"Greenland’s five political parties sent a clear message to President Donald Trump on Friday, issuing a joint statement that rejected his increasingly aggressive attempts to acquire the island for the United States.

“We do not want to be Americans, we do not want to be Danes, we want to be Greenlanders,” the statement said, signed by the leaders of the five political parties, including Greenland’s prime minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen. “The future of Greenland must be decided by the Greenlandic people.” "
Source Time.com

Guess 100k$ wasn't enough.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Tuesday, January 13, 2026 - 06:25 am: Edit

Google inquiry:
Quote:” Do Greenlanders want to be part of Denmark?
AI Overview
No, Greenland doesn't want to be part of Denmark in the sense of remaining a territory; a majority of Greenlanders consistently favor eventual independence, but they want it on their own terms, not at the cost of their welfare state, and strongly reject foreign control like the US's offers. While most political parties lean towards independence, the main obstacle is the massive Danish financial support (block grants for defense, justice, etc.), making a sudden split economically difficult.
Key Points:
Strong Independence Movement: Opinion polls show a clear majority (often around two-thirds) of Greenlanders support eventual independence from Denmark.
Economic Dependence: Greenland relies heavily on Denmark's annual subsidies (around $600 million) for essential services, making immediate full independence challenging without jeopardizing their high standard of living.
Self-Governance: Greenland already has extensive self-rule (Home Rule since 1979, Self-Government Act in 2009) over domestic affairs, but Denmark still manages foreign policy and defense.
Rejection of US Control: Greenlanders overwhelmingly oppose U.S. offers to buy or annex the island, viewing it as interference and an affront to their self-determination.
Danish Acceptance (in Principle): Denmark acknowledges Greenland's right to decide its future, though the economic realities create complex issues.
In essence, Greenland wants to be an independent nation, but the path to that goal is complicated by economic realities, leading to a desire for independence eventually, but not now if it means losing their welfare system.”

Somewhat different that what Carl posted.

Note: google AI , may contain errors.

By MarkSHoyle (Bolo) on Tuesday, January 13, 2026 - 10:03 am: Edit

During the 80/90s, Puerto Rico had a regular referendum on whether to:

Become a State
Become Independent or
Maintain the current relationship

Not sure when they stopped doing that...
seems they finally decided they liked
the Status Quo....

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Tuesday, January 13, 2026 - 10:22 am: Edit

I think they stopped when they realized that even a referendum in favor of statehood wasn't going anywhere with Congress.

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Wednesday, January 14, 2026 - 08:23 am: Edit

IF the Dems take both houses and the Presidency, I suspect DC & PR statehood would happen pretty quickly... Dunno if that would be a good or bad thing for either place.

IIRC both locations get benefits for not being states...

Personally I'd like DC, PR, the American Caribbean Islands, andd the American Pacific Islands to all get statehood.

DC 700,000 residents
PR 3,200,000 people
US Virgin Islands 104,000
IS Pacific Island Territories 275,000

Wyoming by contrast has around 600,000

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Wednesday, January 14, 2026 - 08:39 am: Edit

Instead of invading Iceland how about we just start buying it piece by piece?

Heck we lease base space all over the world.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Wednesday, January 14, 2026 - 10:11 am: Edit

Presuming you meant Greenland rather than Iceland, Mike, we already have an agreement in place that gives the U.S. what amounts to a free hand with setting up bases, stationing forces, and undertaking defensive operations there, an agreement that goes back to 1951. It's the Defense of Greenland: Agreement Between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark, for those who want to dig it up (I'd provide a link, but we're not supposed to do that in the RWM thread).

It is that agreement that puts the claim that taking Greenland is necessary to prevent Russian/Chinese intrusions in considerable question.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Wednesday, January 14, 2026 - 11:01 am: Edit

A quick Google inquiry resulted in:

