Attrition: Ukrainian Casualties One Tenth of Russian
March 1, 2026: While Russia is running out of soldiers, Ukraine isn’t. Russian troops are constantly attacking, and the Ukrainians have developed defensive tactics that maximize Russian losses and minimize Ukrainian casualties. Ukrainian soldiers are better trained, equipped and led. Ukrainians receive two or three months of training before going into combat. Their officers and sergeants are skilled veterans. Russian soldiers often go into combat with minimal training, as in a week or two to learn how to use their weapons and operate on a battlefield subjected to constant drone surveillance and attack. Russian officers are told to shoot any soldiers who refuse to attack or try to desert. Most Russians now realize that being sent to Ukraine you are likely to be killed or wounded. When new Russian recruits realize how little preparation they received, they understand why Russian casualties are so high.
The situation has deteriorated to the point that this year Russia has not been able to obtain enough new recruits each month to replace those lost in the previous month. Most Russian soldiers are enlisted via a voluntary contract. Large sums are paid for those who sign and up to $2,000 a month is paid to those who go to Ukraine. Death benefits for next of kin are also high. Unfortunately, many of these payments are never made because the body of the dead soldier must be returned to the family before all this money is turned over to the family. A growing number of bodies are either not returned, or the dead soldier is reported as missing in action. The bodies are buried in Ukraine. The graves are not marked, and Russian army officials tell the families that their man went missing or perhaps deserted. Details of this scam have reached Russian families, despite government efforts to censor the internet and social media apps. This means fewer voluntary recruits and a growing manpower crisis for the Russian army, which has had to delay or cancel planned offensive operations.
The situation is much different in Ukraine. Last year it became legal for military age men to leave the country. In 2021 there were 2 million Ukrainians living outside Ukraine. Since 2022 that has been increasing each year. Current Ukrainian population is about 39 million and the government has been seeking ways to improve morale while also sustaining the fight against Russian invaders.
One proposal which was implemented was establishing universal training for 18-22 year old men. For those still in school, mandatory training for male students is now conducted in universities and other post-high school institutions as a standalone subject. Training consists of 90 hours of theoretical instruction followed by 210 hours of practical training Subjects include basic methods of military service, first aid, and operational tactics before they move to hands-on exercises in specialized training centers. This approach is supposed to make the trainees more confident about military service and less likely to flee the country because they feared what might happen if they went to war.
Ukrainians have been fighting the Russians for over four years and are seeking to institutionalize their military lessons learned. The Russians are now short of resources and still operate under economic sanctions. Ukraine believes that with improved training for all their personnel, they will reduce their own casualties while increasing those of the Russians. Vladimir Putin vowed to keep fighting for as long as it took. That will be an empty promise if Putin discovers that a major change in troop quality makes any Russian military efforts futile and very costly in terms of men and resources.
Ukraine already has some units that adopted these improved methods before the war but never had time or resources to retrain everyone. Over the last year Ukrainians have been standardizing their troop training and using methods that combine all that has been learned so far. This is done by simply by adopting what did work, discarding what didn’t and gradually retraining all units that were not using the most effective methods. All new recruits would be taught to use the new techniques, even if it lengthened the basic training.
NATO nations add individual training for sergeants and officers, some of it delivered via videos, including interactive versions. European NATO members play a larger role in this retraining because they are close enough, often adjacent to Ukraine, to receive Ukrainian trainees and send them back quickly after training is complete.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, March 03, 2026 - 03:33 pm: Edit

NBC Weapons: Chinese Biolabs Still Active in the United States
March 1, 2026: Last month another Chinese biolab was discovered in Las Vegas. The police had received an anonymous tip that a biolab was operating inside a home. Police then raided the home and found over a thousand items that were stored in the adjacent garage along with chemical laboratory equipment including centrifuges and other equipment as well commercial refrigerators. The owner of the home was a Jia Bei Zhu, who was already in custody since 2023 because of another illegal biolab in a California town. The owners of both labs had ties to the Chinese government.
Six years ago an American and two Chinese were indicted for secretly providing China with U.S. technology. The American was Charles Lieber, head of the Harvard Chemistry and Chemical Biology department. He was accused of secretly establishing a working relationship with a Chinese university at Wuhan. Lieber established research efforts at Harvard, recruiting top scientists to work on projects of interest to China and secretly passing research results to China. He also received millions of dollars from China to further this research. During the FBI investigation Lieber repeatedly lied about these activities, which did not prevent the FBI from eventually gathering all they needed to arrest Lieber and indict him. It is rare for China to convince a senior American academic, like Harvard department head Charles Lieber, to get involved in illegal research projects. Why Lieber got involved in such blatantly illegal activities was not disclosed and details probably won’t emerge until his trial.
Also indicted for Harvard-related espionage was a Chinese citizen, Zheng Zaosong, who was studying at Harvard on a student visa and was accused of trying to smuggle 21 vials of biological material and research data back to China. The third defendant was Yanqing Yeh, a Chinese student at nearby Boston University. She was also an active duty lieutenant in the Chinese Army who was supervised by a colonel at a Chinese military academy that was working on new technology for the Chinese military. This school was on an American list of Chinese educational institutions that were banned from working with anyone in the United States. Yeh was also caught trying to smuggle research data back to China. Yeh had lied about her military status when she applied for a student visa, asserting that she had been discharged from the army, and left out her connections with the banned in the United States Chinese military academy she was working for as an army officer. She was also accused of being an unregistered foreign agent. Among the items uncovered by the FBI was that Yeh had been assigned to investigate one American academic at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School who was researching computer security. Given how active China has been using hackers to steal valuable data from the United States, that particular assignment was ominous. Yeah had presented herself as a student but further investigation showed she was a very active Chinese spy.
It is illegal for American academics and researchers to secretly work for Chinese government or commercial firms. These restrictions won’t trigger similar measures for Americans in China because China has long assigned police and intel specialists to closely observe who visiting Americans visit. This surveillance often involves MSS secret police agents advising Chinese to refuse such meetings or only do it with an MSS agent present, usually pretending to be an employee of the firm.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, March 03, 2026 - 03:34 pm: Edit

