requiring the maintenance of local emergency teams to handle old UXOs that are still being discovered. That will apply to parts of Ukraine for a long time. There are not many World War Two UXOs in Ukraine because there was not a lot of sustained combat on stationary fronts, and few aerial bombs compared to Germany, which was pounded for years by American and British heavy bombers. Currently about 160,000 square kilometers of Ukraine are contaminated, mainly with unexploded dud shells, rockets, hand grenades and some buried stockpiles of explosives. The longer the fighting goes on the more UXOs will be created.
Russia did not use landmines in Ukraine until the 2022 invasion and have since been using them in any territory they retreat from, if they have time. These landmines are recently manufactured models that usually work, rather than turn into UXOs as many older or improvised landmines do. Russia denies this but the landmines found are easily identified as Russian designs. Leaving behind landmines and IETs indicates the Russians don’t believe they will reoccupy that territory anytime soon and don’t care about local civilians killed or wounded by these devices.
Currently Russian landmines and IETs are being used in Kherson province north of Crimea. The mines tend to be anti-personnel and anti-vehicle models delivered by rocket launchers. Landmines, emplaced manually by troops or engineers, are older models, some dating back to the 1950s that have been kept in storage ever since. Many of these prove to be duds used to slow down the advancing Ukrainians, who expect Russian landmines and have troops trained to uncover them so they can be destroyed from a distance.
Russians and Ukrainians living in Crimea and parts of Donbas occupied since 2014 fear that Russia will leave behind landmines and IETs if the Ukrainians liberate these areas and that is making the locals nervous. Russians are leaving because of that, as well as the increasing Ukrainian partisan activity in Crimea and Donbas. Ukrainian collaborators are also leaving, even if they are tolerated but not really welcome in Russia. The partisans often attack the Ukrainian collaborators with IETs planted in automobiles or just use gunfire.
Some countries, especially the United States, believe the Ottawa Convention that banned landmines is largely a failure because landmines are still widely used. While 161 nations signed the Ottawa treaty, 36 did not, including Russia. Ukraine signed the treaty and is not believed to have used landmines. Other major military powers that did not sign the treaty include China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, the Palestinians, both Koreas, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Most of these nations still see a pressing need for landmines, although many are trying to find replacement weapons.
While landmines were outlawed in 1999, most of the nations that rushed to sign the Ottawa Convention either didn't have landmines or didn't have any reason to use them. While landmine casualties have declined from about 20,000 a year when the Cold War ended in 1991 to about 4,000 now, that was largely due to the collapse of many communist governments, which were always the biggest landmine users, mainly to keep people from entering or leaving their territory. The fall of communism led to more open borders and a lot of mines were taken out of service. The treaty backers like to take credit for 87 countries destroying 46 million landmines. The reality was that most of those mines would have been destroyed anyway because of the collapse of the many communist governments which made most of those mines.
Despite the anti-landmine efforts, some countries still manufacture and use them. In the last few years Israel, Libya, Syria, North Korea, Iran, and Myanmar/Burma planted new mines. Some nations which still use landmines, like Israel, have taken the lead in developing new technology and techniques for quickly clearing landmines, especially old ones whose location was never recorded.
In addition India, Myanmar, and Pakistan are still manufacturing landmines. Arms dealers still provide large quantities of Russian and Chinese landmines, many of them Cold War surplus. China, Russia, and other communist nations were the major producers of landmines during the Cold War. The mines were produced not so much for use against potential enemies but to aid in keeping the borders closed and prevent citizens from leaving these unpleasant dictatorships.
There has been a growing list of outlaw organizations that are ignoring the 1999 ban. Until 2021 the Taliban in Afghanistan and the TTP in Pakistan were still manufacturing landmines in primitive workshops and using them against Pakistani, Afghan, and foreign soldiers, as well as civilians who refused to support Islamic terrorism. Rebels and gangsters did not sign the international agreement and find the mines a cheap way to control civilian populations and slow down the movements of the security forces. It takes more time, money, and effort to remove these mines than to place them.
