No matter your views on the President, the way to effectuate change is via VOTING. Anything else is just evil.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Sunday, April 26, 2026 - 02:17 pm: Edit

Ukraine now has its two Swedish AEWC radar planes fully operational. This airborne radar system allows Ukraine to better track hundreds of aerial targets and, now and then, arrange an ambush in which low flying F16s can get in position to hit SU35 fighters, Russia’s best, with AIM120 missiles. The Swedish planes can also track Russian glide bombs. Even better it can identify the launch aircraft before they launch, allowing Ukrainian fighters to drive them away with AIM120s. New Gryphon fighters, built by Sweden to work with the radar planes, will only improve Ukraine’s defenses.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Sunday, April 26, 2026 - 02:25 pm: Edit

The discussion of WW2 fighters was moved to the military history section.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Sunday, April 26, 2026 - 04:42 pm: Edit

Ukraine is deploying new Jedi helicopter drones able to fly at 220mph. The high speed allows them to quickly reach areas threatened by Russian drones. They mainly hunt Shaheed drones but are expanding to many drone types. Jedi has daylight and night cameras. It can do recon. It destroys Russian drones with a blast frag bomb the size of a hand grenade. Jedi entered use in March. It is radar qued but a human uses the cameras to hunt the target. It can attack from any direction, but due to speed it’s easier to chase them down. Ukraine intercepted 75% of Russian drones in February but wans Jedi to push past 95%.

By MarkSHoyle (Bolo) on Sunday, April 26, 2026 - 05:11 pm: Edit

Caught a video story, that several U.S. schools are testing using drones as a defense against shooters...

Video showed a couple smaller (10/12" drones similar to the ones used in Drone Racing).....
End of the video showed the impact of one against a standing dummy....

Can only question how quickly one could be employed against an active threat....

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Sunday, April 26, 2026 - 06:26 pm: Edit

Cole Allen admitted to police he was Targeting members of the Trump Administration. He Has now stopped talking.

Cole Allen had attended No Kings rallies.

Cole Allen wrote a manifesto espousing anti-Christian and anti-conservative statements. He sent a copy to his brother and sister, both of whom called police to say their brother was likely to do something really bad sometime really soon. He took a train to Chicago and Washington DC. It is unclear if he had the weapons with him or acquired them on arrival.

By Mike Erickson (Mike_Erickson) on Sunday, April 26, 2026 - 06:29 pm: Edit

Most trains in the US can be boarded without going thru metal detectors or passing through any security screening whatsoever. If you want to take a weapon with you, just pack it carefully in innocuous looking luggage and you are good to go.

--Mike

By A David Merritt (Adm) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 10:28 am: Edit

Reading a purported copy of Cole Allen's manifesto it does not appear to be anti Christian, nor anti Conservative.

It appears to be, as Allen sees it, anti corruption.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 11:28 am: Edit

Iran has offered to open Hormuz and end the war but to discuss nuclear issues at some future round of talks.

This won’t fly. It amounts to the US giving up its leverage and stall talks while Iran digs the enriched uranium out of the bombed cave and spinning it into a few nuclear bombs.

This is a continuation of Iranian Delusion Syndrome, in which Iran’s leadership will agree to anything that results in them having nuclear weapons and think that they will eventually get a new US president who is stupid enough to agree.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 11:30 am: Edit

ADM, and yet, police continue to say it is both. Might be more than one purported document?

By A David Merritt (Adm) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 11:36 am: Edit

Certainly possible, what I say was a "public" document, and law enforcement may be reading other things on the shooters devices.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 01:18 pm: Edit

Multiple people can find multiple themes in the same document. I struggle to find things in political speeches that others say not only exist but prove evil intent.

I heard on satellite radio that at least one fake manifesto is circulating on clickbait websites.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 03:04 pm: Edit

Another month, another Russian ally. The Russia-backed government in Mali is taking serious hits. A Russian helicopter was shot down with the loss of all hands. Russia has pulled out of Kidal. Mali's defense minister was killed.

The situation is ongoing. Russians remain elsewhere in Mali. There has been fighting near Bamako. The Government has not yet fallen.

Typically, the purpose of Russian operations in Africa is to extract gold and/or money. Therefore, the outcome matters.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 03:18 pm: Edit

I watched a fascinating Army recruitment video.

They want college students in engineering or technology programs to sign up for a one-year contract as a combat drone operator. No push ups, no PT, no saluting, no Army nonsense. You just train to fly drones, then fly them. Guaranteed not to be front line combat, but rear area.

Signup benefits: All student loans to date forgiven. When you get discharged, you go back to school at no cost to you for school, meals, dorm. $50,000 sign-up bonus. $75,000 salary. Lifetime veterans benefits. Guaranteed graduation, they will provide free tutors if you need help with a course.

Did I mention that this is the Russian Army, not the US Army.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 03:19 pm: Edit