Quote:”… While there's no evidence of active military Russian or Chinese surveys currently swarming Greenland's waters, China has significant economic interests, including plans for mining projects and research facilities, leading to increased scientific/commercial vessel presence and monitoring concerns from the US and Nordic nations, with claims of Russian and Chinese activity often linked to political rhetoric rather than confirmed large-scale surveys, though deeper Arctic monitoring by both occurs.
Chinese Presence:
Economic Focus: Chinese companies are involved in major planned mining projects (rare earth) and proposed research facilities in Greenland, suggesting significant interest beyond just surveys.
Scientific/Research: China aims to be a "polar great power" and uses dual-purpose research vessels, which can collect data for both civilian and military use, increasing surveillance in the Arctic.
Monitoring: The US and Nordic countries closely watch Chinese research/investment, but actual military surveys near Greenland are disputed.
Russian Presence:
Limited Near Greenland: Nordic diplomats and tracking data indicate minimal Russian naval/submarine presence directly around Greenland recently, though Russia increases activity in the broader Arctic.
Political Rhetoric: Claims of Russian ships near Greenland are often tied to political statements, with intelligence suggesting the activity is more towards the Russian side of the Arctic.
Overall:
There's a tension between China's economic ambitions and Russia's strategic Arctic presence, versus US/Danish desires for control and security in the region.
While no "swarming" of warships or dedicated survey vessels by Russia or China near Greenland seems confirmed by Nordic intelligence, China's scientific/commercial interest is real and growing, raising security concerns. ”

As always, this includes some AI results, and may not be entirely accurate.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Wednesday, January 14, 2026 - 11:07 am: Edit

And for good measure, an additional inquiry of how many Russian and Chinese science or survey ships are in the artic…

Quote:” In 2026, both Russia and China have significantly expanded their fleets of research and survey vessels in the Arctic, often operating in tandem as part of increased strategic cooperation.
Chinese Research Vessels
China’s Arctic research fleet reached "unprecedented" levels by late 2025 and remains highly active in 2026.
Operating Count: At least 5 research vessels have been recently confirmed operating simultaneously in Arctic waters near Alaska.
Key Vessels:
Xue Long 2 (Snow Dragon 2)
Ji Di (Polar)
Zhong Shan Da Xue Ji Di (Sun Yat-sen University Polar)
Shen Hai Yi Hao
Tan Suo San Hao
Technological Milestone: In 2025, China successfully deployed a research submarine beneath Arctic ice for the first time.
Russian Research Vessels
Russia maintains the world's largest Arctic fleet, which includes dedicated scientific platforms and dual-purpose survey vessels.
Dedicated Research Platform: The Severny Polyus (North Pole) ice-proof platform is currently active in the North Pole 42 expedition, which is scheduled to continue through 2026. It houses 15 laboratories for year-round scientific study.
The GUGI Fleet: Russia's "Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research" (GUGI) operates more than 50 specialized ships and submarines. While officially classified as research-based, Western officials note these vessels are equipped for intelligence gathering and seabed surveillance.
Annual Expeditions: Russia conducts more than 20 scientific expeditions annually across the Arctic to monitor climate change and the Northern Sea Route.
New Construction: The Ivan Frolov, a 165-meter scientific vessel with 20 laboratories, is currently under construction to further expand these capabilities. ”

AI results may contain errors.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Wednesday, January 14, 2026 - 12:51 pm: Edit

None of which contradicts what I said. Under the 1951 agreement, we can arm Greenland to the teeth with U.S. forces if we're so willing.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, January 14, 2026 - 01:10 pm: Edit

Let’s do it, defacto invasion!

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Wednesday, January 14, 2026 - 01:23 pm: Edit

I detest half measures!

We have air force, space force and weather services in Greenland

We need a full navy base(with covered drydocks!), an army base, Marine base and a Coast Guard station.

Why not throw in a Army Corps of Engineer installation, a Veterans Administration Hospital, and introduce a head start learning center, senior citizens centers and we can offer to build Bidens presidential library (provided he and the mrs live there year round!) (it was reported earlier the donations to build Bidens presidential library stopped when the 2025 presidential election results were reported.)

Heck, with so many U.S. service members deployed, it could restart the Greenlanders high birth rate!

Seems legit.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Wednesday, January 14, 2026 - 03:02 pm: Edit

For what it's worth, it appears likely that the Biden presidential library will be consolidated with previous Biden institutions at the University of Delaware (namely, the Joseph R. Biden Jr. School of Public Policy and Administration).

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, January 14, 2026 - 09:05 pm: Edit

Mike G: all of those are reliably Democrat areas, which is why it hasn't happened. Texas could divide into five Republican states, but that won't be approved either.

By Ryan Opel (Ryan) on Wednesday, January 14, 2026 - 09:47 pm: Edit

Shrink the area of DC to a couple of blocks around the National Mall that encompasses most of the Federal Buildings in DC. No housing in the area. Return the rest to Maryland.

