How about a three-seater: Pilot, weapons officer, social media influencer? That would allow us to post YouTube and X and Reddit in real time.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, April 22, 2026 - 02:07 pm: Edit

Leadership: China Does Not Need Persian Gulf Oil
April 22, 2026: Specialists in the PRC/People’s Republic of China claim that the country’s energy system is robust enough to withstand major foreign disruptions, including war in the Persian Gulf, disputing Western assertions of Chinese susceptibility to strategic chokepoints.
Because of supply route divergence via Russia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia, potential blockades of the straits of Hormuz or Malacca now inflict less economic damage to the Chinese energy supply. Global economic interdependence and China's growing domestic energy ability further limit risk of disruption.
Strategic petroleum reserves, varied imports, domestic production especially coal, and rapid expansion of renewable energy have helped reduce the Chinese reliance on seaborne oil and augmented its long-term energy security.
The notion that China remains excessively dependent on foreign energy imports has obtained continued traction in Western policy discussions. Some analysts argue that American military action against Iran would significantly weaken Chinese energy security, while others suggest that an American naval blockade of the Strait of Malacca could serve as a dependable instrument of military and economic deterrence against China. Many scholars and policy experts largely identify no such liabilities. Few believe that any blockade of the Strait of Hormuz could be sustained over the medium, let alone long term, and many argue that the so-called Malacca dilemma has largely faded amid the Chinese diversification of energy sources and rapid expansion of domestic energy capacity.
The Chinese reliance on foreign energy remains substantial. According to World Bank data, China imported roughly 30 percent of its total energy consumption as of 2023, while the United States was a net energy exporter. This underlying dependence constitutes a real strategic vulnerability and helps explain China’s sustained emphasis on energy security. The key issue, however, is not whether such vulnerability exists, but whether it is as acute or as exploitable through military or economic coercion as commonly assumed. Much of China’s energy strategy over the past two decades can be understood as an effort to mitigate this risk.
Chinese experts generally argue that a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is untenable and unlikely to critically threaten the Chinese energy guarantees. Iran’s economy is to a large extent reliant on oil exports, so the Strait of Hormuz will have to open eventually. Iran’s blockade is limited and not intended to block the Strait of Hormuz, as Iran is selectively allowing certain Chinese vessels transit. Iran is not capable of maintaining a long-term blockade of the strait, which is why it has targeted vessels rather than closing the strait entirely. The new American announcement of a blockade of Iranian imports and exports may change that.
Chinese influential officials point out that China enjoys a robust and flexible toolkit to manage any potential energy disruptions. Despite escalating pressures in international energy markets caused by the Iran crisis, the Chinese administration has already established an energy security system including strategic petroleum reserves, commercial reserves, domestic exploration, diversified imports, and the rapid growth of new 21st Century energy 21st Century plan. Likewise, even if Iranian oil imports were removed, these supplies account for less than 15 percent of China’s total imports. China maintains over 1.3 billion barrels of crude oil reserves, equivalent to about 180 days of consumption, far exceeding the 150-day threshold recommended by the International Energy Agency. This also enhances the country’s resilience to supply upsets. In practical terms, Chinese analysts observe that coordination between China and the largest oil companies; Sinopec, China National Petroleum Corporation CNPC, and China National Offshore Oil Corporation act as a buffer that can cover import gaps, helping to stabilize prices and prevent market panic. Combined with regional infrastructure and diversified sources, these measures help manage any supply disruption.
Chinese leaders express confidence that the economy is well-positioned to absorb the impact of any market shocks caused by the Iran conflict. State-owned oil companies would absorb some of the market shocks and mitigate energy prices. Deflationary pressures in China also work in China’s favor in hedging against oil-induced inflation. This contrasts with the low-inflation environment of Japan and India, and it will help to manage price fluctuations, even if costs increase for corporations.
Chinese experts argue that the Malacca Strait is no longer a critical vulnerability, as the existence of other global chokepoints and Chinese diversification of energy sources reduce its strategic significance. The Malacca dilemma is a false proposition, claiming that the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean are strewn with U.S. naval and air bases, so the threat persists even without a blockade. Chinese noted in the same year that the Lombok, Sunda, and Miyako straits also would still pose threats, even if China could break through the Malacca Strait.
China has overcome the Malacca dilemma through domestic energy diversification efforts and the construction of new routes. Other experts widely emphasize that strong energy self-sufficiency, combined with diversified energy import routes, has greatly reduced the strategic importance of the Malacca Strait as a potential chokepoint. In 2023, experts saw no risk to Chinese energy security, assessing that China could reach a self-sufficiency rate of 80 percent. China imports oil and gas from 55 different countries, and new import routes from Myanmar, Central Asia, and Russia have reduced dependence on maritime transport via the Malacca Strait. Chinese experts further note that with Russian oil now heading south to China and India, China is no longer as vulnerable to external energy shocks.
