I am sure. My point is that reading the contract provides no clue of the fate of these recruits.

Russia is not unique.

When I signed my USArmy contract in 1971 it was for Corps of Engineers, and within 24 hours a series of recruiters were handing me forms to voluntarily transfer to infantry (which was bleeding dry in Vietnam). I refused. I was subjected to a week of pressure to sign the amendment, and it stopped only when my father, a colonel of engineers, made a phone call and threatened to call the two star general who commanded the corps of engineers and my uncle, who was a senior aide to the ranking Republican senator.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 10:50 pm: Edit

Uh oh, the presidential assassin is an engineer.

By A David Merritt (Adm) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 10:54 pm: Edit

And a game designer...

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 11:39 pm: Edit

During the evacuation of the Hilton ballroom after the assassination attempt, attendees took 147 bottles of wine with them.

Kennedy said she grabbed three bottles of champagne and poured drinks for fellow evacuees in the room they were taken to.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, April 27, 2026 - 11:50 pm: Edit

The mentalist at the WHCA dinner was busy guessing the name of Karoline Leavitt and that is why he didn’t detect the shooter.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 28, 2026 - 12:41 am: Edit

What games did he design?

By A David Merritt (Adm) on Tuesday, April 28, 2026 - 08:24 am: Edit

Games for your phone, per MSM.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 28, 2026 - 11:18 am: Edit

Spain is sending 100 vamtac vehicles, basically humvees. Britain will provide Rapid Ranger air defense systems to be installed on some of the vehicles. These systems can engage cruise missiles, glide bombs, and drones.

By Douglas Lampert (Dlampert) on Tuesday, April 28, 2026 - 11:54 am: Edit

My little sister's best friend in highschool went to Vanderbilt as a Math/Education double major planning to teach highschool math. At some point fairly early in the process, the US Navy said, "We'll give you full tuition and a stipend, a commission when you finish, and a guarantee of a stateside job as a teacher."

Her father was a Lt. Col. I assume that since all of the rest of us thought that that guaranteed asignment wasn't worth the paper it was printed on if the Navy really needed her somewhere else, that her father warned her of the same. (He also warned her when she was teaching math to Navy enlisted to buy herself an engagement and wedding ring and wear them in class despite the fact that commissioned officer teaching enlistees should have been some protection. Probably wise.)

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Tuesday, April 28, 2026 - 04:32 pm: Edit

I am seeing some people online claiming that Iran has the ability to export a small portion of its oil over the Caspian Sea. I'm unclear to what degree this is true. For example, one "source" is the Tehran Times, which is linked to the Iranian regime, obviously not known for telling the truth.

Still, I have to imagine that at least some oil can be exported by this route.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, April 28, 2026 - 05:23 pm: Edit

UNITED 24, the Ukrainian government press/propaganda agency, has posted a number of interviews of Russian POWs. It's anyone's guess if the prisoners are lying to get better treatment, if the whole video is a propaganda lie, or if it's all true. Given Russian history, it's more likely than not that it's all true. Here are a few bits and pieces.

The Russians are desperate for recruits. (Other sources have noted that for several months the combat losses have exceeded recruitment, including foreign mercenaries.

One element of the recruit desperation is the use of the prisons as recruiting stations. Prisoners are offered the chance to enlist; those who refuse are starved, beaten, or raped until they sign up. Prisoner have a "V" on their ID cards meaning they are not to be trusted and can be expected to avoid duty and to desert at the first opportunity. Prisoner-soldiers who complete dangerous missions might have the V removed.

Police across the country are given quotas to find people to arrest and throw in prison for the most ridiculous or trivial of charges, such as walking home drunk after an evening at the tavern.

Men from Belarus (a Russian ally that is not at war) are recruited as hard as Russia can without much result. Instead, men from Belarus take jobs in Russia that are going begging because so many Russians have been drafted, killed, or fled the country. As these are the best military specimens available, police look for excuses to jail them where they can be forced into the Army.

New recruits from another source are given 4-6 weeks of training then sent into combat.

Officers killed in combat are recovered and sent home for proper burials and cash death benefits for the family.

