Archive through April 16, 2026

Star Fleet Universe Discussion Board: Non-Game Discussions: Real-World Military: Archive through April 16, 2026
By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 13, 2026 - 04:59 pm: Edit

Air Weapons: A-10 In The Strait of Hormuz
April 9, 2026: The American A-10 ground attack aircraft, equipped with a 30mm autocannon and pylons for carrying bombs and missiles, proved invaluable in briefly opening up the Strait of Hormuz. This ten kilometer wide body of water is the only way in and out of the Persian Gulf. Iranian efforts to block this strait were foiled by the presence of several A-10 aircraft. The A-10s, and AH-60 gunships hunted down and destroyed Iranian attack boats and mine laying vessels. This eventually led to opening up the Strait of Hormuz for tankers and other ships that normally passed through these waters.
This occurred despite 30 years of U.S. Air Force efforts to get rid of its most popular, affordable, and effective aircraft. Over the last few years, the air force has apparently decided to stop trying to get rid of its popular, at least with pilots and infantry, A-10 attack aircraft. Nicknamed Warthog or just Hog, the A-10 never got much respect from air force leaders. The A-10 did gain enough popular and political clout to keep this aircraft flying. The latest plan reduces the A-10 force by 44 aircraft, to 237. These will equip seven squadrons. Three are active duty and four operated by part-time National Guard and reserve personnel. The reserve units would be available within 30 days for deployment to a combat zone. The reserve pilots are largely retired fighter pilots and tend to have more experience in the A-10 than the younger active-duty pilots. The reservists fly regularly and their aircraft are kept in shape for regular operations.
Retiring 44 of the older A-10s makes it easier for the air force to afford continuing upgrades for A-10s so they have the same new tech other warplanes use. This policy has seen the A-10s undergoing regular upgrades over the last two decades. These included new wings, a project that was finally completed in 2019. The air force now plans to keep the A-10s in service until 2040. One catch is that the air force will not allow A-10s to operate in airspace threatened by modern enemy air defense systems. Once these threats have been eliminated the A-10s can enter. Meanwhile the A-10s will get plenty of work dealing with Islamic terrorists and irregulars of all sorts.
This 2020 A-10 agreement came after six years of uncertainty and enormous pressure from the ground forces and Congress to keep the A-10 around for as long as possible. This effort was in response to a 2014 air force plan to retire all 340 remaining A-10s along with 70 elderly F-15Cs. The reasons were budget shortages and the enormous costs of developing and building the new F-35 stealth fighter. The air force planned to retire these 410 combat aircraft and about a hundred support planes by 2020, when over a hundred new F-35s would enter service leaving the air force with about 300 fewer combat aircraft. Since the United States then has about 2,700 combat aircraft in the air force and navy the loss of 410 aircraft would mean 11 percent fewer combat aircraft.
There was not much protest over retiring the elderly F-15Cs and support aircraft. The A-10 was a different matter. There was resistance and in 2016 the air force agreed the A-10 would not be retired and came up with another plan, which was announced in 2020. The new plans will also retire 29 older air refueling aircraft, 24 older C-130Hs, 24 Global Hawk UAVs and 17 B-1B bombers.
One thing that kept the A-10 in service was that close air support tech had rapidly evolved since the 1990s. Now A-10s use smart bombs or missiles most of the time. The upgrades included targeting pods that enable A-10 pilots to spot targets while at higher over 3,000 meters altitudes. That puts them out of range of small arms and many anti-aircraft weapons. Although the A-10 was built for ground support, armed with a 30mm rotary cannon for shooting up Russian tanks during a potential World War 3 in Europe that never happened. The last A-10 left Europe in 2013. The threat of Russia invading Western Europe disappeared in 1991, along with the Soviet Union and 80 percent of Russian troops. At the same time the A-10 finally got work in the 1991 battle to drive Iraqi troops out of Kuwait. A decade later the A-10 was back in demand again. In Iraq and Afghanistan troops appreciated the ability to call in an A-10 for a strafing run. A few hundred 30mm rounds not only did a lot of damage but also tended to demoralize the enemy and make it easier to capture them alive or drive them away. Smart bombs and missiles tended to leave fewer prisoners and were not as scary as the roar and loud buzz of a low-flying A-10 using its 30mm autocannon.
The A-10 proved to be a formidable combat aircraft in post-Cold War conflicts, first in the 1991 liberation of Kuwait and later in Afghanistan and Iraq. These conflicts involved the elimination of the modern Russian fighter aircraft and ground based air defense systems.
