Archive through January 06, 2026
Star Fleet Universe Discussion Board: Non-Game Discussions: Real-World Military:
Archive through January 06, 2026
>> Nuclear power plants take time to build up steam (Um, they have poor acceleration from zero)
>> By contrast, gas turbine power can go from zero to full power in under a minute. This fast reaction can make the difference in sub-hunting.
True, true. And:
1. Modern ship nuclear reactors can ramp power up more quickly.
2. One doesn't need to pick one or the other. You can use combined nuclear and non-nuclear propulsion. Kirov, for example, has both systems, and they can work independently or be combined for top speed.
3. In a modern nuclear powered vessel that needs to have the ability to sprint quickly, you could use electric propulsion with electric motors and some batteries, for example. So if the ship is at a dead stop and the reactor is mostly idle, and then suddenly the ship needs to reposition quickly, you could run the electric motors off the batteries while the reactor incrementally ramps power up. It's just a matter of sizing the system for the use cases.
4. One could also make a modern hybrid with gas turbines or diesels as well, either electric or mechanical, somewhat conceptually similar to Kirov.
So there are ways to get a lot of value out of modern nuclear propulsion, while designing the overall propulsion system to behave the way the ship needs it to behave.
--Mike
I am fine with battleship for these. They are 35,000 tons, twice the size of cruisers. The Kirovs was happily styled battlecruisers by the West (Russia just called them cruisers with a wink), despite little true comparisons. Spiritually they are fine successors to the South Dakota and New Mexico.
That's fair, if you go by the root phrase of "Line of Battle Ships" they fit well.
If the currently-presented configuration remains unchanged, how about calling it the Federation-Destroyer-But-It-Never-Received-The "+ Refit" class?
Morale: Russia Popular Opposition to the War
January 2, 2026: The war in Ukraine has provided Russia with multiple problems. One of the more troublesome is growing public criticism. Many Russians are protesting not the invasion of Ukraine, but the impact it is having them and family members. The Russian government overreacted, as it tends to do, arresting thousands of Russians for casual comments about the son of a friend who might be sent to Ukraine. When the Russian government decides that dissent among the public about the war, even if it’s not criticism, arrests must be made and the people must be made to understand that all Russians support what is being done in Ukraine. Most Russians do, but the government believes that rounding up and punishing a few thousand people will inspire everyone else to keep quiet.
What is happening now is part of a decades-long transformation of Russian attitudes towards their government and vice versa. Over a decade ago Russian opinion polls revealed that a decade long transformation back into a police state was losing popularity. Most Russians believed the government was prosecuting protestors and reformers out of spite, not because the accused have broken any laws or threaten public order. Russians want order and prosperity, but it was becoming increasingly clear that most Russians did not want their police state past restored. This was particularly the case when the government tried to take control of organizations that provided useful independent opinions. Thus the surprising, to the government, public opposition to attempts to curb the independence of the Academy of Sciences. This organization was government controlled during the Soviet period, but was always respected because science was one of the few areas where the communists made Russians proud. The Academy became independent of the government after the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. The current government sees the Academy of Sciences as another base for malcontents and critics. In this case, the scientists had more support than the government.
Despite the growth of public opposition, Russia continues its transformation back into a police state. It’s not just reformers who are attacked; foreigners are demonized and foreign aid organizations were recently banned. The government wants to eliminate independent Russian charities as well. This was based on the fear that any independent organization was a potential threat to the state. Very Soviet, and this attitude had some support inside Russia where paranoia thrives because many still see enemies of the state wandering around everywhere.
The new police state mentality requires a lot of external enemies to make Russians frightened enough to tolerate all the new restrictions. This includes using the state-controlled media to demonize the traditional Soviet era enemies of Western Europe and the United States. This caused a lot of anger and frustration in Western Europe. For example, government propaganda complaining about Western anti-missile systems as a ploy to disarm Russia, not stop missile attacks from Iran or North Korea, was seen as absurd by other Europeans. This paranoia, constantly delivered by state controlled media, finds many receptive minds inside Russia. Here, paranoia about the outside world, especially the West, has been a cultural staple for centuries. Senior Russian military leaders openly discuss how Russia might be forced to attack Western anti-missile systems, in self-defense. This was mainly for internal consumption but it alarmed foreigners.
Despite growing government persecution, often using the same methods the Soviets invented, pro-democracy and anti-corruption groups continue to hold public demonstrations. There was also growing discontent among senior government officials about the return to the Soviet past. Unlike the Soviet bureaucrats, the current ones are more aware of the outside world and understand that police states are not as economically successful as true democracies. Early in the Soviet period those with knowledge of the outside world were purged, and usually killed, from the leadership. Currently, pro-Soviet style officials believe that police-state powers make it easier to take down corruption. This was depicted as a fantasy by reformers, who pointed out that communist police states only remain uncorrupt for a brief period before the rot sets in. The big problem in Russia was that for centuries the government has been a police state, one imposed by allegedly enlightened czars. The Soviets dumped the monarchy, expanded the police state, and suppressed the market economy. That did not work, but there’s no general agreement in the current leadership about exactly why. Many Russians just feel more comfortable with a strong man in charge, be they czar, communist, or the deliberately macho Vladimir Putin. Most Russians will tolerate a tyrant if there is peace and prosperity. But this time around Russians want some limits on their protective tyrant.
FYEO
The Scourge of Islam
Why are most terrorism deaths the result of Islamic radicalism? Worse, why is that form of terrorism most common in the Middle East among the Arabs, especially those from the Arabian Peninsula where Islam first appeared 1,500 years ago? Until recently it was difficult for people in most Middle Eastern countries to openly discuss this tendency, much less where it came from and what could be done about it. That has been changing over the last decade and accelerated in 2017 as Arab nations, especially the oil-rich ones in Arabia, openly developed closer ties with Israel mainly for protection from Iranian threats. A side effect of that was that it has become possible for Arab journalists and officials to openly, in the media, discuss Israel and why it is a good idea for the Arab states, who have been in a state of war with Israel since the late 1940s, to now openly treat Israel as an ally. The main reason is obvious; Israel is the military superpower in the region, despite containing only two percent of the people in the Middle East.
Worldwide Islamic terrorism-related deaths have fallen by over 50 percent since 2014, when there were 35,000. Global deaths hit 19,000 in 2017 and under 14,000 for 2018. Since 2014, five nations Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria and Pakistan have accounted for most of these deaths. The largest source of Islamic terror deaths during that period was ISIL/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, a more radical faction of al Qaeda that currently is where the most radical practitioners of Islamic terrorism are found. Islamic terrorists continue to be, as it has been since the 1990s, the main source of terrorism-related deaths, accounting for about 90 percent of the fatalities. The remainder of the terrorist-related deaths are ethnic, often tribal, conflicts in Africa and Asia. Purely political terrorism accounts for a fraction of one percent of all terrorist-related deaths and are outnumbered by terrorism deaths inflicted by common criminals.
Arabs don’t like to dwell on their key role in creating and sustaining this scourge of terrorism. At the same time their new allies, the Israelis, have a different list of notable accomplishments, including great success in dealing with Islamic terrorism. Arabs don’t like to discuss why the Arabs and Israelis are different, at least not in public. But thanks to the internet, anyone curious about Israeli military capabilities can find out in private. What Arabs can discuss openly is the Israeli achievements in science and technology. It is no secret that Moslems, despite having a population 85 times larger than Jews, win one Nobel prize for every 33 awarded to Jews. Arab journalists place less emphasis on that and more on the fact that tiny Israel is one of the top creators of new inventions worldwide. Arabs attribute this to more effective educational institutions and policies. Arabs can now admit that their government have not been as pro-science/technology as the Israelis in particular and Jews in general. Some Arab leaders attribute the disparity to Arab engineers and scientists being lured to the West by better pay and fewer restrictions, but the basic problem is there are more opportunities for engineers and scientists in the non-Moslem world.
What is still avoided is a public discussion of the cultural crisis in the Arab world in particular and the Moslem world in general. The crisis is expressed by an abundance of corruption and a lack of economic, educational, and political progress and performance. By whatever measure you wish to use, Nobel prizes, literacy rates, patents awarded, books published or translated, GDP growth, the Arabs have fallen behind the rest of the world. Part of the problem is the Arab tendency to blame outsiders and to avoid taking responsibility. Tolerating tyranny and resistance to change doesn't help either. Those attitudes are shifting, ever so slowly.
The exact nature of this lethal cultural miasma can best be described by enumerating the major components. Let’s start with the fact that most Arab countries are a patchwork of different tribes and groups, and Arab leaders survive by playing one group off against another. Loyalty is to one's group, not the nation. Most countries are dominated by a single group that is usually a minority like Bedouins in Jordan, Alawites in Syria, Sunnis in Iraq, and Nejdis in Saudi Arabia. All of which means that leadership jobs are assigned not by merit but by loyalty and tribal affiliation.
Islamic schools favor rote memorization, especially of scripture. Most Islamic scholars are hostile to the concept of interpreting the Koran, which is considered the word of God as given to His prophet Mohammed. This has resulted in looking down on Westerners who will look something up if they don't know. Arabs prefer to fake it and pretend it's all in their head. While failure is accepted as the price of learning and success in the West, that sort of thing is not an option for most Arabs. Improvisation and innovation are generally discouraged. Arab government organizations go by the book while Westerners are more likely to rewrite the book and thus be much more effective. Despite years of Western advice on this matter, many Arab officials stick with the old, less effective, traditions.
There is little middle management, like NCOs in the military. The ruling class consists of owners, officers, and officials, while everyone else is treated like a different social caste and there is no effort to bridge the gap using what the West calls middle management. The majority of people are treated harshly. Work accidents that would end the careers of Western managers, officers, or officials are ignored in the Arab world and nobody cares. This is slowly changing, with the steady growth of a proper NCO/sergeants corps and middle management, plus better management attitudes towards their subordinates. But the old ways often return, with disastrous effects on the morale and effectiveness of the average Arab.
Not surprisingly, in Arab cultures, the ruling class is despised by their subordinates, and this does not bother the leaders much at all. Many Arab leaders simply cannot understand how treating subordinates, unless they are family, decently will have any benefit. This is another old tradition that dies hard.
Paranoia prevents adequate training. This is made worse by the habit of Arab tyrants insisting that their subordinate organizations have little contact with each other, thus ensuring that no subordinate leader can become powerful enough to overthrow the commander. Subordinate organizations are purposely kept from working together or communicating on a large scale. Arab subordinate leaders don't have as broad a knowledge of what their subordinate leaders do, as is the case with their Western counterparts. Promotions are based more on political reliability than proficiency and efficiency. Arab leaders prefer to be feared, rather than respected, by their subordinates. This approach leads to poorly trained populations and low morale. A few rousing speeches about Moslem Brotherhood before a national emergency boils over does little to repair the damage. Many, if not most, Arab leaders now know that the paranoia and parochialism are bad but ancient traditions are hard to abandon.
Arab leaders often do not trust each other. While an American manager or officer can be reasonably confident that the others they work with will be competent and reliable, Arabs in similar situations seriously doubt that their peers will do their job on time or accurately. This is an inefficient and sometimes fatal attitude. It's been difficult getting Arab leaders to change when it comes to trust.
Arab leaders consider it acceptable to lie to subordinates and allies in order to further their personal agenda. This had catastrophic consequences throughout Arab history and continues to make progress difficult. When called out on this behavior, Arabs will assert that they were misunderstood. This is still going on.
While Western American middle managers, and Westerners in general, are only too happy to impart their wisdom and skills to others because teaching is the ultimate expression of prestige, Arabs try to keep any technical information and manuals secret. To Arabs, the value and prestige of an individual is based not on what he can teach but on what he knows that no one else knows. This destructive habit is still around, despite years of American advisors patiently explaining why this is counterproductive.
While Westerners thrive on competition among themselves, Arab leaders avoid this as the loser would be humiliated. Better for everyone to fail together than for competition to be allowed, even if it eventually benefits everyone. This attitude is still a factor in the Arab world.
Westerners are taught leadership and technology; Arabs are taught only technology and not nearly enough. Leadership is given little attention as Arab leaders are assumed to know this by virtue of their social status as appointed leaders. The new generation of Arab leaders have been taught leadership, but for too many of them, this is an alien concept that they do not understand or really know what to do with.
Initiative is considered a dangerous trait in the Arab world, so subordinates prefer to fail rather than make an independent decision. Large-scale enterprises are micromanaged by senior leaders, who prefer to suffer defeat rather than lose control of their subordinates. Even worse, an Arab manager will not tell a Western counterpart why he cannot make the decision, or even that he cannot make it, leaving Western managers angry and frustrated because the Arabs won't make a decision. The Arab leaders simply will not admit that they do not have that authority. The new generation of Arab managers have been sent to Western management schools, but there's still not a lot of enthusiasm for initiative, which is often seen as a decadent and dangerous Western import.