Despite the 1999 treaty, landmines are still causing about 4,000 casualties a year worldwide. About 20 percent of the victims are killed and 90 percent of them are males. This is largely because men are more likely to be out in the bush or working farmlands that still contain mines. A third of the casualties are police and soldiers. This is because in many countries rebels and criminals are still using landmines, either factory made ones from countries that did not sign the Ottawa Convention or locally made models.
Landmines are simple to make and workshops are easily set up to do it. There's no shortage of mines out there, despite the fact that so many have been destroyed in the name of the 1999 Ottawa Convention. There are believed to be at least 100 million mines still in the ground and at least as many in military warehouses for future use.
The 1999 Ottawa Convention was supposed to have eliminated the threat of landmines. It hasn't worked because the owners of the largest landmine stockpiles, especially Russia and China, refused to sign. Chinese landmines are still available on the international arms black market. China is believed to have the largest stockpile, mostly of anti-personnel mines. The old ones are often sold before they become worthless. But even these mines, which go for $5-10 each, are too expensive for many of the criminal organizations that buy them. New land mines, competitive with the factory-built ones from China, can be built for less than $3 each. You can find all the technical data you need on the Internet.
Meanwhile, the most effective way to get the mine-clearing done is by training local volunteers to be part of the part-time mine-clearing teams. The government must provide training, pay that should be good by local standards, and health and life insurance. When a new bunch of mines are found usually by an animal coming across them, the team gets to work.
Landmines continue to be a nasty problem for many nations. This is especially true of countries in out-of-the-way places that rarely generate many headlines for any reason. A typical case is Tajikistan. One of the northern neighbors of Afghanistan, Tajikistan long had mines on its borders because of communist policies towards free movement. After becoming independent of Russia in the early 1990s, Tajikistan went through several years of civil war in which both sides planted thousands of Cold War surplus landmines. Russia helped settle that internal conflict and supplied peacekeepers, who also manned the Afghan border to try and keep the Afghan heroin and hashish out. This involved creating more new minefields along the Afghan border. There were also some mines planted on the new international borders with other former parts of the Soviet Union.
While Tajikistan got some foreign aid to help with clearing all those mines, only about a third of the known minefields have been cleared so far. Fortunately, the mines tend to be planted in thinly populated areas, so only about 350,000 people live near enough to the mined areas to be in any danger. Thus, since 1991, 20-30 people a year have been killed by the mines, with another 30-40 wounded. Civilians are the most frequent victims of landmines.
India and Pakistan continue to maintain extensive minefields along their 900-kilometer border. Both countries still manufacture mines. Same deal with the two Koreas and Israel on its Syrian border.
The United States believes it cannot ignore this vital tool in conventional warfare. This is especially true in an increasingly unstable strategic environment. The ethical problem is an important one. Unilateral disarmament is a fools’ errand when likely adversaries won’t join in. Since 2016 the Americans have been developing landmines with a self-destruct and self-activation function. These landmines would be rendered harmless after a conflict. There are two approaches to the problem. First one aims to add additional sensors and connect smart mines into wireless networks supervised by a soldier who decides whether to detonate landmines or not. Meanwhile, the second way involves the addition of self-destruct and self-activate mechanisms that activate after a set time or when the battery power is exhausted.
There is still a problem because self-destruct mechanisms are not 100 percent reliable. International agreements allow a 10 percent dud rate. This could be higher due to the delivery method. The landmines are usually scattered by aircraft or artillery at a rate of thousands in a matter of minutes, with little precision. These are similar to cluster munitions, and some landmines might fail to arm or their self-destruct system is damaged. For example, Russia has used smart mines which are still dangerous in Chechnya many years after the conflict. Even more advanced networked minefields pose a serious danger for friendly forces passing through them when in off-mode as did dumb minefields during Gulf War of 1991.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, November 25, 2025 - 03:50 pm: Edit