By Chuck Strong (Raider) on Thursday, January 15, 2026 - 02:56 am: Edit

What Ryan said...The only residents should be the President, VP, and their families.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Thursday, January 15, 2026 - 08:14 am: Edit

Someone please make note of the date and time: Ryan, Chuck and I are all in agreement on something.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Thursday, January 15, 2026 - 09:04 am: Edit

Not likely to happen…

Maryland might not want DC.

The potential tax revenues are not likely to exceed to total cost of social spending programs such as welfare, housing assistance, energy assistance, food stamps (anyone care to wager on whether the assistance programs in D.C. are filled with fraud?)

The political party in power in Maryland may not want to add the potential fraud in D.C. to their own snake pits…

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Thursday, January 15, 2026 - 09:12 am: Edit

Note I said "IF the Dems take both houses and the Presidency"

And I don't think Guam & Samoa are very "Blue." IIRC they are pretty conservative people.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, January 15, 2026 - 09:44 am: Edit

For DC, I would leave it alone but let residents vote in Maryland.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, January 15, 2026 - 11:15 am: Edit

Air Weapons: Russian Drones Over Europe
January 14, 2026: Last year in Europe there were over a thousand incidents of drones flying near or over military installations. Over 2,000 drones were involved, and, in 96 percent of the incidents, the drone operators could not be identified. German intelligence experts concluded that whoever was doing this had financial and logistical resources to carry out these extensive drone operations. The primary suspect was Russia, which had already been caught carrying out sabotage and disruption operations in the Baltic Sea, Germany and the Netherlands.
In May of last year, two cargo ships, the HAV Dolphin and the HAV Snapper, were seen behaving strangely. The Dolphin was moving aimlessly around Kiel Bay for ten days. The ship never unloaded or took on cargo. Meanwhile, over a hundred kilometers away, off the Netherlands coast, the Snapper remained stationary near a Dutch island two hours before seven drones were seen hovering over the Russian freighter Lauga being escorted by the German police to the North Sea. The Snapper stayed behind for four days, moving aimlessly in circles.
The activities of Dolphin and Snapper were reported briefly and not with much detail, in European media. Seven German journalism students noted these stories and decided to practice what they were studying and find out what was really going on. It took the students five week and a 2,500 kilometer automobile ride across three countries to find out what Russian drones were doing over Europe and how they were getting there.
The students obtained relevant classified documents describing the extent of the drone problem. While the documents were classified, most of the data had already appeared in European media. The mystery drones had been seen over military installations and in several instances that included drone activity shutting down commercial airports for hours or intermittently over a period of days.
The public uproar over these disruptions led German police and security agencies to go after the usual suspects. These included the two Russian freighters Dolphin and Snapper. Both ships were searched several times and nothing was found. The German student investigators discovered that the searches were perfunctory and superficial. Left unsearched were shipping containers that would have contained drones and equipment to launch and operate them.
Drones had been spotted over or near defense manufacturing facilities, chemical producers and nuclear power plants. The drones were also showing over areas where shipments of military equipment for Ukraine were being prepared. Any facility involved with supporting Ukrainian military operations noticed more drones buzzing around.
When concerned citizens or local officials made inquiries, the government always seemed to give the same answer, that there was nothing sinister going on and that these investigations were ongoing. None of this was true, because no government agency was putting all the clues together and discovering what the seven students later revealed. And the revelation was that the drones were Russian, not local hobbyists or civilians using their own drones. Most of the suspicious drone activity took place near the North Sea or Baltic Sea coast. The Russians were using three cargo ships, Lauga, Dolphin and Snapper as launch platforms for drones. Most commercial ships currently carry drones to assist in operations. But the Russian ships were carrying hundreds of drones as well as drone operators and technicians to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance and occasional harassment missions.
The seven German journalism students sorted through all this data and concluded, in a well-documented assessment, that the Russians were using the same three cargo ships to carry out espionage activities. These ships were working for the Russian Defense Ministry, and it took seven diligent German students to document and prove it.
The students used publicly available AIS/Automated Identification System ship tracking systems to find where Lauga, Dolphin and Snapper were and had been. Currently you can still track these ships via the AIS. Western intelligence agencies rely on AIS tracking for all sorts of things. AIS was originally developed to make it easier to track ships at sea and was rapidly adopted by most large commercial vessels in the 1990s. AIS is essentially an automatic radio transponder beacon that, when it receives a signal from a nearby AIS equipped ship, responds with the ship's identity, course, and speed. This is meant to enable AIS ships to avoid collisions with each other. Smugglers or merchant ships dealing in shady practices turn off their AIS.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, January 15, 2026 - 11:15 am: Edit