Lack of initiative makes it difficult for Arabs to maintain modern equipment. Complex modern devices require on the spot maintenance, and that means delegating authority, information, and tools. Arab cultures avoid doing this and prefer to use easier to control central repair shops. This makes the timely maintenance of equipment difficult. Entrepreneurs, often non-Arab Moslems, frequently handle a lot of the maintenance. This is still a problem throughout the Middle East, where the oil rich nations have most of their non-government operations staffed by foreigners.
Security is maniacal. Everything, even vaguely military or government related is top secret. While Western military and corporation promotion lists are routinely published, this rarely happens in Arab organizations. Officers and managers are suddenly transferred without warning to keep them from forging alliances or networks. Any team spirit among officials is discouraged.
All these traits were reinforced, from the 1950s to the 1980s, by Soviet advisors and admiration for the success of Soviet socialism and management practices. To the Russians, anything government related was secret, subordinates were scum, there was no functional middle management system, and everyone was paranoid about everyone else. These were not communist traits but Russian customs that had existed for centuries. They were adopted by the communists to make their dictatorship more secure from rebellion. Arab dictators avidly accepted this kind of advice but were still concerned about how rapidly the communist dictatorships all came tumbling down between 1989 and 1991. The Russian influence is still fondly remembered because the Russians had developed some highly effective police state methods. This made it easier for the police and military to control a country, even if despicable methods were used. While these Russian techniques can work to hunt down terrorists in a police state, it doesn't work in any other useful endeavors and that’s the main reason the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.
These counterproductive traits are ancient and predate Islam but the nature of Islamic theology has perpetuated them in Moslem nations. While the West eventually separated church and state, helped by a few useful bits of advice in the Christian Bible, that is more difficult with Islam because the word Islam literally means submission and Moslem scripture is quite specific about Islam being a way of life and a form of government as well as a religion.
Most of these bad habits are ancient but they are not immune to change, even when Islam is involved. A quick look at the history of the Islamic world since World War II shows one constant: poor leadership. There are exceptions. Turkey, starting in the 1920s, sought to reform and modernize its governmental and cultural institutions, including a clear separation of church and state. Malaysia, after a chaotic beginning in the 1950s, sorted itself out and created an efficient government, by Moslem standards, and adopted much of the English common law used when Britain was the colonial ruler of the area. This included a rather incorruptible, especially by local standards, judiciary. This gave Malaysia a big economic advantage, and led to rapid economic growth, despite some loud political squabbles. Islamic radicals never got a foothold in Malaysia, although some exist there. But Malaysians in general, and local counter-terrorism forces in particular, are not hospitable to Islamic terrorists.
These reforms are always under assault by Islamic conservatives. The Islamic party that has run the Turk government since 2003 has become increasingly paranoid about religion and anyone not Moslem. The Turkish president has been openly accusing the non-Moslem world of making war on Islam. This is the same attitude Islamic terrorists use to justify their attacks on non-Moslem targets. Yet Turkey has remained a member of NATO and taken strong measures to shut down Islamic terrorist groups inside Turkey.
Since the 1920s Turkey has kept church and state separate but the current government wants to change that and is gradually doing so. One threat involved a proposal to undo the 1928 law that made the Roman alphabet standard. This would be done by again teaching the Arabic alphabet in schools and eventually dropping the Roman alphabet completely. This proposal was defeated but the government did make it legal to teach the old Turkish documents using Arabic script in religious schools. In 1928 the adoption of the Roman alphabet linked Turkey more closely, culturally and economically, with the West and those connections are proving difficult to undo. Going back to the Arabic alphabet was very unpopular and the government quickly discovered that most Turks opposed this change. In response to this defeat, the government added more mandatory Islamic religious instruction in schools.
To make matter worse, the Turkish Islamic politicians got elected to power on the promise of cleaning up the corruption that was increasingly hurting the economy as well as politics and life in general. For nearly a decade the Islamic politicians did reduce the corruption, but then evidence began to appear that many of the Islamic politicians had themselves had become corrupt in addition to threatening to end the separation of church and state as well. The Islamic government sought to silence those who were openly criticizing bad behavior by pro-Islam politicians. This despite the fact that ISIL considers the current Turkish government un-Islamic and wants to replace it, by force if necessary, and make largely secular Turkey part of the new caliphate. Most Turks oppose ISIL, but most Turks don’t want a civil war over the issue and are trying to settle the matter via with elections. That may or may not work depending on how many Islamic politicians agree to respect the democratic process. Yet Islamic radicals are quite certain that democracy, and many other Western customs like education for women, and free speech are un-Islamic and must be avoided. The constant in the current outbreak of terrorist violence is religion and particularly Islam. It is dangerous to point that out but, as the Arabs have discovered, even more, dangerous to try and ignore.
The rest of the Annual Wars Update for 2025
This is our annual summary of current war zones and an overview of where it’s all heading. After this overview there is the alphabetical list of the 41 war zones and a quick summary of how the local violence has been proceeding. Since we have been covering this sort of thing for over twenty years now, there are many war zones that have gone quiet. We left most of those in summary, with a note that those wars had gone dormant, and maybe extinct. History shows that dormant is more common than extinct. Forever wars, or at least multi-century ones, are an ancient tradition.
Overall things are a lot more peaceful than the headlines or Internet chatter would have you believe. Like most major trends, world peace sneaked up on everyone and a lot of people have not noticed. Thanks to modern technology, especially ubiquitous access to cell phones and the Internet, any mayhem anywhere on the planet easily becomes another news item for a global audience. This gives the impression of more violence when it is nothing more than unprecedented general access to violence that until recently was never broadcast worldwide and accompanied by video. That gives a false impression that has not been widely acknowledged.
FYEO
Information Warfare: Annual Wars Update for 2025
January 2, 2026: Before we begin the Update, there is a more immediate threat that has to be addressed.
There are 41 ongoing wars, insurgencies, and miscellaneous violent events
Afghanistan Civil War/Terrorist Insurgency
Algeria Terrorist Insurgency
Angola Terrorist Insurgency
Bangladesh Terrorist Insurgency
Benin Terrorist Insurgency
Burkina Faso Terrorist Insurgency
Cambodia War With Thailand
Cameroon Terrorist Insurgency
CAR Civil War CAR/Central African Republic
Chad Terrorist Insurgency
Colombia Civil War/Drug War
Congo Terrorist Insurgency
Ecuador Civil War/Drug War
Ethiopia Civil War
Haiti Civil War/Gang War
Iran Terrorist Insurgency
Iraq Terrorist Insurgency/Political Unrest
Israel Israel-Palestine War
Ivory Coast Terrorist Insurgency
Libya Terrorist Insurgency
Mali Terrorist Insurgency
Mexico Drug War
Morocco Terrorist Insurgency
Mozambique Civil War
Myanmar Civil War
Niger Terrorist Insurgency
Nigeria Terrorist Insurgency
Pakistan Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Conflict
Palestine Israel-Palestine War
Russia Russo-Ukrainian War
Rwanda Terrorist Insurgency
Somalia Civil War
South Sudan Ethnic violence
Sudan Civil War
Tanzania Terrorist Insurgency
Thailand Terrorist Insurgency
Togo Terrorist Insurgency
Tunisia Terrorist Insurgency
Uganda Terrorist Insurgency
Ukraine Russo-Ukrainian War
Yemen Civil War
Nearly half the war casualties in 2025 occurred in Ukraine and Russia where the two nations have been at it for nearly four years. There is no end in sight although there have been several efforts to negotiate a peace.
FYEO
The Great Nuclear Ceasefire And Its Benefits
Despite the growing military power of China and saber rattling from Russia, the major military powers continue the GNC/Great Nuclear Ceasefire that began in the 1950s when Russia got nuclear weapons, and soon realized they could not afford to use them without risking more destruction than past foes like the Nazis, Mongols or pandemics like the medieval Bubonic Plague inflicted. As more countries obtained nuclear weapons, it was realized that you can't afford to use them, but they're comforting to possess, prevailed and the unprecedented truce persisted. There have been wars, but not between the big players who have the largest and most destructive conventional forces. There has never been, since the modern state system developed in the 16th century, such a long period without a war between major powers. Even the current Ukraine War Russia indicates they would not use nuclear weapons.
Since the Cold War ended in 1991 there have been fewer wars, at least in the traditional sense, and the GNC holds. Not only have there been fewer wars since the 1950s but there has been a lot less poverty, especially since the Cold War, and so many communist governments, ended in 1990. The communist nations failed economically and most of them rapidly reduced poverty once they had a free market economy. At the end of the Cold War, in the late 1980s, 40 percent of the world population lived in destitution, also defined as extreme poverty. Three decades later, that poverty rate was down to ten percent and currently is 7 percent. Most of the remaining extreme poverty occurs in badly governed areas of the Middle East, especially Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan as well African nations like Libya, Congo, and Sudan that are also the scene of wars or general disorder.
The downside is that there are a lot more low-level rebellions and civil wars, but overall a lot less death, destruction, and extreme poverty. Most people are unaware of this situation because the mass media never made a lot of the GNC as it was something that was just there and not considered newsworthy. Besides, adopting the attitude that nuclear bombs, power plants and medicine are evil sells if you are in the news business. Calling any incident, with a lot of gunfire and a few dead bodies, a war has also been misleading. The fact is, worldwide violence has been declining since the end of the Cold War and the elimination of Russian subsidies and encouragement for pro-communist, or simply pro-Russia or just anti-West, rebels, and terrorists. The media also has a hard time keeping score. If you step back and take a look at all the wars going on, a more accurate picture emerges. In light of that, take sensational reporting of the Chinese threat with a bit of skepticism.
Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022 and that was the first major war since the 1930s when World War II began and was soon raging worldwide. The Ukraine War is local, but it involves a major power, Russia, that was a more powerful major power before the Cold War ended in 1991 and the Soviet Union dissolved, losing half its population. The Ukraine War is the first step in rebuilding the Russian empire that was run by monarchies for centuries until the early 1920s when the communist Soviets took over. The former components of the Soviet Union do not want to rejoin any Russian empire and that is why Ukraine fights so hard against the invading Russians.
With the exception of Ukraine, there are examples of international opposition to empire rebuilding. This was the case with Iran, which had economic sanctions reinstated in 2018. This led to a reduction in violence because of less Iranian financial support for the foreign wars and international troublemaking in general. That changed by 2023 when Iran fired over a thousand rockets and missiles and saw all of them intercepted. There was one fatality, as a Palestinian man was killed by falling rocket debris. Last year, Israel and the United States launched a massive attack on Iran to further reduce the possibility of Iran building nuclear weapons.
Most current wars are basically uprisings against inefficient, corrupt, and oppressive police states or feudal societies which are seen as out-of-step with the modern world. The internet and widespread adoption of smartphones made most people on the planet aware that a better life was not only a possibility but that many people, especially in the West, had lived the good life for generations.
Many revolutions are led by radicals preaching failed dogmas like Islamic conservatism, Maoism, and other forms of radical socialism that still resonate among people who don't know about, or care, about the dismal track records of these creeds. After 1991 Iran replaced some of the lost Soviet terrorist support effort. Iran kept Hezbollah, Hamas, and a few smaller groups going, and that's it. Israel destroyed Hezbollah in 2024 and is going after Hamas now. Terrorists in general miss the Soviets, who really knew how to treat bad boys right. No one has yet replaced the Soviets in that respect, an accomplishment even most Russians would rather not dwell on.
FYEO
Paramilitary: Chinese International Police Training
January 6, 2026: China has committed to training of thousands of foreign police in a series of well publicized events. These include instruction of protective services, counterterrorism, gendarmerie and paramilitary forces. China has been doing this since 2000 and is providing training in 138 countries. Most of these nations have already received training or are scheduled to receive in the near future. China considers this an exercise in soft power, foreign policy and international cooperation.
About the same time China began providing training for foreign peacekeepers and foreign peacekeeping police. Countries bordering China receive more of this training. This improves Chinese security and diplomatic relations.
Most training concentrates on anti-crime training and counter-drug investigation as well as assistance in creating government security organizations like the Central African Republic’s presidential guard and the Black Berets in Cuba. Another subject is how to carry out repression and state sponsored violence. So far, there have been nearly 900 training events. The program plans to train 20,000 police officers over the next five years.
China obtains instructors from its own police force. The 660,000 personnel of the Chinese PAP/People's Armed Police exist to take care of emergencies, and they tend to be kept busy with the thousands of demonstrations held each year. While there are about 1.4 million local police, for emergencies you call the PAP. The history of the PAP is a confusing one. The People's Armed Police were created in 1982. In fact, a lot of demobilized PLA troops have been incorporated into the PAP since its creation. The PAP’s ancestor was the Peoples Public Security Force, established in 1949 after the creation of the communist government in China. However, it was disbanded during the 1960s Cultural Revolution and its duties transferred to the PLA/People's Liberation Army. After the Cultural Revolution the government decided that the PLAs primary duties should be the national defense of the country. So frontier police units were moved to the Ministry of Public Security, the same ministry that oversees the civilian Chinese police.