Armor: Ukrainians Misused M1Ai Tanks
February 28, 2026: Last year Ukraine received 49 U.S.-made M1A1 tanks from Australia, which is receiving more effective M1A2 SEPv3 models from the Americans. Ukraine had received 31 M1A1s from the U.S. in 2024. As of 2026, nearly 90 percent of these have been lost in combat. Ukrainians modified the M1A1s to operate and survive in a war dominated by the widespread use of drones. The M1A1s received reactive armor, rooftop cages, and electronic countermeasures.
The main problem the Ukrainians had with the M1 was that this tanks was designed to operate in a combined arms environment. That means the M1s would be accompanied by infantry in Bradley IFV/Infantry Fighting Vehicles along with air and artillery support on call. A combat engineer vehicle would be added if anti-tank mines were expected. Conditions are different in the Ukraine War were tanks are considered targets rather than threats. In the first year of the war Russia lost some three thousand tanks. After that tanks were rarely seen in combat. When tanks are used, they are put to work individually, providing artillery support for infantry attacks. Tanks like the M1 and the German Leopard 2 were useful in night combat because their night vision sensors allowed an individual tank to monitor Russian activity several kilometers distant. If a target was spotted, the tank could fire a 120mm shell and destroy it. These tanks, if equipped with reactive armor and overhead nets, could survive multiple drone attacks but would eventually succumb when drones damaged the track laying system tanks travel on. Once immobilized a tank was an easy target for artillery and additional drone attacks. There have been few tank-versus-tank actions in Ukraine because tanks don’t last long.
The United States sent 31 M1 tanks to Ukraine and were put to work, but not in ways that the mass media was able to understand or report on accurately. In the combat zone the Ukrainians quickly figured out how to best use their impressive new tanks. The Ukrainian crews had been trained before the tanks arrived and praised the efficient internal layout of the tanks and the number of useful capabilities of the M1. The battlefield in Ukraine is unlike any the M1 had ever operated in. Within a year at least five Abrams tanks were lost in combat, with another three damaged.
The Ukraine War has seen an unprecedented use of drones for reconnaissance, surveillance, and attacks from above. All tanks are more vulnerable to attacks from above. Sending dozens of quadcopter type drones against tanks turned out to be a decisive weapon if the tank was not equipped with metal screens and signal jammers to cause some or all of the drones to lose their control signals and fall to the ground, or fly around aimlessly. If a tank was not prepared for drone attack it was soon immobilized as its engine was damaged and disabled. That was because armor is thin or nonexistent over the engine compartment behind the turret. Normally the engine compartment was not vulnerable to attack. The extensive use of drones changed that. To make matters worse there were a lot of anti-vehicle mines used in Ukraine, which could damage or destroy a portion of the tracklaying system that tanks rely on for movement and mobility. Bust a track and the tank is immobilized until the crew or someone else can fix the track. This is a laborious process that can take over an hour and cannot be done while the tank is under attack by drones or just rifle and machine-gun fire.
The war in Ukraine has made it easier for the U.S. Army to get all the money wanted for upgrades to the American M1 tank force. The problem was that few of those upgrades protect tanks from drones.
The army had already developed and scrutinized a new SEP/ System Enhancement Package update called SEP4 for its M1 tanks. The previous upgrade was Sep3 and entered service in 2020 after years of testing. This upgrade contained lots of incremental improvements of features the SEP3 tanks already have. This included upgrades to the gunner’s sight and a meteorological sensor that collects data on weather conditions to improve accuracy of the main gun. The U.S. Army has led the world in tank gun accuracy for decades and the SEP4 features offer small improvements. In Ukraine the 120mm gun was rarely used because the Russians had few tanks left after they lost so many in the first year of the war.
Since the 1980s there have only been these incremental improvements for use against opponents who largely use T-72 upgrades that have not closed the wide effectiveness gap with the M1 and a few similar tanks like Leopard 2, Challenger, LeClerc and Merkava. A major advantage of the M1 is that it has more combat experience than any other tank, especially its primary opponent: improved T-72/90 models. The most recent combat experience for these tanks has been in Ukraine, when the most modern Russian tank failed in a spectacular fashion against modern Western portable anti-tank weapons. These infantry weapons have a long history of success and to capitalize on that Poland has obtained lots of them and even built its own versions.
Noting the similar success of the M1, in 2021 Poland ordered 250 M1A2SEP3 tanks for $6 million each. These will be new tanks, not upgrades of older models and all will not be delivered until 2026. The M1A2SEP3 is also known as the M1A2C and is currently the most advanced version of the M1. The Poles consider this tank the best option to deal with any new Russian tank developments. The 66-ton M1A2C also includes the Israeli Trophy ADS/active defense system which has proved itself in combat and is capable of defeating ATGMs/Anti-tank guided missiles and RPGs/rocket propelled grenades. Deliveries began in late 2022 and were in four years.
The 250 Polish M1A2s will complement the 240 used German Leopard 2A4s Poland obtained at bargain prices since 2002, along with a license to upgrade them to the 2A6 standard as the 62-ton Leopard 2PL. Poland is also upgrading over a hundred of its 380 older Russian T-72 tanks, most of them built in Poland during the Cold War, and 225 PT-91s, a much-improved Polish T-72 variant designed and built locally since 1995. Poland plans to retire its remaining T-72s as the M1A2s arrive and the experience of these tanks in the Ukraine fighting will accelerate the retirement process. Poland has also ordered a thousand modern K-2 tanks from South Korea, most of them to be built in Poland.
Currently the most advanced Russian tank in service is the T-72B3, which is considered as good as the T-90, a 48-ton T-72 upgrade introduced in 1993 as the T-72BU but had a marketing name change to T-90. Over 3,200 were built and most were exported to India where they were produced under license. The 45-ton T-72B3 is cheaper and considered by Russian commanders and crews as equal to the more expensive T-90. Russia used to have about 2,000 T-72B3s, with most of its 590 T-90s in storage and T-72B3 used for active-duty units. Russia lost most of those T-72B3s in Ukraine since February 2022 along with many of the T-90s brought out of storage. Poland sees its M1 order as a prudent and successful investment.
Russia has a new tank design, the T-14, that improves on the T-72 but has not been in combat and is too expensive to purchase in large quantities. The 48-ton T-14 is a radical new design that appears quite impressive but has so far proved too complex and too expensive to mass produce. Mass production was supposed to have started in 2015 but technical problems and shrinking defense budgets halted that until 2020 when covid19 restrictions again delayed production until 2022. The war in Ukraine meant further delays. Russia has fewer than thirty development and pre-production T-14s which have been undergoing field tests with tank units since 2016. The T-14 has a three-man crew and a fully automated turret with the three crew all in an armored capsule under the turret.
The T-14 relies on a lot of new techs, some more advanced than any other Western tank has installed. Getting all that tech to work reliably has been a major problem. Getting all these problems fixed has made the T-14 more expensive, at about $4 million each. That’s twice what the reliable T-72B3 costs and Russian combat commanders and crews will have to be convinced that the T-14 works and is not just as reliable as the T-72B3, but also better at surviving in combat. Mass production to build less than two hundred more T-14s was supposed to begin in 2022. At the moment it looks like the Polish M1A2Cs will be the first American tanks to meet the T-14 in combat if Russia ever tries to make a move on Poland and has any new tanks to do it with. The Russians considered sending some T-14s to Ukraine but the list of known and potential defects made it obvious that T-14s in combat would be an embarrassment. There are major problems with the engine and electronics and now Russia can’t afford the money needed to deal with those problems.
The M1A2C tank is considered the best combat proven tank in the world. But there are many different models of M1s which vary considerably in their combat capability. The earliest model is only about half as capable as the 2013 M1A2SEP2 model. The M1 is an old design with the first of 3,273 M1 tanks produced in 1978. This version had a 105mm gun. The first of 4,796 M1A1s with a 120mm gun and depleted uranium armor were produced in 1985. Another 221 were built for the U.S. Marines, 555 co-produced with Egypt and another 200 M1A1s sent to Egypt. Production of the M1A2 with its improved fire control system began in 1986, with 77 for the US Army, 315 for Saudi Arabia, and 218 for Kuwait. Another 600 M1s were upgraded to M1A2 standards. Deliveries of these upgrades began in 1998. In 2001 the army began to upgrade 240 M1A2 tanks as part of an ongoing SEP program with better thermal imaging and fire control equipment as well as communications and computer equipment that would allow tanks to operate a full color battlefield internet with each other, as well as headquarters and warplanes with similar equipment. By 2013 the army had upgraded 700 tanks to the M1A2SEP2 standard and built another 240 new M1A2SEP2 vehicles. The goal is to get at least 2,000 upgraded to M1A2SEP2 or higher in the 2020s.
So far over 10,000 American M1 tanks have been produced and most of them subsequently updated at least once, mainly in the 1990s. The army is planning to maintain and upgrade its M1 tank fleet of 7,000 vehicles into the 2030s. The M1 has already been in service since the 1980s and may become the first MBT/main battle tank design to stay in service for half a century. Technically, some World War II tanks achieved that dubious goal but not in the service of a major power.
The SEP3 entered service in 2020 after being introduced for testing in 2017. SEP3 includes more improvements in the previous TUSK (Tank Urban Survival Kit) armor and RWS/remote weapons station machine-gun upgrades, improved electricity generation and distribution for all the electronic gadgets that need recharging, upgraded communications and networking and installation of VHMS/Vehicle Health Management System and the use of LRMs/ Line Replaceable Modules to make it easier to upgrade or repair problems. The new communications features include ADL/Ammunition DataLink to use airburst rounds. There is also an improved counter-IED/ improvised explosive device armor package, an upgraded FLIR/night vision heat sensor and an APU/Auxiliary Power Unit under armor to run electronics while stationary instead of using its fuel-thirsty turbine engine. The final addition was the Trophy ADS.
The SEP2/3 upgrades also expanded on MVP/Multifunction Vehicle Protection features which includes external cameras that let the crew see what is going on outside at all times, day, or night and in bad weather.
The SEP program is continuous, upgrading existing M1A2 tanks to the new SEP3 standard as well as upgrading more M1A2SEPs to the SEP2 level. These upgrades keep the M1, or at least some of them, competitive with more recently designed and built tanks. The U.S. has over a thousand of the SEP2 upgraded M1A2s and is getting as many of those upgraded to SEP3 as the budget allows.
The original M1A2SEP was developed in the late 1990s by upgrading protection and a few other minor fixes. These were followed after 2003’s combat experience in Iraq with TUSK and evolved into the SEP2 upgrade. TUSK was installed on hundreds of tanks headed for Iraq as well as several hundred more M1s that had battle damage repaired and TUSK upgrades installed at the same time.
TUSK entered service in 2007 with reactive armor panels for the side and rear of the tank, to provide added protection from RPGs. A slat armor panel protects the engine exhaust outlet of the tank from RPGs. A 1.5-ton belly armor kit, which can be installed in two hours, provides additional protection from mines and large bombs. Enhancements also include night vision for all crew members. There is also a telephone added to the side of the tank, so that infantry can more easily communicate with the crew when the tank is buttoned up/all hatches closed. The complete TUSK kit costs about $500,000 per vehicle and requires about twelve hours to install all the components. Later additions to TUSK included a rear-view camera for the driver and RWS so the commanders' 12.7mm machine-gun can be operated from inside the tank. This is particularly useful if the tank is taking a lot of small arms fire. This led to providing all-round vidcam views of what was going on outside the tank.
The M1A2SEP2 made most of the TUSK items standard and added more improvements like the RWS for the 12.7mm machine-gun as standard, as well in computer hardware, including color flat screen displays for the crew and software, including a new operating system along with improved TUSK ERA/explosive reactive armor, making the external phone standard and upgrading the transmission to make it more reliable.
The electronics on the M1 have undergone several upgrades so far, in addition to new ammo types for the main gun. A major enhancement was depleted uranium armor, which made the M1 virtually invulnerable from the front.
The one remaining item in need of major improvement is the 1,500-horsepower gas turbine engine. Past improvements here included electronic monitors on many engine components, an electronic logbook to record all pertinent engine activity, and a maintenance program that makes the most of all this data. If the engine is monitored closely and constantly, it's possible to carry out maintenance in a timelier manner before something fails. The army would also like to develop an improved, more efficient and less expensive to maintain engine, but that is also a costly item they can't afford at the moment.
MVP can also link to audio sensors that work with video sensors to automatically detect where enemy fire is coming from. The United States tested MVP on their Bradley M2 IFV. New anti-tank weapons are always being developed and the army wants to at least be able to afford new gear to deal with new threats. One threat that is currently ignored is top attack warheads that put a shaped charge type attack against the thin top armor. There are also new types of mines and electronic threats. If the M1 is to survive for half a century it will have to evolve, as well as endure. The M1A2C is an evolutionary design compared to the T-14 which is a revolutionary design with a lot of new techs introduced at once.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, March 03, 2026 - 03:34 pm: Edit