Procurement: Russian Billionaires Must Pay The State
April 24, 2026: Recently Vladimir Putin reacted to the theoretically huge rise in Russia’s oil income as a result of the Iran war. Putin is profoundly concerned about Russia's economic dilemma. On March 26 the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Russia’s most powerful industrialists were warned against undue confidence over rising economic costs from the war in the Middle East.
If the market changes one way today, tomorrow it could turn the other way. Putin sought to have this message be widely heard as the full contents of such meetings are normally not disclosed. Since the Ukraine War began, the list of attendees has been declared a secret.
Behind closed doors, Putin did something more significant. Even as he promised to take all of Ukraine’s Donbas region, he invited the assembled gathering of wealthy businessmen to contribute voluntary aid to the war effort.
The notion of shaking down business in a problematic time for the country originated with the Rosneft director, who proposed the issuance of war bonds as the fundraising process. Since he was not a major shareholder in the company he runs, he will be spared the questionable honor of contributing his own money.
Others, though, responded immediately, offering $1.1 billion. Another sanctioned businessman agreed to contribute when asked.
These men had little choice. It is beyond belief that Russia’s major billionaires would refuse, and that’s closely linked to why these men should no longer be called oligarchs. Decades ago, they could impose their will on Russia, manipulate the legislature, and bend or subvert the law: they were oligarchs in the true sense of the word.
But since the financial crisis of 2008–09, and with increasing speed after Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, they bend to the Kremlin’s will rather than shape it. The invasion of Ukraine marked a new stage in this subservience. Putin has offered his tycoons state support in weathering Western sanctions in exchange for complete loyalty and public backing of the war. Squeezed between those sanctions and the threat of domestic reprisals, the billionaires fell into line. They are creatures of Putin now, not a power unto themselves.
Putin’s demand might seem odd given the financial windfall the war in Iran has delivered; estimates suggest this could amount to $2.8 billion monthly if prices stay high. Add in gas and fertilizer revenues, and it’s clear the budget is benefiting.
But there is no disagreement. Russia's posture is that commodity windfalls are temporary, while the costs of war are structural and open-ended. Therefore, the state reaches for both simultaneously and forces the rich to finance some of the war effort to remove it from government accounts.
Four weeks of war in the Middle East, and the oil price surge it has triggered, have given the Russian government room to breathe for the moment. Both the Russian government and the Finance Ministry know the situation remains unpredictable. The immediate improvement in revenues has allowed Russia to abandon plans to tighten budget management which would have redirected a larger share of oil income into reserves rather than spending. The Finance Ministry has not, however, abandoned a separate round of planned budget cuts.
Annual revenue increases will depend on how long prices stay high and nobody can predict that with confidence. There are some grounds for the government to feel optimistic; even the most hopeful oil analysts argue that were the war to end tomorrow, supply disruptions would persist for at least four months given the need to repair infrastructure, restart facilities, and clear backlogs in tanker traffic. The average oil price for this year is unlikely to fall below $80 a barrel even in optimistic situations.
Given this uncertainty, the Finance Ministry has decided to suspend its budget rule entirely until the summer. That means all oil and gas revenues will flow directly to the budget, regardless of the price level, rather than being diverted to the National Wealth Fund. The ministry is pursuing two objectives: ensuring the deficit is brought under control while conditions allow and avoiding strain on currency markets. Had the rule remained in force, the ministry would have been obliged to purchase exporters’ foreign currency earnings before those companies could pocket the bulk of their windfall.
Oil revenues are not the only source the state is turning to. Whether the government will follow through on its earlier spending cuts remains unclear: with oil prices high, the immediate fiscal pressure has eased, and cutting budgets in a boom is politically awkward. Spending has, in any case, been inflated by four years of wartime fiscal stimulus. At his meeting with business leaders, Putin himself warned against using the oil bonus to pay out dividends or ramp up state expenditure. The logic is plain: if elevated prices are temporary, windfall profits cannot simply be spent.
And if they cannot be spent, but the war still needs funding, other sources must be found. That is where the voluntary contributions come in. The surge in profits flowing to fertilizer, grain, and aluminum businesses will tempt the state to force owners to share their gains, just as it did in 2022.
The war in Iran has given Russia’s budget breathing space, but it has not resolved the fundamental problems. The very fact that even with oil at $100 a barrel, Putin is passing around the collection tin tells you that the gap between structural expenditures and revenues has not closed.
Other risks loom too. If prices stay too high for too long, which they could as in 2008 and 2014, this will prompt a global demand slump. Combined with rising supply, that would push prices sharply lower, potentially very fast. For now, the government is making the most of the moment, and making sure business pays its share.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 03:20 pm: Edit