Information Warfare: Israeli Algorithmic Counterinsurgency
November 25, 2025: Most people are not aware that the current war in Gaza is fought with the Israelis using automation, sensors and software together in a system which identifies what the enemy is about to do, and what Israeli airstrikes or ground combat actions will best defeat Hamas with minimal civilian casualties.
Another example occurred in 2024 when personnel from Unit 8200 trained an Artificial Intelligence/AI model to understand spoken Arabic. The model used the many telephone conversations and text messages obtained while electronically monitoring the Palestinian territories. Unit 8200 has been around since 1952 and specialize in signals intelligence, cyberwarfare, decryption, intelligence, clandestine operations, surveillance and keeping up with the latest technology to do their job. Unit 8200 is responsible for developing and monitoring the use of Israeli Algorithmic Counterinsurgency. These tools have been used by the Israelis in just about every counterinsurgency operation Israel has undertaken in the last seventy years.
For example Unit 8200 began building a model to create a sophisticated chatbot tool that could answer questions about monitored people by using massive quantities of data collected. Unit 8200 accelerated system development after the Hamas attack out of Gaza in October 2023.
Unit 8200 built a Large Language Model/LLM, a deep learning system based on all the Arab language material they had collected. Unit 8200’s AI models knew what everyone in the West Bank was doing. This was done with large-scale retention of intercepted Palestinian telecommunications. That meant using AI to analyze communications, recognize patterns and make predictions.
In 2022 ChatGPT became available and Unit 8200 experts modified ChatGPT to use massive amounts of information to expertly handle complex requests. After the Hamas 2023 attacks Israel called up several hundred thousand reservists. These included personnel who knew how to create LLMs. These experts began building an LLM that understands written Arabic found in media broadcasts, literature and media. This was a problem because most of the collected data was spoken Arabic.
Unit 8200 collected all the spoken Arabic text they had and created a database of about a hundred billion words from groups that were hostile to Israel. Israelis also trained the model to understand specific terms used by anti-Israel groups. This massive collection of training data included large volumes of communications between Palestinians, which was just what the model needed to succeed.
Earlier machine learning models used by Unit 8200 made wide-scale surveillance of Palestinians effective as a form of control, particularly in the West Bank where they said it has contributed to a greater number of arrests. The model enabled Israeli intelligence specialists to automatically analyze intercepted phone conversations and identify Palestinians planning to attack soldiers or Israelis living in illegal settlements. When Israeli soldiers entered West Bank communities, the AI system detected people using words indicating hostile activity like throwing rocks or using firearms against soldiers.
When used to select targets for airstrikes, the AI sometimes makes mistakes when pilots are sent to attack innocent civilians instead of militants. The Israelis admit that mistakes are made but, in a war for survival, occasional mistakes are acceptable. Israel is fighting groups that want to destroy Israel and drive all surviving Jews from the region.
The Americans have also built similar systems, but for different purposes. Over a decade ago the U.S. Department of Defense finally realized, at the most senior levels, that the nature of and progress in this war was being poorly presented to the national leadership and the public. Actually, from the very beginning there was a reluctance to reveal the masses of data collected and how it was analyzed. Partly this was to prevent the enemy from realizing how much information on terrorist operations it possessed. But another reason was the fact that such a large mass of data could be interpreted many different ways, some of them unfavorable to the United States. Thus there was no body count or any other type of measure released by the Department of Defense. Internally, there were various metrics measurements presented to senior military and political leadership. The big problem was the use of aggregation combining a lot of data together that should not have been combined. That was a problem that slowly became ob
It's now recognized that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere, like Yemen, Somalia, North Africa, and so on were all somewhat different and that context for each of them was crucial if you were going to analyze them. For example, al Qaeda is more of an idea than a centralized organization. Thus the al Qaeda found in each country, or part of a country, usually has different means and motivations. The war in Iraq was actually several separate wars going on at the same time and occasionally interacting with other wars nearby. Same thing in Afghanistan and places like Somalia. Measuring progress is more accurate if you show the unique trends in all the different wars. Some of them ended early, some escalated, and some are still in progress, while others evolve into new kinds of conflicts. In other words, the military should use contextual assessment in reporting what is going on with guerilla conflict or irregular warfare in general.
What the Department of Defense did here was fix a problem it created. This happened during the Vietnam War, which the U.S. military establishment didn't really want any part of. The Pentagon in the 1960s was fixated on the conventional military threat the Soviet Union presented in Europe and elsewhere. But a new generation of technocrats had taken over in the Department of Defense and many of their new ideas were handed over to bureaucrats who didn't understand what they were doing. Generals who pointed out problems in these new methods tended to retire ahead of schedule.
Before long, it became conventional wisdom that the U.S. was incapable of handling irregular warfare. This was odd, as the United States had an enviable track record when it comes to defeating guerillas and irregular forces in general. Even Vietnam, which conventional wisdom counts as a defeat, wasn't. The conventional wisdom, as is often the case, is wrong. By the time the last U.S. combat units pulled out of South Vietnam in 1972, the local guerilla movement, the Viet Cong, was destroyed. North Vietnam came south three years later with a conventional invasion, sending tank and infantry divisions charging across the border and conquering their neighbor the old fashioned way.
When the United States first got involved with Vietnam in the late 1950s, there was good reason to believe American assistance would lead to the defeat of the communist guerilla movement in South Vietnam. That was because the communists had not been doing so well with their guerilla wars. In the previous two decades there had been twelve communist insurgencies, and 75 percent of them had been defeated. These included the Greek Civil War 1944-1949, Spanish Republican Insurgency 1944-1952, Iranian Communist Uprising 1945-1946, Philippine Huk War 1946-1954, Madagascan Nationalist Revolt 1947-1949, Korean Partisan War 1948-1953, Sarawak/Sabah Confrontation 1960-1966, Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, and the Kenyan Mau-Mau Rebellion 1952-1955. The communists won in the Cuban Revolution 1956-1958, the First Indochina War 1945-1954, and the Chinese Civil War 1945-1949. The communists went on to lose the guerilla phase of the Second Indochina War 1959-1970. Guerillas make great copy for journalists. You know, the little
The main problem with COIN/Counterinsurgency Warfare is that the American armed forces take it for granted. U.S. troops have been defeating guerilla movements for centuries. Through most of American history, COIN has been the most frequent form of warfare American troops were involved with. But COIN has always been viewed as a minor, secondary military role. It never got any respect. The generals preferred to prepare for a major war with a proper army, not playing cops and robbers with a bunch of poorly organized losers.
Even the U.S. Marine Corps, after half a century of COIN operations, were glad to put that behind them in the late 1930s. All that remained of that experience was a classic book, The Small Wars Manual, written by some marine officers on the eve of World War II. That book, which is still in print, contained timeless wisdom and techniques on how to deal with COIN operations and small wars in general. Every COIN book simply repeats the basic wisdom laid down in The Small Wars Manual.
The basic truth is that COIN tactics and techniques have not changed for thousands of years. What has also not changed is the professional soldiers' disdain for COIN operations. This sort of thing has never been considered real soldiering. But the U.S. Army and Marines have finally come to accept that COIN is a major job, something that U.S. troops have always been good at and something that you have to pay attention to.
So when you see more news stories about new COIN manuals or American ignorance of irregular warfare, keep in mind the history of that kind of warfare and how long, and successfully, Americans have been dealing with it.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, November 25, 2025 - 05:28 pm: Edit