Since 2004 the most requested ground support aircraft in Afghanistan has been the A-10. There was similar A-10 affection in Iraq. Troops from all nations quickly came to appreciate the unique abilities of this 1970s era aircraft that the U.S. Air Force has wanted to eliminate. The air force sought to do this gradually, when there was less work for A-10s. In 2011 the air force announced that it was retiring 102 A-10s, leaving 243 in service. Opposition from the army and Congress halted that. That was not the first, nor the last retirement effort. Until 2020, the air force kept at it and it was feared that the air force would revive its efforts to eliminate the A-10. That does not appear to be the case this time.
At the same time the air force tried to retire A-10s it accelerated the upgrading of the remaining A-10s to the A-10C standard. Also called the PE for precision engagement model, the refurbished A-10s were supposed to remain in service until 2028, meaning most A-10Cs would have served over 40 years and as many as 16,000 flight hours. The upgrade effort was underway soon after A-10s began seeing much heavier use after 2003. The upgrades included new electronics as well as engine refurbishment. The A-10C provides the pilot with the same targeting and fire control gadgets the latest fighters and bombers have. The new A-10C cockpit has all the spiffy color displays and easy to use controls. Because it is a single-seat aircraft that flies close to the ground, something that requires a lot more concentration, all the automation in the cockpit allows the pilot to do a lot more with less stress, exertion, and risk.
The basic A-10 is a 1960s design, so the new additions are quite spectacular in comparison. New communications gear has also been added, allowing A-10 pilots to share pictures and videos with troops on the ground. The A-10 pilot also has access to the Blue Force Tracker system, so that the nearest friendly ground forces show up on the HUD Head-Up Display when coming in low to use the 30mm cannon. The A-10C could now use smart bombs, making it a do-it-all aircraft for ground support.
A-10s were worked hard in Afghanistan. For example, an A-10 squadron has a dozen aircraft and 18 pilots. Pilots often average about a hundred hours a month in the air while in a combat zone. That's about twenty sorties, as each sortie averages about five hours. The aircraft ranged all over southern Afghanistan, waiting for troops below to call for some air support. The A-10 could always fly low and slow and were designed, and armored, to survive a lot of ground fire. The troops trust the A-10 more than the F-16 or any other aircraft used for ground support.
The A-10 is a 23-ton, twin-engine, single-seat aircraft whose primary weapon is a multi-barrel 30mm cannon originally designed to fire armor piercing shells at Russian tanks. These days the 1,174 30mm rounds are mostly high explosive versions. The 30mm cannon fires 363-gram 12.7 ounce rounds at the rate of about 65 a second. The cannon usually fires in one or two-second bursts. In addition, the A-10 can carry seven tons of bombs and missiles. These days the A-10 goes out with smart bombs (GPS and laser-guided) and 306 kg/670 pound Maverick missiles. It can also carry a targeting pod, enabling the pilot to use high magnification day/night cameras to scour the area for enemy activity. Cruising speed is 560 kilometers an hour and the A-10 can slow down to about 230 kilometers an hour. In Afghanistan two drop tanks were often carried to give the aircraft more fuel and maximize airtime over the battlefield.
If there is another major war in some place like Korea or with Iran, the A-10s would once more be one of the most popular warplanes with the ground troops, if they are still around. Otherwise, the troops on the ground will have to make do with smart bombs and a growing number of GPS guided mortar shells, artillery shells and rockets.
At one point the air force argued that the F-35 could replace the A-10 as a ground attack aircraft. One of the problems with using F-35s is that this aircraft costs more than twice as much an hour to operate. Moreover, only the A-10 can regularly go low and strafe enemy forces. F-16s and F-35s are too fast and unarmored to get away with that. The A-10 was designed to take a lot of hits and keep flying. A-10s have regularly demonstrated this reliability.
Finally, the air force admitted it would take fifteen years and a lot of money to develop an A-10 replacement. The current plan is to eventually turn that dangerous duty to a new generation of UAVs. This is something Predator and Reaper UAVs have already been handling, except for the low altitude strafing duty. This is often used to intimidate a stubborn foe and that still works. The A-10 makes a lot of noise when coming in low, with part of the racket coming from its 30mm autocannon. Again, this has been proven time and again. It is not a theoretical capability but very real and still in demand. No aircraft will ever duplicate that. When the A-10 finally retires in 2040 it will have been in service 73 years, fifty of them after being declared obsolete at the end of the Cold War.
FYEO

