Naval Air: And Then There Was One CVN
April 17, 2026: As of late March, the U.S. Navy has only one CVN/Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carrier operating near Iran. The USN has eleven CVNs, but the CVN-78 Ford was sidelined by a fire in its laundry facility which disrupted operations throughout the ship. This left only CVN-72 Abraham Lincoln. The other nine CVNs are deployed elsewhere or undergoing periodic upgrades and maintenance, including expensive and time consuming refueling. This involves removing and replacing the nuclear fuel. This includes partial dismantling of the ship. The most recent CVNs avoid this process. Currently only four CVNs are operational, CVN-78, CVN 72, CVN 73, and CVN 77.
USS John C. Stennis/CVN-74 is currently 14 months behind schedule and the USS Harry S. Truman/CVN-75 is undergoing a complicated refit to repair damage resulting from a collision. The problem is that the USN has only one shipyard that can handle this. Scheduled maintenance and unscheduled repairs are what keeps many CVNs from deploying.
Current status of all CVNs in service or planned. As of early April.
CVN name is followed year it entered service or is scheduled to do so
CVN 68 USS Nimitz 1975, Scheduled for retirement but that is delayed until 2027
CVN 69 USS Dwight D. Eisenhower 1977, Currently in port undergoing maintenance
CVN 70 USS Carl Vinson 1982, Currently in port undergoing maintenance
CVN 71 USS Theodore Roosevelt 1986, Currently in port preparing for deployment
CVN 72 USS Abraham Lincoln 1989, Currently deployed in the Arabian Sea
CVN 73 USS George Washington 1992, Currently in port at Yokosuka Japan
CVN 74 USS John C. Stennis 1995 Undergoing, RCOH/Refueling and Complex Overhaul
CVN 75 USS Harry S. Truman 1998, In port preparing for RCOH
CVN 76 USS Ronald Reagan 2003, In port undergoing scheduled maintenance
CVN 77 USS George H. W. Bush 2009, Currently deployed in the Atlantic Ocean
CVN 78 USS Ford, In Port at Split, Croatia
CVN 79 USS John F. Kennedy, expected to enter service in 2027
CVN 80 USS Enterprise, expected to enter service in 2029
CVN 81 USS Doris Miller, expected to enter service in 2032
CVN 82 USS William J. Clinton, expected to enter service in 2036
CVN 83 USS George W. Bush, Still To Be Determined
There are many other reasons why CVNs have problems remaining operational. Eight years ago the navy confirmed that it had major problems with the design and construction of its new EMALS Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System catapult installed in its latest aircraft carrier; the USS Ford CVN 78 and the three other Ford class carriers under construction. During sea trials the Ford used EMALS heavily, as would be the case in combat and training operations and found EMALS less reliable than the older steam catapult, more labor intensive to operate, put more stress on launched aircraft than expected and due to a basic design flaw if one EMALS catapult becomes inoperable, the other three catapults could not be used in the meantime as was the case with steam catapults. This meant that the older practice of taking one or more steam catapults offline for maintenance or repairs while at sea was not practical because the design of the EMALS system did not allow for it. The navy admitted that in combat if one or more catapults were rendered unusable, they remained that way until it was possible to shut down all four catapults for repairs.
The navy also asked for another delay in performing mandated shock tests, in which controlled explosions were set off near the hull that generated at least 66 percent of the amount of force the ship was designed to handle. This would reveal what equipment was not sufficiently built or installed to handle shock and make changes as well as confirming that the hull can handle the stress overall. The navy wanted to wait until the second Ford class carrier entered service in 2024 because, it admitted, it was unsure how badly shock tests would damage new systems and design features. Meanwhile there were some other major shortcomings with the Fords, including electronics, the radars, the flight deck arresting gear and some of the elevators. But none of these are as serious as the malfunctioning catapults.
Some of the problems with EMALS were of the sort that could be fixed while the new ship was in service. That included tweaking EMALS operation to generate less stress on aircraft, modifying design of EMALS and reorganizing how sailors use the system to attain the smaller number of personnel required for catapult operations. But the fatal flaws involved reliability. An EMALS catapult was supposed to have a breakdown every 4,100 launches but in heavy use EMALS actually failed every 400 launches. By the end of 2017 the navy concluded that an EMALS equipped carrier had only a seven percent chance of successfully completing a typical four day surge multiple catapult launches for a major combat operation and only a 70 percent chance of completing a one day surge operation. That was because when one EMALS catapult went down all four were inoperable. In effect the Ford class carriers were much less capable of performing in combat than their predecessors.
With steam catapults when one went down the other three could continue to operate. Worse, even minor repairs or maintenance on one EMALS catapult meant all four had to be out of service. The navy hoped they could come up with some modifications to EMALS to fix all these problems. In the meantime, the new Ford carrier was much less useful than older ones that use steam catapults. In fact, the Ford class carriers were basically worthless, except for training of the non-flight crew which could function without reliable catapults.
There were no easy solutions. For example, it would cost over half a billion dollars to remove EMALS and install the older steam catapults. This would also take up to several years and lead to many other internal changes. The navy considered bringing a recently retired carrier back to active service as a stopgap because whatever the fix is it would not be quick or cheap. The most worrisome part of this was the apparent inability of navy ship building and design experts to come up with a solution for the problem they created.
This EMALS catastrophe was avoidable, and the problems should have been detected and taken care of before the Ford was on sea trials. Back in 2010, when the U.S. Navy planned to equip future aircraft carriers with electromagnetic catapults, it seemed like a great idea, and everyone was assured that all was proceeding according to plan. This was especially true after EMALS passed some key tests in 2010. This included the first time an EMALS catapult launched an F-18E carrier jet fighter. This was from a land base equipped with the test version of EMALS. Earlier in 2010 tests had been put on hold for a bit while software problems were fixed.
The mechanical aspects of the electromagnetic catapult were believed to be pretty much solved but the test model the navy was working with had been having some serious problems with the control software. In the midst of all this there was no mention of the key problems, like being able to repair one catapult while the other three kept working. This had been a key feature of steam catapults for a long time and what is really scary here is that no one caught it.
With the 2010 decision, the plan to put electromagnetic catapults into all future carriers beginning with the Ford went ahead and apparently serious criticism of real problems was no longer an option. This was a great relief at the time because the Ford was under construction and a massive and expensive redesign would be needed to make room for the bulkier steam catapult. Now that option must be again considered, along with the other option, to try and fix the problems that were missed in 2010.
EMALS is still preferred because when it works as designed it puts less stress on launched aircraft, moves the aircraft forward more gradually, requires fewer people to operate, and is easier to maintain without much plumbing, fewer mechanical parts and lots of sturdy electronics. The gentler treatment of launched aircraft would means that smaller aircraft could use the catapult and that aircraft with larger payloads could be launched. Without a functional EMALS the steam and electricity generation system of the Ford class carriers, designed to supply large quantities of electric power, would not be able to provide the needed quantities of electricity to operate powerful new weapons like railguns and high powered lasers as well as EMALS.
The EMALS disaster calls into question the ability of the navy to handle new, untried, technologies. That is not a new problem and has been around since World War II. In retrospect not enough was done to test and address what are now obvious problems. The current solution was to delay the moment of truth as long as possible and then conclude that it was unclear exactly how it happened but that measures would be taken to see that it never happens again. That approach is wearing thin because more people are well aware that is just a cover for the corruption and mismanagement that has been developing within the industries that build warships. The U.S. Navy has been having a growing number of similar problems: the design of the LCS, the DDG 1000 and a lot of smaller systems.
Before the EMALS crisis the Ford was expected to cost nearly $14 billion. About 40 percent of that is for designing the first ship of the class, so the actual cost of the first ship CVN 78 itself will be at least $9 billion and about the same for subsequent ships of the class. Except, that is, for the additional cost of fixing the EMALS problems. Against this the navy expected to reduce the carrier's lifetime operating expenses by several billion dollars because of greatly reduced crew size. Compared to the current Nimitz class carriers, which cost over $5 billion each to build, the Fords will feel, well, kind of empty because of the automation and smaller crews. There was also more computer networking, and robots, reducing the number of people constantly moving around inside a Nimitz class carrier with a crew of 6,000. The most recent Nimitz class ships had a lot of this automation already but adding EMALS was considered too expensive because of the major engineer changes to the power plant and electrical systems. A lot of that is subject to change depending on what internal alterations are required to make the carrier work at least as well as the Nimitz class.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 20, 2026 - 04:58 pm: Edit