Surface Forces : Red Sea Failures And The Strait of Hormuz
April 24, 2026: The Western allies trying to negotiate a way to protect the Strait of Hormuz for oil and natural gas shipping face an unambiguous reality: a similar effort in the Red Sea that started years earlier cost billions of dollars and ultimately failed against Yemen’s Houthis. The recent collapse of Iranian resistance and request for more negotiations has largely removed Iran from any involvement in the Red Sea or anywhere else.
Meanwhile, the costly Red Sea experience, with four ships sunk, more than $1 billion in weapons expended, and a route that the shipping industry until recently avoided, displays the more complex Strait of Hormuz situation. This shipping route is used by about 20 percent of the global oil and liquefied natural gas supply, and is now blocked by Iran, a more frightening adversary than the Houthis.
Iran’s threats to the strait and its attacks on energy infrastructure in nearby Gulf nations sent oil prices soaring in the worst interruption to oil and gas supplies in history. Without the strait’s reopening, shortages will become more dire, threatening higher costs for energy, food and numerous other products worldwide.
There is no substitute for the Strait of Hormuz. It is the world’s strait, under international law and realistic certainty.
U.N. Security Council members were recently negotiating resolutions for protecting the strait, with some nations, such as Bahrain, taking an influential stance that would authorize the use of all means necessary to protect the strait, including use of force when needed.
Security and maritime experts described the numerous challenges facing the Americans and its allies in protecting the strait. Iran has more advanced military forces than the Houthis, with their arsenal of inexpensive drones, floating mines, and missiles, and easy access from its steep mountainous coast to the narrow waterway. Defending convoy operations in the Strait of Hormuz is substantially more difficult than in the Red Sea.
That was a big concern for the American President as he sought to justify the Iran war ahead of the November midterm elections to inflation-weary American voters now facing gasoline at nearly $4 a gallon. The spike in energy prices is not expected to fully reverse until the waterway opens. Now the situation has been resolved.
Trump has been noncommittal about U.S. involvement, first saying the American Navy would escort ships when needed, then more recently saying other nations should lead the effort. Iran tried and failed to block most ships from the maritime choke point since joint U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran began February 28. Iran is no longer considering a proposal to levy fees on vessels that want to use the strait.
The American mission to protect Red Sea shipping from the Houthis launched in December 2023, with European nations joining in with their own operation a few months later. The allies shot down hundreds of drones and missiles, but the Houthis still sank four ships between 2024 and 2025. Shippers no longer avoid the passageway, once home to 12 percent of world trade, and no longer choose the much longer voyage around the Horn of Africa.
The danger zone around the Strait of Hormuz is up to five times larger than the Houthis’ attack area around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait that flows into the Red Sea. Unlike the Houthis, Iran’s IRGC/Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a professional military with access to its own weapons factories and access to funding.
Providing escorts for the strait would require as many as a dozen large warships such as destroyers, backed up by jets, drones and helicopters to account for the limitations created by the lack of space to maneuver, some military experts said. Overhead air cover would be critical to protect against flying drones as well as explosive-laden manned or unmanned vessels that can easily blend into sea traffic.
Observers believe Iran’s IRGC fighters no longer have missile and drone stockpiles hidden in buildings and caves along the hundreds of miles of steep and mountainous coastline. In some places, the shore comes so close to ships that drones could swarm a vessel in as little as five to 10 minutes.
Sea mines and heavily armed mini submarines are no longer the threat the Americans encountered in the Red Sea. There is no evidence that Iran mined the strait and no remaining Iranian presence in the area. The Strait is open and traffic is moving slowly, at least until the Iranians commence more UAV and cruise missile attacks on shipping.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 03:25 pm: Edit

Marines: Marines Use Their Drone to Sink A Ship
April 27, 2026: In March the American Marine Corps carried out its first live-fire drone strike against a maritime surface vessel last month during a trial in Japan as part of the service’s effort to advance its autonomous capabilities.
Marines from the III Expeditionary Operations Training Group and operators from Naval Special Warfare conducted the maritime drone strike from a Naval Special Warfare surface craft, taking out an unmanned surface vessel designed and built by the Marine team. The trial, held in Okinawa, Japan, in early March and announced by the service last week, marks the latest Marine Corps drone test this year. Three Marine Expeditionary Forces have held various drone trials in the last three months.
These events were a landmark in the increasingly close integration of Special Operations Forces and conventional forces, ushering in a new era where drones, and even their targets, are designed and built by the Marines.
The trial was successful and was also a powerful demonstration of a force multiplier on a new scale. The Marines demonstrated the ability to launch attack drones from their self-built submerged drones, showcasing a rapidly growing robotics capability within the Marine Corps, poised to significantly increase sensing and firepower in defense of the fleet. Using a combination of submerged and aerial drones, Marines can now investigate vessels of interest and, if they are confirmed as hostile, engage them with organic, unmanned firepower.
Drone integration is part of the III EOTG/Expeditionary Operations Training Group’s mission to prepare individual Marines for the challenges of modern expeditionary warfare. The unit’s Unmanned Systems Branch currently has a two-fold focus, perfecting payload delivery and developing robust counter-unmanned systems. The Marines are learning not just how to be drone operators but are also being trained as engineers who are prepared to build their own unmanned systems from local economies during conflict.
By training Marines in the construction and operation of these systems, III EOTG is building an arsenal of innovators ready to fabricate and deploy unmanned aerial, surface and ground systems tailored to specific battlefield needs.
Marines are learning to create leave-behind sensors, build mesh networks or develop unique systems across sea, air or land to deliver payloads, based on the situations faced. Along with sea-based drones, III EOTG is also developing first-person view drones for III MEF to deploy in operations.
The Marine Corps has been experimenting with and deploying small drone systems as part of the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 plan, which includes the deployment of Marines in small teams to conduct littoral, dispersed and expeditionary operations by either directly attacking targets or providing targeting information, particularly in the Indo-Pacific where Marines are expected to deploy in remote locations in the first and second island chains. There is also the requirement for such small teams to be able to build and deploy drones independently based on the situation. The Marine Corps is also experimenting in the use of sea and aerial drones to resupply such units.
Along with trials on using drones offensively, the Marine Corps has also conducted trials on defending against drones and maintaining communications with drones. Earlier this year, Marines and American naval forces and partners tested new defenses against swarming drones during the Technology Operational Experimentation Event Wave Breaker at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina.
During the experiment, Marines from 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines, formed a defensive Blue Cell tasked with protecting a high-value naval vessel and critical airfield runways from a simulated, large-scale drone attack. The event’s core purpose was to establish a rigorous process for testing emerging technologies in harsh, real-world maritime conditions, directly responding to the evolving character of war, the news release reads.
The Space Dynamics Laboratory provided key technology in the form of its Counter Air for the Office of Naval Research system that integrates radars, cameras and computer vision systems to detect, track and engage hostile drones, boats and aircraft.
By assessing new capabilities in a realistic environment, the Wave Breaker exercise directly forges the future of naval operations. This hands-on integration is the ultimate test of advanced technology, ensuring our forces become more lethal and resilient.
Earlier in the year at Camp Pendleton, Marines joined with the Defense Innovation Unit and industry professionals to evaluate first-person view drones that use fiber optic cables, marking the American Marine Corps’ first field evaluation of the technology for drone employment in contested environments, a Marine Corps news release reads.
Participating vendors for the fiber-optic evaluation included Auterion, Kraken, ModalAI, Neros and Nokturnal AI, with support from Contact Front Technologies, according to the release. The three-day assessment focused on presently available FPV drone solutions designed to maintain command-and-control and video feeds when radio frequency links are degraded. Unlike traditional unmanned aircraft systems that rely on wireless signals, fiber optic cables provide a physical data connection between the operator and the aircraft, reducing vulnerability to electronic warfare and enabling more reliable employment in denied environments.
The evaluation brought together Marines from 3rd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion and 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, with I MEF coordinating the event alongside the Defense Innovation Unit as part of Project G.I., a Defense Department-wide effort intended to accelerate the fielding of solutions across the joint force.
Project G.I., which launched in June 2025, uses an accelerated approach intended to move mature technology from proposal to hands-on testing in months rather than years, according to the release. Marines have played a leading role in the challenge by organizing field-based evaluations, bringing together Marines with recent operational experience and ensuring feedback from end users is captured, translated into actionable requirements and pushed directly to industry teams.
Last summer, Marines assigned to I MEF partnered with the Defense Innovation Unit and vendors during a larger Project G.I. evaluation at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, which combined familiarization training with scenario-based demonstrations. January’s event built on that momentum by concentrating on fiber optic cable performance, a capability increasingly associated with maintaining drone effectiveness under electronic attack. Marines assessed how FPV systems connected by fiber optic cables could support tactical kinetic-effects while sustaining control and video in environments where traditional links can be disrupted, the service said in a release.
Fiber-optic tethered FPV capabilities are required on today’s battlefield. By deliberately building trained cadres within the command, MEF is positioned to scale pilots and capability rapidly, and to responsibly leverage every opportunity to integrate, evaluate and familiarize warfighters with proven systems.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 03:26 pm: Edit