Experts also highlight that growing military coverage demonstrates that China can effectively manage energy supply routes. Good relations with neighboring countries have produced new overland energy passages, and the Chinese Air Force operational radius now covers the Malacca Strait. With these factors in mind, he sees the Malacca Strait as increasingly insignificant. Some experts argued that the Malacca Strait may not even constitute a chokepoint in the first place, as international legal arrangements and the shared interests of major powers would preserve freedom of navigation there. Nearly all countries have a stake in the strait, and that no one country’s navy could block it.
China’s continued reliance on coal, combined with extensive domestic energy infrastructure, provides a robust foundation for the energy system. Coal reserves, which account for over 90 percent of the China’s fossil fuel reserves, have reached 280 million tons, enough to meet 30 days of consumption by coal plants across the country China is nearly self-sufficient in coal and has an extensive interprovincial railway-waterway coal transport network, which is an important safeguard for energy security.
Beyond domestic production, China's substantial domestic market strengthens its bargaining power with energy-producing countries, further mitigating the risks posed by potential chokepoints or external disruptions. Exporting countries need access to China's energy market. The global energy market, if the Iran War had not started, is a buyer’s market, a fact recognized across the world. Researchers at the Chinese Academy of Sciences CAS echo this sentiment, recently writing that the size of the Chinese market will translate to productive international relationships and maintain bargaining power.
In the long-term, the threat posed by blockades may further diminish as Chinese growth slows and it increasingly relies on renewable energy. China’s recent increases in energy consumption have been significantly slower than its alleged increases in GDP. Consequently, disruptions to imports today cause less macroeconomic damage than they would have done a decade ago. During the same period, the share of total energy consumption accounted for by clean energy increased from less than 17 percent to more than 31 percent, reflecting a decreasing reliance on imported oil overall and making China more resilient to energy shocks. It has been noted that new energy replaced 28 million tons of gasoline and diesel consumption in 2024, suggesting that domestic gasoline and diesel consumption may have already peaked. He believes that oil security pressure may decrease.
Chinese energy security is far more robust than is often portrayed in Western policy discourse. While U.S. strategists and some analysts continue to emphasize chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca as potential levers of leverage over China, Chinese experts reject the notion that these waterways constitute critical vulnerabilities. Despite continued reliance on foreign oil, Chinese scholars and policy analysts have argued that China has diversified its import sources, expanded domestic production, and built strategic reserves to the extent that China can absorb even a prolonged disruption. Additionally, Chinese investments in renewable energy, new energy vehicles, and overland pipelines further reduce dependence on maritime chokepoints. Its bargaining power with resource-producing nations also helps to effectively mitigate external threats. In short, the so-called Malacca dilemma and Strait of Hormuz anxieties are largely overstated, reflecting a Western perception gap rather than actual vulnerabilities.
These all ignore the possibility that China might attack Taiwan, which would result in a US blockade of China. This would not be an energy disaster for China, as its present need for 30% of its energy from oil and coal imports would be offset by the collapse of its exports whose energy use comprises about 30% of all Chinese energy use. The major US blockade threat to China would be that it would put about 30% of China’s labor force out of work, an event which terrifies the Chinese Communist Party.
A definite point to ponder concerning the Iran war is the collapse of Chinese relations with the oil-producing Arab states of the Persian Gulf, and with Iran if its mullah regime is destroyed. China has overtly sided with the latter, which attacked those countries though they were neutral in the war. The Iranian people hate their mullah regime so, if it is replaced, they may hate China as an aider of their oppression by the mullahs. This might result in a voluntary embargo by the entire Persian Gulf on all oil exports to China in the event of a war with the Americans.
These all ignore the possibility that China might attack Taiwan, which would result in a US blockade of China. This would not be an energy disaster for China, as its present need for 30 percent of its energy from oil and coal imports would be offset by the collapse of its exports whose energy use comprises about 30 percent of all Chinese energy use. The major American blockade threat to China would be that it would put about 30 percent of China’s labor force out of work, an event which terrifies the Chinese Communist Party.
A definite point to ponder concerning the Iran war is the collapse of Chinese relations with the oil-producing Arab states of the Persian Gulf, and with Iran if its religious dictatorship is destroyed. China has overtly sided with the latter, which attacked those countries though they were neutral in the war. The Iranian people hate their religious dictatorship so, if it is replaced, they may hate China as an enabler of their oppression by the religious dictatorship. This might result in a voluntary embargo by the entire Persian Gulf on all oil exports to China in the event of a war with the Americans.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, April 22, 2026 - 02:08 pm: Edit