Zelenski isn't going to take the 28 point deal unless he feels its the best deal he's gonna get. If he takes it, he was convinced he would do no better. I am sure the Czechs didn't like losing the Sudeten territory with all the rich coal and iron mines, and that turned out fine, some Brit said it brought a generation of peace, so this Ukraine deal will be okay.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, November 26, 2025 - 02:50 pm: Edit

Morale: Russian Brutality Questioned
November 26, 2025: Russia is different from the West and operates differently, especially in wartime. Some of the differences include barbaric treatment of Russian soldiers by their officers, and brutal conduct by Russian soldiers when dealing with enemy prisoners or civilians going about their business. So far there have been over a hundred cases of Russian officers killing their own troops for refusing to fight. This is called zeroing out unfit, rebellious or disliked soldiers. Early in the Russian government explicitly condoned and encouraged these punishments. Russian leaders also ignore Ukrainian or NATO complaints about Russian mistreatment and murder of Ukrainian civilians. Russian leaders regard this atrocious behavior as an example of how Russia is different from the decadent West and will eventually triumph because Russia is willing to do things the decadent Westerners abhor and avoid.
Despite international condemnation and criticism, Russian bad behavior continues. For example, earlier this year soldiers of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade committed atrocities by attacking civilians with drones to terrorize people in southern Ukraine. The victims were often going about their daily routine but, if they were out in the open, they were targets for these frequent drone attacks. The attacks also included ambulances, which were supposed to have some immunity from attack. The Russians ignored that and killed ambulance drivers, medics, and passengers. Before this terrorism ended over 200 civilians were killed and hundreds more wounded.
Since 2023, a year after the invasion, Russian soldiers were accused of numerous atrocities and war crimes in Ukraine. Reports via the Russian internet described numerous Russian war crimes against civilians in Ukraine. Many Russian commentators admit that the war in Ukraine is lost and want Putin held accountable for the heavy cost in men, money and prestige. Ukraine will be demanding prosecutions for war crimes and compensation from Russia for damages and numerous atrocities.
Most Russians criticize their own military. There are many reasons, and most stem from the poor treatment of conscript soldiers.
The Russian military was unpopular for the one year conscripts mainly because of the brutal treatment they received. This was not getting better, and hazing incidents constantly increase. This is a serious problem. There were a lot of reasons for not wanting to be in the Russian Army, but the worst of them was the hazing of new recruits by soldiers who had been in a few months longer. It was thought that this sort of thing would speed the demise of conscription in Russia once the Cold War ended in 1991. It didn't. The government found that, even among the higher quality contract/volunteer soldiers, the old abuses lived on, and most of the best contract soldiers left when their contracts were up. This was because of the brutality and lack of discipline in the barracks. The hazing was most frequently committed by troops who had been in for six months or so against the new recruits. That extended to a pattern of abuse and brutality by all senior enlisted troops against junior ones. It was and is out of control.
This hazing originally developed after World War II, when Russia deliberately avoided developing a professional NCO corps. It preferred to have officers take care of nearly all troop supervision. The Soviets failed to note that good NCOs were the key to developing effective soldiers. They felt that officers were more reliable, as they were more carefully selected and monitored. The NCOs that did exist were treated as slightly more reliable enlisted men but given little real authority.
Since officers did not live with the men, slack supervision and discipline in the barracks gave rise to vicious hazing and exploitation of junior conscripts by senior ones. This led to very low morale and a lot of suicides, theft, sabotage, and desertions. The hazing has been one of the basic causes of crimes in the Russian armed forces, accounting for 20 to 30 percent of all soldier crimes. This also produced a suicide rate that is among the highest in the world. Poor working conditions in general also mean that Russian soldiers are nearly twice as likely to die from accidents or suicide than American soldiers. Long recognized as a problem, no solution to the hazing has ever worked.
Conscription itself, and the prospect of being exposed to hazing, led to a massive increase in draft-dodging. Bribes and document fraud were freely used. Few parents or potential conscripts consider this a crime. Avoiding the draft was seen as a form of self-preservation long before the massive casualties of the current war began.
The Russian lack of sergeants was difficult to fix. Just promoting more troops to that rank, paying them more, and telling them to take charge did not work. Upon looking at how Western armies did it, the Russians noted that those foreign armies provided a lot of professional training for new NCOs and more of it as the NCOs advanced in rank. But this was a long-term process, and it was known that it would take years, perhaps decades, before benefits could be felt.
All this is in sharp contrast to the old days. When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, it had five million troops in its armed forces. Throughout the 1990s it was just a million in Russia. As a result of these personnel problems, Russian efforts to reform and upgrade its armed forces failed. The basic problem was that few Russian men were willing to join, even at good pay rates. Efforts to recruit women and foreigners have not made up for this. The Russian military has an image problem that just won't go away. This resulted in the period of service for conscripts being lowered to one year in 2008. That was partly to placate the growing number of parents who were encouraging and assisting their kids in avoiding military service.
All this came after more than a decade of reforms in the armed forces, particularly the army. Poor discipline, low morale, and incompetent performance are all legacies of the 1921–1991 Soviet era. Russian commanders, envious of the success of all-volunteer Western forces, had long studied their former foes and decided to adopt many more Western military customs. For example, one reform ordered that Russian troops would not be confined to their barracks most of the time. In the Soviet era, conscripted troops were treated like convicts, and their barracks were more like a prison than the college dormitory atmosphere found in troop housing for Western military personnel. Russian conscripts were now free to leave the base on weekends and work only a five-day week. Things like this helped a bit, but not enough.
Russia has tried to change public attitudes toward the armed forces by publicizing all the new changes and programs. But word got around that most of these efforts failed. Blame that on the internet. Polls consistently show that most military-age men do not want to serve in the military, and the main reason is the hazing and prison-like conditions in the barracks. Then Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, and manpower problems became even worse due to escalating corruption and massive casualties. After the Ukraine War is over there will be more efforts at reform and all these efforts might someday succeed.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, November 26, 2025 - 02:51 pm: Edit