Enlisted men killed are left where they fell and listed as "missing" so the family never gets the cash benefit. Special teams are sent to identify and recover bodies, but they just steal whatever they can find in the pockets of the dead, such as watches, wallets, phones, rings, and so forth. Military gear is recovered and issued to new recruits.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, April 29, 2026 - 02:03 pm: Edit

Intelligence: Ukrainian Lessons On What Does Not Work
April 29, 2026: In mid-2023, Ukrainian troops were operating in southeastern Ukraine region of Novodarivka. The plan was for twelve Ukrainian brigades to advance on a 30 kilometers front and seize the Russian bases area established around the town of Tokmak. For this to work Ukrainian combat engineers had to clear a lane through Russian minefields. The minefields were covered by Russian drones, snipers and machine-guns. The Ukrainian engineers were unable to create a mine-free path. Without the cleared path, nothing could be done.
Against ready defenses, breaching and gap-crossing capacity can decide whether a land force ever gets to test the rest of its campaign strategy. When an effort to penetrate enemy defenses fails, the larger campaign depending on the breach stalls and large quantities of fuel, munitions and other supplies must be redistributed to other units on the front line preparing for major offensive or defensive operations. This can be tricky in Ukraine where both sides have drones ready to attack supply trucks moving near the front line.
Campaign plans often emphasize transportation, logistics support, and munitions because those factors are central to feasibility and can be expressed in definite planning relationships. Campaign plans should emphasize those factors, but a land force can stall earlier. If a land force cannot open a lane through a prepared obstacle belt or sustain a crossing under fire, the follow-on force never gets to the part of the plan where those other calculations matter.
Similar operations in Ukraine already occurred in a similar fashion. A recent Ukrainian military publication article on the 2023 counteroffensive explores how the combined arms breach sat at the center of the campaign’s maneuver-attrition discussion. The undertaking could not continue on schedule once the breach failed.
This means enough is already visible to justify a sharper planning question. Campaign creators should ask what happens if breaching assets are disabled, the first lane does not open, or the crossing cannot be sustained. They should ask that before they become absorbed with what happens after the force passes through.
Before the counteroffensive began, Ukraine’s Orikhiv-Tokmak theory projected twelve brigades breaking through 30 kilometers of frontage, isolating Tokmak within seven days, and then driving south toward the coastal city of Melitopol. Russian defenses on that alignment were deep, layered, and visible to all before the assault. Tempo depended on a successful breach.
At Novodarivka, the breaching company sought to clear a lane, straying under pressure, then being immobilized as soldiers and vehicles were disabled by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. To make matters worse, Russian mortar and small arms fire also hit the breaching company.
Russian forces constructed a reasonable defensive position and completed it effectively. The losses among the Ukrainian combat engineers do not explain the failure of the 2023 counteroffensive. Ukrainian troops did not implement the original plan as designed. Equipment arrived late, training time was short, and Russia integrated observation, fires, aviation, and obstacles effectively. The broader explanation, however, strengthens the central point. Once the breach failed, the larger campaign could not unfold on the timetable that gave the original plan its promise.
Russia’s failed attempt to cross the Siverskyi Donets river in May 2022 shows the same logic from the other side. Russian forces lost an entire battalion tactical group at the river. Their fuel, ammunition, and manpower elsewhere did not matter because the force at the crossing never secured the opening that would have let those other resources count.
A breach or crossing is not a mere engineering drill. Rather, it is a combined arms operation that requires reconnaissance to find the site, fires to suppress defenders, obscuration to reduce enemy observation, security forces to protect the lane, engineers to reduce obstacles or emplace the crossing, traffic control to move units through in order, and follow-on operations to keep the opening from collapsing. When those actions fall out of sequence, the crossing can stall even when the larger force remains intact.
The practical lesson is simple, treat breaching and crossing capacity as explicit campaign variables. Wargame their loss rates, measure their redundancy, and test whether the exploitation concept persists through disruption at the breach or crossing site. If it does not, then the plan’s concluding point may arrive far earlier than the logistics estimate suggests.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, April 29, 2026 - 02:04 pm: Edit