Russia Must Have More Efficient Corruption
April 22, 2026: Russian leader Vladimir Putin has demanded more efficient corruption in the military. Russia is running out of money for its war with Ukraine because the military system is riddled with corruption, and no one has been able to get a grip on it.
Vladimir Putin’s Russia, like many post-Soviet autocratic systems, is built on dense patronage networks that allow members of the president’s inner circle to steal money. This form of corruption is watched and, when the moment is right, the targeted individual can be accused of stealing money though the government has known that all along. Generals are told to behave as expected, or your crimes will be revealed, and you will be humiliated.
There are limits. The Russian budget is under huge pressure. Whatever the results of the American -Israeli war on Iran where the Americans have temporarily eased sanctions on Russian oil, any relief can’t come soon enough. Russia is now in serious talks about slashing the 2026 budget by 10 percent. Any cuts would fall mainly on the civilian side of the economy, while military spending remains untouched.
Even so, the Defense Ministry remains under significant political pressure, something demonstrated by the continuing campaign against graft. Earlier this year, the government announced the arrest on corruption charges of yet another former deputy defense minister, Ruslan Tsalikov, a close, long-time associate of Sergey Shoigu, who led the ministry until 2024. He was a much-decorated official, with a full Knight of the Merit to the Fatherland Order who had been rewarded for impeccable service.
Tsalikov is accused of creating a criminal group to steal from the state budget from 2017-24, and of bribery and money laundering. The Russia of 2026 is saying that the Russia of 2024 and before was corrupt at the highest levels. That is one reason why Shoigu was replaced by Andrei Belousov, an economist with no military background two years ago. Russia’s public explanation, echoed by analysts, was simple: impose discipline on the war budget’s exponential growth. This has not worked. Every Russian budget since 2022 has promised to cut military spending in two or three years, and none has done so.
Unable to reduce outlays, the government has made efforts to spend more efficiently by reducing corruption. At least, that is one way to read parallel processes that have been unfolding inside the defense ministry over the past two years.
The first involved arguably the most sweeping purge of officials in the history of post-Soviet Russia. Shoigu’s removal as minister in May 2024 was preceded by the arrest of several close associates, including another deputy minister. But the purge didn’t stop when the leadership changed.
It has now lasted two years, and more than seventy individuals have been arrested so far. Nearly half are officials from the Defense Ministry or its subordinate organizations, the other half are their suppliers and contractors. By comparison, the previous Defense Ministry purge, which also accompanied a change of minister in 2012, swept up fewer than 20 people and barely touched senior officials.
In dictatorships, high-profile anti-corruption cases are usually a tool for redistributing cash. But sometimes, given the right incentives at the top, something closer to performance-driven anti-corruption emerges. The government clearly has those incentives now and Putin wants his war machine to be more effective.
The relentlessly expanding purge at the Defense Ministry may well serve that goal. The FSB-led security services are dismantling the cash-extraction networks built up under Shoigu’s team, clearing the way for new leadership to restructure the ministry more quickly.