The PAP is rigidly organized, like most of Communist China's military and police organizations, with a national headquarters in Beijing and local headquarters in every province of the country. Another confusing aspect of the PAP is that it is under the authority of two different bodies; the Central Military Commission and the Ministry of Public Security, which also manages the regular police forces. Within the PAP, a number of different types of units exist each with their own distinct missions, some of them military-oriented and some law enforcement-oriented. These units are internal defense units, frontier defense units, fire brigade units, mobilized divisions, commandos, and forest police units.
The internal defense units are basically light infantry units designed to suppress internal threats with force. This would mean anything from putting down demonstrations to fighting armed guerrillas or terrorists. They also guard government buildings and other key facilities throughout the country. The frontier defense troops are also basically light infantry trained along military lines. However, instead of protecting against internal threats, these forces are basically a first line of border defense against attack by a foreign enemy and against other border violations. They also serve an important law enforcement role as they are the equivalent of the American Border Patrol and are involved in seizing cross-border narcotics shipments and other contraband.
PAP units stationed in Beijing are there to protect the central government bureaucracy. Mobile PAP units are organized as mechanized infantry and have been formed in response to the growing threats of rebellion in the Xinjiang province and Tibet. Ethnic minority separatism has long been a problem in China and the Chinese government is determined to keep a lid on it. The Special Police Units are sort of a cross between police SWAT teams and DELTA Force commandos. They are in charge of both counter-terrorism and riot control. Thus, the PAP is, in reality, both a national police force and an extra military ground force to be used for the country's defense.
FYEO
Air Weapons: The Russian October Air Campaign In Ukraine
January 6, 2026: In Ukraine the Russian October air campaign was one of the most intense so far. Russia used over 5,000 Shahed drones, 74 cruise missiles, and 148 ballistic missiles. The targets were components of the Ukrainian energy production network. Russia wanted Ukrainian industries and civilians to suffer as the weather grew colder. Russia is now producing over 5,000 Shaheds a month. Russia calls the Shaheeds it produces the Geran. These 200 kg drones travel at a speed of 180 kilometers an hour at an altitude of about 100 meters. They carry a 50 kg warhead. GPS navigation is jammable when close to the target while the unjammable, but less accurate INS backup is not affected. The Geran is the Russian version of the Iranian Shahed 136 Russia produces under license at a Russian factory built last year.
Over 80 percent of the Gerans have been detected and destroyed by a clever Ukrainian air defense system created by two Ukrainian engineers. Called Sky Fortress, it consists of nearly 10,000 cell phones mounted on two-meter poles with their microphones activated to detect the unique sounds of Gerans flying nearby. All this data goes to a command post where operators can triangulate on, locate and track the incoming drones and direct groups of gun trucks, each equipped with multiple machine-guns and lots of ammunition, to positions the drones will pass over. The gun trucks have managed to destroy most of the drones they encounter. Ukraine has built several hundred of these gun trucks and deploys them quickly via roads or cross country to carry out the interception. This system costs less than a single Patriot air defense missile. This drone defense system is operated by thousands of Ukrainian soldiers, and its simplicity, effectiveness and low cost has led NATO countries to request more details from the Ukrainians, including visits to NATO countries to further explain the system. Russia responded by having their Gerans fly higher, beyond the range of the machine-guns. Ukraine went on to develop new countermeasures.
Year by year Russia and Ukraine develop new offensive weapons to use against each other. Ukrainian air strikes use larger drones at targets deep inside Russia.
Like most western militaries, Russia has become dependent on the use of missiles and drones instead of artillery and airstrikes. Ukraine reports that, from late 2022 through late 2024, Russia used 4,800 missiles and nearly 15,000 attack drones. The missiles are expensive, most costing one or two million dollars each, while some of the drones cost $35,000. More recent drone designs cost only a few hundred dollars each. It was thought that the inexpensive drones would replace the use of 155mm artillery. The range and cost of artillery shells vary from $3,000 to $100,000 depending on its version and purpose. The basic 155mm shell weighs 43 kg and contains about seven kg of explosives. The standard Russian equivalent is the 152mm shell.
The only Russian sources of weapons and munitions have been Iran and North Korea, which has a feeble economy with a GDP of only $30 billion and has long been subject to economic sanctions. Iran is also sanctioned but has oil to export and a GDP of over $400 billion. Iran was also responsible for the recent completion of a Shahed drone manufacturing facility on the Volga River. Russia has over fifty firms manufacturing over two dozen types of drones. These include three dozen different models, most of them with a range of 40 kilometers while about a dozen have ranges of 100 to 2,000 kilometers.
Russia is building a drone manufacturing infrastructure. By 2026 330,000 people will be involved in the development, production, and operation of drones by 2026. By 2035 1.5 million people may be involved in drone design, development and production.
Russia continues to obtain drones and drone construction assistance from Iran. While Russia produces 330-350 Shahed-136 drones per month, Iran also helps out. Russia has manufactured over 2,000 Shahed drones and at least 2,600 have been sent by Iran.
FYEO
Support: Ukrainian Tactical Innovations
January 5, 2026: Ukraine has advised its NATO supporters to pay close attention to the Ukrainian experience to better defend themselves from a possible Russian attack in the next ten years. Drones were an unexpected development that had a huge impact on how battles in Ukraine's current war are fought. Drones were successful because they were cheap, easily modified, and expendable. Modifications and upgrades could be implemented quickly and inexpensively Both Russian and Ukrainian forces were soon using cheap quadcopter drones controlled by soldiers a few kilometers distant using FPV/First Person Viewing goggles to see what the day/night video camera on the drone can see. Adding night vision is available when needed, at a higher cost per drone. These drones cost a few hundred dollars each with the most complex models going for about a thousand dollars. Most of these drones carry half a kilogram of explosives, so operators can instantly turn the drone into a flying bomb that can fly into a target and detonate. Some drones carry more explosives depending on what is needed to deal with a target.
These drones are awesome and debilitating weapons when used in large numbers. If a target isn’t moving or requires more explosive power that the drones can supply, one of the drone operators can call in artillery, rocket, or missile fire, or even an airstrike. Larger, fixed wing drones are used for long range, often over a thousand kilometers, operations against targets deep inside Russia.
Drones are usually able to complete their mission, whether it is a one-way attack or reconnaissance and surveillance. The recon missions are usually survivable and enable the drone to be reused. All these drones are constantly performing surveillance, which means that both sides commit enough drones to maintain constant surveillance over a portion of the front line, to a depth, into enemy territory, of at least a few kilometers. Longer range drones can track Russian operations hundreds of kilometers behind the front lines.
This massive use of FPV-armed drones has revolutionized warfare in Ukraine and both sides are producing as many as they can. Russia initially produced its own drones now after briefly using imported Iranian Shahed-136 drones that cost over $100,000 each. Ukraine demonstrated that you could design and build drones with similar capabilities at less than a tenth of that. The Iranian drone was more complex than it needed to be, and even the Russians soon realized this and turned from the Shahed-136 for more capable drones they copied from Ukrainian designs or their own. Russia still uses their Shahed drones because they have a factory to build them and the more airborne drones they can send on a mission, the better the chance that some will hit the target. There are also larger fixed-wing drones that can drop bombs or release smaller attack drones. These larger bomber drones can also transport supplies to troops who are hard to reach otherwise.
Ukraine has also developed land-based drone vehicles/DVs for carrying supplies or bringing back casualties. DVs have revolutionized combat zone transportation. The DVs are operated remotely and can often make a trip autonomously. In Ukraine, the battlefield is increasingly dominated by unmanned air and land vehicles. The operators stay in bunkers and rarely venture out. The combat zone is under constant surveillance and if infantry advance, they do so in small groups under the protections of their own drones.
Conventional artillery, mortar and rocket weapons have had to change the way they operate. They must fire a few rounds quickly and move before counterfire hits them. Because of this, these weapons are less effective and drones now account for over 80 percent of casualties. Tanks and other armored vehicles are similarly constrained and have to be used infrequently lest they be swarmed by drones and destroyed or immobilized.
Military leaders in other nations have noted this and are scrambling to equip their own forces with the most effective drones. Not having enough of these to match the number the enemy has in a portion of the front means you are at a serious disadvantage in that area. These drones are still evolving in terms of design and use and are becoming more effective and essential.
One countermeasure that can work for a while is electronic jamming of the drones’ control signal. Drone guidance systems are constantly modified or upgraded to cope with this. Most drones have flight control software that sends drones with jammed control signals back to where they took off to land for reuse. The jammers on the ground can be attacked by drones programmed to home in on the jamming signal. Countermeasures can be overcome and the side that can do this more quickly and completely has an advantage. That advantage is usually temporary because both sides are putting a lot of effort into keeping their combat drones effective on the battlefield.
The widespread use of drones has tuned combat brigades, battalions and companies into avid users of drones. While Ukraine has a separate Drone Force for developing new drones and assessing the use of current ones, most drones are used by regular combat units. Some of these units are selected to test new drones or drone concepts.
Ukraine has long been a major developer and manufacturer of weapons and military equipment. Before 1991, when Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union, these innovation and manufacturing capabilities were recognized and encouraged. Since independence in 1991 Ukraine has continued to encourage its defense firms to continue their work. This has resulted in several new weapons and upgrades for existing systems.
In 2021 Ukrainian introduced its Neptune anti-ship missile and, starting two months after the 2022 Russian invasion, Neptune was used to cripple and eventually neutralize the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
Neptune was first used in April 2022 to attack and sink the 12,000-ton Moskva, flagship of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. Moskva was hit by two Neptunes. Russia denied this and said the explosions and fires on the Moskva were the result of an accident on the ship that damage-control efforts by the 500-man crew were unable to handle, leading to major ammunition explosions.
Moskva was directing operations off the Ukrainian port of Odessa at the time. As the flagship of the Black Sea fleet, Moskva had senior officers and their staffs on board to plan and direct Russian efforts to attack Ukrainian ports, especially Odessa, and turn Ukraine into a landlocked nation.
Russia later admitted Moskva sank while being towed back to its home port in the nearby Crimean Peninsula. Russia will not admit Moskva was hit by two Ukrainian anti-ship missiles because the Moskva had multiple defenses against such attacks. Apparently, Ukraine used one or more of their Turkish TB2 UAVs to track and harass Moskva and that enabled the two Neptune missiles to get through and start the fires that the crew could not handle and led to the abandon ship order. Ukraine may also have used ECM/ Electronic Countermeasures on Moskva to enable the missile strike.
Russia tried to blame the loss of the ship on massive crew incompetence rather than admit the ship was hit by two Ukrainian missiles. To do so would also include crew incompetence by not turning on all the anti-missile defenses because they were distracted by the Ukrainian UAVs. It might also indicate that the missile defenses were inadequate. With the ship at the bottom of the Black Sea, the surviving crew had to explain what happened and why.
NATO nations supplying Ukraine with weapons have noted that Ukraine manages to continue developing and producing new weapons while under constant attack by Russian missiles and have agreed to joint-production and development deals inside Ukraine, some of them before the war is over. Ukraine had sought such co-op deals before the Russian invasion but there was little interest from NATO nations until they saw Ukrainian capabilities under wartime conditions.
FYEO
Support: Beamte Today
January 4, 2026: In Europe, there is a tradition of using civilians for many military administrative jobs. German civil servants called Beamte are generally subject to the same laws and regulations as employees in the private sector. For example, the state can only fire Beamte if they commit a felony.
China recently adopted this approach to reduce the growing number of officers. Their civilian administrative and technical specialists who were part of the military started wearing uniforms and had rank and pay equivalent to equivalent ranks of senior NCOs and officers all the way up to high-ranking generals. In Germany these civilians were called Beamten/officials and the system was established so the number of Beamten could be greatly expanded in wartime to provide needed specialists in areas like medicine, meteorology/weather prediction, logistics/procuring food, clothing and equipment, legal, education, research, construction, finance, maintenance and repair of heavy equipment and so on. The rank insignia on beamte uniforms were similar to but distinct from what officers and senior NCOs wore.
Bematen do not have military title or authority of officers, although junior troops often cannot tell the difference and saluted beamte they encountered. Beamte only have authority, not command, in their specialty and often supervise large numbers of non-uniformed civilians and coordinated activities with managers and executives of civilian firms providing goods and services to the military. During World War II over 100,000 Beamten worked for the German military and, towards the end of the war many of them, especially those who were retired officers or NCOs, were converted to officers because of the shortage of officers in the last year of the war.