Information Warfare: Iranian Internal Communications During The War
April 27, 2026: Iranians have been under internet blackout for 55 consecutive days as connectivity flatlined at two percent of normal levels. Restrictions on global network access continue to hinder online commerce, payment systems and digitally dependent sectors of the economy.
In early January after nearly two weeks of protests in Iran, government leaders enacted an internet blackout. There were extensive telephone and internet blackouts in the capital, with added disruptions reported in the cities of Isfahan, Lordegan, Abdanan, parts of Shiraz, and Kermanshah. CyberWar specialists reported that Iran's National Information Network was also fully disconnected, even internally within Iran.
Although the blackout had been diminished on 28 January, severe limitations were still maintained. The Iranian Minister of Communications recognized that the shutdown was costing the economy $35.7 million a day. In April, another official anticipated that the direct cost of the shutdown was between $30-40 million per day, and that adding indirect costs makes the true impact closer to $70-80 million per day. Online sales fell by 80 percent during the Internet shutdown, while the Tehran Stock Exchange overall index lost 450,000 points over a four-day period, and $1,677,000,000. In January 2026, the number of financial transactions in Iran had dropped by 185 million.
The Internet blackout, which initially did not affect satellite internet connections like Starlink, has expanded efforts to shut down the Starlink internet, alongside operations to seize satellite dishes to hinder access to the Internet. The Internet blackout has been described as an attempt by the government to cover up the 2026 Iran massacres.
As of 16 February, internet traffic levels in Iran were reduced by half. At the same time internet prices increased by 18 percent, bringing the total increase to 52 percent.
Following the 28 February Israeli American attacks on Iran, there was a renewed nationwide internet blackout in Iran, as Western internet experts reported internet connectivity in Iran dropping to 4 percent the usual activity of ordinary levels. Overseas Iranians abroad admitted that they could not communicate with relatives in Iran or connect with the Iranian intranet. In early March, internet traffic was calculated at about one percent of the usual connectivity.
By late April, the shutdown had entered its 53rd consecutive day, making it the longest national internet disruption recorded worldwide. Iranian technicians began restoring the internet to elite users, while most of the population remained without access to the internet. As of mid-April, it was projected that the shutdown had cost the economy $1.8 billion. Internet connectivity remained at extremely limited levels, restricting access to autonomous information sources. In the second week of April, Iranian internet experts admitted that there was no firm schedule for reinstating the internet.
Back in February Iran emerged from its self-imposed internet blackout that was used as part of an effort to curb anti-government protests. That January 8-28 blackout was more extreme than any nation had ever endured. Mobile networks, text messaging services, landlines were disabled and Starlink was blocked. When a few domestic services became available, the government removed specific social features, such as comment sections on news sites and chat boxes in online marketplaces.
What remained operational, for a while at least, was the government controlled and monitored national Intranet. This system was only available inside Iran and users could not use it to contact anyone outside Iran without government permission and monitoring. The current system prevents Iranians from using VPNs or special SIM cards for phones to communicate. Also blocked are chat functions in nonpolitical apps like ridesharing or shopping platforms. Any channel that allows two people to exchange text is seen as a threat. Then there was shortwave radio, which has limited range and
The Iranian government has its priorities, and information control is more important than a functioning economy, growing poverty and the ability of Iranians to assemble to protest government policies or use the internet to discuss these problems with other Iranians or the outside world.
All this suppression came under attack at the end of February when the United States, Israeli and a few other nations declared war on Iran. If the current Iranian government collapses, the attacking coalition should promise prompt revival of internet and messaging service throughout the country. Many Iranians have discovered that the internet is something worth fighting and dying for. A post war Iranian communications net could also benefit from the addition of technologies that are harder to whitelist or block, such as mesh networks and D2C/Direct 2 Consumer technologies that bypass the choke points of state-controlled ISPs/Internet Service Suppliers.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 03:28 pm: Edit