The identity of the targets supports this argument. Roughly 85 percent of defendants come from the logistics side of the military machine that provide construction, food supply, and ammunition. All four arrested deputy ministers oversaw these domains. The armament side has barely been touched during the purges.
Yet there is every reason to think corruption is as deeply embedded across the Russian military system. The asymmetry in the purge may reflect a deliberate priority: to squeeze costs in logistics and support, so that spending on armament can keep growing.
The classified-versus-open military spending ratio offers indirect confirmation. Until 2023, the split was roughly equal. By 2024–2025, the share of classified expenditure, which primarily covers armament procurement, had risen to nearly 70 percent.
The purge is only half the story. Alongside it, a second process has been unfolding inside the Defense Ministry, one that points to a different kind of change.
Until 2024, the ministry, like much of the Russian federal bureaucracy, was run as the private fiefdom of a single elite faction. Even if the General Staff reported directly to Putin, Shoigu controlled the business side of the ministry and used it to cultivate his patronage network.
His successor, Belousov, likely commands a smaller network of his own, although the Dossier publication has published documents about his private life, including an Italian villa. Despite the fact that he begins official meetings with a prayer, it is likely Belousov has built new cash-extraction chains given the sheer scale of the defense budget. But the government changed strategy, rather than handing the ministry to a single faction, it shifted it to collective management. At least, that is what the biography of the new deputy minister lineup suggests.
Belousov himself managed to place only one close ally among his 10 deputies: Oleg Savelyev, a colleague from his years at the Economics Ministry. Pavel Fradkov was another appointee. He is a figure with security service ties, son of a former SVR chief, and brother of the head of the state-controlled bank financing military procurement.
The first deputy minister slot went to Leonid Gornin, a senior Finance Ministry technocrat. Despite a superficially similar background to Belousov, Gornin represents a different wing of the economic bureaucracy — he is closer to the tight-money faction around the finance minister and central bank head, and considerably more skeptical of the large-scale state investment agenda that Belousov has long championed.
Another deputy minister is Anna Tsiviliova, Putin’s niece and head of the Defenders of the Fatherland foundation, the state veterans’ fund that functions, in practice, as a political control mechanism over that constituency.
Two more deputies, Alexei Krivoruchko and Vasily Osmakov, who oversee the armament sector, are close to Sergei Chemezov, the powerful head of the state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec, and one of Putin’s longest-standing allies.
The remaining four deputies, including Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, come from the military. Three held their posts through the 2024 reshuffle. The fourth, Alexander Sanchik, a career officer who commanded major Russian formations in Ukraine, was personally introduced to his new role by Putin in November. Sanchik will oversee most logistics departments.
Two years after Shoigu’s removal, both the purge and the shift to collective management appear to be structural rather than temporary changes. Together they point to a system designed not to reduce war spending, but to make Russia’s war machine run more efficiently under tighter political control.
That much is clear. It is less clear whether the changes are actually achieving the efficiencies that Putin seeks or whether Russia’s old boy system has pioneered new methods to rob the taxpayer, and short-change the soldiers at the front.
FYEO