Attrition: Ukrainian Partisans Disable Russian Mobilization
January 13, 2026: Ukrainian partisans have added hacking to their toolbox. Last month the Atesh group carried out a hack that disabled reestrpovestok.RF, the Russian electronic military draft network. This network sends out draft notices to men in Russia plus Russian-occupied portions of Ukraine. It took weeks to get the system fully functional again. Atesh also carries out attacks on Russian railroads, usually by disabling engines or switching systems. These attacks take place deep inside Russia, where security is thin to non-existent.
Three years ago, Ukraine began organizing partisan groups within Russian-occupied portions of Ukraine as well as in Russia itself. Many Russian civilians were unhappy with this war, which was getting lots of Russian soldiers killed and causing economic problems inside Russia. This led to the formation of several armed groups of pro-Ukraine Russians as well as making it easier for Russian-speaking Ukrainian operatives to operate inside Russia collecting information and organizing sabotage missions. Most of the sabotage was made to appear as an accident or lack of maintenance, both of which are common inside peacetime as well as wartime Russia.
Since the Americans would not supply Ukraine with satellite photos of possible targets inside Russia, Ukraine used its agents to locate or confirm the location and condition of potential targets. This is what made the drone attacks possible on eighteen Russian fuel refining and storage locations in one year. This caused fuel shortages and higher fuel prices inside Russia. Attacks were also on manufacturers of key components for military equipment as well as warehouses containing military equipment, including explosive items. Those nighttime attacks, even more than the ones on fuel depots, produced dramatic explosions and fires that could be seen for many kilometers. So many of these occurred that the state controlled mass media could not effectively conceal what was happening and that it was the Ukrainians who were doing it.
Ukraine deliberately carried out these attacks near major cities like Moscow, St Petersburg, and more distant cities like Kazan, which is 730 kilometers east of Moscow. Nearly half the population of Kazan are native Tatars who would rather live in a Tartar nation than one dominated by Russians. There are many other ethnic minorities in Russia and Ukraine can find locals willing to aid the Ukrainians in their fight against Russia.
The Ukrainians had already organized and in some cases armed thousands of Ukrainian civilians living in Russian controlled areas. These partisans devote most of their efforts to obtaining detailed information on what local Russian forces are doing and what shape these Russian troops are in. It can take days to get status reports to Ukrainian forces about Russian military activities. These reports often result in Ukrainian drone attacks on key Russian targets.
Russia has had less success maintaining agents inside Ukraine. At the start of the war, it was revealed that Russia had lots of agents, some of them in the Ukrainian government and military. During the first year of the war most of these Russian agents were revealed, often as they sought to carry out acts of sabotage. By the second year of the war Russia had few agents left inside Ukraine while Ukraine had a growing number of agents inside Russia. This was because few Russians could see any justification for Russia invading Ukraine. The war in Ukraine has become increasingly unpopular inside Russia and more Russians are acting against their own government. Ukraine appears to have little contact with these anti-government Russians other than not interfering with them if they base themselves on the Ukrainian side of the border in between attacks inside Russia.
In response to these partisan attacks, the Russian army has deployed over 30,000 soldiers in border areas where the partisans, both Russian and Ukrainian, were operating. The partisans are numerous, with up to 100,000 Russian members of these pro-Ukrainian groups who support and carry out operations inside Russia.
As the war in Ukraine gets more Russian soldiers killed and does more damage to the Russian economy, the Russian partisans inside Russia become more active and troublesome.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, January 15, 2026 - 11:16 am: Edit