Morale: Putin Errors Erode Voter Support
April 26, 2026: Russian leader Vladimir Putin has caused numerous errors, driving down his support. As Russians’ rage about Putin’s moves to disable the Russian internet increases, Russian analysts are revealing more errors Putin has been making and surveys show his support declining to disastrous levels.
There are increasing indications that hostility to Putin’s policies is spreading throughout the leaders, increasing the probability that they will merge into groups which might seek and perhaps even succeed in blocking Russian government policies and erode voter support.
None of this means Putin is about to be emasculated, let alone overthrown. But it could persuade Putin to take even more repressive and aggressive measures. Taken together, these developments suggest Putin is now less able to act as if opposition to his policies is irrelevant.
Russian anger over President Vladimir Putin’s moves against the internet is growing and spreading even to groups long thought to be his most loyal supporters. Russian commentators are pointing to other mistakes Putin has been making, and opinion surveys show that his approval rating is falling to the lowest level since before he launched the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. He now faces a buildup of disapproval that some have called an apocalypse. There are even posters and carrying of signs, which are important indications in the Russian system that opposition to Putin’s policies is spreading, increasing the likelihood of groups coalescing that will seek and perhaps even succeed in blocking government policies that they do not approve of. None of this, to be sure, means Putin is about to be overthrown as it could lead him, as it has in the past when he felt at all cornered, to take even more repressive and aggressive steps. This combination of factors, however, does suggest that he will no longer be able to act as if opposition is irrelevant and will likely have to devote more time to rebuilding his authority among leaders and in the population.
Putin’s moves against the internet are increasingly unpopular because they have affected the lives of so many Russians, including members of the leadership in government, the military, and business who have grown accustomed to using various internet channels. Recent polls show that support for and trust in the Government leader have fallen to seven year lows. The decline reflects anger over his internet policies, a flood of bad news at home and abroad in recent months, and signs that Putin does not intend to change strategy. This marks a shift from the past, when he often backed away from the more extreme aspects of his policies or sought to isolate unpopular ones by restricting their impact, as was the case with his war against Ukraine, where, instead of general mobilization, he relied on huge bonuses to encourage enlistment. That policy is now failing. In 2022, only 15 percent of Russians had a close relative in the war. Now more than twice that share do. Russian analysts argue that popular anger over Putin’s moves against the internet is compounded by other concerns, including the lack of progress in Ukraine toward either victory or peace, failures in Venezuela and Iran, and deteriorating economic and social conditions at home.
Putin has responded to protests about the internet in two ways, repression and silence. He has ordered widespread arrests and detentions of those who have taken to the streets to protest his actions. He has not spoken out about the internet restrictions or any of these other problems in recent times, reducing his public appearances in the last quarter by a significant amount compared to 2025. The Russian leader may suppose that repression is enough, but his failure to address various issues may result in an even larger problem, analysts say, as it contributes to the sense that he is out of touch.
Putin may not care very much about popular opposition to his internet policies. He still has reliable security forces to control the situation, and his popularity ratings are above 60 percent in polls released by his government. Putin certainly has reason to worry about the appearance of opposition to his internet policies among members of his leaders, especially technocratic groups that favor development over tighter control. Ever more members of these groups have been speaking out, contributing to the sense, not only among other elite groups but also in the Russian population, that splits are developing in the government. This perception encourages others to resist, in the hope of tipping the political balance away from Putin and toward those who share their views.
The question now is how far this process, involving the alienation of the Russian population and of leaders beyond the loyal generals. Russian commentators imply that Putin has been committing more mistakes and angering more ordinary people and members of the leadership than at any time since he began his expanded Ukraine war. While the situation has not yet reached a critical level and, as a result, Putin may be able to ride out this storm, it will come with increased difficulty, especially if he does not return to the tactics he used in earlier crises his government faced.
In six earlier crises since Putin became president, government leaders not only took public positions to seize the propagandist high ground but also modified his policies. This signaled that he was paying attention to the population and would avoid angering it more than he felt necessary. Now Putin is doing neither, however, appearing in public far less frequently and showing no signs of being willing to modify his original decisions. This increasingly sclerotic approach has come to a head over the last three months, as the government has suffered a series of policy defeats abroad amid a rising tide of problems at home. Dictators fail when the number of problems grows too large for them to handle. Such rulers, however, risk serious problems if they do not show themselves responding to crises and act as if they are not required to. That is where the Putin dictatorship now stands. The number of problems is growing, although likely not yet to the point where they alone will be enough to bring the government leader down. Putin’s failure to react now is undermining his rule, perhaps not enough to lead to his ouster in the immediate future but likely reducing the number of additional crises that could prove sufficient to produce that outcome.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 03:28 pm: Edit