By Jason E. Schaff (Jschaff297061) on Wednesday, April 22, 2026 - 06:19 pm: Edit

The A-10 looks to be on its way to becoming for tactical aircraft what the B-52 is for strategic aircraft.

By MarkSHoyle (Bolo) on Wednesday, April 22, 2026 - 06:43 pm: Edit

There are several pics (imagination I assume) of updated/slimmed down version of the A-10....

Nice looking a/c but don't know if whoever though it up thinks it would be as rugged as the current airframe...

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, April 22, 2026 - 07:06 pm: Edit

I would think with current technology we could build a super A10M.

By Mike Erickson (Mike_Erickson) on Wednesday, April 22, 2026 - 08:11 pm: Edit

>> The A-10 looks to be on its way to becoming for tactical aircraft what the B-52 is for strategic aircraft.

And then, of course, it logically becomes the B10.

--Mike

By Douglas Lampert (Dlampert) on Wednesday, April 22, 2026 - 10:03 pm: Edit

The obvious, plausible, A-10 replacement is a drone. That greatly reduces the importance of survivability and of air-to-air capability, and lets the army have the system so they're not dependent on the Air Force for ground support.

The problem is convincing Congress and the US military that it's possible to build a big, long range, high capability drone, without gold plating it. You need the office charter to specify a fairly tight set of restrictions on system capabilities so that mission creep can be resisted. (The way we procure makes for enormous pressure to increase system capabilities, sane people in the program office need all the help they can get to resist this.)

Fortunately, the Air Force will help you push for strict limits on bombing and air-to-air capabilities, which might let you avoid gold plating the system.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Thursday, April 23, 2026 - 06:10 am: Edit

Secretary of the Navy, John Phelan, has resigned,

According to Fox News, the working relationship between Secretary of War, Hegseth and the now former Secretary of the Navy has been tense for months.

Fox News listed several incidents, the first of which was John Phelan pitched the idea of a new battleship design directly to President Trump, effectively going over The head of the Secretary of War Hegseth.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, April 23, 2026 - 01:28 pm: Edit

Attrition: Russia Cannot Handle More Ukrainian Attacks
April 23, 2026: Russia cannot handle the number of Ukrainian drone attacks. For example, earlier this year, within one week, Ukraine carried out over a hundred missile and drone attacks. Targets included petroleum storage sites, electronics factories and power plants and distribution networks. Ukraine has significantly stepped up production of their locally designed long range drones. This is what made recent successes possible.
Russian military analysts are taking a more realistic view of the situation. They note that Ukraine itself is radically changing its goals and methods of war, specifically increasing the scale of drone use, as well as the tactical and operational depth of its operations. Ukraine is also deploying additional air defense systems to protect logistics systems and critical supply lines. In addition, Ukraine has started building defensive fortifications, as well as analyzing their personnel losses. Following the Ukrainian attack on a Russian factory in western Russia, near the Belarus border, it was apparent that Russian anti-aircraft systems were unable to shoot down Ukrainian missiles or surveillance drones.
Russian paranoia about Ukrainian efforts to hack the Russian internet and monitor civilian and military activities, including traffic and surveillance cameras has led to shutting down internet access in areas near the Ukrainian border subject to Ukrainian drone strikes. It took some time before the Russians realized that these internet shutdowns had little impact on Ukrainian drone attacks.
The Russian current reaction to all this is to change nothing and issue press releases about imaginary victories. Russia now claims that Ukraine, not Russia, has suffered 1.3 million casualties so far. That is an accurate figure for Russian losses, but Ukrainian losses are 200,000 dead and about half a million wounded and missing.
Russian offensive operations have been largely stalled during the last year. Ukrainian forces are on the offensive and are taking more territory from the Russians. The Russian response has to increase military spending, which now accounts for about half the annual budget. A lot of that money is spent on trying to obtain more soldiers. Few Russians want to serve in Ukraine and Russia is having growing diplomatic problems as it offers large sums of money to poor citizens of Asians countries so they can fight and die in Ukraine.
Desperate for more manpower, Russia is now doing something it told Russian parents it would never do, actively recruiting college students and young Russians in general. High school students are trained as drone operators and assured of a relatively safe job as a drone operator in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces eagerly hunt down and kill Russian drone operators because that’s how you win battles. Despite this, a growing number of teenagers are joining the military right after graduation. Russia continues to offer large sums for those who sign one year contracts to fight in Ukraine. In reality these contracts don’t expire until the war is over or the soldier who signed the contract is dead. Many of these young men die while serving in the infantry, which is what happens if they fail to qualify as a drone operator. Russia also often doesn’t pay some or all enlistment bonuses, and some combat officers send drone operators into combat. Particularly if they don’t pay bribes demanded by those officers.
Despite all this, parents and school officials still encourage their sons to sign contracts and fight for the Motherland. At the rate this is going, Russia is going to have a hollow generation where many young men were lost to war and its after-effects. Nothing like this has been seen since World War II, where generations of young Russian men born in the early 1920s were largely wiped out. History is repeating itself in Russia, as it has so many times in the past.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, April 23, 2026 - 01:29 pm: Edit