Winning: Russia Becoming a Chinese Vassal
February 28, 2026 : Russia is increasingly dependent on China for economic support and help in rebuilding an economy ravaged by more than four years of war in Ukraine. China is willing to help, but not as an ally but as a patron for its new Russian client state. China seeks to turn Russia into a vassal state.
This is nothing new, not when you consider that the traditional Chinese name for their country is Zhongguo, which is usually translated into English as Middle Kingdom. But a more literal and accurate translation is everything under the heavens. Until the 21st century this mainly meant adjacent land areas. But now China points out that everything means the South China Sea, portions of India and the Russian Pacific Coastal region. The Zhongguo tradition also means China does not have allies, just powerful trading partners, like America and European nations. Then there are client states like North Korea, Pakistan and others who deny the status, like Russia. That has always been the Chinese outlook, and it hasn’t changed.
Some things have changed. China finally underwent the Industrial Revolution during the 1980s. While that made China an economic superpower, China is no longer a self-sufficient continental power, as it had been for thousands of years. Now China is dependent on international trade to keep its economy going. Treating foreigners with disdain and often deceiving and exploiting them has consequences. The most immediate example is how China is dealing with its recent debt crises and the possibility of a major economic disruption. China is seeking to make its enemies suffer for this, instead of itself, and so far, that appears to be working.
Less hostile foreigners can also be a problem. This can be seen in the problems China is having with its two nuclear-armed clients, Russia and Pakistan. Both these clients have used their connections with China to carry out aggressive actions against weaker neighbors.
China supports this misbehavior because China is also an empire trying to reclaim lost territories. That some of those territories are currently Russia’s Far East is not officially discussed in Russia or China but is no secret to many Russians and Chinese. That is a problem for another day as currently Russia and China support each other’s imperial ambitions in Ukraine and the South China Sea and help each other out to deal with any associated problems, especially the UN or economic sanctions.
China is confident it can achieve its goals because it is not only an economic superpower but a military one as well.
The top ten armed forces in the world by number of troops are
1. China
2. India
3. United States
4. North Korea
5. Russia
6. Ukraine
7. Pakistan
8. Iran
9. Ethiopia
10. South Korea
The top ten according to military effectiveness is different with the Americans in first place followed by China, Russia, India, Britain, South Korea, Pakistan, Japan, Israel and France.
Note that the top ten according to military spending for 2023 is quite different.
1 United States $916 billion, which is 3.4 percent of GDP and 37 percent of global defense spending
2 China $296, 1.7 percent and 12 percent of global defense spending
3 Russia $109, 5.9 percent and 4.5 percent of global defense spending
4 India $83, 6 2.4 percent and 3.4 percent of global defense spending
5 Saudi Arabia $75.6, 7.1 percent and 3.1 percent of global defense spending
6 Britain $74.9, 2.3 percent and 3.1 percent of global defense spending
7 Germany $66.8, 1.5 percent and 2.7 percent of global defense spending
8 Ukraine $64.8, 37 percent and 2.7 percent of global defense spending
9 France $61.3, 2.1 percent and 2.5 percent of global defense spending
10 Japan $50.2, 1.2 percent and 2.1 percent of global defense spending
China does not want to fight a war to achieve this hegemony, and it doesn’t have to. The Chinese economy is the second largest in the world while its military exists mainly to protect China from military threats. The Chinese economy is the offensive weapon China is using to dominate the globe.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, March 03, 2026 - 03:35 pm: Edit