The current Chinese military has two million personnel plus, so far, about 30,000 Beamte which the Chinese call contract civilians or civilian cadres/supervisors. There are many more non-uniformed civilian employees that the contract civilians supervise. Many of these work for provincial recruiting and administrative organizations that handle conscription and volunteers for the military. Like the Germans, the Chinese Beamte are considered officer level officials who wear uniforms with special insignia, are paid at rates similar to officers and provide a force of experienced Beamte that can be rapidly expanded in wartime. The Chinese beamte work on three-to-five-year employment contracts. Many more civilian technical specialists never have to wear a uniform at all, like computer security personnel, because that sort of thing is not popular with the hacker types. These specialists often move on to other jobs and are no longer useful to the military. The Chinese follow the skills, not civilians or officers seeking a career.
The American system is different, and the Department of Defense has 750,000 civilian government employees. Most of these are never expected to serve with the troops although some do and the civil service/GS ranks are used to determine what level accommodations these civilians receive if working with the military overseas or a combat zone. These civilians are usually given combat uniforms with no rank insignia. So are other civilians attached to the military in a combat zone, like journalists. But this is much less militarized than the beamte system developed by many European armies during the 19th century. The system continues in some countries into the present although most now use the less formal American system for civilian employees of the military. China found the German World War II system more useful for their needs, especially since the CCP/Chinese Communist Party occupies a special position in the Chinese military similar to the German Nazi Party during World War II. Like the Germans the Chinese favor military veterans for Beamte jobs but only if the vets have the necessary technical or educational skills as well.
FYEO
Information Warfare: Russia Cracks Down On Social Media
January 4, 2026: Vladimir Putin has long had a difficult relationship with the internet. His most recent solution is Max, a government controlled messaging app. The government has access to messages transmitted using Max. To encourage Russians to switch to Max, Putin ordered that the most popular apps WhatsApp and Telegram suffer from degraded service. That means voice and video traffic was slowed down and some activity was randomly blocked. The government explained that these disruptions were anti-fraud measures. So far nearly half of Russia’s internet users are on Max, although only about half those users are on Max regularly. Meanwhile Max is cheaper and more reliable than the alternatives, even after WhatsApp and Telegram service returned to normal.
The introduction of Max is part of Putin’s plan to create a sovereign, used in Russia only, internet. Max won’t interfere with that. There are problems with this because the internet is essential for running the economy and the military. At the same time internet chatter is the primary source of criticism for the Ukraine War and the problems with the economic sanctions.
Internet chatter about what was going on in Ukraine made it more difficult for Russia to obtain soldiers. To avoid army service in Ukraine, several million Russians left the country, some for good. The government increased restrictions on who could leave, and military age men found ways to get past that, notably bribery. Those caught were forced to join the army, and their reluctance to fight resulted in officers receiving orders to shoot soldiers who refused to fight.
There were at least a hundred of these incidents, these soldiers and officers referred to as zeroing out a reluctant soldier by shooting him. The dead soldiers were called zeroes and the next of kin were simply told that their son died heroically in Ukraine. That explanation often failed when news of what actually happened arrived via the internet.
The internet made it easier to spread the bad news, even after the government made it illegal to say bad things about the war effort. A few complainers were prosecuted, but that backfired when online complaints and protests increased. There were not enough judicial resources available to handle all the complainers. Welcome to the internet paradox, too troublesome to tolerate, but too useful to lose.
But it’s not for lack of trying. Last year, Russia carried out a brief pre-dawn test of its ability to turn internet access for Russians into a sovereign internet that is not connected to the worldwide internet. That means Russians could only use the internet within Russian and must use Russian-based websites and network services, like search, messaging and social media. There are versions of all these services based in Russian as well as internationally popular versions like Google, Wikipedia, Twitter and Facebook.
The sovereign internet test revealed some problems, like interference with large scale Internet-based communications systems created for the nationwide railroad network and other nationwide communications systems that also require some access to international systems. A long-term implementation of Russia’s sovereign internet would disrupt some portions of the Russian economy that depend on constant communication with foreign firms.
The sovereign internet is meant to be used for short periods. There are other uses of the sovereign internet that include remaining connected to neighboring nations like Iran, which is trying to develop a sovereign internet and China, which already has one. Internet pioneers predicted that some countries would seek to develop a sovereign internet in order to exercise government control over the internet. This was something that early internet developers feared would happen because the international free exchange of information was a threat to the power of totalitarian government. The totalitarians were expected to eventually strike back and now they have.
North Korea also has a sovereign internet as well as restrictions on who can use this internet. Only a small number of government, commercial, and military are allowed to use the internet to communicate with people outside the country.
FYEO
Support: China Upgrades South China Sea Bases
January 3, 2026: China has militarized more of the Spratly Islands; Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef. Mischief Reef is the largest at 663 hectares. Subi Reef is about 70 percent the size of Mischief and Fiery Cross about half the size of Mischief Reef. All these reefs have air strips and docking facilities. Subi Reef recently received two radar domes like those on the other two reefs, which gives the Chinese near total radar coverage of the seas and airspace around the Spratly Islands. All three reefs have had their surface area expanded and built up to include upgrades to ELINT/Electronic Intelligence systems, weapons emplacements, housing and related infrastructure. Empty weapons and vehicle emplacements on these islands enable the Chinese to quickly fly or ship in vehicle-mounted weapons and radar/fire control sets. The emplacements can also handle anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile launchers.
Last year saw the Chinese ramming Filipino coast guard ships as well as using water cannons against them. The ongoing territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea continue to escalate as the Chinese openly and aggressively drive Filipino navy ships from areas the Philippines have long controlled. In 2016 the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Netherlands ruled that, under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Philippines won their case brought in 2013 that Chinese claims and activities in the South China Sea were unlawful. China had claimed 90 percent of the South China Sea. Over the last sixteen years China has been increasingly aggressive while asserting those claims. While this recently escalated to using water cannon and ramming, past efforts are more tangible like the artificial islands built throughout the South China Sea and garrisoned with heavily armed Chinese forces.
The United States and other Western and local allies like Australia, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Singapore send warships and aircraft into the disputed areas to confront the Chinese. The message is that if China wants to start World War 3 in the South China Sea, the opposition will be substantial and include most of China’s neighbors.
An added problem for the Chinese was the 2022 election of Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos Jr. as the Filipino president. Nicknamed Bongbong, the new president was the son of an ousted prior Filipino president. Bongbong is a populist reformer who delivered on his campaign promises to reform the laws that made it difficult for Filipino farmers to make a living. Bongbong also upgraded and reinforced the armed forces, as well as military alliances with the United States and local nations that were also threatened by China.
The Philippines increased its military presence and activities in the South China Sea, especially around the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal, where it claims sovereignty over parts of the disputed waters and features. The country has also received support from its allies, such as the United States, Japan, and Australia, in conducting joint exercises and patrols, as well as providing military assistance and equipment. However, China has also intensified its operations and use of coercion in the region, deploying more ships, aircraft, and missiles, and building new structures and facilities on the artificial islands it occupies.
The risk of miscalculation and escalation remains high as China continues to ignore a 2016 ruling by the international Permanent Court of Arbitration. China had previously agreed to abide by the terms of the court ruling, but denied knowledge of any previous agreement when the Philippines resisted Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. The international support the Philippines received to confront China has stalled the Chinese plans to occupy and fortify all the islands in the South China Sea,
The Philippines has maintained a balance between its alliance with the United States and its economic ties with China. The Philippines reaffirmed its commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States, which provide for mutual defense and security cooperation, as well as access to military bases and facilities. The country has also welcomed the U.S. support for its maritime claims and rights in the South China Sea, as well as the U.S. sanctions against Chinese officials and entities involved in the disputes. However, the Philippines has also sought to improve diplomatic relations with China, which is its largest trading partner and a major source of investment. The Philippines sought to manage and resolve the territorial disputes through dialogue and diplomacy, rather than confrontation and arbitration, as it did in 2016 when it won a landmark case at the Permanent Court of Arbitration that invalidated China's expansive claims in the South China Sea.
Meanwhile the Philippines has an unemployment rate of about five percent, inflation is about three percent in 2025, the local currency, the peso, has stabilized its exchange rate versus the dollar to between 55 and 60 pesos to the dollar. Economic growth for 2025 is five percent.
Decades of effort finally reduced or eliminated the internal threat of leftist and Islamic rebellions. Now most Filipinos are more concerned about endemic corruption, but optimistic in the progress made since 2023 to reduce drug addiction and reduce drug smuggling.
There is also the Chinese threat, with more Chinese warships showing up in what had been, until recently, unquestionably Filipino controlled waters. Most Filipinos see China as a threat but not as crucial as the internal problems with drugs, corruption, Islamic terrorism, and unemployment.
Leadership: New US Western Hemisphere Command USAWHC
January 3, 2026: Shortly after World War II ended in 1945, the United States military, then the largest in the world, was told to create overseas commands to look after American interests and military forces. This system has expanded since the late 1940s, with a series of modifications including one this year that added a new command to handle the United States and all the other nations in the Western hemisphere.
Because of the current trend for many Moslem nations to officially recognize or increase military and economic cooperation with Israel, in 2021 the U.S. reclassified Israel as part of CENTCOM/Central Command rather than EUCOM/European Command which includes nations in Europe, including Russia. CENTCOM covers the Middle East, Southwest Asia, northwest Africa and the Persian Gulf. Israel was part of EUCOM from the beginning in 1948 while CENTCOM was created in the 1980s because of where it was. Israel has always been more involved with nations in CENTCOM rather than EUCOM. Israel has been the most powerful and cooperative ally of the United States in CENTCOM and has become the most advanced military, economic and scientific nation in the region. During that time Israel was, for all practical matters, part of CENTCOM and regularly traded, trained, and shared intel with CENTCOM and nations in CENTCOM as well as NATO nations in EUCON. Most EUCOM nations had diplomatic and trading relationships with the Moslem nations in CENTCOM.
Since the 1990s the major military threat to Europe in CENTCOM was Iran and in the last decade Iran has declared most Arab nations in the regions as enemies and become a military threat to all of them, along with Israel and the United States. This put Israel in a unique position as it has long seen EUCOM nations as allies and was treated as a peer by European countries. Moslem nations long agreed with that but now see that as an advantage, not a threat. The result is Israel officially becoming part of CENTCOM. This has made it easier for Israel and the United States to coordinate military operations, including joint naval patrols in the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea. It is easier to plan joint operations against Iran and any other threats in CENTCOM.
Currently the United States military has eight unified geographic combatant commands in which a four-star general or admiral controls all American military units in a geographic area. The origins of the geographic commands began with the two global military commands the U.S. created during World War II to provide a unified command for all American forces in the Pacific and Europe. After the war, these two commands became regional unified combatant commands known as EUCOM for Europe, including the Soviet Union and PACCOM for the Pacific region, including Korea and China. In 1963 SOUTHCOM was created for Latin America. In 1983 CENTCOM was created for the Middle East and was followed in 2002 by NORTHCOM for North America. In 2007 AFRICOM was created for African nations not already part of CENTCOM. In 2019 SPACECOM was added to handle orbital forces and the earth-based units that put satellites and other structures into orbit. In 2025 Army Western Hemisphere Command/USAWHC was formed. This organization handles the defense of U.S. territory, supporting assistance and relief missions for natural disasters like wildfires, hurricanes in both the continental U.S., its neighbors and countries in South America.
For decades the four star-generals or admirals in charge of the regional commands were called CINCs/Commander in Chief. In 2002 that was changed because the president of the United States, who is, per the constitution, the commander in chief of the armed forces, would be the only one referred to as CINC. The old CINCs would be referred to by new titles, like Commander, US Central Command. Despite that the commanders of the regional commands continued to be known, unofficially, as CINCs. Over the years that term was used less and less as a new generation got used to using the term commander for the senior officers running the regional commands.
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Procurement: Origins Of The US Naval Crisis
January 1, 2026: New ship building programs remain behind schedule and over budget. That’s because American shipyards lack the capacity and skilled workforce to build the ships needed. The solution is to retire obsolete ships, modernize shipyards and adopt realistic shipbuilding efforts. Spending more money on shipbuilding won’t work if you don’t have the shipyards and skilled workers. The United States must adopt a program of shipyard modernization workforce recruiting and training. Implementing rational shipbuilding goals will mean fewer ships for a while. That won’t encourage China to attack as they realize that this new American program will put more ships in service on a sustained basis. Meanwhile a half dozen Virginia class SSNs could shut down most Chinese imports and exports.
There are also lessons to be learned from our allies. South Korea and Japan use a modular approach, with components of ships built in many different shipyards and land based facilities. These components are brought to shipyards and rapidly reassembled into new ships.
Then there are important lessons from the past. In the early 1990s, with the Cold War over, and the mighty Soviet fleet rapidly falling apart, only about 25 percent of American warships were at sea at any one time. Since September 11, 2001, there's been a lot more to do, and about half the fleet has been at sea at any one time. Most of this has to do with counter-terrorism operations, and support of operations in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and keeping an eye on China’s growing naval forces.