Weapons: Taiwanese Defense Drones Against Chinese Attack
January 13, 2026: Late last year Taiwan successfully conducted sea trials for six SeaShark 680 naval drones. These drones, including, eventually, the larger SeaShark 800, carry payloads that include an autonomous guidance system, navigational sensors, explosives and an AI/Artificial Intelligence enhanced navigation and communications system that enables groups of SeaSharks to form and maintain a swarm formation despite enemy use of electronic jamming. Taiwan is buying 1,350 SeaSharks at a cost of $750,000 each. The larger SeaShark 800 will carry a ton of explosives.
American military analysts believe that the successful Ukrainian use of airborne and naval drones against Russia in the Black Sea provides a realistic solution to the problems Taiwan faces in defending itself against an attack by the Chinese navy. As a major supplier of military aid to Ukraine, the Ukrainians share details of their experience with new weapons against the Russians. The problem is that the United States refuses to adopt the Ukrainian designed drones and instead sticks with similar, but much inferior, systems developed by politically favored defense contractors in the United States.
Among the U.S. Navy-developed drones is the Remus 100 that the navy successfully used in the Persian Gulf during 2008. Remus 100 is a 37 kg vehicle that looks like a small torpedo. It is 1.6 meters long and 190mm in diameter. Carrying side-scanning sonar and other sensors, a Remus 100 can stay underwater for 22 hours, traveling at a cruising speed of five kilometers an hour. Top speed is about nine kilometers an hour. Remus is actually a UUV/Unmanned Underwater Vessel that can operate up to 100 kilometers from its operator and dive up to 100 meters. The UUV keeps costs down by using GPS, in addition to inertial guidance. The UUV surfaces every hour or two to get a GPS fix, and then goes back to doing what it was programmed to do. Ukraine could use them to find and eliminate Russian bottom mines in shallow coastal waters, but that has not been a problem for Ukraine because the Russians have already been defeated by Ukraine designed and manufactured drones.
Worse, the U.S. proposed Remus 100 was designed mainly for civilian applications like inspecting underwater facilities, pollution monitoring, underwater survey, or search. In theory there are similar military and police applications, notably searching for naval mines. Russia did try to use naval mines, the floating kind, not the ones that lie on or are chained to the sea bottom. Russia tried to block Ukraine from importing or exporting goods via their main port of Odessa, which is in western Ukraine near the costs of NATO members Romania and Bulgaria. Those mines were cleared in 2023 using conventional methods, plus the drones that forced the Russian navy to move over a thousand kilometers away, to the distant Sea of Azov in the northeastern portion of the Black Sea. Even there, Ukrainian drones continue to threaten and attack Russian warships taking refuge in ports there. The Ukrainian drones prevent Russia from importing or exporting any goods via the Black Sea route.
Remus is not an offensive weapon, which the Ukrainian designed drones are, and it was with these drones that Ukraine defeated the Russian Black Sea fleet. That was quite an accomplishment for a country that does not have a navy. The Russians were not only defeated, but they were also humiliated.
If the United States wants to give Taiwan useful advice and assistance, they must adopt what worked for the Ukrainians, not try to create something new that can be described as made in America.
Currently the US Navy established USVRON\Unmanned Surface Vessel Squadron 3 at a navy west coast base. The squadron operates drones known as GARCs/Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft. These are small, 1.6 ton, 4.8 meter long drones with a top speed of 65 kilometers an hour. Range varies depending on cruising speed. At 54 kilometers an hour max range is 750 kilometers. At 11 kilometers an hour the range is 1,300 kilometers. GARCs are designed to handle 2.5 meter waves and moderate winds. Any more than that and a GARC will be blown off course until the seas return to normal.