Murphy's Law: Chinese Military Corruption Curse
February 27, 2026: Chinese leader Xi Jinping has removed over 30 generals and admirals in the last three years. Nearly all were charged with corruption. This purge reduced the seven-member Central Military Commission to just two, Xi and a newly promoted vice chairman of the committee that controls Chinese peacetime and wartime military operations. Xi has not revealed a lot of information on exactly why these long-serving and very experienced officers were removed. It is assumed to be corruption. In China, corruption in military procurement is an ancient and destructive tradition.
While these criminal practices disappeared for a decade or so after the communist took over in 1948, the problem soon resumed and has been spinning out of control. Twenty years ago, in an attempt to rein in sticky-fingered officers, the government performed financial audits on 4,000 senior military officers. This included a hundred of the most senior, army commanders and above, who had access to the most opportunities to get rich illegally. These audits are not something particularly new. Over the past five years, auditors examined 77,000 military organizations and projects, as well as 7,890 officers. The auditors reported that they had recovered $850 million. There were also some prosecutions. The main intention of the audits is to discourage officers from stealing. The thefts have become so pervasive that many officers consider it a legitimate way to augment their low pay. The audits are also used to evaluate officers for promotion.
Xi’s recent purge is not expected to eliminate this corruption. The newly promoted officers who replaced the recently removed ones will require a few years of work to settle into their new positions. After that the corruption will resume. It always does.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, March 03, 2026 - 03:35 pm: Edit

Procurement: Safeguarding USN Fuel Supplies At Sea
February 27, 2026: United States Navy operations at sea are limited by the availability of fuel supplies. Petroleum-based fuels are volatile compounds that cannot be stored for more than six months. After that these fuels rapidly lose effectiveness and are worthless after a year. Naval operations depend on continuous supplies of fuel. A few navies have reduced this problem with nuclear powered aircraft carriers. At the time these carriers were first being built it was felt that smaller ships could also benefit from nuclear power. It was soon discovered that this was not possible because the high cost of replacing diesel and fuel oil engines with nuclear ones was too expensive.
Nuclear powered aircraft carriers have tens of thousands of liters of JP5 aviation fuel for the fixed wing and helicopters on board. This is highly flammable fuel that is easily ignited to create fast moving fires. All warship crews, and especially those aboard aircraft carriers, carry out damage control exercises that involve containing and extinguishing JP5 fires. The U.S. Navy has suffered about twenty of these JP5 fires. Most have occurred while aircraft were being fueled or because fueling equipment malfunctioned.
There is another fuel problem, getting it where it is needed in a timely fashion. The American Navy is the most powerful in the world and has been that way for eighty years. That primacy is now threatened by the American inability to maintain an adequate number of supply and support ships for the fleet at sea. This is particularly in the Pacific, where the U.S. Fleet prevailed because it built and maintained hundreds of ships to carry supplies, including fuel, to keep ground, and air naval force operational. In the final year of the 1941-45 Pacific War the USN had a thousand warships, 2,000 amphibious ships and over 4,000 cargo and fuel ships travelling between the United States and the combat zone to keep the naval war going. Currently there are not enough fuel resupply ships to supply major wartime operations in the Western Pacific.
While building more oilers, as naval tankers are called, is the primary solution, there are temporary fixes available. This was seen in action eleven years ago when Canada was forced to use commercial shipping companies to obtain two supply ships for refueling and transferring other needed items to Canadian warships at sea. Using commercial ships for this is nothing new. Before the development of specialized naval supply ships in the early 20th century the job had long been done by civilian ships. But the widespread use of oil as ship fuel in the early 2oth century made it possible, with some special equipment and trained operators, to refuel warships at sea while both ships were moving. Same deal with transferring other supplies like food, spare parts and so on. These techniques enabled the warships to keep moving, often essential in a combat zone or on your way to one. However the need for special equipment and trained personnel meant it was easier for the navy to build, crew and operate these ships.
But like aerial refueling, a growing number of nations have found it less expensive and just as effective to use civilian contractors who buy surplus aerial tankers or convert large cargo transports to the task. The military is regularly outsourcing flight training and all sorts of technical support services. So it was no big leap to do this for warship resupply at sea.
The main reason Canada went this route was because of political and bureaucratic delays in building two new naval resupply ships to replace the two that had been in service for nearly 50 years had to be retired in 2015. The commercial ships will use largely navy crews so that these sailors will maintain their skills for when the newly built naval resupply ships are ready for service in five or six years. In the meantime the Canadians have relied on allies to temporarily provide supply ships until the interim civilian ships are ready to go.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, March 03, 2026 - 03:36 pm: Edit