To make this possible, the navy changed the way it went to sea. Gone were the regular, clockwork, six month deployments of carrier and amphibious task forces. Now these units are deployed for shorter periods, giving the crews more time in port, and more reason to stay in the navy. Too many long deployments made sailors choose between the navy and family, and the navy usually lost out.
The U.S. Navy still spends more time at sea than any other, thus maintaining skills that are second to none. But that requires billions of dollars a year for fuel and spare parts, not to mention the months ships must spend getting major maintenance after years at sea. If the money doesn't keep coming for this, the U.S. Navy will end up like the Soviet fleet, rotting away from lack of maintenance and training.
Twenty years ago, the number of ships in the U.S. Navy hit a new low, with only 296 combat ships in the fleet. This was the lowest it has been since just before World War I, over 80 years ago. But the American fleet was still the largest and most powerful in the world. Since 1914, the average size of ships has gone up, crew size has gone down and combat power per ship has increased enormously. Towards the end of the Cold War, the navy was headed for a 600 warship fleet. But the end of the Cold War in 1991 saw the mighty Soviet Union fleet disappear as a combat force. This left America, and its allies, with uncontested control of the high seas. But the navy found itself worrying more about supporting the war on terror, and operating off coasts, not chasing down Russian nuclear subs on the high seas. To that end, the U.S. Navy sought to build a new class of smaller, coastal fighting ships, and unmanned drones to operate off carriers. The drones were particularly important, because they could fly long range bombing missions without wearing out human crews. Smart bombs allowed carriers to do a lot more damage with the same amount of bombs. This was a vital consideration for the navy, as they could only drop the bombs they had with them. New, more automated ships meant less strain on the smaller crews, and better living conditions. Even with new building programs, the navy doesn’t expect to get much larger than 310-360 ships in the next twenty years.
Forces: Ukraine Adopts Corps Organization
January 1, 2026: The Ukrainian army recently reorganized its forces into ten corps. In doing this Ukraine reduced the number of subordinate units a commander must deal with. Because of these reforms Ukraine was able to defeat Russian efforts to carry out offensives rapidly in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia provinces. The corps organization enabled the Ukrainians to rapidly create formations of troops for offensive and counterattack operations.
Nine years ago Russia, in an effort to promote morale and national pride, Russia modified a 2008 reorganization to reconstitute the famous, during World War II and the Cold War, 1st Guards Tank Army. This revived unit was stationed in western Russia, the better to frighten European countries that were invaded during World War II, or threatened by it during the Cold War by the original 1st Guards Tank Army. The latest version was a showcase unit and the first to receive new tanks and other weapons as well as the best troops available.
The new 1st Guards Tank Army is actually remarkably similar to its World War II counterpart. Back then mechanized tank or infantry forces were based on brigades. These were organized into division-sized mechanized or tank corps. Thus the World War II 1st Guards Tank Army consisted of the 8th Guards Mechanized Corps with three mechanized infantry brigades and one tank brigade. The 11th Guards Tank Corps of three tank brigades and one mechanized infantry brigade. The 2015 version consisted of one tank division, with two tank regiments. There was one mechanized infantry division with one tank regiment, three mechanized infantry regiments, one independent tank brigade and one independent mechanized infantry brigade.
During the Cold War the 1st Guards Tank Army consisted of two tank divisions and one mechanized infantry division. All three divisions of the 1st Guards Tank Army had about the same number of troops, some 35,000 troops and about 300 tanks. All three versions had supporting troops, artillery, anti-aircraft, engineers, supply and so on.
The World War II era brigades had few support units and depended on the corps and army for supply, maintenance, artillery and so on. In 2008 Russia reorganized its army by replacing divisions with more self-sufficient brigades. When that change was complete several years later the combat forces consisted of 55 combat brigades, 33 mechanized infantry, four tank and 22 Spetsnaz, airborne or air assault units. These brigades were about half the size of American combat brigades and about a third of the personnel were conscripts who served for one year. The skill levels of troops in these brigades was much lower than for comparable troops in American or British brigades and elite brigades in French, German and some other Western forces. There were also 28 combat support brigades eight armed with multi-barrel rocket launchers like the U.S. MLRS, nine with short range ballistic missiles, ten with anti-aircraft missile systems and one engineer brigade.
Russia, like the United States, did not get rid of divisions as divisions, but they became a headquarters with some support units that could handle two or more combat brigades.
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Morale: Ukraine War And the Russian Rural Recession
December 31, 2025: Nearly four years of war in Ukraine have devastated the Russian civilian economy. This year, 75 percent of Russia’s regions report serious budget deficits and more enterprises are becoming unprofitable. The government estimates that a third of all Russian enterprises have become unprofitable. The government expects to spend about $200 billion on military operations this year. These economic sanctions and lower profits from sanctioned oil exports have resulted in growing poverty throughout rural Russia. In the major cities, especially Moscow, there is relative prosperity. Any Muscovite who travels outside the city discovers he is living in a prosperous economic bubble surrounded by a nation of growing privation.
Spending on the Ukraine war has caused inflation to hit 7 percent this year with forecasts of 12 percent or more in 2026. Production of consumer goods is declining and more food is being purchased from other nations. In response to this recession, the government is nationalizing at least 180 large unprofitable enterprises. Most Russian regions have seen their local industries becoming unprofitable and laying off their workers. Joining the army can alleviate economic hardship for the soldiers' families but there is a one in three chance that a soldier will be killed or disabled.
The extent of the recession can be seen in lower income tax revenues, sometimes 50 percent lower. Export income is also declining, for coal as well as oil and other items. When the war is over the situation will worsen because of massive layoffs in military industries.
Invading Ukraine proved to be a disaster for the Russian economy. The expected quick win turned into a losing battle against determined Ukrainians armed with over $100 billion of weapons supplied by NATO nations, especially the United States, and at least equal amounts of economic aid. In addition to the unexpected resistance, the Russian economy was hit with substantial economic sanctions that reduced oil income and blocked Russia from receiving vital electronics and other items that could only be obtained from NATO countries.
At the same time Russia was trying to create a wartime economy that could support its efforts in Ukraine while also maintaining sufficient resources to keep more Russians from sliding into poverty. After three years of enormous personnel losses, there were fewer men to recruit. A growing number of Russian men, and some soldiers and officers, fled the country. This meant that Russian losses were not just the million dead and disabled soldiers, but millions of men who left Russia.
The government soon outlawed this migration. This slowed migration down but did not stop it. The government realized that most Russians were willing to fight to defend Russia, but many refused to support a Russian invasion of a neighboring country.
The Russian economy also took heavy losses because of the sanctions. The combination of rising personnel losses to combat and migration plus economic sanctions on a war economy proved disastrous for Russia. During 2023 Russia revenues from sanctioned oil and natural gas declined by a quarter while the percentage of the government devoted to the war increased dramatically.
It was obvious that Russia was having severe financial problems when Russia started to make large withdrawals from the National Welfare Fund/NWF, rather than increasing contributions to the fund. The NWF exists to keep the economy stable and able to pay for pensions and maintain infrastructure and investment in essential Russian industries. By 2024 the NWF was no longer able to meet all those obligations. A labor shortage appeared because millions of Russian civilians had fled the country, a million were dead or disabled in the war, and more didn’t work for fear of being forced into the military. The fall in government tax collections and profits from government-owned petroleum operations ended many infrastructure projects and payments to social welfare programs. When the majority of Russians feel the shortages, the government has a major political problem. Russian civilian morale has been sinking since mid-2023. Popular support for the war is declining. The government tried to resist this by devoting eight percent of the budget to payments for disabled soldiers or the families of dead soldiers. The cash shortages meant these payments were a one-time event during 2023. It could not be repeated because the government was broke.
The war appears to be continuing into 2026 despite Russia’s shortage of cash and soldiers. Russia has hired thousands of North Korean soldiers as a stopgap, but this is a limited resource. North Korea is demanding help with its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. This angers China, the last major ally Russia has. Not only is China reducing economic cooperation with Russia, but it has also raised the issue of extensive portions of Russia’s Far Eastern Pacific coastal provinces that are claimed by China. Over the last few centuries Russia did take many of these territories from China and now China sees an opportunity to get them back, or simply take them back. If this happens, Russia could lose up to twenty percent of its territory.
To keep the war going in Ukraine, Russia has sacrificed millions of personnel and the health and stability of its economy. To keep the war going, Russia may have to surrender its disputed territories in the Far East. All this has increased pressure on President Vladimir Putin. He has ruled or misruled Russia for 26 years and now faces internal opposition by his key allies. The major economic leaders of Russia, called oligarchs, see their business interests, employees and customers being hurt by Putin’s war. Will Putin risk civil unrest and economic collapse to keep the war going? These are questions that will have to be answered in 2026 when money, patience and military capabilities are all exhausted.
FYEO
Procurement: The Changing Economics Of War
December 31, 2025: Ukrainian-developed drones changed the nature, and cost, of warfare. Drones are cheap and the drone operators are rarely casualties. Ukrainian civilians and soldiers often modify their drones and share those innovations with other Ukrainians. Those concepts spread to Europe and the United States, where entrepreneurs began developing new weapons and military equipment. One entrepreneur had created SpaceX, a company that put thousands of communications satellites into orbit. Musk allowed Ukrainian forces to use this satellite network for battlefield communications and it gave the Ukrainians an edge over the Russians.
Another entrepreneur created a nine meter-long autonomous, jet fighter, the CA-1. An AI/Artificial Intelligence system was used to train the CA-1 via multiple engagements between CA-1 and fighter pilots controlling modern jet fighters in numerous combat simulations. Then two CA-1s engaged two fighter pilots operating modern jet fighters in a simulated battle. The CA-1s defeated the human pilots. This capability had been long feared by air forces, and now it was a reality.
Entrepreneurs have developed even more autonomous weapons and military equipment. Ukraine has also been using ground based combat drones, and in at least two cases Russian soldiers surrendered to the drones. Russia has also encouraged its entrepreneurs, but there are 500 million Europeans, 310 million Americans and only 140 million Russians.
NATO nations are facing major military, economic and security problems because of the war in Ukraine. What it comes down to is that military leaders back all possible military aid for Ukraine while political leaders face problems with paying for it. Not just the financial cost but the impact on voters who find themselves facing higher taxes and as well as inflation and shortages of essential goods. Supporting the Ukrainian war with Russia is expensive and exposes the true costs of cutting defense expenditures in the past by not maintaining sufficient stockpiles of weapons and munitions.
The basic problem is that it is a historical fact, reinforced by the current situation, that you must maintain adequate stockpiles of ammunition, equipment and supplies for use against a large, well-equipped enemy in a war. These stockpiles are also referred to as the “War Reserve, as in large quantities of everything required to keep the troops supplied during the initial 30-60 days of fighting until production can be increased to sustain the fighting. These stockpiles must contain the most useful munitions and other supplies and be positioned so they can be moved to the combat zones as quickly as possible. Without adequate logistics, as in the right supplies delivered in time, wars or at least battles, are often lost early and often. The Russians had such enormous stockpiles but ran out of those in mid-2024. That would have happened to the Ukrainians in late 2022 but for financial and military support from NATO, particularly the United States.
The original reason for NATO was, as the British put it, about “keeping the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down.” NATO was formed after World War II ended in 1945. That also ended over 70 years of major wars instigated by Germany. Now Germany was partitioned and the Western half faced another Russian invasion. The German occupation was short and the Germans were eager to join NATO and help keep the Russians out. That attitude has persisted through the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and reunification of Germany. The Germans had lost all interest in wars of aggression, but the Russians had not.
The Soviet Union prospered for a while after Nikita Khrushchev, who took over when Josef Stalin died in 1953, concentrated on the economy and well-being of Russians rather than the world conquest and generally murderous attitudes of Stalin. This was a welcome change for most Russians if only because Stalin’s policies had resulted in 20 percent of the Russian population dying in wars or domestic terror against Russians by Stalin to protect his power.
Khrushchev was gone within a decade, the first Russian leader in a long time to retire alive from office rather than die or be killed while in power. Khrushchev was replaced by less altruistic politicians who had aligned with Russian military leaders who wanted to start an arms race with the West and prepare for an eventual attack on Western Europe and that new NATO alliance. Then as now, Russia described this as necessary to defend Russia from more prosperous NATO countries who might think and act like Russians. This is a bad habit that Russia is having a difficult time overcoming even though the old Soviet Union collapsed from, among other things, doing the same thing.
After the Soviet Union dissolved, Russia tried democracy to do another Khrushchev for a decade. There was some success but not enough because Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer, took power and returned to the police state and military buildup that Stalin and Khrushchev’s successors tried with such disastrous results. Putin won the support of the military by spending a lot of money Russian could not afford to update the Cold War era weapons. Those updates, as well as new tactics and unit organizations, turned out to be failures and this was made clear when the overconfident Russian military invaded Ukraine. Despite the initial failures, Russia persists and is still seeking to intimidate NATO into submission. For Russia it is a three-front war. First there is the very obvious combat in Ukraine as well as an Information War against politicians and journalists in NATO countries. Then there is an economic struggle to deal with the economic sanctions.