Winning: Ukrainian Attack Drones Outclass Russian Models
April 29, 2026: Ukraine uses 30 percent more drones than Russia. In the first half of 2025 there was a sharp increase in the Russian use of attack drones, primarily FPV\First Person View drones. The Ukrainian drone advantage slowed, stopped and sometimes reversed the momentum of the Russians offensive operations
It’s a similar situation with the daily percentage of drones operating with FOG\Fiber Optic Guidance. These drones are controlled via a fiber-optic cable that can be many kilometers long. FOG drones cannot be jammed. For Ukraine, 32 percent of drones use FOG guidance while the Russians use only 24 percent.
The Ukrainians were faster when it came to new innovations in drone design. The Russians imitate this progress but are always a few months or more behind.
In some parts of the 1,100 kilometer front line the Russians can concentrate more drones than the Ukrainians have for offensive operations. There are fewer Russian offensives because of high casualties, troop shortages and declining morale among the troops. The Ukrainians have taken advantage of this and are reclaiming more territory from the Russians. At this rate, the Russians might be pushed out of Ukraine by 2027. One factor making this possible are the increasing number of long-range attacks against Russian refineries, pipelines, weapons and electronics manufacturing. Last month, in a particularly bold move, Ukraine sent nearly a hundred drones against the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, which is 1,500 kilometers from Ukraine. While the Russians admitted they had to delay some operations at Plesetsk, it is still unclear how much, if any damage, the drones did to the Plesetsk facility.
These Ukrainian attacks deep inside Russia are disrupting Russian efforts to use their air defense systems effectively, or at all. The S300 and S400 air defense batteries have to be moved by rail or barge to new locations. The Ukrainian drones are now equipped with guidance systems that can attack one of several targets, depending on which target has the least air defense systems protecting it. The air defense crisis also means that front line troops are often left with little or no air defense systems.
For Russia, the most damaging Ukrainian innovation in drone warfare is their use of AI/Artificial Intelligence for drone targeting systems. The AI drone contains a targeting system that finds targets. The AI drone operator confirms which targets are real and once a target is confirmed the AI targeting system needs no further communication with anyone. It is resistant to all forms of jamming.
Modern warfare has been radically changed by the introduction of FPV drones. These drones are an omnipresent aerial threat to armored vehicles and infantry on foot. Each FPV drone costs less than a thousand dollars. Operators use the video camera on the drone to see what is below and find targets. Armed FPV operators are several kilometers away to decide when their FPV drones will drop explosives on an armored vehicle, which has thinner armor on top, or infantry in the open or in trenches. To do so, the drone operators often operate in pairs, with one flying behind the other and concentrating on the big picture while seeking a likely target. When such a target is found by the reconnaissance drone, the armed drone is directed to the target. The two FPV drone operators are usually in the same room or tent and can take control of new drones, which are lined up and brought outside for launch when needed. The reconnaissance drones are often unarmed so they can spend more time in the air to seek a target.
The Ukrainians developed the FPV drone in 2022, when only a few FPV drone attacks were recorded. The Ukrainian Army was the first to appreciate the potential of FPV drones. By the summer of 2023, the Russian Army also began to use FPV drones in greater numbers. Since then, the number of FPV drone attacks has grown exponentially on both sides. Only twelve percent of those attacks led to the destruction of the target, which could be a vehicle or group of infantry or even a sniper who was firing through a window from inside a building. In this case, the armed FPV drone would fly through the window and explode in the room the sniper was in. The only defense from this was having a nearby open door the sniper could run to or dive through as the FPV drone approached. Sometimes that isn’t possible because the armed FPV drone is coming down from above the window and then in. You don’t see those coming until it’s too late.
In 2026 Ukraine plans to build at least eight million drones. About five million drones were built last year. The total for 2024 was 1.5 million drones. There have been problems. Chinese component producers are having a hard time keeping up, and, last year, to assist the Russians, China halted sending drone components to Ukraine. Suppliers in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere were quickly found. At least 70 percent of Ukrainian drones are built entirely in Ukraine, and the rest from imported parts or whole assemblies. Some Ukrainian firms have improvised by using plywood and similar materials for their drones. For the FPV First Person View drones, cheaper is better if the drone can hit its first and only target. Most Ukrainian drones are FPV models, which are considered a form of ammunition.
Both sides now use the FPV drones, but there are substantial differences in how the FPV drones are put to work in combat. The Ukrainians seek out high-value targets like armored vehicles, electronic warfare equipment, anti-aircraft systems, and storage sites for munitions or other supplies. Russian trucks carrying supplies are another prime target.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, April 29, 2026 - 02:06 pm: Edit