Intelligence: Israel Bans Chinese Vehicles Over Espionage Fears
February 26, 2026: Last year the Israeli military ordered the withdrawal of 700 Chinese-made automobiles from use by military officers and their families. The IDF/Israeli Defense Forces augments the pay of senior officers by supplying vehicles they can use to carry out their official duties as well as at home with their families. The cars were withdrawn from use because Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, believed that because the cars were equipped with cameras, microphones, sensors, and GPS operating within closed Chinese operating systems, they were a security risk. The information was transmitted, via the internet, to China where the automobile manufacturer used the data for quality control. It was believed that this information, along with the identities of the users, was shared with Chinese intelligence agencies. Israel has had problems with Chinese espionage within its borders before. The current situation is more high-tech than previous ones and the Chinese are not expected to halt their efforts to spy on Israel.
It’s not just Israel. Chinese espionage efforts are underway worldwide. A, if not the main target is the United States. China has been spying or collecting information about the United States since the early 1800s, when the first Chinese diplomatic mission was established. Since then, despite revolutions, civil war, and the establishment of two Chinas in 1949, there has been some Chinese espionage activity in America.
Since World War II, the FBI, CIA, and State Department have been involved in monitoring and seeking to thwart Chinese espionage activities. These involve a long list of activities.
For example, in 2019, the FBI arrested Zhongsan Liu, an employee of the Chinese government. His job was management at the New Jersey branch of the China Association for International Exchange of Personnel, or CAIEP. Since 2017, Liu was observed arranging illegal visas for Chinese recruiters who used CAIEP and Confucius Institutes at six American universities, where these recruiters sought suitable students or faculty for espionage operations. Liu had spent the last 26 years working for CAIEP and was believed to have been active in the Thousand Talents Plan since its inception in 2008. That was about the same time the Confucius Institute program began in 2004 as a means of cultural exchange and, it was later discovered, a means of observing and controlling Chinese students attending foreign universities. As time went by, it was discovered that the Confucius Institutes were more about intelligence work than cultural education. Many of the staff at the Confucius Institutes are Chinese with PhDs and J-1 research visas.
As successful as this espionage effort was, most Chinese Americans approached by recruiters were not interested and politely declined. A growing number quietly reported their encounters to the FBI or to friends who could do it for them. The Chinese knew this was a risk and felt it was acceptable, given the amount of intellectual property that was being stolen and put to work back in China.
Another calculated risk was the Confucius Institutes being exposed as extensions of Chinese espionage efforts and organizing Chinese students to protest against whatever the Chinese government wanted to protest. Many of the students agreed with their government and were not just following orders when they protested some American affront. But these Chinese students, usually in America for the first time, began to doubt some of the issues they were sent out to protest about. This was especially true with the Hong Kong protests, which had been massive. The Hong Kong Chinese want democracy, and the official Chinese Communist Party (CCP) line is that democracy is inefficient and not suitable for China or the Chinese. Many overseas Chinese, as in Taiwan, Singapore, and other Western countries, would disagree. The CCP considers these Chinese misled and in need of reeducation or perhaps the benefits of CCP rule.
Over the last decade, the United States has been prosecuting and convicting a growing number of Chinese-born men, and a few women, for conspiring to commit or actually carrying out economic and other espionage in the United States. Some of these suspects were naturalized American citizens, but a growing number were Chinese citizens here on legitimate visas. As more suspects were identified, patterns began to appear, and these revealed the inner workings of known Chinese intellectual property espionage efforts.
It was known that China had a state-sponsored program to make it easy for foreign-educated Chinese to return home and apply what they had learned in the West to start their own companies. China has made available over $20 billion in venture capital for this program. State-controlled media reported that the government had established nearly a hundred equity investment management operations to run 152 funds and seven debt financing service organizations. All this was to help the nearly 50,000 returning Chinese from the West establish their own companies using what they learned in the West. This program helped create thousands of new firms. Many of these companies were using stolen trade secrets and patents that were being laundered, that is, changed sufficiently to make it difficult for the owners of the stolen intellectual property to easily prove theft.
The FBI and CIA again noted patterns. While many of the returning Chinese students were operating legally, a large number of those new Chinese firms were operating illegally with stolen intellectual property. There were other patterns as well. A lot of the stolen tech seemed to involve those associated with CAIEP, the Thousand Talents Plan, and the Thousand Talents Venture Capital Center. That eventually led to the hundreds of Confucius Institutes associated with Western universities, including a hundred in the United States. This, in turn, led to the arrest of Zhongsan Liu and his prosecution for massive visa fraud via Confucius Institute exchange programs.
Many of the convictions are for conspiring to steal or actually stealing trade secrets. Many of the technologies involved are dual-use for commercial and military applications. Many of these investigations begin when American companies provide the FBI with documentation showing how the Chinese obtained and applied the trade secrets. What the American firms usually lacked was information about who was getting the information, often including detailed manufacturing techniques, to the Chinese. The U.S. is not the only victim here. Many other Western nations are experiencing the same losses. Even Chinese neighbor and ally Russia has suffered heavy losses due to this Chinese economic espionage.
There have been many more court cases about this because Chinese firms have become bolder in how they exploit stolen software, trade secrets, and other technology. In the past, the Chinese were careful in their use of stolen tech when exporting their own military equipment copied from Russian designs. The Chinese had started doing this during the Cold War, which sometimes caused tense relations with the Russians. There were some deadly border skirmishes in the 1970s. This came about because China and Russia developed some territorial and ideological disputes that did not settle down until the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991.
The Russians are still angry about continued Chinese theft of their tech, and growing Russian threats over this caused the Chinese to eventually sign agreements declaring that Chinese firms would stop stealing and reselling Russian tech. In practice, this only slowed the Chinese down, but it placated the Russians for a while. Currently, the Americans are starting to sound like the Russians in the 1990s, but the Americans have more legal and economic clout to deploy.
By 2012, most American officials had come to openly admit that a great deal of American military and commercial technical data had been stolen via Chinese internet-based and conventional espionage efforts. Details of exactly all the evidence of this are unclear, but apparently, it was pretty convincing for many American politicians and senior officials who had previously been skeptical. These Chinese efforts have resulted in most major American weapons systems having tech details obtained by the Chinese, in addition to a lot of non-defense or dual-use technology. It’s not just the United States that is being hit but most nations with anything worth stealing. Many of these nations are noticing that China is the source of most of this espionage, and few are content to remain silent any longer.
It’s no secret that Chinese intelligence collection efforts since the late 1990s have been spectacularly successful. As the rest of the world comes to realize the extent of this success, there is a building desire for retaliation. What form that payback will take remains to be seen. Collecting information, both military and commercial, often means breaking laws, and striking or hacking back at the suspected attackers will involve even more felonies. China has broken many laws. Technically, China has committed acts of war because of the degree to which it penetrated military networks and carried away copies of highly secret material. The U.S. and many other victims have been warning China there will be consequences. As the extent of Chinese espionage becomes known and understood, the call for consequences becomes louder.
China has tried hard to conceal its espionage efforts, not just denying anything and everything connected to its hacking and conventional spying, but also taking precautions. But as their success continued year after year, some of the Chinese hackers became cocky and sloppy. At the same time, the victims became more adept at detecting Chinese efforts and tracing them back to specific Chinese government organizations or non-government hackers inside China.
Undeterred, China has sought to keep its espionage effort going and has even expanded operations. For example, starting in 2008, China opened National Intelligence Colleges in many major universities. In effect, each of these is an Espionage Department where, each year, several hundred carefully selected applicants are accepted in each school to be trained as spies and intelligence operatives. China has found that espionage is an enormously profitable way to obtain military and commercial secrets, so now China trains and rewards those who have a talent for such things and make a career of it. The internet-based operations, however, are only one part of China’s espionage efforts.
While Chinese cyberwar operations in this area get a lot of publicity, the more conventional spying brings in a lot of material that is not reachable on the internet. One indicator of this effort is the fact that American counterintelligence efforts are snagging more Chinese spies. This is partly due to increased spying efforts by China, which puts more of their people out there to get caught, as well as more success by the FBI and CIA. All this espionage, in all its forms, has played a large part in turning China into one of the mightiest industrial and military powers on the planet. China is having a hard time hiding the source of the new technologies they are incorporating into their weapons and commercial products. Many of the victims initially had a hard time accepting the fact that the oh-so-eager-to-export Chinese were robbing their best customers of intellectual property on a grand scale. Now, Western firms are much more wary about dealing with the Chinese.
China has been getting away with something the Soviet Union never accomplished: stealing Western technology and then using it to move ahead of the West. The Soviets lacked the many essential supporting industries found in the West. These firms were usually founded and run by entrepreneurs. This sort of thing was illegal in the Soviet Union. Because of that, the Russians were never able to acquire all the many pieces needed to match Western technical accomplishments. Soviet copies of American computers, for example, were crude, less reliable, and less powerful. It was the same situation with their jet fighters, tanks, and warships.
China gets around this by making it seemingly profitable for Western firms to set up factories in China, where Chinese managers and workers can be taught how to make things correctly. At the same time, China allows thousands of its best students to go to the United States to study. While many of these students will stay in America, where there are better jobs and more opportunities, a growing number are coming back to China and bringing American business and technical skills with them. Finally, China energetically uses the Thousand Grains of Sand approach to espionage. This involves China trying to get all Chinese going overseas, and those of Chinese ancestry living outside the motherland, to spy for China, if only a tiny bit.
This approach to espionage is nothing new. Other nations have used similar systems for centuries. What is unusual is the scale of the Chinese effort, and that makes a difference. Supporting it all is a Chinese intelligence bureaucracy back home that is huge, with nearly 100,000 people working just to keep track of the many Chinese overseas and what they could, or should, be trying to grab for the motherland. This is where many of the graduates of the National Intelligence College program will work.
It begins when Chinese intelligence officials examine who is going overseas and for what purpose. Chinese citizens cannot legally leave the country without the state security organizations being notified. The intel people are not being asked to give permission. They are alerted in case they want to have a talk with students, tourists, or businesspeople before leaving the country. Interviews are often held when these people come back as well.
Those who might come in contact with useful information are asked to remember what they saw or bring back souvenirs. Over 100,000 Chinese students go off to foreign universities each year. Even more go abroad as tourists or on business. Most of these people are not asked to actually act as spies but simply to share, with Chinese government officials, who are not always identified as intelligence personnel, whatever information they obtained. The more ambitious of these people are getting caught and prosecuted. But the majority are quite casual, individually bringing back relatively little and are almost impossible to catch, much less prosecute.
Like the Russians, the Chinese are also employing traditional methods, using people with diplomatic immunity to recruit spies and offering cash, or whatever, to get people to sell them information. This is still effective, and when combined with the Thousand Grains of Sand methods, brings in a lot of secrets.
The final ingredient is a shadowy venture capital operation, sometimes called Project 863, that offers money for Chinese entrepreneurs who will turn the stolen technology into something real. No questions asked. If you can get back to China with the secrets, you are home free and potentially very rich. This is the approach Chinese firms are often set up to do, and little else. While these firms are technically supposed to develop new technologies in China, the unofficial mandate is to steal as much as possible from other nations and not get caught.
Not getting caught is becoming more important because that can lead to increasingly dangerous diplomatic and legal problems. When the Chinese steal some technology and produce something that the Western victims can prove was stolen, via patents and prior use of the technology, legal action can make it impossible, or very difficult, to sell anything using the stolen tech outside of China. For that reason, the Chinese long preferred stealing military technology and tried to avoid using stolen commercial tech in a way that made it easy to determine the source of stolen data. This meant keeping stolen commercial technology inside China. And in some cases, like manufacturing technology, there’s an advantage to not selling it outside of China. Because China is still a communist dictatorship, the courts do as they are told, and they are rarely told to honor foreign patent claims when stolen tech is discovered in China by its foreign owners.
But increasingly, Chinese firms are boldly using their stolen technology, daring foreign firms to try to use Chinese courts to get justice. Instead, the foreign firms are trying to muster support from their governments for lawsuits outside China. Naturally, the Chinese government will howl and insist that it’s all a plot to oppress China. This has worked for a long time, but many of the victims are now telling China that this conflict is being taken to a new and more dangerous level.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, March 03, 2026 - 03:37 pm: Edit