By MarkSHoyle (Bolo) on Monday, April 13, 2026 - 08:09 pm: Edit

Video of a Ukrainian soldier on a vehicle (not in shot) downed a small incoming drone with a shotgun...

Looks like he damaged it enough it veered to the side and exploded in a clump of trees...

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 13, 2026 - 08:41 pm: Edit

Ukraine is now using new “Martian drones” which are invisible to radar and heat sensors, silent, and immune to EW because they are self guiding using AI rather than obsolete fiber optic cables. Waves of these drones are destroying the Russian logistics network. They are fast and use wings to extend their range.

The name was given by Russia; Ukraine calls them bumblebee. Russia claims the drones use the software NASA developed for helicopters on Mars.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 13, 2026 - 08:53 pm: Edit

A Japanese company is cooperating with Ukraine to produce a new generation of drones.

Ukraine plans to build seven million drones a year.

Ukraine is deploying Terra A1 interception drones able to hunt down Shaheed drones. Terra A1 costs only $2500.

By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Tuesday, April 14, 2026 - 03:35 am: Edit

Jeff Wile, I recall seeing something about shoot and scoot in Ukraine. Apparently they prefer not to move at all because then they may be seen by a drone. The drone zone has become really deep.

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Tuesday, April 14, 2026 - 08:26 am: Edit

converting some Leopard Is into howitzers

Perhaps ir's an issue with the 105 gun? Barrel wear or ammunition shortages?

I dunno if any modern 155 system starts with a compatable turret ring size.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Tuesday, April 14, 2026 - 09:32 am: Edit

It turns out that Australia has a significant reason to be a part of the occupation of the Hormuz Strait: since 2001, Australia has closed 6 out of its 8 oil refineries.

Australia exports 96% of its crude oil, the two remaining oil refineries supply 20% of the gas and diesel fuel consumed in Australia. The mechanism is simple, they sell oil to Singapore, which refines it, and sells it back to Australia in the form of gasoline.

The other key data is, Australia maintains a 36 day stockpile of fuels. Interruptions in supply beyond 36 days would have huge impact on the economy.

No word yet as to how many troops, or what units will be sent to participate in the mission.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Tuesday, April 14, 2026 - 09:32 am: Edit

Duplicate.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 14, 2026 - 01:54 pm: Edit

Weapons: Grizzly Hellfire Missile Launcher
April 14, 2026: Recently American defense contractors successfully launched a Hellfire missile from the new Grizzly launcher in a three-meter high cargo container. The Grizzly system is based on the M299 missile launchers, which can be configured several ways to launch both the Hellfire and Joint Air-to-Ground/JAG Missile. Hellfire missiles can track targets autonomously and are used by the Army, Navy and numerous foreign nations using nearly 20 platforms across air, land and sea.
The first five tests occurred six months after research and development, through internal Lockheed Martin investment, demonstrating the ability to quickly deliver a mobile and versatile launcher capability to defeat evolving threats. Built out of low-cost commercially available materials, the containerized launcher can be easily lifted and transported by a wide variety of commercial freight and transport equipment, including trucks, aircraft and ships. The development comes as the Navy is seeking the development of containerized payloads, which can potentially be placed on unmanned surface vessels to increase firepower and flexibility at sea.
The Hellfire II weighs 48 kg carries a 9 kg warhead and has a range of 8,000 meters. The Hellfire is fast, travelling at about 450 meters a second, meaning that it can hit a target at maximum range in less than 20 seconds. Hellfire is popular for use in urban areas because its small warhead has only about a kilogram of explosives and reduces casualties among nearby civilians. The missile is accurate enough to be sent through a window because of its laser guidance.
The U.S. Army uses M299 helicopter missile racks. Introduced in 1994, each one of these racks holds four Hellfire missiles, or sixteen 70mm DAGR guided markets which are guided versions of the venerable 70mm unguided rockets. Alternatively, each rack can hold eight DAGRs and two Hellfires. The racks can be used on the AH-64, AH-1Z, Tiger or the SH-60B helicopters. Each rack weighs 45 kg. Loaded with four Hellfires, the rack weighs 167 kg. Attack helicopters usually carry two of these racks.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 14, 2026 - 01:55 pm: Edit