Submarines: Transforming the Colombian Drug Trade With Drone Submarines
April 17, 2026: Over the last two decades, Colombian drug cartels have been moving illegal drugs to European and Asian countries using submarines of various types. A recent innovation was unmanned submarines carrying drugs and controlled via an onboard Starlink satellite link. The smugglers back in Colombia operate these drone subs remotely. While each of these subs cost between one and two million dollars to build, each carries up to three tons of drugs, worth over $160 million wholesale. The drone subs are here to stay because they are cheap and none of the cartel members have to risk death or capture while operating the older manned submarines.
The United States has been dealing with these submersibles since 2000 because most of them were used to move cocaine to the United States. About 80 percent of the submersible traffic was in the Pacific, from South America to Mexico and, less often, to Central America. Another 15 percent operated in the Caribbean and a growing percentage of the boats were moving cocaine to Africa and Spain.
Most of these narco-subs are still semi-submersible type vessels. These are 10 to 20-meter fiberglass and wood boats, powered by one or two diesel engines, with a very low freeboard and a small conning tower, providing the crew of 3-5, and engine, with fresh air and the ability to safely navigate. A boat of this type was, since they first appeared in the early 1990s, thought to be the only practical kind of submarine for drug smuggling. After 2000 some drug gangs developed real submarines, capable of carrying 5-10 tons of cocaine. These boats were not true submarines because they did not have batteries so they could operate submerged with the diesel engine turned off. Instead, these subs used a World War II innovation, the snorkel. This looked something like a periscope, but thicker in diameter. For narco-subs, the snorkel mast was not retractable, as it is on military subs, but operated on the same principle.
In the smaller narco-subs, the snorkel proved to be more trouble than it was worth. In bad weather, waves constantly washed over the snorkel and forced its water valve to close, so water did not get into the sub. This often caused the diesel to shut down because of insufficient fresh air and too much exhaust unable to vent. The crew had a separate air supply but that supply was not sufficient to keep the diesel going, even for short periods. The snorkel was largely gone by the late 1990s. Instead, the designs of the semi-submersibles were improved by using better methods to cool the exhaust via more pipes outside the sub hull where the colder water absorbed heat before venting into the air via a curved pipe that sent the exhaust down towards the water rather than straight up. By reducing its heat signature this way, the sub reduced its vulnerability to the heat sensors search aircraft used. At that point the semi-submersible subs were very difficult to spot using radar, heat sensors, or even visually, from the air or a surface ship. With these reduced heat emissions, the snorkel was no longer an attractive alternative. The police and military have since obtained better sensors for detecting these narco-subs. The American military is a leader in this field and that is why the one percent detection rate increased to about ten percent of all narco-subs being detected and caught.
The snorkel subs also cost more than semi-submersibles and required a more highly trained crew. For a long time, there were efforts to borrow a lot of technology and ideas from the growing number of recreational submarines being built. That led to the construction of a few true subs, based on recreational subs. These proved to be more expensive to build and operate and some were still detected at sea or during construction. That meant the true subs were not sufficiently more effective to justify their higher cost. Semi-submersibles cost about $2 million to build, which takes about a year. The true submarines take several years to build and cost over $5 million.
That has led to drug gangs changing their tactics and building smaller narco-subs that carry one or two tons of cocaine at $24 million a ton so that, if one of these subs is caught, its loss is just considered a cost of doing business and not a significant financial loss.
Despite losing over a hundred semi-submersibles to the U.S. and South American naval forces, plus hundreds more to accidents and bad weather plus hundreds more to heavy use, the drug gangs have apparently concluded that the subs are the cheapest and most reliable way to ship the drugs. Early on, several hundred of these narco-subs were built and used on one-way trips to Mexico or the United States. Most of them got through. As new ones were built, their designs and durability improved to the point where the semi-submersibles were capable of multiple round-trips. Some have apparently been refurbished or rebuilt so they can undertake even more voyages.
It was these sturdier and more reliable vessels that made the trans-Atlantic routes possible. The more reliable boats also made it possible to obtain more experienced, and effective, crews. The early designs were dangerous and although high fees were paid to crew, usually operators of offshore fishing boats, it was very dangerous. Some of the early crews were recruited by threats against their families or even by kidnapping of family members. With the reusable boats more crews were making a career out of this well-paying job. Moreover, the trans-Atlantic voyages meant covering about 8,000 kilometers, which could take 15-20 days. The trips to Mexico were less than half that and the ones to Central America, or via the Caribbean, even shorter. The early trans-Atlantic voyages went only as far as some islands close to Europe and Africa but these were still about 75 percent as long as going all the way to Spain.
A detection network, run mainly by the United States, located a lot more of these cocaine subs than there were police or coast guard or navy ships available to run them all down. This was a problem that has yet to be solved. It is complicated by the fact that these aerial contacts can be lost even if you keep the search aircraft in the area for a long time so a surface ship can arrive. One possible solution to this was more international cooperation. Since the early 1990s the United States has used a special interagency group of the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Defense, plus international ones in which over a dozen nations participate in intelligence sharing/analysis operation, called the Joint Interagency Task Force-South, to track drug smuggling from South America. After 2001 the task force became quite expert at tracking the submarines and submersibles built in South America for smuggling cocaine to North America and, in a few cases, all the way to Europe. Some of these long-range subs are apparently going all the way from Ecuador to the United States, bypassing the Mexican cartels, who have been fighting each other in a big way since 2008. Trips directly to the United States proved too dangerous and most of the narco-subs now go to Mexico or Central America.
There was always a concern that larger boats would eventually head for Europe. For years little was known about this effort, except that it existed. Then verifiable reports, from informants, electronic eavesdropping and interrogations confirmed that cocaine was coming in via semi-submersibles. It was believed that these subs would be more at risk of being lost because of an accident or bad weather than being spotted. It turned out that the new designs were even capable of making the trip and usually returning under their own power. European navies, especially Portugal and Spain's, and coast guards were alerted and began searching regularly but until 2019 had never actually caught one of these semi-submersibles. At first, it was thought that the risk of failure was so high for these trans-Atlantic narco-subs that few were built and not on a regular basis. That was not the case and the captured gangsters and overheard electronic communications indicated that the subs had become a regular method for moving the cocaine. Then the drone submarines came along and changed the drug smuggling efforts in unimaginable ways.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 20, 2026 - 04:59 pm: Edit