Air Weapons: The Fog Of War In Ukraine
November 26, 2025: Late fall and early winter in Ukraine are beset by fog and mist. A decade ago these conditions would have hidden ground forces from fight-bombers overhead. In 2025 these conditions make it difficult for FPV/First Person View drones to find their targets. The drone operator wears goggles over his eyes so he can see what the drone camera can, or cannot see. For your basic FPV drones, fog and mist are a problem. The solution is the more expensive drones with night-vision sensors, usually based on a combination of object and heat detection and interpretation, which provide adequate surveillance at night or in fog or misty conditions.
The latest Ukrainian innovation is adding AI/Artificial Intelligence to drone targeting systems. The AI drone contains a targeting sensor that finds targets more quickly and accurately. The AI drone operator confirms which targets are real and, once a target is confirmed, the AI targeting system needs no further communication with anyone. It is resistant to all forms of jamming.
Modern warfare has been radically changed by the introduction of FPV drones. These drones are an omnipresent aerial threat to armored vehicles, infantry on foot and even Russian bunkers containing their drone operators and supplies of drones waiting to be launched. Each FPV drone costs about a thousand dollars. That’s about half what drones cost a year ago.
Operators use the video camera on the drone to see what is below and find targets. Armed FPV operators are several kilometers away to decide when their FPV drones will drop explosives on an armored vehicle, which has thinner armor on top, or infantry in the open or in trenches. To do so, the drone operators often operate in pairs, with one flying behind the other and concentrating on the big picture while seeking a likely target. When such a target is found by the reconnaissance drone, the armed drone is directed to the target. The two FPV drone operators are usually in the same room or tent and can take control of new drones, which are lined up and brought outside for launch when needed. The reconnaissance drones are often unarmed so they carry more fuel to spend more time in the air to seek a target.
The Ukrainians developed the FPV drone in 2022, when only a few FPV drone attacks were recorded. The Ukrainian Army was the first to appreciate the potential of FPV drones. By the summer of 2023, the Russian Army also began to use FPV drones in greater numbers. Since then, the number of FPV drone attacks has grown exponentially on both sides. Only twelve percent of those attacks led to the destruction of the target, which could be a vehicle or group of infantry or even a sniper who was firing through a window from inside a building. In this case, the armed FPV drone would fly through the window and explode in the room the sniper was in. The only defense from this was having a nearby open door the sniper could run to or dive through as the FPV drone approached. Sometimes that isn’t possible because the armed FPV drone is coming down from above the window and then in. You don’t see those coming until it’s too late.
Nearly five million drones are being built this year. The total for 2024 was 1.5 million drones. There have been problems. Chinese component producers are having a hard time keeping up, and, last year, to assist the Russians, China halted sending drone components to Ukraine. Suppliers in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere were quickly found. At least 70 percent of Ukrainian drones are built entirely in Ukraine, and the rest from imported parts or whole assemblies. Some Ukrainian firms have improvised by using plywood and similar materials for their drones. For the FPV First Person View drones, cheaper is better if the drone can hit its first and only target. Most Ukrainian drones are FPV models, which are considered a form of ammunition.
Both sides now use the FPV drones, but there are substantial differences in how the FPV drones are put to work in combat. The Ukrainians seek out high-value targets like armored vehicles, electronic warfare equipment, anti-aircraft systems, and storage sites for munitions or other supplies. Russian trucks carrying supplies are another prime target.
Adapting and adopting Ukrainian drone technology means there will be new drone modifications and upgrades for as long as the fighting in Ukraine lasts. These changes come quickly in wartime and always have. In Ukraine, drone designs can be changed in less than a week. This is usually because the Russians have gained an edge with one of their recent tweaks.
While Ukraine has been in the forefront of developing and upgrading drone technology, the Russians have kept up. In war time you either keep up or become an inept underdog that falls farther and farther behind. The Russians have kept most of the time and, when they fail to keep up, suffer heavy losses.
FYEO