Winning: Ukrainian Defenses Improve With Technology
April 26, 2026: Hampered by shortages, delayed aid and restrictions on using some Western weapons, Ukraine’s response has been built gradually, driven by necessity and the will to survive. It has filled gaps where traditional weapons were unavailable or inadequate. Drones have become critical.
Ukraine’s innovation has helped blunt Russian assaults, while its domestic defense industry is moving toward production on a scale that would have seemed impossible at the start of the invasion.
The so-called drone wall is less a fixed system than an evolving one: primarily defensive today, but steadily expanding across the air, sea, and now ground spheres.
What began as an improvisation is increasingly hardening into a technological and durable defense system, as the country seeks to become an indigestible steel porcupine for its rapacious neighbor. Since the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s defense-industrial base has grown at an unprecedented pace, with annual production capacity increasing five times to $50 billion.
Mavic drones, for example, became emblematic of the war not because they were built for combat, but because Ukrainians adapted them to drop grenades when no better option existed. That judgment overlooks Ukraine’s repeated demonstration that systems assembled quickly, adapted continuously, and fielded at scale can have major battlefield impact. For the defenders, it’s been a race to build effective systems that are cheap and can be quickly mass-produced.
This is underlined by the US-Israeli war in Iran, which is offering reminders that expensive and procurement-heavy systems do not guarantee a quick victory, see for example, the reported destruction of 16 Reaper drones over Iran, each costing up to $30 million. Meanwhile, an opponent equipped with cheap drones can still impose disproportionate costs and disrupt forces in ways that traditional procurement models struggle to match. Russia was also slow to absorb some of the lessons. But bogged down in trench warfare in the Donbas, it was eventually forced to adapt, increasing its own drone capability with the help of partners such as China and Iran.
Ukrainian drones are not a revolution at the level of physics or materials, they are a revolution at the level of application, scaling, and adaptability. They systematically change the balance on the battlefield. Now Ukraine’s drone wall is expanding. Mid-range strike drones have wreaked havoc on Russian air defenses, aided by the increasing use of Starlink connectivity over occupied territories.
In March, Sergei Shoigu, secretary of Russia’s Security Council and a former defense minister, warned that Ukraine’s drone production is at a pace that means no region is beyond reach. Ukrainian drones are regularly flying more than 1,000 kilometers into Russia to strike at oil production, export facilities, and factories supporting the arms industry. Russia is poised to cut oil output by a fifth following Ukrainian drone strikes on port facilities; tankers are meanwhile backed up in the Baltic Sea as they cannot fill up at damaged docks.
The most strategically significant development of this war is Ukraine’s ability to strike Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure across vast distances. Ukraine can now reach from the Arctic submarine bases to southern energy infrastructure, he added. Russia cannot defend everything.
Ukraine is also pouring millions of dollars into missile development to match the success of its drones. Ukraine’s defense minister said the government is acting like a venture capital investor by giving large grants to local companies. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in March that every long-range capability Ukraine now possesses, from 500 kilometers to more than 1,000 kilometers was developed domestically.
At sea, Ukrainian naval drones have effectively forced Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to retreat from occupied Crimea to Novorossiysk and are being used to attack shadow fleet oil tankers, possibly including this March 22 strike near Istanbul. Ukrainian drone vessels are now being adapted as carriers for interceptor drones, extending Ukraine’s defensive reach over the water.
Units that integrate ground robotic systems could cut frontline infantry requirements by up to 30 percent by the end of this year and reach 80 percent in the future.
In December, one machine-gun-equipped ground robot reportedly held a position for 45 days. Ukrainians are right when they send robots, not humans. Now Ukrainian engineers are working on ways to integrate land drones into the fortification network.
While Russia has continued to pound Ukrainian cities with drones and missiles, Ukraine has developed low-cost interceptor systems that are attracting worldwide interest, including in the Middle East.
With its young, technology-focused defense minister, many of the key elements are beginning to align. Across the battlefield, drones and other emerging systems are helping fill critical gaps, and Ukraine will continue using that unequal advantage to deny Russia the chance to achieve its goals.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 03:34 pm: Edit

NBC Weapons: Sunk Russian Submarine Not Leaking Radiation
April 25, 2026: After 37 years on, there are no signs of leakage from plutonium warheads. Two recent studies of seabed sediments near the sunken nuclear submarine Komsomolets/K-278 in the Norwegian Sea revealed that no plutonium contamination beyond natural background levels. Given Russian submarines, this is welcome news. One Russian sub was nick-named “Hiroshima” by its nervous crew.
The submarine included one nuclear reactor and two plutonium warheads. The vessel sat on the seafloor approximately 250 kilometers southwest of Bear Island. Since its sinking in early 1989, there have been fears that radioactive leakage could affect the marine environment.
The Norwegian and Barents Seas are among the world’s most productive marine ecosystems and support some of the largest fish stocks on the planet. Nevertheless, two recent studies by Russia and Norway found no evidence of weapons-grade plutonium in residues or seawater near the wreck.
The Russian study, conducted by scientists from the Russian Academy of Sciences, is based on samples collected during the 68th expedition of the research vessel Akademik Mstislav Keldysh. The vessel visited the wreck site numerous times since the early 1990s.
The activity of plutonium isotopes in bottom sediments at the site corresponds to background levels for the Arctic. This indicates that the submarine’s hull is currently effectively containing hazardous materials. The findings were published recently in the journal Marine Pollution Bulletin.
Previous joint Norwegian Russian studies have detected releases of radionuclides from the reactor via a ventilation pipe, but the two plutonium warheads are believed to remain intact. This is despite significant damage to the submarine’s forward section, including both the outer hull and the inner pressure hull, particularly around the torpedo compartment. The warheads are mounted on torpedoes.
A recent Norwegian study, published based on earlier expeditions to the Komsomolets, reached a similar conclusion: No evidence was found of plutonium in the surrounding environment near the damaged forward section of the submarine originating from the nuclear warheads.
Leakage of caesium-137 and strontium-90 from the nuclear reactor has been confirmed, but there is no evidence that these isotopes are accumulating in the marine environment.
The highest levels recorded were around 800 becquerels per liter of seawater inside the wreck’s pipe systems. By comparison, typical levels in the Norwegian Sea today are around 0.001 becquerels per liter indicating that measured samples were approximately 800,000 times higher than normal.
Despite more than 30 years of releases from the reactor, there is little evidence of any build-up of radionuclides in the surrounding environment, as they appear to be rapidly diluted in seawater. These findings have previously been reported by the Barents Observer.
The Komsomolets was on a training mission to the waters where the shallow Barents Sea meets the deeper Norwegian Sea when it sank after a fire on April 7, 1989. The submarine had Zapadnaya Litsa on the Kola Peninsula as home port.
The Russian expedition to the wreck site formed part of an extensive study of plutonium contamination on the Arctic seabed. In total, sediment samples from 22 sites across the Norwegian and Barents Seas were collected and analyzed.
The highest plutonium levels were found north of Novaya Zemlya in the Russian Arctic, originating from global fallout from nuclear testing in the 1950s and 1960s.
The highest 239+240Pu activity concentrations were identified north of Novaya Zemlya archipelago and reached 2314 ± 178 mBq·kg−1. Although three to four times higher than normal background, the results pose no risk to marine life or humans.
Novaya Zemlya served as the Soviet Union’s primary testing ground for thermonuclear weapons. Between 1954 and 1990, a total of 224 tests were carried out across the archipelago, 88 of which were detonated in the atmosphere. The most powerful of these was the so-called Tsar Bomba, detonated on 30 October 1961, with a yield of 58 megatons which was about 4,000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.
The Barents Observer has previously reported that radioactive material from this testing program is now leaking into the marine environment. As the Arctic warms, glaciers on the northern island of Novaya Zemlya are melting, releasing fallout that had long been trapped in the ice.
Another potential source of plutonium in sediments north of Novaya Zemlya is the release from the Mayak plant, located north of Chelyabinsk in the southern Urals.
Significant discharges of radionuclides occurred between 1949 and 1951, when cooling water from the Soviet Union’s first plutonium production reactor was released into the Techa River. From there, it flowed into the Irtysh River and continued northwards via the Ob River, eventually reaching the Kara and Barents Seas.
Soviet scientists detected plutonium in sediments in the Ob Bay, east of the Yamal Peninsula, as early as 1951.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 03:35 pm: Edit