Surface Forces : New Chinese Super Battleship
April 23, 2026: A new Chinese warship has been spotted by satellite photos under construction in a shipyard. The ship has two large square spaces visible that reveal the position and size of the main VLS/Vertical Launch System. Large warships are often measured in terms of the number of VLS cells they have. Estimates imply that the Chinese super battleship will have over 200 VLS cells, far more than earlier designs. It is believed that these cells will likely carry new quantum hyper-sonic weapons. Quantum hypersonic weapons combine quantum technology with hypersonic speeds, exceeding Mach 5.They travel faster than traditional missiles, making them harder to detect and intercept.
Quantum technology applies principles of quantum mechanics for improved targeting and guidance systems. This enables missiles to evade radar and other detection systems through advanced materials and appearances. These missiles could be used for strategic military strikes, defense systems, and avoidance capabilities.
The main gun battery is reportedly to contain at least three rail guns. This is a technology which China has been testing for years. High-powered lasers, strong enough to threaten low-earth-orbit satellites, will provide anti-missile and air defense.
The central citadel, referred to as Xi Tower in Chinese language sources, has 12 decks and offers commanding sea views from the upper stories. The navigation bridge, where the Captain sits, is topped by the flag bridge for Admirals. And above that is the viewing bridge for political Commissars, demonstrating the status of Chinese military hierarchies. The uppermost floor is divided into four apartments. The private club and other hosting facilities are expected to outshine those of the proposed American ship design, an advantage when you want to intimidate potential adversaries or allies.
As the major nations move to the Floating Fortress stage of international competition, naval might is being measured in volume. The sheer scale of this vessel suggests a shift in naval doctrine: from outmaneuvering the enemy to simply obstructing their freedom of navigation.
Now China is building a vessel with the land area of a mid-sized suburb. It has stopped being a naval arms race and has become a hostile real estate takeover of the Pacific.
In comparison, the last American conventional battleships armed with 16”/406mm guns were the four 60,000 Iowa class. Four of these ships were built between 1940 and 1944. Each cost $1.6 billion in 2026 dollars. These vessels were 270 meters long, with a top speed of 61 kilometers an hour and a range of 27,000 kilometers at 28 kilometers an hour cruising speed. The ship carried a crew of 2,700 and was armed with nine 406mm cannon, twenty 5”/127mm guns, 80 40mm and 49 20mm anti-aircraft guns. The large guns had a range of 43 kilometers. Electronics include air and surface search radars as well as a fire control radar. Belt armor for the four Iowa’s were 307mm to 368mm depending on the ship. Turrets, conning tower and decks were also armored. Aircraft consisted of three float planes.
The four Iowa’s were decommissioned after World War II and then brought back several times. USS Iowa was decommissioned in 1949, brought back 1951-88 and finally in 1984-90. For New Jersey it was 1948, 1950-57, 1968-69 and 1982-91. For Missouri it was 1955, and 1986-92. For Wisconsin it was 1948, 1951-58, and 1988-91. When returned to service after World War II, the Iowa’s received upgrades consisting of missile launchers, improved electronics and helicopters/drones instead of floatplanes.
Another aspect of all this is how, since World War II, the descriptions given to warships have evolved. Warships called destroyers appeared a century ago and by the end of World War I they were ships of about 1,000 tons armed with a few guns and some torpedoes and depth charges. By World War II, destroyers had grown to about 3,000 tons. There were also cruisers, weighing in at between 6,000 and 12,000 tons, and battleships, which were 30-60,000 tons. Half a century later, all that's left for surface warfare are destroyers and frigates. For whatever reason, the modern frigates perform the same mission and are about the same size as the World War II destroyers.
Meanwhile modern destroyers have grown to the size of World War II cruisers. Actually, some of the larger destroyers are called cruisers, even though they are only 10-20 percent heavier than the largest destroyers. The latest ships in the U.S. Navy's Burke class destroyers weigh 9,200 tons, cost $1.5 billion to build, have a crew of about 330 sailors, and carry 96 anti-aircraft and cruise missiles. There's only one 5 inch gun, but two helicopters. These modern destroyers could take on any World War II cruiser and win, mainly because the cruise missiles have a range of 1,500 kilometers. A Burke class ship could probably defeat a World War II battleship, although we'll never know for sure since one of those heavily armored ships never got hit by a modern cruise missile. In effect, the U.S. Navy has settled on just four major combat ship types; aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates and nuclear submarines.
FYEO

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Thursday, April 23, 2026 - 03:34 pm: Edit

Yes, that FYEO on Ukraine has it largely right. Though rather than saying Ukraine is gaining ground, it would be more accurate to say that recent net territorial changes are approximately zero.