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Wednesday, November 26, 2025 - 03:52 pm: Edit

Two members of the West Virginia National Guard have been shot and injured in Washington D.C., some two blocks north of the White House; two suspects have arrested, one of which was also shot and injured.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Wednesday, November 26, 2025 - 04:03 pm: Edit

UPDATE: the Gov. of West Virginia has stated that the two Guardsmen who were shot have died.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Wednesday, November 26, 2025 - 05:33 pm: Edit

UPDATE: the Gov. of West Virginia has walked back that statement; the two Guardsman are apparently alive but in critical condition.

By Chuck Strong (Raider) on Wednesday, November 26, 2025 - 08:39 pm: Edit

The alleged assassin who ambushed our two National Guardsmen protecting DC was an ILLEGAL ALIEN from Afghanistan.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Wednesday, November 26, 2025 - 10:15 pm: Edit

It is now being reported that the frigate program of twenty hulls has been modified. The Constellation class, has been reduced to just two hulls, the prospective U.S.S. constellation, and U.S.S. Congress both under construction in a ship yard in Wisconsin.

The original intent of the program was to select an Italian design, and build the ships quickly with few “add ons” or design changes.

The problem is, the bureaucracy didn't stop, there were significant changes, including changing the designated weapons in mid program, resulting in different ships requiring different types of shells, non standard missiles, and unable to operate certain types of helicopters that are already standard in the U.S. navy.

In fact, depending on the actual situation on the first two hulls, both may also get canceled before they can be completed.

The stated reason, being, the fleet does not need two more “Zumwalt” style of high tech, high maintenance, very expensive white elephants at a time the navy desperately needs more hulls in the water.