Surface Forces : Details Of Iranian Naval Mines
April 14, 2026: Iran has a lot of naval mines and could, if they were desperate enough, use them to block the Strait of Hormuz and block all oil exports, including Iran’s. Iran has been developing new ways to deploy their mines. Last year Iran used their Fajr-5 Multiple Launch Rocket System to place naval mines in the Persian Gulf. This mine deployment has only been tested during naval exercises. If used in an actual conflict the mines would block access to the Persian Gulf. If Iran did this, they would block all their own oil exports plus unite all the Arab oil producers and their Western allies. Iran has already suffered heavy economic losses from American and Israeli airstrikes, its economy is wrecked and the population is impoverished and angry. The Iranian people would blame their government, not foreigners. The religious dictatorship of Iran has shown that it is quite unaware of how much they are hated by Iranians. Iran’s government asked its people on national television to go the area where a US F-15 was shot down and search for its pilot. They instead blocked roads to the area impair the ability of Iranian security forces so search for the pilot.
Currently Iran has over 5,000 mines available. The Strait of Hormuz is only 33 kilometers wide at its narrowest point. Iran has a few, if any, floating mines. Most of their mines are moored mines that are just under the surface and anchored to the seabed by a tether. Iran probably has more bottom mines than expected. These lie on the sea bottom and use electronic systems to detect ships passing overhead. The mine control system can be programmed to detonate only when certain types of ships, like tankers or large warships, are present.
Ever since the end of the Cold War a growing number of American naval officers and civilian experts have been urging that more attention be paid to dealing with naval mines. The United States was not alone and in 2012 that led to the U.S. and over 30 other nations conducting a joint mine clearing exercise, called the International Mine Countermeasures Exercise 2012. The numerous training events were directed at dealing with Iranian attempts to block the entrance Straits of Hormuz to the Persian Gulf. The impact of that exercise led to another being held annually ever since. While Iran is the most immediate user of naval mines, it is not alone. North Korea, China and Russia much larger naval mine stockpiles, but these three are not boasting of how and when they would use them,
Iran insists that because of its mines and other weapons it will have no trouble blocking the export of oil via the Straits of Hormuz. Some 35 percent of the world's oil shipments pass through these straits, which comes to about 15-20 tankers a day plus a dozen or more non-tankers. The Persian Gulf, in general, is a busy waterway. It is 989 kilometers long, its average depth is 50 meters, and maximum depth is 90 meters. Naval mines are Iran's best bet if they want to shut down the Strait.
The Iranian problem is that they have a small navy, an obsolete air force, and a poor track record when it comes to shutting down tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf or the Straits of Hormuz. They tried once before, in the 1980s, when they were at war with Iraq. The two nations began attacking each other's tanker traffic early on, in an attempt to cut off each other's oil sales and, thus, military purchases. Iran didn't want to shut the Straits of Hormuz because it needed the oil revenue more than Iraq which was getting billions in aid from other Arab states did. So each country concentrated on attacking shipping in the Persian Gulf. Over 500 ships were attacked, 61 percent of them tankers. Only 23 of the tankers, attacked mainly with anti-ship missiles, were sunk or immobilized. The attacks, using fighter-bombers and warships, only hit about two percent of the ship traffic in the Gulf. Iran lowered its oil prices to cover the higher cost of ship insurance, and, in 1986, Russia and the United States intervened to protect Kuwaiti and Iraqi tankers which were taking most of the damage.
The Iranian military is in worse shape today than it was in the 1980s and would not last long trying to attack ships. That leaves the Straits of Hormuz. This is actually a wide channel about 30 kilometers deep. Normally, shipping sticks to narrow a few kilometers wide channels, going in and out, to avoid collisions. The main Iranian threat has always been seen as naval mines. The Arab states have a lot of mine clearing equipment and more numerous air and naval forces than Iran. In addition, there are the United States and NATO forces in the area. The problem was that all these mine clearing forces had never practiced under realistic wartime conditions. In short, it has long been unclear exactly what it would take to deal with Iranian mines in the straits. Many of those questions were finally answered in 2012 and during subsequent mine clearing exercises.
For an Iranian mining attempt to work they would have to get the mines onto the bottom of the straits and then prevent the rest of the world from clearing those mines. That would be difficult, as will Iranian attempts to plant additional mines. Such attempts would not be impossible as Iran has small submarines and speed boats along with sailors willing to carry out suicidal missions to deliver the mines. Even that may not be sufficient, as this sort of fanaticism failed against the Americans in the 1980s. While Iran has worked to overcome their shortcomings, most of the solutions appear to be publicity stunts mainly meant to make the Iranian population feel better.
Iran has about 5,000 thousand naval mines and that is a small arsenal compared to Russia with over 200,000, China’s 100,000+ and North Korea’s 50,000+. It is generally agreed that all these mines are a serious danger. While often ignored, naval mines are a formidable weapon. But these passive weapons just don't get any respect. The historical record indicates otherwise.