Surface Forces : The Only Missile Icebreaker Gets Plinked
April 15, 2026: A $222 million dollar Russian missile-armed icebreaker, the only one in existence, was damaged by a bomb dropped by a Ukrainian civilian transport. Earlier Ukrainian drones flew 1,000 kilometers to attack a Russian patrol ship near St Petersburg. The drones returned to Ukraine for reuse. The attack delayed the completion of Russia’s second icebreaker by years. At the same time Russia is having problems building new icebreaker ships because of Ukraine War economic sanctions. Despite the sanctions, Russia wants to build as many as 17 nuclear powered icebreakers. Achieving that goal depends on getting out from under the sanctions. That means negotiating an end to the Ukraine War. With nuclear-powered icebreakers, Russia can keep the Northern Sea Route/NSR that stretches across northern Russia from Archangel and Murmansk to Vladivostok open longer and better protected.
Russia, the country with the longest Arctic Ocean shoreline, has long been the largest producer and user of icebreaking ships. Currently there are nearly 200 icebreakers in service worldwide. This degree of activity not only encourages replacement of older icebreakers nearing retirement age but is also increasing the worldwide icebreaker fleet. Russia operates 40 icebreakers, the largest number of any nation.
While Russia is the largest builder and user of icebreakers, they owe much to Finland. Since World War II Finland has led the world in developing more efficient icebreaker designs. One icebreaker innovation Finland did not develop was the armed combat icebreaker. Russia has already built one armed icebreaker, the 9,000-ton Papanin.
The Papanin joined the Northern Fleet, near the Arctic Circle, in late 2025. Construction of the Papanin began in 2017. Armament consists of a 76mm gun, four 12.7mm machine-guns and two 30mm multi barrel Close In Weapons/CIWS for defense against missiles or small surface vessels. There is also space onboard for Uran anti-ship and Kalibr land attack missiles. Four more Papanins are under construction.
The Papanins have a top speed of 33 kilometers an hour and a max range of 19,000 kilometers at a speed of 19 kilometers an hour. These ships are designed to break through ice up to 1.7 meters thick. Maximum endurance on internal fuel and crew supplies is 70 days. The ship crew is 60 with accommodations for another 50 specialists and observers. A helicopter is carried with a hanger to shelter the helicopter from harsh Arctic weather. There are also two small Raptor class patrol boats that can carry 23 people or just the crew of three and over a ton of supplies or equipment. Some small drones can also be carried. There is room for adding sonar and anti-submarine torpedoes. Papanin is similar to current unarmed Norwegian and Canadian icebreakers.
Papanin is armed to protect traffic on the 5,600 kilometers long Russian NSR that links East Asia with Northern Europe. This Arctic sea lane passes along the exclusively Russian northern coast. Russia wants to maintain control of this corridor even though large parts of it are in international seas, outside Russian coastal waters. Russia also has several land bases along this route. These bases are controlled by the Russian Northern Fleet which has assigned over 10,000 troops, more than a hundred aircraft and several dozen warships and submarines to protect the NSR.
As of 2025 the NSR could accommodate nearly 600 merchant ships a year and that capacity is steadily increasing. Because of the ice and Arctic storms, this route can be treacherous. Safety is achieved if the Russians can maintain enough land bases and ports along the route to monitor weather and sea conditions and provide ports if commercial ships must seek temporary refuge. The Northern Sea Route cuts the time required by a third for ships carrying cargo between East Asia and Northern Europe. China and Russia are two major users of this route and Russia wants to increase the safety and security of this route to encourage heavier use. Russia does not charge a fee to use the Northern Sea Route even though Russia has spent billions of dollars to build and maintain this route.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 20, 2026 - 04:59 pm: Edit