The report is obviously written to reflect poorly on the navy and the procurement program.

By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Thursday, November 27, 2025 - 01:06 am: Edit

Well, just as well to axe the program: "The scale is extraordinary… in many ways eye-watering," says Nick Childs, a maritime expert with the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. "The Chinese shipbuilding capacity is something like 200 times overall that of the United States." -BBC

The PLAN have the advantage of that and the only thing that can stop their naval expansion is the cost of maintaining all the war machiery. Especially once they have taken Taiwwan and the EU and US want to cut trade like they did to russia.

By Paul Howard (Raven) on Thursday, November 27, 2025 - 02:19 am: Edit

"The original intent of the program was to select an Italian design, and build the ships quickly with few “add ons” or design changes."

Alas this seems to be pretty much a universal problem Team A does the work - Team B doesn't like it and they in effect make a new 'X'.

Not sure how much truth was in it - but something like 15 years ago - GM 'gave' SAAB the Chassis of it's Mid Range Sedan with instructions to pretty much build a SAAB with two or three tweaks (Headlights etc) and take everything else off GM's part shelf.

GM couldn't understand why it was taking so long and getting so expensive and the famous quote was 'our Drving Software/Sat NAV system didn't fit on your centre Console so we had to re-design the Console and therefore had to redesign the driving cabin....

End result - there was so little uniformity between the original GM intention and final SAAB vehicle - it cost more than designing from scratch a new SAAB car.

On the ships - bBest guess - there is enough reason (I want component X built in location Y) why those in charge can cruicify the original plan and change it to maximise the value for their State - everyone gets what they want - other than the Navy and Tax Payer (and who cares if it costs three times as much, as the end result might be a 5% better ship? - so you get 1 ship and not the needed 3)?

By Gregory S Flusche (Vandar) on Thursday, November 27, 2025 - 08:14 am: Edit

I work in the ship repair industry. We had a ship come in. Brand new we were adding other systems to the ship. This is a navy ship. However, it was built using Metric. All of the drawings and plans are in metric.

We had 1st class mechanics screwing stuff up. They were using their phones to change metric to standard. I just went out and bought a metric tape and stick ruler.

Everything we were adding was in standard the ship was metric. Understand the problem.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Thursday, November 27, 2025 - 09:58 am: Edit

Concerning Carls point above about China ship building capacity being 200 times that of the United States.

Sure, the Chinese are churning out lots of hulls BUT, they also screwed up by the numbers:

1. A main stream media site just reported a story from a South Korean strategic firm, that China currently has 395 ships in commission.

2. Only 125 are active and ready for combat. The rest of the ships are docked in Chinas seaports awaiting needed maintenance. It seems when the CCCP decided to expand shop production, it failed to up grade ship yards and repair facilities. Oh, and the also didn’t train additional repair specialists.

3. Another thing to note, is the total tonnage of the U.S. Navy is something like 4.8 million tons of displacement. The Current Chinese PLAN is only 2.2 million tons. (Going from memory, So I may be off the actual numbers, hopefully not by a lot…). Point being the majority of the ships in the China navy are smaller displacement that the ships in the U.S. Navy.

4. U.S. Navy currently has 11 aircraft carriers in service/commission. China iirc has three, and a fourth one under construction. None of the Chinese carriers are equal to the American ships.

As has been pointed out, nations go to war with what they have, not blue prints and designs of ships and aircraft they say they will build over the next few decades.

If the U.S. and China were to go to war tomorrow, it may not turn out well for the China team.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Thursday, November 27, 2025 - 06:58 pm: Edit

Raider: regarding the shooter in D.C.: Afghan? Yes. Illegal? No.

He had worked for the CIA in Afghanistan, and came here as a legal refugee when the Taliban regained control as part of Operation Allies Welcome; he was granted asylum this past April. His motive is unknown at this time, but he drove all the way from Bellingham WA to carry out the attack.

By Chuck Strong (Raider) on Thursday, November 27, 2025 - 07:13 pm: Edit

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Thursday, November 27, 2025 - 07:16 pm: Edit

Regarding cancellation of the Constellation-class frigates:

This is...problematic, inasmuch as the Constellation was the "return to traditional warships" replacement for the failed Freedom- and Independence-classes of littoral combat ships. Indeed, those were the "build small surface combatants en masse" solution...and they failed miserably. Not just because of the endless problems with the overcomplicated combining gear, not just because of the poor implementation of modularity, but because at the end of the day, they were poor surface combatants because they were small and fragile and underarmed, suitable only for taking on things like Iranian speedboats.