Modern naval mines were widely used for the first time over a century ago, during the Russo-Japanese war 1904- 1905. These were contact mines, floating in shallow water and kept in place with an anchor and chain. When the tide was right, they would be just below the surface, ready to explode whenever struck by a ship. Some 2,000 of these mines were used to destroy sixteen ships during the Russo-Japanese war. That's one ship lost for every 125 mines used.
During World War I 1914-18, modern mine tactics and clearing methods evolved. Thousands of mines were laid to provide defensive barriers against enemy movement in the North Sea and English Channel. Mines were also used offensively by secretly placing them across known enemy sea routes. More than 1,000 merchant and warships were lost because of the 230,000 mines used. That's over 200 mines used for every ship lost.
During World War II there was a major effort to develop better mine clearing methods to deal with an even larger number of mines. During World War II a total of 2,665 ships were lost or damaged to 100,000 offensive mines. That's one ship for every 37 mines. Some 208,000 mines were used defensively to inhibit enemy movement and tie up his resources.
Naval mines achieved several striking successes during World War II. In the Pacific naval mines proved more destructive to the Japanese war effort than the atom bombs. During a 10 week period between April and August 1945, 12,000 mines were delivered to the Japanese coast by American bombers. These destroyed 1,250,000 tons of Japanese shipping, with 670 ships hit and 431 destroyed. That's 18 mines for each ship hit. The Americans had air superiority, so losses during these 1,500 missions amounted to only 15 planes, most of them to accidents. Had these missions been flown against opposition, losses would have been between 30 and 60 aircraft, plus similar losses to their fighter escorts. Either way it was a stunning success for naval mines,
A conventional submarine campaign was also waged against Japanese shipping using mines. Comparisons between subs using mines and torpedoes are interesting. A hundred submarines were involved in a campaign that ran for 45 months from December 1941 to August 1945. Some 4.8 million tons of enemy shipping was sunk with torpedoes. For every US submarine sailor lost using submarine launched torpedoes, 560 tons of enemy ships were sunk. During the mine campaign 3,500 tons were sunk for each U.S. fatality. On a cost basis the difference was equally stark. Counting the cost of lost mine laying aircraft B- 29's at $500,000 each and torpedo-armed submarines at $5 million each, we find that each ton of sunk shipping cost six dollars when using mines and fifty-five dollars when using submarines. This data was classified as secret until the 1970s. It indicates that mines might have been more effective than torpedoes, even if the mines were delivered by submarine.
The Germans waged a minelaying campaign off the east coast of the United States between 1942 and 1944. Only 317 mines were used, which sank or damaged 11 ships. This was a ratio of 29 mines used for each ship hit. More importantly eight major ports were closed for a total of 40 days. One port, Charleston, South Carolina, was closed for 16 days, tying up not only merchant shipping but the thousands of men, warships, and aircraft dealing with the situation. American submarines also waged a limited mine campaign in the Pacific. For 658 mines used, 54 ships were sunk or damaged 12 mines per ship. No subs were lost. Considerable Japanese resources were tied up dealing with the mines. On the Palau atoll the port was closed by the mines and not reopened until the war ended. Even surface ships were used to lay mines. Three thousand mines were laid by destroyers. Only 12 ships were hit but these were barrier fields, not the ambush type mine fields that a submarine can create by sneaking into an enemy held area.
In Korea during the early 1950s, the Soviets provided North Korea with 3,000 mines, many of 1904 vintage. These were used to defend Wonson harbor. It took several weeks for UN forces to clear these, at a loss of a dozen ships hit. Half of these ships were destroyed.
During the Vietnam War over 300,000 American naval mines were used, primarily in rivers. The vast majority were not built as mines but were aerial bombs equipped with magnetic sensors instead of fuzes. These bombs/mines used a small parachute to ensure that no damage occurred on landing. In shallow water these makeshift weapons sat on the bottom and performed as well as mines. Haiphong Harbor was actually mined with 11,000 of these "destructors," as the US air force called them, and less than a hundred conventional mines. Haiphong Harbor was shut down completely for months, and it took years to clear out all the American mines. The "destructor" mine design was so successful that it is still in use, using more modern electronics, such as the Mk 62 mine.
During the 1991 Gulf War the Iraqis laid over a thousand mines off the Iraqi and Kuwaiti coast. The predominantly US naval forces did not have sufficient mine sweeping resources to deal with this situation and had a helicopter carrier and cruiser hit and damaged while trying to clear the area. This effectively prevented any US amphibious operations, although the Marines were not going to be used for a landing anyway. It took over a month of mine clearing after the fighting ceased to eliminate all the mines. In the meantime, two U.S. warships were damaged by these mines. In 2003, the Iraqis again tried to use mines, but were hampered by prompt American, British, and Kuwaiti action.
In any future war naval mines will again surprise everyone with how effective they are. It is feared that terrorists might get their hands on some bottom mines, but so far, there do not appear to have been any attempts.
Meanwhile the 2012 international mine clearing exercise prompted the United States to make several moves to improve mine clearing capability. The U.S. Navy ordered several dozen more of the expendable SeaFox UUVs/unmanned underwater vehicles. These are used to destroy bottom mines which sit on the seabed. These UUVs were sent to the Persian Gulf to deal with potential Iranian use of naval miles. The Seafox UUVs are used on Avenger mine hunting ships already in the Persian Gulf.