Submarines: China Matches US Ocean Surveillance
April 15, 2026: China is using 64 well-equipped oceanographic research vessels, the majority of which were built within the past 15 years. This modern fleet is larger than the U.S. Academic Research Fleet, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s research fleet, and the U.S. Navy’s fleet of oceanographic survey vessels combined. China’s fleet includes polar-capable ships, fisheries research vessels, and ships designed for autonomous unmanned vehicle, remotely operated vehicle, or manned submersible deployments. A technological showpiece is the Zhu Hai Yun, which operates as a mothership for more than 50 unmanned vehicles, including aerial drones, autonomous surface vehicles, and underwater gliders. Its unmanned vessels can operate simultaneously, providing persistent surveillance of an area extending 160 kilometers across, 4 km above the surface, and 1.5 km below the surface while the mothership remains underway.
China has developed five XLUUV\Extra-Large Unmanned Underwater vehicles measuring 15 to 20 meters long. These vehicles can sense physical data, map the seafloor, and carry torpedoes or mines. The XXLUUVs are large enough to carry towed-array sonars and voyage across the Pacific.
For persistent surveillance throughout the water column, China’s Haiyan and Haiyi gliders can operate for months, traveling thousands of miles and periodically transmitting their locations and observations of temperature, salinity, and depth via satellite. The US has long used its equivalents of these, some of which China has obtained because so many have washed up on stray Pacific beaches after accidents. A military variant of the Haiyan glider is equipped with vector acoustic sensors that can determine a line of bearing to a sound source, as well as magnetometers for submarine detection.
On the seafloor along the First Island Chain, China’s cabled seafloor observatory, the National Seafloor Scientific Observation Network, serves the dual purposes of environmental research and acoustic monitoring of marine traffic. The East China Sea segment is focused on the shallow continental shelf, while the South China Sea segment reaches depths of 3,000 meters. The network consists of acoustic arrays, seismometers, physical and chemical sensors, and navigation beacons that provide docking and acoustic navigation for underwater drones. Because the acoustic arrays and gliders can be a tripwire for submarine detection, the network is viewed as an underwater Great Wall of China.
To improve ocean and acoustic forecasting, global and regional ocean models assimilate data from ships, satellites, unmanned vehicles, and moored sensors for more accurate model initialization. In 2025, China achieved a major breakthrough in ocean modeling with the LICOM K++ model, which provides 1-km horizontal resolution for three-dimensional, global ocean simulations. This is significantly better than the US models which simulate global conditions with only 4-km to 9-km resolution. LICOM K++ can simulate fine-scale processes such as oceanic internal waves and microscale eddies—processes that must be mathematically approximated by operational U.S. global models.
With sustained funding and a blurred line between civilian research and military applications, China has closed the gap in a domain in which the United States has long held a significant advantage: stealthy naval operations. By the end of its current Five-Year Plan, China may achieve parity with U.S. naval capabilities in the western Pacific.
Thirteen years ago, China began installing underwater passive sonar systems in its coastal. This enabled China to monitor submarines operating off its coasts and, presumably, in the South China Sea. South Korea did the same when it announced that it was installing underwater submarine sensors off its coasts and this was apparently completed in 2013. The South Korean effort was in response to North Korea using a small submarine to torpedo a South Korea patrol ship in 2010. China simply wants to keep foreign warships as far away as possible, even if it means trying to force them out of international waters.
Technical details were not revealed by China or South Korea, but this sort of thing is similar to the system of passive they just listen to sonars the United States deployed on the sea bottom in key areas during the Cold War. SOSUS\SOund SUrveillance System consisted of several different networks. On the continental shelf areas bordering the North Atlantic was the CAESAR network. In the North Pacific there was COLOSSUS plus a few sensors in the Indian Ocean and a few other places that no one would talk about. The underwater passive sonars listened to everything and sent their data via cable to land stations. From there it was sent back to a central processing facility, often via satellite link. SOSUS was accurate enough to locate a submarine within a circle no wider than 100 kilometers. That's a large area, but depending on the quality of the contact, the circle might be reduced up to ten kilometers. The major drawback of the system was that it did not cover deep water areas more than 500 kilometers from the edge of the continental shelf. This is not a problem for the South Korean or Chinese systems, as both only cover coastal waters or shallow offshore areas like the South China Sea.
SOSUS systems are very expensive to maintain. SOSUS managed to survive the end of the Cold War by making its sensors available for civilian research and by using cheaper and more powerful electronic and communications technology. While many parts of the SOSUS have been shut down, additional portable SOSUS gear has been put in service, to be deployed as needed.
South Korea had the advantage of being able to get help from the United States about SOSUS and how to collect and process the sound signatures of submarines operating in the area. The U.S. was also able to help South Korea obtain more sensitive passive sonar systems that can identify submarine location more accurately. The U.S. has been doing research in this area and knows that such cooperation would result in American access to the South Korean SOSUS. South Korea also has the design and manufacturing capability for this sort of device. The first South Korea SOSUS system was placed off the west coast, near the North Korean border. North Korean submarines, travelling underwater, using battery power and near the coast, are very hard to detect. The South Korean SOSUS will help even the odds. China’s Internet based espionage efforts have probably already stolen a lot of American SOSUS secrets and that helped a lot.

FYEO

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Monday, April 20, 2026 - 05:25 pm: Edit

“Only a 7% chance of a EMALs equipped carrier of completing a 4 day surge…”

I hate to have to admit this, but Carl may turn out to be right on this one,

$14 billion dollars to build and deploy a Ford Class EMALs type super carrier that can work up to 4 days surge combat operations at up to 7% of the time is a terrible idea.

The U.S. navy would be better off removing the EMALs systems, plate ove the decks and install a ski jump.

They could still launch and land F-35 aircraft and existing drones, but the F-47 drone probably would require a Nimitz.

Looks like the Nimitz is going to make at least one additional deployment… and I wouldn’t bet against the odds that another one after that which would put the Nimitz still in commission in 2032.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 20, 2026 - 10:40 pm: Edit

Nimitz left Washington state in March headed south for a deployment with Southern Command, eventually rounding the horn before docking in Norfolk for deactivation.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 - 12:36 am: Edit

Steve, I suspect that you might be looking at an older report, that was the plan, with the Nimitz starting the deactivation procedure in May 2026.

A more recent statement from the Navy indicated that the Nimitz got a reprieve in the form of being retained in active service ontil 2027.

That last part may be conditional on the Navy finding a fix for the EMALs snafu.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 - 12:42 am: Edit

I should note: President Trump announced in October 2025 that he intended to sign an executive order requiring the U.S. Navy to revert to using steam catapults for new carriers,

He has not yet actually done it yet, but well, he said it.

If he does, that means the four bush class ships might not have very long service lives, and the Miller, Clinton, and Bush 43 might not get built at all.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 - 06:21 am: Edit

Peace Talks: I dunno what's going on. One Iranian faction agreed to give Trump what he wants, another denounced the agreement. For this reason and others I don't think any Iranian signature is worth the paper it's scribbled on. The deal deadline is tomorrow, then bombing resumes and Iran will return to about 1400AD.

By Chuck Strong (Raider) on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 - 12:51 pm: Edit

Then why not go after the IRGC leaders and barracks? Especially those that want to keep fighting.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 - 01:15 pm: Edit

Chuck, Isreal is doing that exact thing piecemeal.

Every check point and machinegun nest that they identify gets hit by what ever system is closest.

According to various MSM sites, the IIRG was afraid of more mass demonstrations such as happened in January 2026, that they were prepared to massacre civilians rather than risk mob rule.