GARCS were developed to carry out reconnaissance and surveillance missions and transmit their video images back to another ship or land station for a human operator to monitor if needed. GARC can also carry sonar and use that to detect submarines. Any contacts are reported to a warship which can then use anti-submarine torpedoes or dispatch helicopters equipped with one or more anti-submarine torpedoes. GARC is also well suited to detecting and destroying naval mines.
GARC’s autonomous behavior and sensors make it ideal for port patrol and identifying and reporting any actual or potential threats. GARCs have been successfully used this way in the Persian Gulf to protect ports where American ships are berthed.
In addition to GARC and Remus, there are several other autonomous vessels including surface and underwater craft that can spend months at sea monitoring and recording conditions. These vessels include surface vessels like the 7 meter long Saildrone Explorer that stay at sea for a year while moving along at a speed of 5.6 kilometers an hour. Speed depends on how much wind there is because Explorer actually has a small sail. This includes conditions underwater, which are valuable to submarines, especially USN nuclear submarines that remain underwater for months at a time.
What the U.S. Navy has not been able to produce are the cheap, effective, armed drones and drones the Ukrainian used to cripple the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The problem is situational and political. The American situation is peacetime, not wartime. When you are at war things are done quickly, effectively, and inexpensively. Ukraine demonstrated that with its domestic drone and USV programs.
In the United States peacetime defense procurement is a lot more expensive and takes longer than it would in wartime. That means the Ukrainian type drones and UUVs will cost the USN far more than the Ukrainian models and take years to reach the U.S. Pacific Fleet. If China goes to war over Taiwan, that situation will change overnight. Meanwhile you go to war with what you have when war is declared. Right now the American navy has few of those clever and effective Ukrainian drones and drones. Keep in mind that it took the Ukrainians over a year after the Russian invasion to come up with their brilliant and effective drone designs and tactics that crippled and defeated the mighty Russian Black Sea Fleet.
The United States knows what Ukraine did in the Black Sea but that knowledge does not quickly translate into similar American weapons. The primary problem is so few American naval commanders understand exactly what the Ukrainian did and how to replicate that for the American Pacific Fleet, where such Ukrainian technology is needed.
Four years ago, Taiwan produced a novel and apparently effective anti-radar drone. Their Chien Hsiang drone is a 2 meter wide and 1.2 meter long propeller-driven drone that weighs about 100 kg. Taiwan has not revealed the actual weight. Chien Hsiang has a top speed of 185 kilometers an hour, which is apparently used once it finds a target and attacks it as quickly as possible. This drone is built for endurance and apparently moves slowly most of the time so it can stay in the air for up to 100 hours. The guidance system can be programmed to follow several different strategies while the difficulty in spotting the small drone makes it a threat to enemy ships or land-based radars. Chien Hsiang is launched from launch/storage containers that are mounted on a flatbed tractor-trailer truck carrying the launcher boxes stacked four high. Chien Hsiang apparently launches from the box via a small rocket. Each stack of boxes can be raised at an angle so the drones can easily gain altitude.
Chien Hsiang bears a resemblance to the earlier Israeli Harpy anti-radar drone. The Harpy was heavier at 136 kg, larger and had an endurance of five hours. Taiwan believes that smaller with longer endurance is better.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, January 15, 2026 - 11:17 am: Edit