SeaFox is a small 1.4x.4x.2 meters/55 x 16x8 inches battery-powered sub that weighs 43 kg/95 pounds and has a fiber-optic cable connecting it to a surface ship or hovering helicopter. There the controller can move the SeaFox close to a suspected mine using a small sonar unit to assist navigation, then turn on a spotlight for a video camera to examine the object and determine if it is a mine. If it is, SeaFox gets closer and detonates a shaped charge explosive, sending a shaft of hot plasma through the mine destroying itself and the mine. SeaFox has an endurance of about 100 minutes, a top speed of 10 kilometers an hour, and can dive as deep as 300 meters.
The only American minesweeper ships are the 13 Avengers. These are 72.3 meter-long ships that draw only 4.8 meters of water, enabling them to operate close to shore. The crews are supposed to be trained in navigating such shallow areas. The Avengers are armed with two .50 cal. 12.7mm machine guns, two 7.62mm machine guns, two 40mm automatic grenade launchers, and have a crew of 84. In 2012 four Avengers were in the Persian Gulf, operating out of Bahrain. Another three were based in Sasebo, Japan. The other six are based at San Diego, California.
The U.S. Navy needs these minesweepers because replacement minesweeping helicopters and minesweeping versions of the LCS ship have been delayed by technical problems. Meanwhile the U.S. has upgraded the sonars on its Avenger class ships. The new AN/SQQ-32V4 mine-hunting sonar improves the ability of the sonar to spot mines on sea bottoms cluttered with other stuff natural or manmade. In many parts of the world shallow coastal waters are used as a dumping ground for junk that won’t float ashore. This has been found to help hide bottom mines. The Avengers have also received new engines. The four original diesel engines in each Avenger have never been very reliable. With their new engines the Avengers can still move at up to 27 kilometers an hour. Normally, however, the Avengers move much more slowly at 3-4 kilometers an hour when searching for mines. The Avengers also received improved hydraulics and new mine destruction systems.
The upgrade is part of an attempt to deal with delays in the arrival of the LCS class ships, or at least the ones equipped for mine hunting. So, for the last decade the navy has been hustling to refurbish its existing Avengers. The 3,000 ton LCS ships are designed for minesweeping and a lot of other jobs but the 1,400 ton Avengers specialize in minesweeping. Built mostly of wood and very little iron, the fourteen Avengers entered the fleet between 1987 and 1994, and all are still in service. The upgrades will enable the surviving Avengers to remain in service at least until 2026 and probably until the end of the decade.
The navy also had a dozen smaller Osprey class coastal mine hunters 900 tons displacement, crew of 51, but these were all given away to foreign navies and are to be replaced by the LCS and new minesweeping helicopters.
The navy has also equipped helicopters for mine clearing. But the navy is having a very difficult time maintaining its force of 30 MH-53E helicopters. This aircraft are the only ones that can tow a sled containing naval mine detecting gear. This sort of thing is called AMCM Airborne Mine Countermeasures and is considered essential in areas, like the Persian Gulf, where the enemy Iran might use a lot of naval mines that would have to be cleared quickly in wartime.
The MH-53E is an update of the original 1960s era CH-53 and entered service in the early 1980s. Fifty MH-53Es were built and they have been worked hard ever since. That’s why only 30 are left and few of them are fit to fly at any one time. Originally the navy planned to retire the MH-53Es in 2008, but lighter replacement sleds that could be pulled by smaller and more modern helicopters did not work out as expected. So, retirement was pushed to 2012, then 2017 and currently the navy hopes to keep some MH-53Es operational into the 2020s.
Meanwhile efforts continue to develop lighter equipment for the mine hunting task. Some of these projects have had limited success. The AQS-24A mine-hunting system looks like a torpedo with extra fins and attachment. It is lowered into the water and dragged by the helicopter at speeds of up to 34 kilometers an hour. The AQS-24A contains a high-resolution sonar that seeks out mines then lays on the sea bottom, waiting for ships to pass over. The bottom mine then detonates if a ship type it was programmed to attack is detected. The U.S. Navy has been using this mine hunting approach since the 1980s. The original sled system went through several major upgrades and is considered very reliable and effective. The MH-53E sled is still able to carry more equipment and sweep a larger area faster.
The U.S. Navy has also developed a complementary system, ALMDS/Airborne Laser Mine Detection System. Designed to operate from a MH-60S helicopter, ALMDS uses a Laser Imaging Detection and Ranging blue-green laser to detect and identify naval mines near the surface. Unlike the AQS-24A, ALMDS operates from the low flying, and smaller, helicopters. Surface mines are either moored via a chain to the bottom or floating, a favorite terrorist tactic, and many float just below the surface. The laser works very quickly and enables the ALMDS equipped helicopter to quickly check out large areas for surface mines. Terrorists have used naval mines before, of the floating variety. Navies tend to use the more sophisticated, expensive and hard-to-get bottom mines that lie on the bottom, in shallow water.
American allies have also developed new mine detection and clearing tools and some of the new U.S. equipment uses foreign tech. While new mine designs have become more effective, the basic problem is that the many older mine designs are still very dangerous, especially for the unprepared.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 14, 2026 - 02:21 pm: Edit