The economics of war have changed since the end of the Cold War, an event that was expected to deliver a peace dividend made possible by major cuts in military forces and defense spending. That did not work out as expected because many countries eliminated conscription but underestimated the cost of a smaller all-volunteer force. Another unpleasant surprise was the higher costs for maintaining war reserves. The widespread use of GPS/INS guided shells and rockets since the late 1990s has led to most artillery being retired. One guided shell or rocket can do the work of dozens of unguided projectiles. The validity of this was proven time and again while fighting Islamic terrorists since 2001. This included 2016-18 battles against ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant where the Islamic terrorists were defending urban areas the same way a conventional force would, but smart shells and rockets were used effectively and frequently rather than the older tactic of using far more unguided shells and rockets. In b
Since 2018, U.S. Army orders for 155mm artillery shells were up from 16,573 to 148,287 for 2019 because of a new precision guidance option. In 2020 the emphasis switched to GPS guided 227mm rockets GMLRS and upgrades for the longer range 600mm ATACMS guided rocket. In 2020 the army has ordered 10,193 GMLRS rockets versus 8,101 in 2019 and 6,936 in 2018. In that time the Army discovered that it was easier to use the longer range, 70 kilometers or more, GMLRS than trying to develop longer range tube-based artillery. The need here was to match longer range artillery developed and put in service by Russia and China. Even with longer barrels and rocket-assisted shells, artillery could not reach as far as GMLRS. Moreover, jamming the GPS signal is a less effective enemy option with the much-improved microchip-based INS Inertial Guidance System long used as a less accurate backup in weapons using GPS for projectile guidance. The new INS is nearly as accurate as GPS and if you have to be sure, fire two or three GMLR S at the same target. That works, especially since INS cannot be jammed.
There is still a need for guided and unguided 155mm artillery shells. To provide choice the army has been ordering many more of the PGK Projectile Guidance Kit 155mm fuze. The PGK fuze turns an unguided 155mm shell into a GPS/INS guided one. These were found to be exceptionally useful in Syria and Iraq and, in mid-2017, the U.S. Army ordered another 5,600 PGK fuzes and has been building a stockpile. The army still uses unguided artillery shells for situations that don’t require precise accuracy for each shell, but the PGK provides options that can be implemented quickly to turn any “dumb shell into a smart one. It is unknown if any of these PGK fuzes have been sent to Ukraine.
Recent U.S. defense budgets accelerated purchases of numerous items that have to be stockpiled to sustain a major war, even a short one. Although fighting in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan has involved few American troops, it has seen enough action and use of artillery in support of Iraqi, Syrian and Afghan forces to deplete stockpiles and indicate which items would be needed in another major war. That war came along unexpectedly in 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine and much of NATO's support was in the form of modern ATGMs and other guided weapons.
Before 2008, as the war began to wind down in Iraq, there were warnings that stockpiles and war reserves were being allowed to shrink to dangerously low levels. The impact of this was first seen during the 1973 Arab Israeli war where ammo expenditures were much higher than expected. That lesson remains relevant and politicians don’t like when it stands in the way of keeping the defense budget from interfering with other spending priorities that appeal to more voters.
In early 2016 American military leaders went public about how their complaints about smart bomb and missile shortages were being ignored. In 2015 over 25,000 smart bombs and missiles were used by American mostly allied NATO and local Arabs warplanes operating over Iraq and Syria. Nearly all weapons were supplied by American firms but the American politicians and military leaders couldn’t agree on how to get the money to replace bombs being taken from the war reserve stocks. That debate was largely halted in 2022 when Ukraine was invaded. Now there is lots of support for increasing production of the items most useful to Ukrainian forces, like Javelin and Stinger missiles and rebuilding war reserves of those weapons.
Without NATO membership, Ukraine has to depend on NATO’s voluntary contributions of military assistance to defeat the Russian attack. The initial NATO response was massive and demonstrated the superiority of NATO weapons. It also revealed that NATO nations had underestimated the need to stockpile sufficient munitions to fight this kind or war while nations manufacturing most of these weapons had not paid enough attention, despite frequent warnings, to how long it would take to achieve wartime production levels. Also neglected were the problems of additional economic burdens placed on NATO member civilian populations. The new NATO members had warned of the growing possibility of a Russian attack, even though that was dismissed as unlikely because of the mutual defense aspects of Article 5 in the NATO membership agreement. But it happened in pro-NATO Ukraine and the new NATO members see doing everything they can to support Ukraine as essential to prevent future attacks on NATO members. Taking Ukraine is part o
Politicians prefer to defer hard decisions whenever possible. Insufficient defense spending is a favorite candidate for such false economies. Article 5 made politicians even more eager to defer essential defense spending because not only was NATO military manpower huge, with over three million active duty troops and organized reserves, but NATO forces were equipped with the most modern weapons and equipment. All true. Left out of the press releases was the sorry state of stockpiles of spare parts to keep all the vehicles, aircraft and ships operational and war reserves. This was a special problem for Germany and Britain.
Then there was the fact that half of NATO’s military manpower comes from two countries: the United States and Turkey. This is a major problem because the U.S. also manufactures most of the high-tech weapons and equipment. Turkey has become a very unreliable NATO member since an anti-Israel and anti-NATO government came to power in 2000. Led by Recep Erdogan, the new Turkish government also proved to be economically inept and Erdogan faces loss of power in the next elections because of the damage he did to the local economy and living standards of many Turks. With Ukraine, Erdogan is trying to play both sides to gain any advantage he can for Turkey and his own political career. The war in Ukraine has proved to be a major embarrassment for most NATO governments because politicians believed Russia would not invade Ukraine. The surprise turned politically painful when it was realized how much it was costing to support the Ukrainian forces and how much more expensive, and politically damaging it would be to continue that support until Russia was defeated. Many NATO politicians are looking for a way to evade their moral responsibility to support Ukraine. This is the price East European NATO members are willing to pay and this division threatens to destroy NATO as a unified defensive alliance.
FYEO
Morale: Russia Seeks To Placate Wartime Consumers
December 30, 2025: The war in Ukraine will soon enter its fifth year. Off the battlefield, one of the hardest hit entities is the Russian economy from economic sanctions by NATO countries. At first Russia downplayed the impact of the sanctions and turned its economy into wartime mode. Sensitive to civilian attitudes towards the war, the government sought to keep the stores full and the consumer prices affordable. There were no unemployment problems because the million or so Russians killed, disabled or missing were added to several million more military age men who left Russia. Growing labor shortages have been a problem for over two years. Inflation has been growing and the quality of life declining. To make matters worse, Western sanctions have managed to bring down oil prices and disrupt distribution of sanctioned Russian oil exports. It’s gotten so bad that in 2026 the military budget, currently $161 billion, will shrink.
All this was no surprise for Russian government financial specialists. Three years after invading Ukraine, the Russian defense budget has turned into a monster devastating the economy. This crisis has been brewing since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. The increased defense spending and the years of economic sanctions have deformed the economy as more is spent on weapons and military needs. This displaces production of civilian goods.
Military spending also reveals another Russian tradition, corruption in military procurement Corruption is less tolerated and more frequently punished in the civilian economy. Military production does not directly impact civilians and their lives.
Now that there is more military spending, corrupt officials are getting rich while the soldiers get shoddy equipment. In the case of winter clothing procured for the soldiers, a lot of that ends up on the black market while the troops go without and the military procurement officials get rich. During the first winter of the war, Russian soldiers overcame these shortages by plundering Ukrainian civilians for cold weather clothing. By the second year of the war that source had dried up and Russian soldiers stayed warm any way they could, or via winter clothing mailed them by their families.
The cause of all this woe is the escalating expense of the war in Ukraine. The defense budget for 2023 was $75.2 billion while 2024’s was $115 billion. For 2025 it will be $140 billion followed by a smaller one in 2026. In 2023 Russia expected its 2024 government revenue to be a record $349 billion, but instead it was $450 billion. Because of the ailing economy there is less to tax and government budgets are constricting. With rising defense spending there is less left for pensions and other social welfare programs as well as maintaining and expanding infrastructure. Less money for roads, canals, ports and railways contributed to various calamities in the Russian railroad system.
There are plans to sustain this level of revenue while keeping Russian military spending at record level. This means more purchases of weapons and equipment from Russian suppliers as well as continuing generous death and disability payments to soldiers or their families. The impact of these payments is obvious on poor regions of Russia that have a lot of men in the military. So many local men have been killed or disabled that the families of the dead are now relatively wealthy and spending money on new cars or upgrading their housing and lifestyles in general. This is intentional because the government is desperate to avoid large-scale dissatisfaction with the war effort.
The Russian defense budget is now a wartime budget. For the first time since the Soviet Union collapsed, the defense budget was six percent of GDP and exceeded spending for social welfare programs. Russia plans to maintain this higher defense spending until they win the Ukraine war. That is unlikely to happen because the Ukrainian war effort is subsidized by weapons and military equipment supplied by NATO countries. Collectively, NATO nations account for about half the global GDP. Despite the fact that NATO is far wealthier than Russia, the Russians believe the massive NATO support for Ukraine won’t last as long as the Russian determination to prevail. Russia notes that NATO has 31 member states. Not all these nations agree on long-term policy or how much should be spent on continuing support for Ukraine. At the same time, NATO members agree that Ukraine should be allowed to join NATO. That can only happen when the war with Russia is over. At the moment the Ukrainian forces are better armed and equipped than the Russian invaders. That is one reason why Russian forces are largely on the defensive and suffering much higher casualties and equipment losses than the Ukrainians. the Russian invaders. That is one reason why Russian forces are largely on the defensive and suffering much higher casualties and equipment losses than the Ukrainians.
By spending so much on military production and social welfare, Russia expects to maintain popular support for the war effort. The problem is that Russia does not have enough income to sustain a wartime economy. Spending too much on defense was a major reason why the Soviet Union went bankrupt and collapsed in 1991. It was later discovered that the Soviet government had inadequate financial controls and lacked a realistic financial plan. This was revealed to the world, and most Russians, after 1991. Up until 1991 Russia was spending about 15 percent of GDP on defense and not enough on more urgent matters like managing the economy prudently in order to avoid a financial collapse. Russian leaders did not believe national bankruptcy would cause the collapse of the Soviet Union. Misunderstanding or ignoring a problem won’t solve that problem or eliminate the consequences.
Most of the current Russian leaders consider the collapse of the Soviet Union a great tragedy. The war in Ukraine is seen as a step towards putting back together the empire the Soviet Union presided over. The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union created 15 independent nations, including Russia and Ukraine. Most of these former Soviet Union subjects believe inept leadership by the Russian-dominated Soviet government was the cause of the problems that lead to the bankruptcy and dissolution of the Soviet Union. While many other nations still consider the Russians clever, those who live in Russia or nations that were once part of the Soviet Union are less admiring. This includes China, which regards Russian leaders as prone to making poor decisions. Publicly, the Chinese profess their admiration of and friendship with Russia. Privately, the Chinese are less admiring of the Russian leadership. China does not discuss this with the Russian government because China wants to maintain good relations with its large nuclea
The Chinese regard Russia’s current military budget policies as another example of Russian self-delusion and poor policy decisions which might help Russia but will make neighboring states more wary of what Russia is going to do next. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is considered another example of bad decision making and Russia appears to have learned nothing useful from their defeats inside Ukraine. Russia is already in bad shape economically and militarily and current plans to vastly increase defense spending will make their situation worse. That’s what Russian leaders tend to do. They often find the worst decision and embrace it.
FYEO
Winning: US Copes With Chinese Shipbuilding Supremacy
December 30, 2025: The United States is trying to do something about Chinese dominance in shipbuilding. In 2024 one the two major Chinese shipbuilding firms built more commercial shipping, in terms of tonnage, than the United States has built since 1945. U.S. government efforts to revive American shipbuilding have so far come to nothing. China builds ships faster, cheaper and maintains quality.
In the last decade the emergence of China as the builder of most commercial ships had several dramatic side effects. American military and political leaders realized that China might become a military threat. There followed the realization that the U.S. shipbuilding industry shriveled in the face of the overwhelming Chinese domination. This diminished the ability of the U.S. Navy to maintain and repair their ships. Without a strong domestic commercial shipbuilding industry, there is a critical shortage of workers to maintain U.S. warships.