Air Weapons: South Korean Bunker Busting Missile
February 26, 2026: South Korea has developed the 35-ton Hyunmoo-5 ballistic missile carrying a 7.8 ton warhead at ranges of 600 kilometers or more. Lighter warheads allow the missile to travel up to 5,000 kilometers. The 600 kilometers missile is sufficient for North Korean targets. At 5,000 kilometers the targets would be in China or Russia. The 7.8 ton warhead is 80 percent metal to enable deep penetration through earth or concrete.
South Korea was able to develop the Hyunmoo-5 despite an agreement with the United States to not develop missiles with ranges of more than 180 kilometers and warheads of more than half a ton. By mutual agreement, these restrictions were abolished in 2021. Such agreements are imposed by the United States as a condition of continued American support for the defense of South Korea from North Korean attack. Since South Korea is now an economic powerhouse and a major manufacturer and exporter of military equipment, such restrictions are superfluous. South Korea has been in the top ten of nations in terms of productivity and is headed for the top five. South Korean military forces are better armed and equipped than the northerners. The economies of the two countries are very different, with South Korea having a per-capita GDP more than fifty times that of the north.
South Korea is also considering developing nuclear weapons to match those already held by North Korea, The Americans have long pledged to supply nuclear weapons support to deter the north. American politics, or simply changes in American attitudes towards defending South Korea, prompted South Korea to consider developing their own nuclear weapons, which could certainly do within a few years. The US understands that South Korea is now a major military and economic power. This means the two nations are now allies with each possessing the same military capabilities in East Asia. The would allow the Americans to withdraw their troops from South Korea, where they have been stationed since the end of the Korean War 71 years ago. The U.S. will probably keep a token number of troops in South Korea until the two Koreas are reunited as a democratic nation with a market economy. Russia and China oppose this, but are not willing to start a war over such a unification. South Korea is a major trading partner with China and had similar relationships with Russia until the Ukraine War sanctions were imposed in 2022.
It wasn’t too long ago that South Korea depended on the United States for all sorts of modern weapons. For example, seventeen years ago the U.S. agreed to sell South Korea GBU-28 bunker buster bombs. This 5.8 meter long, 2.2 ton weapon was designed and built in 17 days during the 1991 Gulf War. It can penetrate more than six meters of reinforced concrete or 45 meters of earth, before detonating 306 kg of Tritonal explosive inside a bunker. The bomb is actually a BLU-113 fitted with a laser guidance kit, turning it into the GBU-28.
Saddam Hussein was known to have built two heavily protected underground shelters in 1982 and 1983. The German firms that designed and constructed these 9,000 square meter shelters described them as having 3.2 meters of reinforced concrete for a ceiling and walls with 2.2 meters of reinforced concrete. The main entrances were through three-ton steel doors. Each had two escape tunnels, one going 200 meters to the Tigris River. One bunker was under a Presidential Palace, which would have to be leveled before the GBU-28 could get a shot at the bunker several dozen feet underneath.
North Korea has long been installing military installations in large underground bunkers, often dug into the sides of mountains. North Korea has lots of mountains for this. North Korea has become so good at it that they sell their expertise to other countries. Iran is a current client.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, March 03, 2026 - 03:37 pm: Edit