Leadership: The 1991 Iraq War Reformed the Chinese Army, What Will The 2026 Iran War Do
April 25, 2026: Desert Storm made the modern Chinese military. What is the Iran War doing to it? In January 1991, Chinese military officers watched CNN recordings of the United States dismantling the Iraqi Army and experienced what one Chinese military analyst later called a disturbing nuclear attack. Desert Storm displayed every capability the Chinese military lacked, and China had no choice but to begin remaking its military from the ground up.
Two years later, China’s Central Military Commission codified these lessons in the Military Strategic Guidelines centered on Local Wars Under High Technology Conditions and acknowledged the Chinese military had been preparing for the wrong war. The Gulf War didn’t just scare China; it gave it direction.
Thirty-five years later, the classroom has reopened. The United States and Israel are engaged in a military campaign against Iran, and the Persian Gulf is once again the center of a maritime crisis. The Strait of Hormuz is temporarily closed. Not by minefields or naval blockade, but by the withdrawal of maritime insurance and the cascading commercial decisions that followed.
Tanker traffic dropped first by approximately 70 percent with almost 150 vessels loitering outside the Strait. Transit has since collapsed to nearly zero within the first week, disrupting roughly 20 percent of the world’s daily oil supply and significant volumes of liquefied natural gas. Roughly 750 vessels were stranded inside the Persian Gulf, and the Chinese military paid very close attention.
Immediate intuition is to assume that China is enjoying the turmoil: a distracted America, its military tied down in the Middle East, and precision munitions being expended far from the Pacific. That instinct is wrong.
What the Chinese military's most attentive analysts are likely doing is war-gaming a Taiwan scenario in real-time using the Hormuz crisis as a live stress test for assumptions they have been modeling for decades. Some of what they are finding is profoundly uncomfortable. The tactical lessons are significant but broadly familiar. However, the deeper strategic lessons, the ones that will reshape Chinese planning for the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, are maritime.
In 1991, China’s Desert Storm lesson was almost entirely about its capability gap. The maritime domain barely registered because the Gulf War was largely a land-air campaign. The 2026 crisis is fundamentally a maritime crisis, and China is learning a new lesson: chokepoints do not just threaten an enemy, they threaten anyone who depends on them.
Approximately 84 percent of the oil transiting through the Strait of Hormuz flows to Asian markets. China alone imported roughly five million barrels per day through the Strait, representing approximately 40 to 45 percent of its total crude imports. The Hormuz closure does not primarily threaten Houston or Rotterdam. It throttles the Chinese ports of Tianjin, Qingdao, and Zhoushan.
Prolific naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan understood this. He spent much of his groundbreaking work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, explaining not just how navies project power but how dependence on sea lines of communication creates strategic vulnerabilities. A nation that does not control its own supply lines does not truly control its own strategic fate.
The Chinese military absorbed this lesson from Mahan and filtered it through the lens of Desert Storm’s demonstration of American power projection. In response, China has been building a blue-water navy and acquiring global port access in response.
However, the Hormuz crisis is forcing China to confront a gap that was not illuminated by Desert Storm nor discussed in any specificity by Mahan: China remains critically dependent on chokepoints it cannot protect and does not control. The Strait of Hormuz is the immediate problem, but the Strait of Malacca, through which 80 percent of China’s oil imports transit, is the permanent one.
China’s Foreign Ministry has been reduced to urging all parties to keep the shipping routes in the Strait of Hormuz safe, and reports that China has opened direct talks with Iran to negotiate safe passage for energy shipments underscores that vulnerability. A nation that must ask permission to use a chokepoint does not command it. For Chinese military planners war-gaming a Taiwan contingency, the lesson is immediate: any conflict that triggers a disruption at the Malacca Strait could strangle China’s economy before a single shot is fired. In that regard, Indonesia and the United States have recently made an agreement for their military forces to be interoperable, which has been critical for NATO’s military efficiency. The Indonesian Navy also sinks intruding Chinese fishing vessels outright rather than taking them into port. Indonesia controls the entire eastern coast of the Malacca Strait.
If the choke point lesson is uncomfortable, the insurance lesson may be worse. Within 72 hours of the start of Operation Epic Fury, multiple members of the International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs, which collectively insure roughly 90 percent of the world’s ocean-going tonnage, issued formal cancellation notices for war-risk coverage in the Gulf. Major container lines suspended operations. Lloyd’s Market Association confirmed that roughly 1,000 vessels with a hull value of over $25 billion sat anchored in the area. The choke point was not closed by missiles. It was closed by spreadsheets.
The Chinese military is likely studying this closely because it maps directly onto a Taiwan scenario. Beijing has long assumed that the critical question in a cross-strait contingency would be whether the Chinese navy could establish sea control. The Hormuz crisis suggests a different question entirely: would commercial shipping continue to flow through the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea once insurers withdraw coverage and container lines suspend service?