In contrast, the Chinese Navy has been able to quickly create a navy with more warships than the United States. Chinese shipbuilders are striving to overtake their main rival South Korea as the largest shipbuilder in the world in all categories. One way China helped its shipyards cope was increasing orders for warships. This was going to happen anyway, but the government gave the navy all it wanted and then some. This resulted in 2019 being a record year for warship construction with 28 surface warships launched, including a record ten destroyers plus 16 corvettes and two large amphibious ships. While warships are more complex ships to build, commercial ships still accounted for over 95 percent of the work at the newly consolidated China Shipbuilding Group. From that point on China has been the largest producer of non-nuclear warships. China’s principal problem here is developing adequate manpower for all its new warships.
China has been helping its shipyards since the late 1990s, and that has enabled Chinese shipbuilders to gradually catch up to South Korea and Japan. In 2009, sooner than anyone expected, China surpassed South Korea as the world's largest shipbuilder in terms of tonnage. In 2000 South Korea took the lead from Japan by having the largest share of the world shipbuilding market. The massive South Korean and Japanese shipbuilding capability has enabled these two nations to reinforce the American’s Pacific Fleet and confront the Chinese with a formidable naval force that blocks any efforts to dominate the South China Sea.
At the same time the Chinese have been working hard on how to build new classes of navy supply ships. These are built to efficiently supply ships at sea. In addition to learning how to transfer these supplies at sea, the crews have also learned how to keep all the needed supplies in good shape and stocked in the required quantities. This requires the procurement officers learning how to arrange resupply at local ports in a timely basis.
As the major producers of commercial ships, China was able to design and build supply ships for the Chinese Navy quickly. Currently the U.S. can build ships but only slowly and in small quantities, and most of those built are warships. American yards are not as efficient as the Chinese shipbuilders and take five to ten years to complete a warship that China can complete in a year or two. This includes non-nuclear aircraft carriers.
During World War II, American shipbuilders built more ships, from PT-boats, to cargo ships and aircraft carriers, than all other nations combined. Early in the 21st century, poor workmanship and inept management by shipbuilders led to an epic disaster. The LPD amphibious ships were being delivered two years late, way over budget and riddled with flaws. The San Antonio LPD was the poster child for all that's wrong with American warship construction. The list of problems with these ships was long and embarrassing. It cost nearly $40 million and another three months to get all the defects fixed so the San Antonio could enter service.
While the navy is correct in blaming the shipyards for many of the problems, the admirals and their civilian advisors were and are a large part of the problem. After all, the navy draws up the contracts and supplies inspectors during construction of the ships. While Congressional interference can be blamed as well, in the end, it's the navy that has the most to say, and do, about how the ships are built. The problem is that admirals who stand up and take on the contractors and politicians put their careers on the line. But it appears that a number of admirals are willing to take the risks, and try for some fundamental reform, and finally fix the system that turns out to have more problems than warships. Victories have been elusive. The shipyards and their suppliers have powerful allies in Congress. All that money translates into votes that gets incumbent politicians reelected. Congress is not inclined to attack this kind of patronage and pork, since nearly all members of Congress depend on it.
An example of how this works occurred in 2011 when the navy encountered some serious problems with shoddy shipbuilders. This incident involved the USNS Howard O. Lorenzen, a 12,000 ton, 172 meter long radar ship which failed its acceptance tests. This vessel was built to carry a special billion dollar radar used to track ICBM tests. This tracking activity also supports verification of missile and nuclear weapons treaty compliance. This new ship replaces a similar ship that was over 30 years old. The acceptance tests found serious problems with the steering, electrical system, damage control, anchor control, and helicopter facilities.
The navy has also had schedule, budget and quality problems with submarines and aircraft carriers. But some of the worst problems were with the new San Antonio class amphibious ships. Most of these were late, over budget and rife with systems that didn't work, or work for very long.
The builder of the troubled LPDs did try to fix things, but the shipyard in Louisiana, where the LPDs were built, seemed cursed as well. Nothing the shipbuilder did in terms of changing management seemed to work. So the builder shut down the shipyard, once the largest employer in the state and shifted all LPD 17 work to its Pascagoula, Mississippi, yard in 2013. That helped but did not fix all the problems, which many admirals believe resided with the senior management of shipbuilder Northrop Grumman.
The problems with nuclear subs and carriers are minor compared to the LPD travails. Still, the sheer extent of the problems, across so many ships, was very disturbing. This may be why a growing number of admirals were willing to take career risks, and try for some fundamental reform, and finally fix the system that turns out to have more problems than warships. Victory is not assured. The shipyards and their suppliers have powerful allies in Congress. All that money translates into votes that get incumbent politicians reelected. Congress is not inclined to attack this kind of patronage and pork, since nearly all members of Congress depend on it. The admirals can openly complain, but offended legislators can quietly cripple the careers of those critics. The smart money is betting against the good guys here. So far, the smart money is right. But the bad builder mess is so vast, expensive and messy that even many politicians are calling for some fundamental changes.
In 2025 a new American government came to power pledging to shake things up in government. This meant dismantling and disposing of inefficient and poorly performing agencies. New organizations are created to do what the defunct agency could not do but do it better and cheaper. A recent example of this was the closing of the U.S. Navy Naval Sea Systems Command, or NAVSEA. This organization was responsible for building warships and has a deplorable performance record. The replacement was Shiba Inu, which is headquartered in Louisiana, where most of the navy’s few shipyards are. Shiba Inu stands for Strategic High Impact Barge Artillery Inexpensive Naval Upshift. The first proposal of the new agency was equipping flat bottom barges with cruise missiles and other equipment and towing them out to sea to reach a foreign conflict zone. This idea was immediately shot down when it was pointed out that these barges can only operate on calm water. Any encounter with rough seas will sink a barge. While the U.S. no longe
The NAVSEA replacement was to address the real problems as in insufficient ship building and ship maintenance capabilities. The current situation is that the U.S. Navy is unable to build enough new ships to replace the fleet it currently has, and can’t maintain the ships it does have, let alone battle damage to those ships in war. The navy has nearly 500 ships in active service as well as the reserve fleet. The principal vessels are the combat ships, which include 11 aircraft carriers, nine Amphibious Assault Ships for transporting and landing marine battalions, ten LPD Amphibious Dock Landing Ships to supply amphibious operations, fifty SSNs/Nuclear attack submarines, fourteen SSBNs/Ballistic missile-carrying nuclear submarines, four SSGMs/SSBNs converted to carry over a hundred cruise missiles each, one frigate, 13 cruisers, 75 destroyers and about fifty support ships of various types.
The navy has recognized the growing importance of Unmanned Surface Vessel or drones and Unmanned Underwater drones but has been slow to order and deploy these unmanned vessels to aid the navy in defending Taiwan from Chinese attack.
The American warships are still, on average, more powerful than their Chinese counterparts. This is largely due to the American nuclear aircraft carriers and nuclear submarine forces. China has nothing like these but does have more anti-ship missiles on their ships plus cruise and ballistic missiles launched from land to hit American ships far from the Chinese coast. American warships are generally well-protected from those, but supply ships aren’t. At all. The primary American weakness is seaborne supply, and the Chinese are aware of that.
In 2012, South Korea lost its decade-long battle with China to retain its lead in shipbuilding. Because of a five-year-long depression in the world shipping market, South Korean ship exports fell 30 percent in 2012, to $37.8 billion. China, helped by government subsidies, saw ship exports fall only 10.3 percent, leaving China with $39.2 billion in export sales. The Chinese government has also been giving its shipbuilders lots of new orders for warships, which made its yards more profitable and better able to beat South Korea on price. The Chinese government also provides its shipbuilders with more loans, allowing the builders to offer better credit terms to customers. South Korea was still ahead of China in total orders for ships, but that lead was being lost, and in 2011 South Korea was barely ahead of China. Since 2012, China and South Korea have been competing for overall first place, but so far, South Korea has the edge in quality and innovation, and a recent merger of China’s two biggest ship building c
China has been helping its shipyards since the late 1990s, and that has enabled Chinese shipbuilders to gradually catch up to South Korea and Japan. In 2009, sooner than anyone expected, China surpassed South Korea as the world's largest shipbuilder in terms of tonnage. In late 2009, Chinese yards had orders for 54.96 million CGT of ships, compared to 53.63 million CGT for South Korea. Thus, China had 34.7 percent of the world market.
China has invested a lot of money and effort into expanding its merchant shipbuilding industry so as to improve its warship building capability. In 2006 China produced about a quarter of the world's merchant shipping, while South Korea was in first place, producing about a third. Currently China is in first place followed by South Korea, Japan, Germany, Italy and the United States.
The big thing holding China back in the warship-building area has been the shortage of skilled workers. The Americans have a similar problem. Too many young men go to college and end up unemployed while better paying jobs in the shipbuilding industry go unfilled.
China encouraged merchant shipbuilding, which created experienced shipbuilders ready to learn the more complex tasks needed to build warships. In most cases, merchant ships are larger than warships and much less complex. For example, a common type of merchant ship is the Very Large Crude Carrier or VLCC of 300,000 deadweight tons. This is the largest size tanker that can use the Straits of Malacca to carry oil from the Persian Gulf to East Asia. These ships haul over two million barrels/290,000 tons of oil per trip. These ships are larger than the biggest American aircraft carriers, such as the Nimitz class, which has 110,000 tons of displacement and is nearly 354 meters long.
The major difference between merchant vessels and warships is the equipment they have. Merchant ships are quite basic and plain. A 300,000 ton VLCC is about the same size as a Nimitz-class carrier but costs $130 million to build versus over $4 billion for the carrier. It costs more to run a carrier for one year than the VLCC costs to build. Part of that has to do with crew size, with the carrier having a hundred sailors for every one sailor needed to run the tanker. A VLCC is highly automated, and the crew size is usually under fifty sailors and officers.
By building all those merchant vessels, China has acquired the ability to cheaply build basic warship hulls. It has big problems in creating the complex electronics, mechanical systems, and weapons needed to make a warship work. China is making progress there as well, but not nearly as much as it has in the shipbuilding area.
China became a major force in commercial shipping partly because it became more difficult for South Korean builders to expand. There were more restrictions on land use in South Korea, in addition to higher labor costs. South Korean builders, seeing that they could not match the expansion of Chinese shipyards, expended more effort on building more complex and expensive ships. Japan was following a similar path when it lost the lead to South Korea a decade before China grabbed it. China also gained more market share by offering generous loan terms to foreign buyers of Chinese ships and cheap loans for their own shipbuilders.
The one vulnerability China has not yet come up with a solution for is how to prevent the Americans from seizing many of these Chinese-built, owned, and operated ships during wartime. That is yet another reason for China not to start a war. The Chinese naval warfare plans concentrate on defending against China being attacked by another naval power.
Surface Forces : New German Unmanned Warships
December 29, 2025: The German navy is one of many that are investing in unscrewed vessels. The Germans are developing three models, the 60 meter long Large Remote Missile Vessels/LRMV, the smaller Future Combat Surface Systems/FCSS and Large Unmanned Underwater Vehicles/LUUV. Germany expects to have at least three LRMV, 18 FCSS and 12 LUUV. All of these are to be available by 2035. These drones will work with eight 10,000 ton F127 frigates Germany is building. Based on the smaller U.S. Burke class destroyers, the F127s may be redesignated as destroyers.
The 160meter long vessels have a top speed of 58 kilometers an hour and a range of 7,400 kilometers at a cruising speed that is about half the top speed. Endurance, with onboard fuel and provisions, is 30 days. Systems include a fire control system based on the U.S. Aegis plus both surface and air search AESA radars. There is a SONAR and electro-optical sensors for tracking and firing on small boats or drones. This would be done with an as yet undetermined number of machine guns and Close In Weapons like Phalanx or similar systems.
Missile armament consists of 64 VLS cells for air defense missiles like SM-2 IIIC or SM-6. There are two 21-cell launchers for RIM-116 air defense missiles, two four-cell launchers for the NSM 1a anti-ship or land attack cruise missile, and a 127mm gun. There is also a deck and hangar for two NH90 helicopters equipped for search and rescue or anti-Submarine operations.
The LRMV is meant to be used on the high seas in areas where the F127s are operating. The LRMVs can keep up with the F127s or just slowly circle in an area while waiting for the frigate to order them forward for an operation. The LRMV provides additional missile firepower and can also be used so the frigate can operate a larger inventory of missiles. That makes it clear that the LRMV is a support ship, not a warship. The LRMV has no fire control equipment and depends on encrypted signals from the frigates about where the targets are and when to fire on them. At the moment this is all theoretical, but tests of ships handling fire control for missiles fired from a barge or merchant ships have demonstrated that it can work. LRMV can also be equipped with hundreds of drones, to be used for swarm attacks that can overwhelm an enemy ship’s defenses. China is already experimenting with drone carriers that can launch multiple swarm attacks.
The Ukraine War has already provided lots of examples of how to successfully use naval drones. As early as 2022 Ukrainian water-going drones included Sea Baby, Mother, and MAGURA. At the end of 2023 Cossack Mother, with a top speed of 100 kilometers an hour, entered service. Manufacture of these drones is done in underground facilities to avoid Russian missile and guided bomb attacks.