Intelligence: Ukrainian Espionage In 2025
February 20, 2026: Since Russia 2022, HUR/Ukrainian Military Intelligence service has grown in size and the number and types of operations it conducts. For example, many of the daring Ukrainian long-range drone attacks inside Russia are organized and carried out by HUR. This is made possible by years of work by HUR since 2014, when Russia first seized Ukrainian territory. Because of that long history, HUR became known for successful operations deep inside Russia that took a year or more to plan and organize.
Multiple attacks are used against economic targets over many months. This worked with the Ukrainian attacks on the Russian oil-refining, which ultimately reduced Russian refinery output by over 20 percent. Russia eventually rebuilt those facilities, at a cost of billions of dollars and months of shortages. HUR also organizes campaigns that concentrate on costly even more money to repair. At the end of 2025 it was discovered that Russia had to devote half the government budget to sustain the war in Ukraine and deal with all the damage and economic disruption HUR was causing inside Russia.
In addition to damaged and regularly sabotaged railroads, HUR also concentrated on Russian air defense systems, which Russia has a difficult time replacing because of so many Western components. These HUR operations weakened the Russian air defenses that detected and attacked incoming Ukrainian long range drone attacks. HUR operations would destroy air defenses to create a temporary undefended route into Russia. HUR also found critical and relatively unprotected targets inside Russia. Together, all these HUR preparations and operations led to crippling attacks on key segments of the Russian military economy.
HUR could also be called on to devise and carry out special operations to assist front line soldiers. Sometimes it meant gathering key information on Russian operations in a specific area and doing it quickly. In one case the HUR commandos organized a raid on Russian positions to rescue some Ukrainian troops that had recently been captured. When news of this spread to Russian troops along the 1,200 kilometers front line there was much distress about who might be next.
In other HUR operations, they equipped a dozen captured Russian FPV/First Person View drone operator goggles and arranged for them to be delivered to random Russian FPV units as a gift from Russian civilians. When these were worn and turned on, they exploded. There were several fatalities and many wounded before the Russians found all of these goggles.
Another area that HUR dominates, and invented, is naval drones. In the first two years of the war these drones destroyed or damaged about a third of the ships in the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The surviving ships took refuge in ports over a thousand kilometers from Crimea and Ukrainian ports. The naval drones continue to operate, patrolling the Black Sea looking for Russian merchant and military ships as well as making occasional attacks on Russian Black Sea ports.
While 2025 was an eventful year, earlier HUR activities were often international, like attacks on Russian military or intelligence overseas. These often involve the use of foreign airlines and railroads by unidentified Ukrainian HUR operatives passing themselves off as Ukrainian or Russian civilians. Because the Ukrainian and Russian languages closely resemble each other, it’s easy for a Ukrainian to speak unaccented Russian, but not so easy when a Russian tries it. Many intelligence operatives speak several languages, especially English. The international language airline flight control is English because early in the history of commercial flying most of the aircraft were American. During World War II, the largest air force the world has ever known was American. That continued for many decades after the war and is still generally true in 2024. In other words, if you want to be an intelligence agency field operative, you must speak English, even if it is heavily accented. The United States is a large country that includes Alaska and Hawaii. These two areas contain a lot of people who still speak Inuit Alaskan languages and Hawaiian native languages that never died out. America is the land of many different accents.
Which gets us back to the Ukrainian HUR intelligence field operatives in Syria, where the Khimik detachment got into the country unobserved and then infiltrated the Russian Kuweires airbase and destroyed a mobile electronic warfare system Russia had been using to protect the base from drone attacks. As soon as the electronic warfare system was out of action, numerous drones attacked the unprotected base and did significant damage.
Why would Ukrainian intelligence undertake such a mission so far from Ukraine? It was because this base was also used to train Russian mercenaries to fight in Ukraine. The training was specialized and the students caused problems for the Ukrainian forces fighting the Russian invaders.
Russian forces originally appeared in Syria after the Six-Day War, then left sometime after the Yom Kippur War, and returned in 2015 to assist the beleaguered ruler Bashar Al Assad. Hafez al-Assad, the father of Bashar, had ruled Syria from 1971 to 2000. Hafez sided with the Soviet Union during the Cold War and was a longtime ally of Russia until he died in 2000. His son Bashar took over and was even more efficient, and vicious, than his father. The relationship with Russia increased as Russia used the Syrian port of Targus for their tiny Mediterranean Fleet and a nearby airbase for military and commercial aircraft. This airbase was also used to support the activities of Russian ally Iran in Syria.
There are a lot of Russians operating in Syria, especially since 2015. Russia thought it was safe to train operatives for their war against Ukraine. HUR found out about that and did something to disrupt the Russian operation. This is not the first time HUR has gone after Russian operations in third countries. What was unique about the Syrian operation was that HUR involvement became known, something HUR prefers to avoid. HUR did achieve their objective in Syria, so the overall operation was a success.
It won’t be known for years or decades how many overseas HUR operations there were and how many foreign countries HUR operated in to defeat Russian operations. For example, Russian paramilitary operatives have been very active in Africa, especially Congo, where Russia wants to assure their access to rare minerals that are mined there. They must compete with China and several Western countries. HUR has apparently been causing problems for Russia in Congo as well and has managed to conceal their involvement. HUR may be operating against Russian interests in other parts of the world, including South America. HUR prefers to keep their presence hidden, even from allies like the United States.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, March 03, 2026 - 03:38 pm: Edit

Air Weapons: Missing Link In The New Way Of War
February 20, 2026: The innovative, extensive and effective use of drones in the Ukraine War has alarmed major military powers worldwide. Everyone is seeking ways of effectively integrating drones into their current military forces and war plans. Because of Ukraine, the European NATO countries are expanding and upgrading their forces to deter further Russian aggression. Over half a billion Europeans, backed by 326 million Americans should be enough to deter further aggression by 145 million bankrupt and war weary Russians.
It’s a different story in the Pacific, where an increasingly aggressive and heavily armed Chinese military is preparing for war. Not a major conflict, China could not afford that and really only wants to conquer Taiwan and merge it with China. Such a conflict would be short, violent and possibly indecisive. Drones play a role in that. China is aware of that and has already developed a microwave anti-drone weapon that can quickly and cheaply destroy drones several kilometers away. The U.S. and Israel have developed similar systems and Taiwan has access to much of that technology. Taiwan and China have also been developing drone swarm technology and the use of AI/Artificial Intelligence technology to enable the swarms to operate effectively when facing massive electronic jamming.
The drone factor makes a Chinese attempt to take Taiwan by forces less likely. While drones are a new opportunity, an amphibious operation against Taiwan is nothing like the land war Russia and Ukraine have been fighting.
Everyone could find out how drones might impact current NATO doctrine by examining similar situations in the past. Current American and NATO tactics began emerging in the late 1970s when the United States sought a new combat doctrine to make the best use of new weapons, an all-volunteer force and growing air superiority. West Germany was then urging the United States to adopt tactics that would mean losing less German territory in the opening stages of a war. In 1982 this led to the American AirLand Battle doctrine, which emphasized meeting a mainly Russian Warsaw Pact invasion by attacking as well as defending. West Germany was reassured as were those who had studied the 1972 Arab Israeli war. This conflict began with a surprise attack by Egypt and Syria which was quickly defeated by an Israeli active defense that emphasized attacking as well as defending. The Americans had already adopted an active defense doctrine in 1978 but AirLand Battle was a refinement of that, and evolved to the present with improved versions of these tactics.
The Russians interpreted AirLand Battle as the result of how much post-Vietnam military reforms had turned NATO defense plans into an offensive opportunity for NATO that made any Russian attack less likely to succeed and vulnerable to a NATO invasion of East Europe. The 1991 Iraq war certainly confirmed this, but Russians attributed that to poor quality Iraqi officers and troops.
After the East European Soviet satellite governments collapsed starting in 1989, it was revealed that the Soviets had become less confident of the ability and willingness of East European Warsaw Pact armies to assist Russian forces in attack or defense. Part of this was due to the aftereffects of the crackdown in East Europe after the uprisings of the 1950s and 1960s. Western intelligence officials interviewed many of East European civilians getting out and thought the refugees were exaggerating. They weren’t and that became obvious in 1989, and again two years later when the USSR itself collapsed. Once the Ukraine War has ended, the Russian military may accept that the NATO tactics were a major reason for their failure in Ukraine. Russia will have a difficult but not impossible time implementing a version of the NATO tactics for their forces. It would mean changing how their officers are trained and finally getting serious about reviving the use of NCOs, something the communists eliminated in the 1920s to prevent sergeants from leading another revolution as they did in the early 1920 to create the Soviet Union. In other words, Russia still has the same problems it has been burdened with since the Cold War ended in 1991. While Russia quickly adapted to drone warfare, that was in wartime and as of early 2026, Ukraine is more confident of winning their war with the Russians than the Russians are.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, March 04, 2026 - 06:15 am: Edit