I don't know what kind of gun they're putting into the Leopard Is. I doubt the turret could take a 155 even a lower velocity howitzer. Here is what I found with a very quick google:
============
Ukrainian forces are using Leopard 1A5 tanks as makeshift self-propelled howitzers (indirect fire platforms) due to their thin armor making them unsuitable for direct tank-on-tank combat. While not originally designed for this role, the tanks are effectively engaging Russian infantry and fortifications, with 5th Heavy Mechanized Brigade soldiers reporting higher accuracy than Soviet-era counterparts, needing only 3-4 shots to destroy targets.
Key Aspects of the Leopard 1's Role as "Howitzers" in Ukraine:

Operational Role: Leopard 1s are being used in "shoot-and-scoot" tactics, often operating from camouflaged, closed positions (caponiers).
Effective Range: Currently, these tanks are achieving fire ranges of up to 12 km.
Accuracy: Their precise fire control system allows them to achieve higher accuracy at distance than older Soviet models.
Future Upgrades: The range could be increased to 18 km with new turret modifications, such as the Cockerill 3105, which is designed to provide better indirect fire capability, potentially increasing accuracy and fire support capability.

Other Conversions and Upgrades:

Skyranger 35: Rheinmetall is developing a hybrid "Frankenstein" anti-aircraft vehicle mounting the 35mm Skyranger turret on a Leopard 1 chassis to combat drones and missiles.
Belgian Modification: Some Leopard 1A5s are being upgraded with the Cockerill 3105 turret to improve survival against drones and enhance, allowing for, in some cases, fire from up to 10km away.
Add-on Armor: To mitigate low armor, Leopard 1s are equipped with "barbecue" grilles on the turret and chains to protect the engine, making them more resilient against drones.

As of February 2026, around 200 Leopard 1A5s have been delivered to Ukraine, with several units having been destroyed or damaged in action

By 100% Body-safe Latin Dolls on Tuesday, April 14, 2026 - 03:27 pm: Edit

Authentication Error

Your username/password combination was invalid, or you do not have permission to post to this topic. You may revise your username and password using the form at the bottom of this page.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Tuesday, April 14, 2026 - 03:27 pm: Edit

Zelensky reports that Ukraine has captured a Russian position using only drones and ground robots. He also says this was the "first time in the history of this war", though that is likely open to definitional disputes.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Tuesday, April 14, 2026 - 04:13 pm: Edit

Interesting.

The Ukrainians have actually captured surrendered Russian troops that literally raised their hands to drones that herded them back Ukrainian troops. Happened a couple of times back in 2023.

Perhaps the next battleground will be by sappers tunnels under the battlefield.

By Dana Madsen (Madman) on Tuesday, April 14, 2026 - 06:28 pm: Edit

I've seen reports the Russians are doing the same thing with old tanks. They are using old T54s or T62s as indirect fire support. Per your comments Steve, the Leopard fire systems are likely more accurate, but again, the Russians have lots of old tanks.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Tuesday, April 14, 2026 - 07:45 pm: Edit

Not as many as they used to.

A quick Google inquiry shows that of the 9 tank depots currently active (the whole Russian Federation has nearly 25 tank facilities) with an estimated 92 T-72B models left out of a current inventory of “useable” tanks of 450.

Obviously there are likely more tanks left at the other depots, but not all of them are in positions that Putin can control.

They (the soviets) had thousands of old tanks stockpiled. Putin has expended almost all of the tanks he had access to.

Worse, the number of old tanks getting refurbished monthly has dropped from 50+ month.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, April 15, 2026 - 02:11 am: Edit

The old tanks, back to T55s, are "about as good" as modern tanks for anti-infantry work.

A modern tank cannon can penetrate any of the old tanks, but then, it can also penetrate most of the new ones if used correctly. Even if it doesn't penetrate, the shock of a kinetic round hitting the hull is going to break things inside the tank, like the fire controls and auto-loader and crew bones. A mission kill is about as good as a total scrapyard kill. Putin used a lot of old junk tanks (even, reportedly, some old junkers from China and North Korea) with superficial updates.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Wednesday, April 15, 2026 - 09:17 am: Edit

Generally, I expect you have it exactly right.

That said, Dana madsen’s point about T-54 and T-62 tanks used in the indirect fire role is not because those two old soviet tanks are particularly good in that role. It is because they are useless for the anti infantry work.

That is because the auto-loader was never fixed in those particular tanks.

Oh, that, and the unreliable ammunition for the guns.

I believe the phrase is “more dangerous for their own crews, than anything the enemy could do.”

By MarkSHoyle (Bolo) on Wednesday, April 15, 2026 - 09:29 am: Edit

In direct fire from tanks goes back a long way....
In Korea the U.S. used M-26s and M-4s in the role...
Probably little information would be available on the actual usefulness...