The same insurance mechanism that shut Hormuz in 72 hours could shut the commercial sea lanes on which China’s economy depends. Unlike a naval blockade, an insurance withdrawal cannot be stopped by force. No navy can compel an underwriter to write a policy.
China has been building state-backed maritime insurance mechanisms and positioning its commercial fleet to operate under sovereign-risk coverage precisely to insulate itself from the kind of Western-backed market dependency that has strangled Gulf shipping. The Hormuz crisis validates that investment.
On the other hand, it also reveals how far Beijing needs to go. China’s maritime insurance ecosystem does not yet have enough depth or international credibility to underwrite the scale of coverage that a Taiwan-related disruption would demand. A harder problem still is even if China can ensure its own flag vessels, it cannot compel foreign-flagged ships to continue sailing into a warzone.
The roughly 750 vessels stranded in the Persian Gulf were a preview of what the South China Sea could look like 48 hours into the Taiwan crisis. Commercial shipping was frozen, supply chains severed, and the Chinese navy unable to restart them regardless of how many ships it deploys.
The Hormuz crisis is also teaching China a lesson about commercial shipping as a military instrument. When the United States declared a maritime warning zone in the Persian Gulf, it came with an unusual public admission: it could not guarantee the safety of merchant shipping. The major container lines made their own risk calculations and suspended operations. The financial architecture of global trade enforced a blockade more completely than any naval minefield.
Sinokor, a South Korean shipping conglomerate, began asking the equivalent of roughly $20 per barrel to transport oil to China. This was an extraordinary premium compared to the nominal $2.50 per barrel, and this illustrates how quickly commercial sealift becomes a strategic weapon when maritime risk spikes.
China has been preparing for exactly this scenario. Over the past two decades, Beijing has expanded its merchant fleet to over 4,000 internationally trading ships, captured over 46 percent of global commercial shipbuilding, and invested in the mariner training pipeline to crew those vessels. Critically, the Chinese military has also been integrating commercial shipping into military logistics planning. China’s national defense mobilization laws allow the requisitioning of civilian vessels, and its merchant fleet has been designed with dual-use capability in mind.
The Hormuz crisis is validating China’s investment in a state-linked merchant marine fleet while simultaneously demonstrating the cost of America’s failure to maintain one. However, it is also exposing a gap in China’s own planning: a fleet that can be mobilized for war is also a fleet that can be commercially paralyzed by insurance withdrawal, sanctioned by coalition financial instruments, or stranded at foreign ports. In a Taiwan contingency, the Chinese military’s ability to move troops across the Strait may matter less than whether China’s commercial fleet can continue to feed, fuel, and supply the mainland economy under wartime conditions. The Hormuz crisis is the first live demonstration of how quick commercial architecture can collapse.
Desert Storm inspired China to spend 35 years building the military it now has. Operation Epic Fury will not trigger the same kind of wholesale structural overhaul – the Chinese military has already done that work. What the 2026 crisis is doing is stress-testing China’s maritime strategy against live data and finding specific, uncomfortable gaps: chokepoint dependency that blue-water naval investment has not yet solved, an insurance architecture that can impose a blockade no navy can break, and a commercial fleet that can be mobilized for war but paralyzed by the financial instruments.
Each lesson applies directly to the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. Chinese military planners are not watching the Hormuz crisis as a distant curiosity. They are watching it as a dress rehearsal, and they are taking notes on themselves as much as on the United States.
Mahan argued that sea power rests on two pillars: naval force and commercial maritime enterprise. China has been absorbing both halves of that doctrine. The Strait of Hormuz crisis is revealing that even both halves may not be enough. The question is whether the United States, which builds less than one percent of the world’s commercial ships, fields fewer than 80 vessels in international trade, cannot crew the sealift fleet it already has, and had no war risk insurance mechanism ready when the crisis broke, is learning it too.
FYEO

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 05:38 pm: Edit

Right, and the contract SVC mentioned above likely contains a clause that the Russian Government can extend it if they want to, which in practice they do. Promises to keep people away from the front line are routinely broken. A Russian soldier's salary is frequently extorted by his superiors, and people who refuse to be extorted may be sent on meat assaults or killed outright. "Lifetime" can be and often is measured in weeks from the signing of the contract. Russian drone operators are top-priority targets for Ukrainian drone operators.

Other than that, the ad may be on the level.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 06:57 pm: Edit

The contract has no such clause, but Putin’s partial mobilization order allows all contracts to be modified unilaterally by the government during the emergency.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 08:55 pm: Edit

OK, I stand corrected.

That must be a real comfort for anyone who believes the ad.