There are other reports of IIRG officers getting killed by civilians, three last week.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 - 01:40 pm: Edit

It's hard to find individual soldiers of one type of unit from airplanes.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 - 02:11 pm: Edit

The ring of sandbags with a crew served heavy machine gun is a pretty good clue…

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 - 03:05 pm: Edit

And an Army post looks just like that, and we really don't want to bomb the Army, just the Guards Corps.

Jeff, let the adults talk now.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 - 03:06 pm: Edit

Air Defense: NATO Nations Defenseless Against Drones
April 21, 2026: The European NATO defensive campaign in the Middle East made clear the inadequacy of its air forces. These were organized around small numbers of manned fighters armed with a few expensive precision-guided missiles. There’s a lot of capability but not much capacity.
Stripped of conventional forces by US and Israeli attacks, Iran is increasingly fighting the war with inexpensive rockets, drones, and mines. These may lack the precision of Western weapons, but can be used in large numbers.
Even while subject to massive air attacks, Iran has managed to launch hundreds of Shahed combat drones at targets throughout the Middle East. A 200kg Shahed can travel more than 1,000 km to deliver a 50-kg warhead, at a cost of about $50,000.
In contrast, a $100m Typhoon fighter’s AIM-120 medium-range air-to-air missiles cost more than a million dollars each, and its AIM-132 short-range air-to-air missiles cost $250,000 each. Even if a Typhoon engages Shaheds with its gun, the cost disparity is remarkable. It costs more than the price of a single Shahed just to fuel up a Eurofighter Typhoon for a three-hour air patrol and maintain it after it lands.
The high cost of European warplanes and munitions diminishes stockpiles. By favoring capability over capacity for both aircraft and munitions, the NATO air forces have steadily diminished in recent decades along with their munition’s supplies.
Iran’s concentration on volume means it was able to continue drone attacks far longer than France and Britain, could maintain its aerial defense against them. Even the US and Israel, with their much bigger air forces and munitions stocks, risk losing a long war of attrition.
Europe must switch to affordable air defenses and do so quickly. It’s a lesson Ukraine learned the hard way as Russia scaled up its deployment of drones, including the Iranian-designed Shaheds, some of which are now built in Russia as Gerans.
Since Ukraine switched to affordable air defenses, other European nations have had sufficient warning that their tiny forces are unprepared for a new era of warfare. They ignored the indications and now have to transform while in combat.
Europe must be prepared to defend against tens of thousands of Shahed combat drone barrages day after day. Given the scale attacks, with Russia launching some 60,000 Shaheds at Ukraine in just four years, manned fighters and surface-to-air missile batteries firing guided missiles are incapable of being the main line of defense.
High-end ground-based air defenses, such as Patriot and SAMP/T missile batteries, are unaffordable and unavailable, and unsuited to the task. Instead, European countries should follow Ukraine’s example and develop layered air defense in which numerous inexpensive drones are an affordable defense. Arab nations in the Persian Gulf have recently made contracts with Ukraine to purchase and set up more of Ukraine’s anti-drone defenses there.
Ukraine’s anti-Shahed system works, and it is common for Ukrainian defenders to take down 90 percent of drones during mass attacks. Ukrainians have efficiently accomplished this once or twice a week, month after month, year after year, while also fending off other aerial attacks. On March 23-24, for example, Russia launched its biggest air attack of the war using 982 missiles and drones. More than 900 of the drones were intercepted.
The Ukrainian system employs wide-area radio jamming that scrambles the satellite communication most Shaheds use for navigation. This costs a few million dollars to protect an entire city for years at a time.
The middle layer is roving aerial patrols, which don’t always involve expensive manned fighters. Instead, they might include helicopters, propeller-driven training planes, or even light cargo aircraft with gunners aiming out of their cockpits or cabins. There are also cheap, fast interceptor drones that range just a few kilometers but strike their targets with enough force to destroy them.
Ground-based gun teams form the innermost layer, taking aim at any drones that get through. The gunners might ride in pickup trucks with heavy machine guns bolted to their beds, or in German-made Gepard tracked gun vehicles first made in the 1960s. It costs a gun team a few hundred dollars in fuel and ammunition to shoot down a Shahed.
NATO countries have come to realize that the drone revolution is real and that NATO nations are unprepared to deal with it. Ukrainian military officials are beginning to change minds in NATO about the drone threat. A growing number of NATO military leaders are realizing that any future Russian attack will overwhelm NATO defenders with millions of drones. Ukraine has manufactured over five million drones since late 2023 and Russia is not far behind. When the Ukraine War ends, NATO nations will be the next Russian target, even if Russia loses in Ukraine.
Since 2022 air, land and naval drones have revolutionized warfare. These systems are evidence that combat robots have become an essential component of the military, without many people in or out of uniform paying a lot of attention. That's still the case, especially because the media and even many senior military and political leaders don’t fully understand the technology or how it is implemented. One example of this confusion can be seen with the constant reference to drones as robots. They are simply remotely controlled aircraft, something that’s been around for over half a century. But these drones are being given more and more operating autonomously robotic capabilities. This isn’t new either, as torpedoes have had this ability for over 60 years and missiles for over 50 years.
Swarms of First Person View or FPV drones revolutionized how wars are fought. There are few methods to defeat drone attacks. The primary defensive measure is electronic jamming of the control signal between the drone operator and the drone. Jamming is of limited effectiveness because active jammers are easy targets for drones programmed to detect, home in on and destroy jammers. Depending on how they are programmed, drones will either land if jammed or return to where they were launched.
Despite those defensive measures, and the small explosive payload drones carry, over half the armored vehicles damaged or destroyed in Ukraine were done in by drones. About 60 percent of all casualties for both sides were inflicted by drones. Drone warfare is dominating the battlefield in Ukraine. Tactics and techniques are also evolving as Ukraine and Russia both experiment with drone designs. Both nations are also increasing production of drones and the number of trained operators. Russia and Ukraine realize that drones provide unprecedented surveillance of the battlefield, but only if you have enough drones and operators. One solution for this shortcoming is operator software that enables one operator to control several drones. The number of drones one operator can handle simultaneously depends on operator experience. That cannot be manufactured but must be developed. Whoever can obtain the most trained operators has an advantage.
All these drone developments make combat far more dangerous for the soldiers on the ground. Drones not only keep an eye on enemy troops but are always ready to go in and put them out of action, as in dead or wounded. Troops are still fighting each other on the ground, but now they have to worry about constant surveillance and attacks from the growing number of drones hovering over the battlefield. In addition to operators there are the drone maintainers, who repair damaged or otherwise disabled drones and service those needing a battery recharge or simply a fresh battery.
Ukraine established a Drone Academy to train drone operators in basic and advanced skills. There are courses for commanders on how best to manage and use drones. This is essential because now Ukrainian infantry battalions have over a hundred drones on their TOE/Tables Of Equipment and access to quick replacement of drones used. Americans call items like drones a force multiplier. This means a battalion with lots of drones is more effective, and lethal, than a battalion without so many drones. The Ukrainian military is the first to go so far in this direction and appear to be benefitting from the massive use of drones. Other nations are closely following this development and preparing to adopt what works for Ukraine. Russia is more conservative in how they deal with this, even though they are also using massive numbers of drones.
There are already dozens of Ukrainian companies offering training for drone operators and the Ukrainian military uses the services of these firms. In 2023 Ukraine sought to have more than 10,000 trained operators as quickly as possible. Drone operators specialize. Most learn to operate quadcopters while a large minority learn how to operate FPV drones, and a smaller number learn how to operate fixed wing drones. Ukraine has found that the most difficult operators to recruit and train are those for FPV drones. The Ukrainian military considers drone operators as a separate military specialty like infantryman, artillerymen, or radar operator.
In early 2024 Ukraine created a new branch of their military, the Unmanned Aircraft, or Drone Force. This is in addition to the Ukrainian Air Force and its manned aircraft. The Drone Force does not control the drones Ukrainian forces use regularly and instead contributes to developing new drone models and organizing mass production for those new models that are successful. Drones have been an unexpected development that had a huge impact on how battles in Ukraine's current war are fought. Drones were successful because they were cheap, easily modified, and expendable.
Early on both Russian and Ukrainian forces were using cheap, at a few hundred dollars each, quadcopter drones controlled by soldiers a kilometer or more away using FPV goggles to see what the day/night video camera on the drone can see. Each of these drones carries half a kilogram of explosives, so it can instantly turn the drone into a flying bomb that can fly into a target and detonate. This was an awesome and debilitating weapon when used in large numbers over the combat zone. If a target isn’t moving or requires more explosive power that the drones can supply, one of the drone operators can call in artillery, rocket, or missile fire, or even an airstrike. Larger, fixed wing drones are used for long range, often over a thousand kilometers, operations against targets deep inside Russia.
Since 2022 the use of drones by both sides has escalated and so far millions of drones have been put to work providing surveillance and attack services for both sides. The Ukrainians consider drones another form of ammunition that is cheaper, smarter and far more effective and lethal than guided missiles or GPS guided artillery shells.
NATO leaders, more than the distant Americans, realize that drones are a major threat. Europeans are developing a joint air defense system that now needs the ability to detect and destroy drones as well as aircraft and ballistic missiles. So many new problems and so far, so few solutions.


FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 - 03:06 pm: Edit

Weapons: Russia Declares Snipers Sportsmen
April 21, 2026: The Russian Ministry of Sports decided that shooting with sniper rifles was now an official sporting discipline. Soldiers operating as snipers is now considered a Russian sporting event. There are several categories of shooting including rifles weighing more than 12 kg with a range of up to 3,500 meters. Combining experienced soldiers with those who have achieved skills as sport shooters will create a culture of sniping that will flourish throughout the country. This will begin with training teenage boys how to shoot. This effort began in early 2025 using Russian military rifles like the 12.7 mm AVSK sniper rifle that can hit targets as far away as 2,000 meters.
This came after Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine since early 2022 used so much assault rifle ammunition that by the end of 2023 troops were told to use less ammunition because there was a shortage of rifle ammo. While Russian munitions factories produce several billion rounds of rifle ammunition a year and despite a pre-war stockpile of nearly ten billion rounds, Russian troops soon used much of that and are now facing a shortage of rifle ammunition. Troops are advised to avoid using their rifles on full automatic, like a machinegun. Rifle ammo is one of many shortages Russian troops suffer from in Ukraine. There’s not enough winter clothing, food, and medical supplies though the food shortage is more due to transport problems. There are also shortages of artillery and mortar ammunition. There were about 400,000 Russian soldiers at the time in Ukraine and most rarely fired their rides and when they did it was single shots. Most of those soldiers were using a new model assault rifle, the AK-12 which received its first large-scale combat use once the invasion of Ukraine began in early 2022. The manufacturer didn’t receive many complaints from troops in Ukraine, other than there were not enough AK-12s for all the newly mobilized troops. There was one minor complaint about the two-round burst capability. It wasn’t used except by accident when the user erroneously selected burst fire when they were seeking to select one of the other two options: single-shot or full-automatic. All new or repaired AK-12s had the burst option removed. Western assault rifle manufacturers came to the same conclusion about burst fire and eliminated this option.
Ukrainian troops were also satisfied users of their many captured AK-12s, as it is a major improvement on the older AK rifles Ukrainian troops still used. Ukraine had to quickly arm several hundred thousand new troops in early 2022 after the Russians invaded. Most of those new and territorial/local defense troops received one of several AK type rifles. This included the original 1950’s – 1960’s AK-47 and AKM models using the original 7.62mm round. More recent AK rifles used the 5.45mm round, which is similar to the 5.56mm round the Americans have been using since the 1960s. The United States and other NATO nations have, in the last year, provided Ukraine with thousands of assault rifles that used the 5.56mm round.
There were a growing number of non-Russian users of the AK-12, most of them export customers. Ukraine was the only foreign user that captured them from Russian troops. The first paying export customers were the Persian Gulf Arab nation Qatar and Qatari troops that received the AK-12 in 2018, before most Russian soldiers got them. Qatar never officially announced that it was buying the AK-12 rifles. Previously Qatar, whose army has 42,000 active-duty troops, were already using some older AK-47s but had replaced most of those with the M-16 and similar models from various European suppliers. All these M-16 type weapons used the same ammo, while the AK-47 and more recent assault rifle designs did not.
It was not until mid-2017 that Russia selected the new AK-12 assault rifles as its new standard infantry rifle and part of its new future soldier Ratnik set of gear for its infantry. The government initially had trouble finding the money to buy the 70,000 or more Ratnik systems the army wanted. It wasn’t until 2021 that about half the Ratnik systems were delivered. Priority was given to special operations troops, airborne, airmobile, and marine units.
The basic AK-12 fires the same 5.45x39 round as the AK-74 it replaced, but the AK-12 costs 25 percent more. The AK-12 outperformed the AK-74 in extensive field tests and the troops preferred the new rifle. In 2014 one major change was made to the original 2011 AK-12 design that lowered manufacturing costs and fixed some problems found in field testing. The new version, codenamed AK-400, won the competition with rival rifle designs in 2017. The AK-12 could also be provided in a version that fired the old AK-47 7.62x39mm round that was introduced in 1944 and was still popular in many countries. The AK-12 also keeps the basic design principles of the AK-47 alive into the 21st century.
How the AK-12 came to be quite an epic undertaking. Russia made several attempts to develop and introduce a replacement for the AK-74. Some new designs even made it into combat. For example, some special operations units got the new AN-94 in the 1990s while most troops continued to use the elderly, in design and manufacture, AK-74s. The troops wanted something that could match the improvements in Western assault rifles. The firm that designed most Russian assault rifles since the 1940s designed a new AK-12 assault rifle in response to that but the Russian Defense Ministry stalled efforts to even test it. That resistance was finally overcome, and the AK-12 eventually passed the tests and outperformed competing designs.
This all began in 2012 when the two-century old Russian firm Izhmash, later renamed the Kalashnikov Company, that had produced assault rifles since World War II, announced the arrival of their AK-12 fifth-generation assault rifle. Like earlier AKs the AK-12 used a lot of the basic AK-47 design principles but added many new features popular in Western assault rifles. The AK-12 is but the latest in a long line of innovative Russian infantry weapons that began showing up towards the end of World War II. Assault rifles have since become the standard infantry weapon, almost entirely replacing bolt-action and semi-automatic rifles. The first-generation AK was the AK-47 followed by the AKM in the 1960s, then the AK-74, which was very similar to the U.S. M-16. In the 1970s there were limited numbers of the AN-94, a much-improved AK-74, in the 1990s. Over fifty million AK-47s and AKMs were made, most of them outside Russia. Production on a small scale continues. It is still the most numerous assault rifle in use.
The original AK-12, code named AK-200, was a 3.3 kg weapon that was 943 mm long with a 415mm barrel. It can be fitted to fire one of four calibers: the original 7.62x39 of the AK-47/AKM, the 5.56x45 of the M-16, the 5.45x39 of the AK-74, or the 7.62x51 NATO rifle/machine-gun round. The AK-12 can use all AK-47/AKM magazines when firing 7.62x39 ammo.