Sea Baby carrying 850 kg of explosives was used in the mid-2023 Kerch Bridge attack. MAGURA carries 320 kg of explosives while Mother carries 450 kg. These drones are no longer used just for delivering explosives against a target, they can also be used for reconnaissance when equipped with video cameras that broadcast what they see back to the drone operator. Some drones have been armed with small rocket launchers or surface-to-air missiles. Malyuk has a range of over 700 kilometers, which means it is suitable for operations on the high seas. Endurance is about 60 hours, and top speed is over 70 kilometers an hour. MAGURA has similar characteristics. Mamai was used in the long-range attacks on the distant naval base at Novorossiysk on Russia’s Black Sea eastern, which is a thousand kilometers from Crimea. Such Ukrainian sea drones have shot down Russian aircraft. Ukraine builds 96 percent of its drones in local factories. The other four percent are sent by NATO countries.
The aggressive and successful use of Ukrainian drones against the Russian Black Sea fleet was unprecedented in the history of naval warfare. Not only were these drones tactically successful, but financially as well. For example, new frigates cost about $1.5 billion each. That much money can also pay for 5,000 drones. Destroyers cost twice as much as frigates. The frigates and destroyers are high seas ships that can travel all over the world. The drones operate in coastal waters although some of the larger drones can operate up to a thousand kilometers from where they were launched. These drones carry video cameras and satellite-based communications systems to collect information and, in peacetime, do so without fear of attack. Severe storms are another matter, but any storm damage will be broadcast as it is happening, at least until the video cameras or communications equipment is disabled.
Ukrainian naval drones and land based missiles destroyed over a third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and forced the survivors to take shelter at Russian ports over a thousand kilometers from Crimea. While Russia still occupies Crimea, the area is under siege by Ukrainian naval drones and land based missiles. Soon Russia will no longer be able to supply Crimea because of this. The Kerch Strait bridge from Russia to Crimea is in bad shape and can only allow limited truck traffic. By the end of 2024 Russia had withdrawn all its ships from Crimea and shut down its ship repair facilities. Ukraine has the means to demolish what is left of the bridge whenever they want to. This will happen when Ukraine decides to blockade Crimea and force the Russians to abandon the peninsula because they cannot supply it.
The only effective protection from naval drone attacks is the installation of multiple 25mm or 30mm automatic cannon gun mounts that are automated and use advanced AI and sensors. The guns can point downward towards waters close to the hull. This makes it possible for the autocannon to fire on naval drones that get very close to the ship. Russia has been using weapons like this, from ships as well as helicopters. These are the same helicopters that also drop aerial attack drones to destroy Ukrainian naval drones.
FYEO
Special Operations: Reforming Chinese Special Operations Forces
December 29, 2025: China is reforming and reorganizing its Special Operations Forces/SOF. This is a process that began in 2017. This included the use of twelve-man teams and increased emphasis on training and special equipment for these commandos. China believes it will take until 2049 for Chinese SOF training and equipment upgrades to be complete. At that point China will have over 40,000 SOF personnel. Currently China has about 25,000 personnel in its SOF units. Some 80 percent belong to the army, with the air force, navy and rocket forces having the rest.
At a recent international SOF competition in Serbia, the Chinese SOP personnel performed as if they were inexperienced and inadequately trained. The current organization consists of fifteen army brigades and one brigade each for the marines, airborne forces and the rocket forces. The army brigades consist of 2,000-3,000 personnel. The other services have regiments of about a thousand SOF personnel. The national police also has SOF units, which are largely more like police SWAT/Special Weapons and Tactics teams. The police are in the process of training some of their units to the same level as the army SOF units. Retired army SOF personnel are hired for this work. The police want to be less dependent on the military SOF to take care of extreme situations.
There is a loosely connected international SOF community. Chinese SOF personnel know what the foreign SOF teams can do and how they acquired their skills. For a long time Chinese military commanders ignored the superiority of foreign SOF. Now they have been ordered to meet the highest standards and have been given cash, access to the best personnel and equipment and told to get it done in 24 years or else.
China began organizing commando units in the late 1980s. This was seen as an experiment but, after noting the success of American and British commandos in the 1991 Gulf War, the Chinese decided to push the concept throughout their armed forces. Unfortunately, they appear to have diluted their efforts by establishing special operations units in each of the seven military districts, as well as in the navy and the Airborne Corps. There were two Special Warfare Corps, but most of the commando troops in China were more like SWAT teams for use against criminal gangs and dissidents, rather than special operations troops in the American sense.
China has also developed systems to counter hostile commandos threatening Chinese facilities. Since the 1990s China has been installing more and more 55mm DP-65 remotely controlled anti-swimmer grenade launching systems on its ships and in some coastal bases. This is because more Chinese ships are visiting foreign ports and need that kind of protection. The DP-65 is also seen on the platforms China is building on or near disputed rocks, reefs, and uninhabited islands in the South China Sea.
The DP-65 uses a special kind of sonar to detect swimmers nearby. The six barrel DP-65 is designed to defeat underwater attackers using scuba gear to approach and plant bombs or simply seek out information. The 55mm grenades are similar to those found on RPGs but have a flare at the end so that sailors on shore can see where it lands and know where the swimmer might be. The 55mm grenade has a fuze which sets off the warhead when the grenade reaches a preset depth. When the grenade explodes it will kill or injure any swimmer within 16 meters.
Air Weapons: Russian Drone Priority
December 28, 2025: While Russia was an early user of Iranian Shaheed drones against Ukraine, the Ukrainians developed more drone innovations and out-produced the Russians, until now. After more than a year of effort, and the use of a special task force called Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, or just Rubicon, these Russian efforts to reform and upgrade their drone operations have paid off. This year Russia is sending nearly ten times the number of drones against Ukrainian targets than they did last year.
New Russian drones are more capable and are usually sent out in multiple large groups called swarms. The swarms come at targets from different directions and approach at different altitudes before diving at the target. Russia began using more decoys and continually upgraded their electronic warfare techniques to protect the swarms. Russian electronic warfare has always been excellent at protecting troops and facilities from attacks. The Ukrainian drones still get through, but in smaller numbers.
For the first time in over three years of war, the Russians have an advantage in drone war operations. The Ukrainians responded quickly, but suffered a lot of damage while doing so. The novel Russian tactics and equipment prompted the Ukrainians to quickly develop effective countermeasures. Still, there was an increase in Russian drone victories. Ukraine is always working on new technologies and tactics and it will be interesting to see how Ukraine adapts to the new Russian methods.
After all, the original Ukrainian drone proliferation began when many individual Ukrainians, or small teams of civilians, designed and built drones. The drones served as potential candidates for widespread use and mass production. This proliferation of designers and manufacturers led to rapid evolution of drone capabilities and uses. Those who could not keep up were less successful in combat and suffered higher losses. Each month nearly 400,000 drones are now built in Ukrainian factories or home workshops. Most of these workshops are informal affairs, located in spare rooms, garages, barns, empty industrial space or anyplace protected from the weather and aerial surveillance. Russia will hit any drone manufacturing sites if they can identify them.
One result of the Ukraine War was the emergence of inexpensive drones as a decisive weapon as well as a reconnaissance and surveillance system. In 2023, a year after Russia invaded Ukraine, the Ukrainians were building their own drones, often at home or scattered workshops. By late 2024 Ukrainians were producing over 15o,000 drones a month. In 2025 Ukraine will produce over 400,000 drones a month. By purchasing components in bulk, thousands of Ukrainian men and women are building these drones for the armed forces or for someone they know in the military. Troops at the front also build and modify drones to fit their immediate situations. For the soldiers, designing better drones is often a matter of life or death.
This competitiveness led to First Person View/FPV drones as well as drones guided via Fiber Optic cable Guidance or FOG. Electronic jamming was useless against the FOG drones. The only limitation was the length of the cable. This meant the operator had to be at one end of the kilometers long cable. Operators could be further away if there was time to lay another kilometer or two of cable further to the rear. Ukrainian drone operators often worked in drone workshops before entering the military and were accustomed to upgrading drone operator equipment while in the combat zone. Any successful innovations were made known to workshop operators throughout Ukraine.
This is how the Ukrainians maintain a lead over the Russians in drone technology and production. The Russian government discourages, or even outlaws, individuals building drones, and centralizes drone production. This gives the Ukrainians an edge in drone quantity and quality. The Ukrainians are defending their homeland and Russia is having an increasingly difficult time justifying continued fighting and over a million Russians killed or disabled in Ukraine.
NATO countries are trying to adopt drone technology and use it for their own armed forces. Ukraine has received over $200 billion in military and economic assistance from NATO countries and shares their drone experience and technology with their benefactors. Drones have revolutionized warfare and are causing 70 percent of casualties in Ukraine. The Ukraine War is a battle between industrialized countries employing modern weapons. It is the war of the future that has become what all armed forces in the world must adopt to remain competitive.
Even before the Ukraine War, drones were being used in irregular warfare in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Africa. Drug gangs have used drones to smuggle drugs into the United States, or into a prison to aid in an escape attempt. Drones are everywhere, despite laws in some countries restricting or prohibiting their use.
The latest innovation in drone warfare is the Ukrainian use of AI/Artificial Intelligence for drone targeting systems. The AI drone contains a targeting system that finds targets. The AI drone operator confirms which targets are real and, once a target is confirmed, the AI targeting system needs no further communication with anyone. It is resistant to all forms of jamming.
Modern warfare has been radically changed by the introduction of FPV drones. These drones are an omnipresent aerial threat to all vehicles, including heavily armored tanks, and infantry on foot. Each FPV drone costs less than a thousand dollars. Operators use the video camera on the drone to see what is below and find targets. Armed FPV operators are several kilometers away to decide when their FPV drones will drop explosives on an armored vehicle, which has thinner armor on top, or infantry in the open or in trenches. To do so, the drone operators often operate in pairs, with one flying behind the other and concentrating on the big picture while seeking a likely target. When such a target is found by the reconnaissance drone, the armed drone is directed to the target. The two FPV drone operators are usually in the same room or tent and can take control of new drones, which are lined up and brought outside for launch when needed. The reconnaissance drones are often unarmed so they can spend more time in the
The Ukrainians developed the FPV drone in 2022, when only a few FPV drone attacks were recorded. The Ukrainian Army was the first to appreciate the potential of FPV drones. By the summer of 2023, the Russian Army also began to use FPV drones in greater numbers. Since then, the number of FPV drone attacks has grown exponentially on both sides. Only twelve percent of those attacks led to the destruction of the target, which could be a vehicle or group of infantry or even a sniper who was firing through a window from inside a building. In this case, the armed FPV drone would fly through the window and explode in the room the sniper was in. The only defense from this was having a nearby open door which the sniper could run to or dive through as the FPV drone approached. Sometimes that isn’t possible because the armed FPV drone is coming down from above the window and then in. You don’t see those coming until it’s too late.
Nearly five million drones are being built this year. The total for 2024 was 1.5 million drones. There have been problems. Chinese component producers are having a hard time keeping up, and, last year, to assist the Russians, China halted sending drone components to Ukraine. Suppliers in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere were quickly found. At least 70 percent of Ukrainian drones are built entirely in Ukraine, and the rest from imported parts or whole assemblies. Some Ukrainian firms have improvised by using plywood and similar materials for their drones. For the FPV First Person View drones, cheaper is better if the drone can hit its first and only target. Most Ukrainian drones are FPV models, which are considered a form of ammunition.
Both sides now use the FPV drones, but there are substantial differences in how the FPV drones are put to work in combat. The Ukrainians seek out high-value targets like armored vehicles, electronic warfare equipment, anti-aircraft systems, and storage sites for munitions or other supplies. Russian trucks carrying supplies are another prime target.
FYEO
Respectfully, ADM, while you make a very good point, these new "Really Large Cruisers" still need to be able to engage in the ASW mission.
Baseline 3 and later Aegis Cruisers were built with the SQR-19 TacTaSS, unlike the earlier ships. This, plus their LAMPS-III gave them an ASW capability that may have been just as good as the Spru-Cans, despite their purpose mission as the Shields of the Fleet.
We need to expect that these new Very Large Cruisers will also have that expectation.
As to the power demands, yes, nuclear power is able to generate quite a bit of electricity, but so can gas turbine engines feeding straight into generators.
Also, the ships can have a sort of "APR" system installed that could (a guess on my part) be built on something like the gas turbine engines that power the Abrams Tank. Fifteen hundred shaft-horsepower feeding a generator should be able to handle all the demands of the proposed lasers and railguns.
If they're loud, then they can be mounted higher up to remove the noise from the lower hull area. They're also small (volume wise), so it's possible that, if one isn't strong enough, that they could put in three or four so they'll always have more than one available, even if they have one out of service for maintenance.
With all that, how likely is it that BuShips will go with a "Nuclear with Gas Turbine" power plant combination? 