An Israeli F35 shot down an Iranian jet in the first dogfight of Operation Roaring Lion.

Almost all of the Iranian launch trucks for long range missiles have been destroyed. The problem now is the drones, which can be launched from anywhere by relatively common trucks. These are impossible to eliminate.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, March 04, 2026 - 06:18 am: Edit

The US has hit 2,000 targets so far.

The meeting of the council of experts included the top 81 leaders, including mostly clerics but many others. Many of these were killed, but it cannot be confirmed how many survived.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, March 04, 2026 - 06:45 am: Edit

The son of the late Ayatollah Khameni has been selected as the third Supreme leader of the Iranian republic.

Trump said that Prince Pahlavi seems a nice guy but that someone from inside Iran might be a better choice for a post Ayatollah leader.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, March 04, 2026 - 07:12 am: Edit

An Iranian missile entered Turkish territory and was shot down by a NATO missile battery. This might have been an accident.

A number of Iranian missiles are being intercepted over Tel Aviv right now. Just a few missiles. The barrage came from both Iran and Lebanon. Someone did the math to create a time on target attack. Two impacts were seen in the city.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, March 04, 2026 - 08:24 am: Edit

A US submarine sank an Iranian warship using a single torpedo. This is the first since 1945.

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Wednesday, March 04, 2026 - 08:33 am: Edit

"someone the authority to just go out and buy stuff." It's called COTS and buying stuff via the NSN system.

Sweden is the leader of aircraft using roads for aircraft. They even have a system to hace mobile teams refuel and rearm their fighters using a few tech and some conscripts. Their fighters are designed for easy maintenance.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Wednesday, March 04, 2026 - 09:13 am: Edit

It appears that the Iranian ship sunk by a U.S. submarine was IRIS Dena, variously described as a frigate or destroyer, with a displacement of ~1500 tons.

As for the submarine that launched the Mk 48 torpedo - the first time the 54-year old Mk 48 has been successfully used in war - it was described during a briefing by the Chair of the Joint Chiefs as a "fast attack submarine", which makes it either USS Seawolf (known to be currently operating in the Indo-Pacific region), an older Los Angeles-class boat, or one of the newer Virginia-class boats.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Wednesday, March 04, 2026 - 09:18 am: Edit

Mike: the Saab 39E/F Gripen is genuinely impressive in that regard (as well as its dogfight maneuverability); there's a reason it's one of the finalists for adoption by, among others, Canada and Ukraine.

By Alan Trevor (Thyrm) on Wednesday, March 04, 2026 - 11:54 am: Edit

Jessica,

The thing is, "dogfight maneuverability" is generally not regarded as all that important in modern air-to-air work. The last confirmed air-to-air gun kill between fixed wing jet fighters was in 1982, in the Falklands.^* The U.S. did have a more recent gun kill in 1991, but against an Iraqi helicopter. Venezuela claimed a gun kill against an OV-10 Bronco in 1992. But an OV-10 is propeller-driven.

Similarly, and regarding SVC's 6:15 AM post from this morning, the Israeli F-35 shootdown of an Iranian YAK-130 was probably not a "dogfight". But I have been unable to find details, so can't say for sure.


^*A "dogfight" is defined by the maneuvering character of the fight, not the weapons used. A gun kill is not necessarily a dogfight and a missile kill might be a dogfight. Even back during World War II, most air-to-are kills were not, properly speaking, dogfights. Most aces (all all the nations) advised against getting into dogfights. They certainly believed fighter pilots needed to know how to dogfight in case they found themselves in one. But the pilot shouldn't go around trying to get into dogfights.

The one exception who comes to mind would be Hans-Joachim Marseille, who would probably be on the "short list" for greatest fighter pilot who ever lived. At times, he did actually seem to seek out dogfights. There may be others I'm forgetting about, but I think they would be in the minority of fighter pilots, especially aces.

By Alan Trevor (Thyrm) on Wednesday, March 04, 2026 - 12:09 pm: Edit

I think I should add that, so far as I know, there are no universally accepted criteria, or any universally accepted definition, for what constitutes a "dogfight". Generally, dogfights occur at close range with primary emphasis on air combat maneuvering. But different pilots will differ on the specifics. Some air-to-air combats are obviously "dogfights". Some are obviously not. And some... well, people may argue about whether that was a dogfight or not. Keep that in mind when I make (perhaps too careless) statements like:

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Quote:

Even back during World War II, most air-to-are kills were not, properly speaking, dogfights.

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By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, March 04, 2026 - 12:11 pm: Edit

Dogfight was what the media called it. We all know how accurate they are using military terms, such as the AC130 bomber and the M109 Paladin tank.

By Alan Trevor (Thyrm) on Wednesday, March 04, 2026 - 12:18 pm: Edit

I remember reading somewhere (too many years ago for me to remember where) about the Arleigh Burke-class Battleships!

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Wednesday, March 04, 2026 - 12:40 pm: Edit

Alan,

Inasmuch as drone warfare is increasingly common, and as GOG (Good Old Guns) are one way to bring them down, that dogfight capability seems to be on the way back into relevance.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, March 04, 2026 - 12:44 pm: Edit

In WW2 Pacific, Japanese loved to dogfight as their lightly built fighters could out turn heavier American fighters. Chennault of the Flying Tigers adopted the concept of the vertical dogfight, diving on the enemy then diving away after a gun pass.

There were some unusual dogfights over the Atlantic between bombers, including German Condors and Ju88s against British bombers and seaplanes.

By Alan Trevor (Thyrm) on Wednesday, March 04, 2026 - 01:47 pm: Edit

Jessica,

I don't think that follows. Even granting the use of fighter-mounted guns as a primary anti-drone weapons, I don't believe the tactics and procedures of their employment would fall within the ambit of "dogfighting"; at least, not until such time as the drones or drone controllers are aware of the fighters and take specifically focused defense actions, rather than just random evasive maneuvering.