There are a lot of small but important changes in the AK-12. The stock was adjustable. The charging handle is easily used whether you are left or right-handed. There is an improved safety switch, pistol grip, hinged top cover, muzzle break, iron sight, and smaller ejection port. The AK-12 has Picatinny rails, which the U.S. developed standard for attaching all sorts of accessories. The fire control switch now allows for single shot and full- automatic. The AK-12 is inherently more accurate because of improved barrel rifling. The AK-12 handles more easily, has a longer effective range of up to 600 meters, and apparently has the same ruggedness of the original AK-47. That last item was put to the test, as the Russian military has had a growing number of AK-12s into the field since 2015, where their performance under combat conditions could be monitored.
In 2018 Russia introduced an AK-12 variant, the AK-308, which fires the standard NATO 7.62x51 rifle ammo. Known to civilians as the Winchester 308 round, the 7.62x51 has been a NATO standard since the 1950s. While largely replaced by the 5.56x45 round in the 1960s and 70s, the 7.62mm is still widely used for sniper rifles and vehicle mounted machine-guns. The Russian company that manufactures the AK line of weapons has, since the 1990s, come up with a lot of new designs, mainly for the export market and these new weapons were often chambered for the Western 7.62mm and 5.56mm or whatever a large purchaser wanted. The AK-308 prototype evolved into the new Russian military rifle AK-12/15 chambered for the 7.62x51 rather than the 5.45x39 AK-12 round or the 7.62x39 for the AK-15 and AK-47.
The AK-308 is 885mm long with a 415mm barrel and folding stock. Empty weight is 4.1 kg, and it uses a 20 or 30 round magazine. Rate of fire on full-automatic is 700 rounds a minute and max effective range is 800 meters. AK-308 has a Picatinny rail and attachments for grenade launcher, suppressor, and bayonet. In short, it is a 7.62mm rifle any Western soldier would immediately be able to handle even though it is obviously based on the original AK-47 design. The AK-308 is actually based on the AK-103 which was itself a version of the 1970s AK-74. The latest Russian assault rifle, the AK-12 also can be adapted to fire the NATO 7.62x51 but the AK-308 design is competitive with the AK-12/15 weapons which are the latest generation of Russian military rifles.
All these AK rifles began with a Russian World War II veteran, Mikhail Kalashnikov, who came up with a brilliant rifle design which so impressed his bosses that they named it after him. AK means Avtomat Kalashnikova which literally translates as Kalashnikov Automatic. This was no fluke. Kalashnikov had always been into mechanical things and grew up in Siberia where rural folk could own a rifle for hunting. As a result of that he was familiar with how rifles operated in addition to being a mechanical genius. Kalashnikov was conscripted in 1938 and because of his small size was assigned to a tank unit. There his ingenuity and mechanical skills came to the notice of his superiors, who praised and encouraged him. He was badly wounded in combat in 1941 and while he spent six months recuperating, came up with some innovative ideas for a new rifle design, instigated by complaints he heard from wounded infantry soldiers. He wrote to the senior officers who had praised his skills before the war and was transferred to a weapons development organization. Among his many innovations and designs over the next five years was the AK-47, which began replacing all older infantry rifles in 1949. Kalashnikov died in 2013 but until the end he hunted and innovated, backing things like the Ratnik concept.
The Ratnik system is the Russian version of an American concept pioneered in the 1980s, called Land Warrior, which resulted in the introduction of new body armor, personal communications, wearable computers, night vision devices, and personal medical equipment. Several European countries have followed, especially the German Infanterist der Zukunft or Infantryman Of The Future, and Russia did the same but was delayed by cash shortages and debates over whether a new infantry rifle was needed. Unlike the United States, Russia included a new rifle design AK-12 as part of its Ratnik gear. There was a lot of opposition to the AK-12 within the Russian high command, but at the troop level there was an even more vigorous and louder call for something to replace the Cold War era AK-74.
The AK-12 was not the best, from a technical point of view, candidate for Ratnik. The A545 was a more modern and efficient design, but the AK-12 proved more rugged and Russian troops are not big fans of radical change when it comes to basic items like rifles. The AK-12 is the second attempt since the end of the Cold War in 1991 to develop a worthy successor to the AK-47. Earlier efforts had not been entirely successful. Part of the problem was that there was not a pressing need for a new AK in Russia. For example, in 2011, Russia stopped buying new AK-74 rifles. Since they already have ten million AK assault rifles, most of them older AK-47 and AKM models in stock and less than a million troops on active duty, plus about as many in the reserves. Buying more assault rifles was deemed wasteful. This did not stop the purchase of special small arms for commandos and other specialist combat units.
The new policy did not stop work on the new AK-12. This weapon was originally based on the 5.45mm AK-74, which replaced the 7.62mm AK-47/AKM series as the standard infantry weapon towards the end of the Cold War. The AK-74 entered service in the 1970s and twenty years later a replacement was developed, the AN-94. This rifle used the 5.45mm round first seen in the AK-74 but was able to use larger, 45-round and 60-round magazines. The AN-94 also had burst fire of two rounds, while Western rifles tend to use three rounds.
The AN-94 was supposed to replace all AK-74s in Russian service but due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and sharp cuts in the defense budget, this did not happen. There were also concerns about the mechanical complexity and reliability of the AN-94. That's apparently why the AK-12 was not based on the AN-94. One AN-94 feature that was adopted for the AK-12 was the option to use a 60-round magazine.
Meanwhile, an improved AK-74M was introduced in 1991, and is still in service. This is a 3.4 kg, 943 mm weapon with a 415 mm barrel. It has rails for sights and such and can use a 30 or 45 round magazine. Rate of fire is 650 RPM on full auto, and max effective range was 600 meters. The AK-74 looked like an AK-47 and used the same technology.
Some five million AK-74s were built, most before the Cold War ended in 1991. North Korea manufactures a copy of the AK-74 called the Type 98. The AK-74M was the basis for the AK-12, and the two weapons are very similar, with the new rifle having more flexibility and capacity for accessories.