I've followed that war closely and seen Ukraine's steady technological progress. Hence my continual insistence that Ukraine is likely to win.

To their points, I would add that Ukrainian drone and missile production are both continuing to ramp up. The rate at which Russia sustains damage can therefore be expected to increase further.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, April 23, 2026 - 04:03 pm: Edit

It is a dynamic situation and the sudden unexpected appearance of a new weapon, tactic, or other situation may seriously affect the trend lines.
Right now they do indeed seem to be going in Ukraine's direction. That could change quickly if a new Russian weapon suddenly kills targets previously immune or changes the way Ukraine does things. Ukraine is mass-producing defensive anti-drones and Russia could suddenly develop something new (such as a way to track cruise missiles by satellite) and everything could change. If Ukraine is suddenly unable to attack distant targets, the trend line would become very negative.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Thursday, April 23, 2026 - 05:08 pm: Edit

Barely possible I suppose, but it seems far-fetched. Can you think of a modern war where one side had a strong tech/research trend in its favor, across multiple arenas, and that suddenly reversed?

Your specific example does not seem likely to do much. Ukraine has made most of its gains with drones, not missiles.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, April 23, 2026 - 05:24 pm: Edit

There have been many war-changing weapons.

The atomic bomb in 1945, for one.

Proximity fuzes for artillery and magnetic mines for the ocean could have been war changers but they were kept secret too long.

Soviet wake-homing torpedoes would have been one, had it come to that.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Thursday, April 23, 2026 - 08:06 pm: Edit

Sure, but the Bomb was developed by the side that was winning the tech race anyway.

Meanwhile, Ukraine is stacking advantage after advantage after advantage. A recent one is that their four-man bomber drone teams now only need two of the four anywhere near the front. This makes it easier for the other half of the team to hide (2 people instead of 4), and if the team is discovered and taken out, the potential casualty count is halved.

Ukraine is ahead of both Russia and the US in battle management, product feedback loop time, FPV drones, anti-drones, strike drones, naval drones, and ground drones/combat robotics. A Russian advance would presumably be in one area, leaving Ukraine still ahead in all the others.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, April 23, 2026 - 09:36 pm: Edit

Again, war is a dynamic model, and things CAN change. I don't want them do, but I'm not going to schedule my vacation to see the spectacular June wildflower blooms of Ukraine. Not for this year.

By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Thursday, April 23, 2026 - 11:39 pm: Edit

I am sort of with Steve here.
The Russians are shooting themselves in the foot very much, which is basically the consequences of them being a corrupt and sclerotic dictatorship, BUT there are still many fighting for their country with skill and imagination and determination, and you can notice that here and there.
Unfortunately for them their overall economic situation is not looking good. Not only do the Ukrainians reach further and hit harder with their drones, but now Orban is gone they have EUs full support.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Friday, April 24, 2026 - 12:20 am: Edit

Ancient Rome fell for a number of reasons, one of which were large numbers of barbarian tribes, Eastern Roman empire never solved the technology of light horse with advanced (compared to Roman) bows, it seems we might live to see Putins resurgent Russian empire (at least his dreams of it…) fall to Ukrainian cheap combat drones.

Troubled times indeed.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Friday, April 24, 2026 - 02:42 pm: Edit

The fall of Hungarian PM Orban is sending a pro-Ukraine shockwave through the EU, or perhaps the deletion of a pro-Russian twerk. Orban was a political, not military, ally of Putin, slowing or blocking EU actions for Ukraine. Orban was a piece of work, redesigning the entire Hungarian bureaucracy into an Orban-worshipping propaganda machine. Orban was blocking a huge EU loan to Ukraine that will now go through. Orban was maneuvering to force Ukraine to reopen the Russian oil pipelines. The EU will now quickly move to form closer ties with Ukraine which will effectively bring Ukraine closer to NATO. The new PM, Peter Magyar, wants to help Ukraine. “Magyar” is the Hungarian word for “Hungary” which would be like electing Yankee America as president of the US.

One of the seven known times that Jessica and I ever agreed on anything was that Orban had to go.