By A David Merritt (Adm) on Wednesday, April 15, 2026 - 10:53 am: Edit

Jeff Wile; The Soviet T54/T55 series tanks did not get auto-loaders.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, April 15, 2026 - 12:32 pm: Edit

The US used tanks and tank destroyers for indirect fire during WW2.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Wednesday, April 15, 2026 - 05:25 pm: Edit

ADM:

I have seen video of Russian soldiers using T-54 and T-55 tanks for indirect fire role, just assumed that there was an auto loader in use. Guess that means a soldier has to physically enter the tank after each round has been fired, to manually reload it every time.

Sorry, will try to not make that mistake again.

By A David Merritt (Adm) on Wednesday, April 15, 2026 - 05:44 pm: Edit

That's rather common with dodgy ammunition, think of the fun of being the loader when you have a misfire.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, April 15, 2026 - 11:33 pm: Edit

Several Arab countries have ancient T55s and use them in a unique way. They drive to a firing position, aim the gun, get the entire crew out of the tank, and fire the gun by pulling a string run through the hatch. Then they climb back inside to reload and re-aim.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, April 16, 2026 - 02:35 pm: Edit

Winning: Russia Stalled While Ukraine Is On The Offensive
April 16, 2026: Ukraine is on the offensive while Russia is sliding into bankruptcy. Russian offensive operations have stalled in the past few months while Ukrainian forces advance, often unopposed because there are no Russian troops available to stop them. Ukrainian drone production from local factories have Russian troops fleeing or committing suicide rather than face obliteration by these drone swarms.
Meanwhile Ukraine is exporting thousands of defensive interceptor drones to Persian Gulf states. These drones are used to destroy Iranian drones unleashed against the Gulf States and their critical oil production facilities. In March, the number of combat sorties of drone interceptors and the number of targets destroyed in Ukraine increased by over 50 percent compared to the previous month. FPV/First Person View drones are now causing 90 percent of Russian losses.
At the same time Ukraine increased the procurement of engineering mines and explosives for drones. In the first three months of 2026 quantities equaled more than half the purchases in 2025 and they will be significantly greater by the end of the year. Munitions for drones enables targeted strikes against infantry and vehicles without use of expensive 155mm shells or artillery rockets. They are used against the enemy where other means are ineffective, and save artillery and missile resources for more substantial targets.
Ukraine has become Europe’s source for drone warfare innovation. Ukraine is the testing ground for a new generation of drones capable of flying 20 kilometers through electronic warfare defenses while carrying ten to twenty kg of explosives. In late March Ukrainian Air Assault Forces Command revealed that it had halted a Russian advance near the border of the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk provinces.
While Russia continues to advance overall, Ukraine has reclaimed 470 square kilometers of occupied territory this year, marking its first territorial gains since 2023. Ukraine provided more than enough evidence to support the liberation of at least 334 square kilometers and this is believed to underestimate Ukrainian advances. Meanwhile the Russian rate of advance has declined by two-thirds over the past 18 months.
Russian forces advanced at a rate of 14.9 square kilometers a day from October 2024 to March 2025, compared with 10.7 square kilometers a day from March 1, 2025, to October 1 and 5.5 square kilometers a day in the first three months of 2026.
Ukrainian President Zelenskyy declared that the front-line situation is the best it has been in 10 months. The offensive Russia was planning for March were thwarted ⁠ by the Ukrainian forces. That is why the Russians will attempt to increase their number of attacks.
Ukraine began attacking Russia’s two oil export terminals on the Baltic Sea to deny Russian efforts to benefit from increasing oil income. Oil companies warned buyers they could declare force majeure on supply contracts from major Baltic Sea ports. Oil export facilities at the Baltic’s Ust-Luga and Primorsk account for about 60 percent of Russia’s oil export capacity. The closure of one will significantly restrict Russia’s ability to generate income for its war in Ukraine.
So far Russia lost 40 to 43 percent of its oil export capacity and oil exports had fallen from four million to 2.32 million barrels per day. These operations have also reduced the domestic oil supply.
The loss of Ust-Luga also means reductions of oil refining at four of the largest refineries in European Russia, Kirishi, Yaroslavl, Moscow and Ryazan. These facilities refine about 55 million metric tons of oil each year. That’s 400,000 barrels per day. Ukraine also attacked the Kirishi and Yaroslavl refineries in late March. The Russian government banned exports of vehicle fuel between April and July in an attempt to stabilize domestic prices. Russia banned vehicle fuel exports in September in response to Ukrainian attacks on refineries.
Ukraine has also been attacking Russian munitions manufacturing. Ukraine attacked the Promsintez explosives plant using Flamingo drones. Promsintez produces 30,000 tons of military explosives a year. Russia admitted that it has lost 45 percent of its missile production because of these attacks.

FYEO

Administrator's Control Panel -- Board Moderators Only
Administer Page | Delete Conversation | Close Conversation | Move Conversation