Marines: Japanese Combat Landing Battalion
April 28, 2026: Since the 2010s, Japan has been compelled to respond to China’s maritime expansion and military buildup. A particularly critical issue has been how to defend Japan’s remote islands and key island chains in the East China Sea, commonly known as the Nansei Islands. To address this challenge, the ARDB/Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, a specialized force for initial defense operations, was established in March 2018.
The ARDB is a JGSDF/Japan Ground Self-Defense Force unit with approximately 3,000 personnel. Its defining characteristic is its full-scale amphibious operational capability, something the JGSDF had never previously possessed. If an enemy were to seize one of Japan’s remote islands, recapturing it would require an amphibious assault against a well-defended position. The ARDB was created as a dedicated force for this purpose.
The ARDB consists of three regiments, known as Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiments, as its core units. To facilitate their landing operations, the brigade has been equipped with AAV-7 amphibious assault vehicles. The ARDB operates three variants of the AAV-7: the personnel carrier, command, and recovery versions. The standard personnel carrier variant is crewed by a commander, driver, and rear crew member, and can transport approximately ten troops in its rear compartment.
During amphibious operations, the ARDB embarks its AAV-7s onto JMSDF/Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Ōsumi-class LST/Landing Ship Tank, launching them from the well deck for shore assaults. The brigade is based at Ainoura Garrison in Sasebo, Nagasaki Prefecture, which is close to JMSDF Sasebo Naval Base. This location was chosen to enable rapid embarkation onto transport ships in times of emergency.
The ARDB’s AAV-7s are primarily assigned to the Combat Landing Battalion, which is composed of three Combat Landing Companies. The JGSDF had never previously operated amphibious armored vehicles, and its AAV-7 crews were selected from personnel who had previously served as tank operators. Given the fundamental differences between tanks and amphibious assault vehicles, one requires some perspective on AAV-7 operations.
In armored units, we have traditionally operated tanks and MCV/Maneuver Combat Vehicles which are wheeled tank-like armored vehicles. These vehicles are described as having three key capabilities: firepower, protection, and mobility. However, the AAV-7 introduces a fourth capability—transport capacity. It can carry troops in its cabin for transportation or deploy combat engineers to conduct obstacle-clearing operations on the shoreline. Unlike previous armored vehicles, which were primarily designed for combat, the AAV-7 is distinct in that it combines combat capability with the ability to transport personnel and equipment.
Japanese marine operations include landing from the sea, advancing inland, and engaging in combat, all in one nonstop training event. However, in Japan, there is no single location where it is possible to conduct all these phases together. As a result, marines have to train for each phase separately. This includes maritime maneuvering aboard JMSDF transport ships, shore landings, and inland combat exercises that must all be carried out at different times and locations. One of the key challenges is how to maintain and improve marines’ proficiency under these conditions.
Japan is developing a new amphibious armored vehicle that will replace the current AAV-7s. The new vehicle is being developed by MHI\Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The AAV-7 is armed only with a 40mm grenade launcher and a 12.7mm heavy machine gun. Onboard infantry units carry few anti-tank weapons, mostly recoilless guns. The new AAV requires a 30mm autocannon.
While at sea, the new AAV requires improved mobility and stability. The current AAV-7 experiences extreme motion and rolling at sea, causing severe motion sickness among crew members. Additionally, its maximum waterborne speed is only around 13 kilometers an hour, meaning it takes a considerable amount of time to travel from the ship to the shore during an amphibious assault. This is a significant drawback. The next-generation AAV must be capable of high-speed, stable navigation at sea.
Eight years ago the U.S. Marine Corps selected a design for its new ACV/Amphibious Combat Vehicle 1.1. There were five proposals offered in 2015 and the marines spent $240 million so the two finalists could each build sixteen of their vehicles for competitive testing that began in 2016.
The winning design was from European defense firm BAE and it is a variant of an existing vehicle; the SuperAV 6x6 used by the Brazilian Army as the VBTP-MR Guarani. The ACV version is an 8x8 vehicle weighing 31.5 tons and carrying 13 marines plus 3 crew. Other modifications the marines required included amphibious capability, the use of lighter modular composite armor including ceramics, and have features that make them equal, if not better at resisting mine and IED explosions than MRAP/Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles using steel armor. ACV has an improved V shaped hull design with additional blast protection features for the floors as well as blast resistant seats attached to the troop compartment’s ceiling instead of the bottom of the vehicle’s hull. All these features had already been found, by trial and error in Iraq and Afghanistan, to greatly reduce casualties for vehicles attacked by landmines or roadside bombs.
The initial production contract is for 30 ACV 1.1 vehicles that will be delivered by late 2019 and most of the remaining 184 vehicles over the next few years. Each ACV 1.1 costs about $6 million. The speed with which the ACV 1.2 modifications are implemented, to produce a better protected and more lethal ACV, are partly driven by how much the marines can afford to spend on the project.
As good as the ACV sounds, this was not how it was supposed to be. In 2014 the marines revised its view of the future. Gone were the prospects of large, with hundreds or thousands of landing craft, amphibious operations that occurred in great numbers during World War II. The last operation of this type at Inchon, Korea occurred in 1950, 76 years ago. Now the marines expect to conduct raids, from ships up to 200 kilometers offshore. No amphibious armored vehicles could handle that, so landing tactics have to be changed. This resulted in major revisions to the specs for the new marine ACV amphibious armored vehicle.
The 2015 reality turned out to be different, and better. Given the prototypes offered and growing budget reductions it looked like the ACV 1.1 finalist would have the capability of moving from 20 kilometers offshore under its own power. To accomplish this the marines had to accept a vehicle that carried fewer marines and was somewhat less capable in the water. The AAV7 has 30 percent reserve buoyancy enabling it to cross 36 kilometers of water in sea state 5 at speeds of up to 12 kilometers an hour. The ACV 1.1 has 21 percent reserve buoyancy enabling it to cross 36 kilometers of water in sea state 3 at speeds of up to 11 kilometers an hour. On the plus side the ACV has wheels, not a track laying system and can do 105 kilometers an hour on roads versus 72 for the AAV7. In addition wheeled armored vehicles require far less maintenance that tracked ones, which need their tracks replaced far more frequently than wheels wear out.
Meanwhile the marines refurbished the existing, 1970s era AAV7 amphibious armored vehicles to prolong service life until ACV can replace them. In addition to better protection the elderly AAV7s will be refurbished so they can remain in use until the mid-2020s. The marines never expected the AAV7s to last this long but several attempts to develop a replacement came up short. Thus the need to extend the life of their thousand AAV7 amphibious armored vehicles. These entered service in the 1970s and are falling apart. Moreover, some two thirds of the AAV7s saw service in Iraq, where they got as much use in two months as they normally did in two years of peacetime operations. Some 400 AAV7s were scheduled for refurbishing. Thus the AAV7s can still be used into the 2030s, or whenever the ACV are available in large enough numbers to replace them. With the acceptance of a final design for ACV 1.1 it looks like the AAV7s will be needed for about five more years.
The 29 ton AAV7s has a crew of four; driver, commander, gunner and rear crewman, and carries 25 combat ready marines as passengers. The vehicle is armed with a 40mm automatic grenade launcher and a 12.7mm machine-gun. When new their top land speed was 72 kilometers an hour on roads, 32 off road and 13 in water.
Back in 2011 the marines gave up on high-speed, sea skimming, amphibious assault vehicles. It then turned to a new ACV design to replace the AAV7s. DARPA/Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency was called in to help design the new vehicle. This may sound either very innovative or very desperate, and in reality, it was both, in part because the marines had spent three billion dollars in an unsuccessful attempt with the EFV/Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle to design and develop a high-speed amphibious vehicle, and partly because that failure made it clear that some original thinking was required. In the end the ACV was the EFV without most of the expensive stuff that didn't work. In effect, the ACV was to be a 21st century version of the AAV7, optimized to pass all its development tests and get into service as quickly as possible. DARPA quickly did its job but the resulting ACV was still more expensive, at $12 million, than the shrinking marine budget could handle. The ACV design was tweaked until an affordable price was achieved.
In retrospect, the marines could have just built the EFV without the high-speed capability but that was eventually considered technically and politically impractical. The problem remains that the technology simply does not yet exist yet to make the high-speed capability workable. The budget situation is grim, leaving the usually unstoppable Marine Corps running into an immovable object and improvising as best they can. The marines had asked the navy to develop a high speed amphibious craft, or connector, to get ACVs to shore quickly but the navy budget was also shrinking and proved unable to handle the cost of developing and building the connector. Some marine analysts point out that the need for moving amphibious vehicles 200 kilometers from ship to shore is probably unrealistic for any likely future marine operations.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, April 29, 2026 - 02:06 pm: Edit