The lesson that was learned was that small, fragile ships don't cut it, and the Constellation class was adopted as the result of that lesson. Now it appears we're prepared to unlearn it all over again...and in the process, continue paying out ever-increasing money to an ever-increasing number of contractors. (Don't forget, the reason that both Freedom and Independence were put into production, when they were supposed to be prototypes in competition with each other, was because former Sen. Shelby pushed for them both to enter production in order to satisfy both sets of contractors.)

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Thursday, November 27, 2025 - 07:20 pm: Edit

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, November 27, 2025 - 07:23 pm: Edit

Chuck, Jessica, chill.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Thursday, November 27, 2025 - 07:33 pm: Edit

Aye, sir.

By Ryan Opel (Feast) on Thursday, November 27, 2025 - 08:56 pm: Edit

Rest in Peace SPC Sarah Beckstrom, WVARNG.

You have fought the good fight; You have finished the Race; We will keep the faith.

By Mike Erickson (Mike_Erickson) on Thursday, November 27, 2025 - 11:25 pm: Edit

With respect to the Constellation program, my sense is the problems really began with the lack of acceptance of the basic design, which was less expensive, more French centric, and used things like Aster missiles. That FREMM design had been build and sold before, so it was off-the-shelf. IMHO it was a solid lower-midrange frigate, but not a Burke DD. But Burkes are crazy good at everything, including shooting down ICBMs (!). And crazy expensive at $2.5B each.

Once the new Constellation requirements began to flow in, for things like using US missiles and adding a miniature version of AEGIS with a much more powerful set of sensors, the ships basically became baby Burkes, and depending upon who you read the price per ship leapt up by 50-100%. So it was no longer the easy OTS solution. And it was no longer cheap. And for what you got, it wasn't that great a value option vs a Burke.

So it's understandable it got cancelled. It was sort of a frankenstein monster of basic and cheap and very capable and expensive. The classic example of trying to satisfy two conflicting sets of requirements.

--Mike

By Mike Erickson (Mike_Erickson) on Thursday, November 27, 2025 - 11:34 pm: Edit

I don't think a war with China will rise and fall on the PLAN ships. The decisive force appears to be their large number of land-based long range missiles which appear to be able to destroy a US CSG well outside of the range of the CSG aircraft.

To fix that, USN probably needs longer ranged attack aircraft and some dedicated long range tankers, sorta like USN circa a few decades ago. It's not clear if USN can fix those problems quickly.

--Mike

By Chuck Strong (Raider) on Friday, November 28, 2025 - 12:45 am: Edit

SPC Sarah Beckstrom deserved better, her death was entirely preventable!

By Paul Howard (Raven) on Friday, November 28, 2025 - 02:40 am: Edit

'Lighter/Cheaper' ships

Question - what is needed??

1) Low cost, limited capability ships - which are in effect 'War Cruisers - designed for a shorter life span (I am guessing Jessica's comments about fragility on the littoral ships has meant normal sea 'wear and tear' has been alot higher than expected - which isn't a new thing) - but you build alot of them and and scrap them as they fail

2) Medium cost, medium capabiliy ships - which are sturdier - but you have less of them.


It's easy for an Arm Chair Admiral to say "I want some of column A and some of column B, and something new" and overlook the point was you can pick any 2 of 3 - but never have all 3 (the old Contractors Joke, "do you want it done quickly, cheaply or well built - pick 2 and it will be done").

I can understand lighter ships will get damaged more easily in storms etc - so is there a way to in effect re-create the Protected Cruiser Class from the late 19th Century?

A bigger ship - but much less armour and possibly less armourment than a normal Cruiser.

Yes, a bigger ship needs more crew (and more crew are good for damage control) - and so your probably just have extra storage areas on the ship, rather than extra systems.

The fun part is how do you from day 1 state what the mission of the ship is - and guarantee that the powers that be don't decide 'mission plus X and Y would make it so much more useful' (and twice the cost and three times the delay in bulding it.....)?

(I have the horrible feeling the answer will always be 'yes, everyone can agree to build the ship to those specifications and it will be done' - honest governer. And then not agree).


Mike also rasied apoint - I thought US Carriers could use F18's (and the older Vikings?? as airboune tankers (With the F18's, 1 would refil 2 and it would then go back to the Carrier) - was the capabiltiy scapped (or poribably retired in the case of the Vikings)?