Surface Forces : Ukraine Goes After Russian Shadow Fleet
January 12, 2026: Ukraine is going after the Russian shadow fleet of lawless tankers moving sanctioned oil to customers. In the last few months at least a dozen attacks and sabotage attacks and sabotage efforts were launched against shadow fleet tankers. These included using naval drones in the Black Sea to sink or disable Russian tankers. This happened while the tankers were trying to reach the Russian port of Novorossiysk, which is the primary port for loading tankers.
Russia’s economy and war effort against Ukraine is financed by oil and other energy exports. Russia is operating under severe economic sanctions imposed to reduce that income and create economic conditions for Russia that make it difficult to impossible to continue their war in Ukraine.
The key to Russian oil exports is the use of foreign tankers to covertly smuggle their petroleum and coal from Russia to overseas customers. Eighty percent of the oil for China goes by pipeline and cannot be disrupted. China accounts for nearly half of Russian petroleum and other energy exports. It’s the other half that is at risk because of a growing list of sanctions.
The economic sanctions were imposed on Russia because of its 2022 invasion, in an effort to reduce its hard currency income from exports of oil and natural gas. These are the main Russian exports and the major source of income for the Russian government and war effort. To evade these sanctions, Russia created a growing shadow fleet of oil tankers purchased and/or leased abroad and obtained unrestricted access to a Chinese smuggler haven maintained in Hong Kong.
Current estimates are that nearly 900 tankers are smuggling sanctioned Russian petroleum to customers in China, India, the European Union/EU, Turkey and Myanmar. Most refined petroleum products go to Turkey, China, Brazil, Singapore and India. The rest goes to nine countries, in the Middle East, Africa and Taiwan. China has been buying 47 percent of the crude oil while India takes 37 percent followed by Turkey and the EU with six percent each. China, India and Turkey account for about 90 percent of Russian income from the sale of oil, natural gas and coal. The U.S. is imposing additional tariffs on countries that import Russian oil. India is already subject to these tariffs, which increases what they have to pay for imports from the United States. The Americans are negotiating with China and Turkey over what tariffs will be imposed to discourage Russian oil imports.
The nations enforcing the sanctions, particularly the United States, have tracked the routes of the Russian shadow fleet and noted the key role Hong Kong plays in arranging the movement of sanctioned Russian oil to its primary customers in China and India. Hong Kong is also a major source for supplying sanctioned nations with weapons and munitions. A current customer is Russia. Hong Kong does this by allowing Russian tankers and cargo ships, operating with fake credentials to disguise their Russian affiliation, to bring in Russian oil and other raw materials. The Russian ships then leave Hong Kong carrying weapons for their war in Ukraine.
Another major player in the Russian smuggling effort is North Korea. For years North Korea has been buying small, second-hand cargo and tanker ships and using them for smuggling. A favored evasion technique consists of taking on or transferring cargo at sea in its own territorial waters. The North Korean merchant fleet consists of about 150 ships, mostly purchased from Chinese firms.
North Korea is a notorious and persistent maritime smuggler. Because of North Korean smuggling, the United States expanded its maritime smuggling and sanctions enforcement program in 2018 when a new multi-national enforcement organization was created. Initial members were the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Britain, France, South Korea, and Japan. The Enforcement Coordination Cell, or ECC, is enforcing the UN sanctions that curb North Korean smuggling related to items needed for their nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In addition, the ECC allowed member nations to also enforce whatever other sanctions or naval missions their government put a priority on. The U.S. has since invited India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines to join and assist with monitoring growing Chinese violation of offshore water rights, especially in the South China Sea and other areas of the West Pacific.
The ECC concentrates on the 2,000-kilometer-long shipping lane from the Indian Ocean, through the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea to North Korea. Along this route there are not only North Korean flagged ships participating in smuggling, but even more Chinese, Taiwanese, Liberian, Sri Lankan, and ships that are independent and fly whatever flag they believe will keep them from getting seized for smuggling. Earlier U.S. efforts had already identified many North Korean and Iranian owned tankers and cargo ships that were often engaged in smuggling. This led Iran and North Korea to use their own ships less and willing foreign ships instead. These third-party ships are the ones the ECC sought to identify. These ships can be identified, along with their owners and the owners can have banking and other sanctions placed on them. Many nations, not part of the ECC, but economic partners with ECC members, will cooperate if a smuggler ship visits one of their ports. At that point the captain can be arrested and the ship seized.
The ECC member warships do not depend on inspecting suspicious ships while at sea, but confirming who is where and when. This is especially useful for spotting smugglers who often turn off their location beacons and continue in running dark mode. These location beacons transmit current ID and location to any nearby ships and often, via satellite, to their owner and international shipping organizations. The location data, past and current, can be found on several public websites. The beacons exist mainly as a safety measure for ships operating at night or in bad weather in heavily used shipping lanes. Smugglers have learned how to turn off their beacons near a port where, it is assumed, they have docked or anchored off the coast waiting for an available dock.
Some smugglers are using spoofing, a form of jamming that just modifies the beacon signal to present a false location. This is where warships and maritime aircraft come in as these can identify ships visually or using radar followed by visual inspection. This is more damaging to the smugglers because it provides more evidence that their ship was involved in smuggling, and with enough evidence, you can go after the ship owners and seize the ship whenever it enters coastal waters, within 22 kilometers of land belonging to a nation that will seize outlaw ships.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, January 15, 2026 - 11:17 am: Edit