Naval Air: Portuguese Navy Drone Carrier
April 28, 2026: Recently the Damen Shipyards Group facility in Romania launched a Drone Carrier for the Portuguese Navy. This vessel looks like an aircraft carrier. This ship will serve as the NRP/Navio da República Portugues and is an MPV/Multi-Purpose Vessel. The ship is expected to enter service later this year The MPV 10720 is based on a Portuguese Navy concept for a versatile naval platform designed to handle various operational tasks.
This vessel operates autonomously, is built for use in tropical and moderate regions, and excels in tasks like oceanographic research, environmental monitoring, humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and maritime support.
The ship is 108 meters long and 20 meters wide. Maximum speed is 28 kilometers an hour. Cargo capacity can be 18 containers, or 18 vehicles, or ten RIB/Rigid Inflatable Boats. If necessary, the ship can carry 300 soldiers. There are two hangars for 2 helicopters or one helicopter and several drones. These aircraft operate from a 94 by 11 meter flight deck.
Damen collaborated with the Portuguese Navy and suppliers to develop the 7,000-ton MPSS/Multi-Purpose Support Ship, combining military technology with capable solutions. The vessel’s launch begins pre-delivery, marking its role in Portugal’s maritime security, scientific research, and disaster relief.
The MPV 10720 reflects the navy’s innovative approach and efficient partnership with Damen. Named after a Portuguese king from the Age of Discovery, the ship will undergo sea trials later this year and join the fleet alongside other Damen-built frigates.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, April 29, 2026 - 02:11 pm: Edit