FYEO

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 - 04:15 pm: Edit

"the left has declared Israel the new Nazis and actively supports Islamic terrorist groups"

I think this is a tad unfair. There are plenty on the right that despise Israel and on the left that support it.

For example three "on the right" anti Israel people in the US:

Candace Owens: U.S. conservative commentator, noted for promoting conspiracy theories and criticizing "Zionist" influence.

Nick Fuentes: Far-right American political commentator and white nationalist.

Tucker Carlson: U.S. conservative podcaster and former Fox News host.

By A David Merritt (Adm) on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 - 04:51 pm: Edit

EMALS; my understanding is that if one breaks down, the other one in its position, (Forward/Angled flight decks) still needs to be shut down, instead of all four needing to be shut down. With future vessels having the ability to keep three working, while one is repaired.

Is this correct?

In any event, given that China has on EMALS CV, and the UK is working on refitting their carries, eventually, as well as France and India planning on using EMALS it would appear that US problems are more in the vein of poor implementation, than a bad idea.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 - 05:13 pm: Edit

Trump has extended the ceasefire for an undefined period of time until Iran presents their new proposal for peace. Iran has a history of stalling peace talks without any real intention of reaching a deal.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 - 05:25 pm: Edit

Mike, a few cherry picked outliers don’t prove anything, and the three you cited are so far out there I cannot see them from my porch.

Meanwhile the vast majority mainstream left is doing exactly what the article says.

It’s totally fair.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 - 06:03 pm: Edit

But the blockade still in place may limit how much Iran can practically stall.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 - 09:21 pm: Edit

That's why Trump won't end the blockade.

Iran demands that Trump end the blockade (and sanctions) as a condition to START peace talks. Nobody could be that stupid.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 - 10:34 pm: Edit

In other news The Secretary of the Air Force made an announcement about the plans for the A-10 warthog aircraft.

Quote:” Air Force Delays A-10 Retirement Until 2030
April 20, 2026 | By Chris Gordon


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The Air Force is extending the life of the A-10 Thunderbolt II attack plane until at least 2030, pausing the service’s plan to retire the close air support aircraft amid active combat in the Middle East.

Air Force Secretary Troy Meink announced the move on social media, saying the service made the move in consultation with Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth.


Meink promised there was “more to come” after praising President Donald Trump for “quick, decisive leadership as we equip our force.”

The Air Force is set to unveil its fiscal 2027 budget on April 21, when its latest plans for its future fleet are likely to come into focus.

The service has tried to wind down its fleet of A-10s for years, arguing that the aircraft isn’t survivable in the high-end conflict that it expects to face in the future and had planned to rid itself of the aircraft by the end of the decade. But Meink’s comments indicate it has reversed course. The move comes as the aircraft has been heavily used in recent operations in the Middle East.

“This preserves combat power as the Defense Industrial Base works to increase combat aircraft production,” Meink wrote on in a post on X.

The Air Force plans to replace the A-10 in its close air support role with the F-35A Lightning II stealth fighter, and it plans to buy 38 F-35As in fiscal 2027. The Air Force has yet to spell out its full plans for the next few years, but high-level budget documents released earlier this month offer insight into procurement plans for some platforms. In addition to F-35s, the Air Force plans to buy 24 F-15EXs next year—62 new fighters in total. The service will have a total of 129 F-15EX Eagle II fighters under plans released last year. The Air Force is also investing significantly in the B-21 Raider bomber and the sixth-generation F-47 fighter jet.

As of fiscal 2026, there were 162 A-10s in the Air Force inventory, which the service originally planned to retire. Some members of Congress have long been skeptical of the Air Force’s plans to retire the A-10, nicknamed the “Warthog,” and the latest National Defense Authorization Act mandated that the USAF keep at least 103 A-10s through the end of this fiscal year. The bill also required Meink to deliver a report to Congress on the status of the Air Force’s A-10 fleet and its proposed retirement plans by the end of last month, a briefing which has not been made public.

Earlier this year, the Air Force ended pilot training for new A-10 aviators and is ceasing depot-level maintenance—airframe overhauls, upgrades, and rebuilds—for the aircraft as part of its long-term plan to retire the Warthog. The Air Force has cut a quarter of its A-10 inventory since 2024 and planned to shelve the remaining fleet over the next two years.

But the A-10 remains a key aircraft in current conflicts. A-10s have been used by U.S. Central Command against Iranian-aligned militia groups in Iraq and against armed Iranian small boats in the Strait of Hormuz during the conflict with Iran, according to U.S. officials. A-10s are among the aircraft being used to enforce a U.S. blockade against Iranian ports, people familiar with the matter told Air & Space Forces Magazine.”

There is much more to the article, just copied what seemed important, but in my haste might have missed some othe points, there is a lot in the whole article.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 - 11:10 pm: Edit

We need to build more A10s.

By Douglas Lampert (Dlampert) on Wednesday, April 22, 2026 - 01:10 pm: Edit

Steve, you should know better, we can't build more of a 1972 design that only cost $12 million a unit in today's dollars (building in the upgrades would presumably add something to that if you could build one today).

We need a newer, better, more modern version with so much electronics that it needs to be a two seater with an estimated cost of $100 million. That will be much better.