Winning: Chinese The Real Winner In Ukraine
January 11, 2026: While China is a major trading partner with NATO nations and Russia, the Ukraine War is providing China with some valuable opportunities. China backs Russia, but discreetly so to avoid Western economic sanctions. China does not give expensive aid to its loyal neighbors. With Russia under onerous economic sanctions, Russia benefits from all the non-military goods China sells to them. For China, a Russian victory in Ukraine means China will get a quick and thorough look at captured Western weapons. A Russian victory would also mean European nations would concentrate on defense spending and not compete for sales of goods to Chinese customers worldwide, especially in East Asia. Whoever wins, China senses opportunities.
Even before Russia actually invaded Ukraine, China advised that such an operation would be unwise. Russian leader Vladimir Putin ignored that advice, which implied that Putin did not have an accurate assessment of what the Russian military was actually capable of. Chinese leader Xi Jinping was further dismayed when Putin also ignored Chinese calls for withdrawing from Ukraine and limiting the long-term damage to the partnership with China. Successful Chinese leaders tend to be more mindful of historical lessons and seek not to misinterpret them.
Russia insists that Ukraine is part of Russia and must be reunited with the motherland. China has a roughly similar situation with Taiwan. Some believe that, unlike Russia, China does not consider a major attack on Taiwan a suitable solution because of the side effects and risks.
The Ukrainian experience has already persuaded most Taiwanese that they could reliably defeat or disrupt Chinese attack plans. Taiwanese also note that CCP/Chinese Communist Party rule in China is failing, especially since Xi Jinping reversed many of the reforms the CCP implemented in the 1980s to get the Chinese economy going and curb most government efforts to disrupt that economic growth. Democracies have similar problems but, because they are democracies have an effective way to fix things by electing new officials.
China, Taiwan and the United States are all studying the Ukraine War for useful lessons and one of the few they could all agree on was that the huge quantities of artillery ammunition expended exceeded peacetime estimates. This might have an impact on a Chinese attempt to seize Taiwan by force. Taiwan has been increasing its weapons and munitions stockpiles for years as well as training more men for combat duty. While China has long planned to use over a thousand ballistic missiles and lots of airstrikes, they still have to get troops onto the island and deal with Taiwanese ground forces. At that point both sides would be depending on artillery a lot and the Ukraine War has demonstrated that a lot more artillery ammunition is needed than anyone planned for. Transporting that extra artillery ammunition ashore in Taiwan complicates Chinese logistical planning and delays its readiness to attack. Then there was the drone revolution triggered by Ukraine Taiwan has noted that and now Chinese invaders will have to deal with thousands of naval and aerial drones attacking their amphibious invading force,
The Ukraine War also demonstrated the importance of motivation and morale. The Taiwanese identify with the Ukrainians while the Chinese note that they, like Russia, are basically police state dictatorships while Ukraine and Taiwan are democracies that are highly motivated to innovate and fight to preserve their way of life. China would also suffer much more than Russia from any economic problems an attack on Taiwan would lead to.
China, like Russia, has internal economic and population problems. China’s working age population is dramatically shrinking and that is having an impact on the military because not enough Chinese are willing to serve. Its economic problems were amplified by large-scale covid19 related shutdowns in 2022. This triggered widespread and very open public resistance. The government backed down, unwilling to literally go to war with its people over this. Chinese leaders were then obsessed with there being no covid19 infections at all in China and so imposed the shutdowns. Most Chinese, however, paid attention to what was happening in the rest of the world, concluded that some infections and deaths were preferable to the shutdowns, and took to the streets to coerce the government into shutting down the shutdowns. The breadth and depth of their protests was unprecedented in the history of Communist China and so threatened the power of the Chinese Communist Party that it submitted to public demands. This set a dangerous precedent for the future.
One of the economic risks associated with China attacking Taiwan is the economic backlash and damage to China. Western sea power will immediately block Chinese imports and exports for at least the duration of hostilities, and sanctions will block or greatly diminish those for longer. Worse, the ensuing worldwide financial and economic chaos will dramatically reduce Western demand for Chinese products long-term. China’s economy is far more dependent on its exports than the West is on imports from China.
Next is the unique position of the Taiwanese electronics industry, which is the sole or primary manufacturer of several key electronic components. China and the rest of the world are very dependent on Taiwanese computer products. Destruction of Taiwanese computer products industries during an invasion would result in world-wide economic disruptions for several years before America, Japan and South Korea could replace Taiwan’s former production. Taiwan has made veiled threats of destroying the plants producing those unique products at the onset of any Chinese attack. This issue will become more prominent during the immediate run-up before the invasion, and cause increasingly greater anxiety and turmoil in both Western and Chinese markets as they prepare for both the loss of Taiwan’s unique products plus all Chinese imports and exports for an uncertain period.
China’s economy would suffer most of all because China is as dependent on the West for Taiwanese electronics, and on Western imports of China’s non-electronic products that would plunge due to lack of Western demand during a recession. The West would certainly not export its computer electronics to China given that China would have caused such economic chaos, and China lacks the ability to manufacture its own advanced electronics without imports of key Western components and materials.
The price of a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan could easily be destruction of CCP rule in China. As an invasion gets closer, the risks of trying it will become more and more apparent to China’s very risk-averse Communist Party leaders, and President Xi is just one man.
Another problem is the lack of accurate information on key aspects of the government and economy. All this is nothing new, and over thousands of years Chinese have realized that you cannot eliminate corruption, but you can try to minimize the most dangerous side-effects, like a hollowed out military that looks great but cannot win at endeavors like a sudden attack on Taiwan. Chinese analysts, discussing this in public forums like mass media, professional journals and so on, conclude that one should honor the ancient advice of Sun Tzu by convincingly threatening war but not actually fighting unless there is no choice. That would mean using your forces to defend China but not to get into a war of aggression you can’t win. Sun Tzu also advised ignoring advice from military leaders that the troops are ready for any contingency, including an order to attack a neighbor. Unless you have a military with recent successful military experience, any claims to military capabilities and success in a war are suspect.

FYEO