SecWar Hegseth's wife wore a relatively inexpensive dress to the White House Correspondent's Dinner (a similar dress is available from China for $42 or Temu for $21), rather than a much more expensive evening gown. What a travesty! What an insult to the entire press core, to America, and to the entire world! Horrors! We must impeach him right away!

By Mike Erickson (Mike_Erickson) on Wednesday, April 29, 2026 - 03:57 pm: Edit

>> people online claiming that Iran has the ability to export a
>> small portion of its oil over the Caspian Sea

Iran has rail links to the Caspian, and then ships can take cargo from there to any of the Caspian-adjacent nations (CAN), including Russia. This is the link used to trade drones and drone parts. It is also used to swap petroleum products with CAN. These links supposedly have a maximum average capacity to "swap" up to 100k barrels per day (Israel bombed some of them). It's not clear how the swap rate compares to the straight through cargo rate.

Iran also has rail links to Turkey and another to Turkmenistan that ultimately leads to China. The Turkey link could theoretically carry up to 45k barrels per day, and the China link perhaps 60k barrels per day. The China link supposedly includes one or perhaps two gauge swaps, which complicates the transit and potentially requires more equipment.

It's not clear if there is enough tanker car capacity within Iran to run all three of these rail links at full tilt for an extended period of time.

--Mike

By Steve Petrick (Petrick) on Wednesday, April 29, 2026 - 04:05 pm: Edit

I wonder what Iran is disguising their tanker cars as. There is, I think, little doubt the U.S. and Israel is tracking them and will destroy them if (when?) the war goes hot again.

By Steve Petrick (Petrick) on Wednesday, April 29, 2026 - 04:16 pm: Edit

My real problem is that I am looking at an invasion USA scenario (Chuck Norris film) where Iran runs a group of fanatical die for Allah commandoes into the U.S. with a collection of explosive devices (ATGs, RPVs, etc.) and attacks the White House. I am surprised it has not happened as of yet given what happened in the last Administration (illegal immigration). Supposedly 20 million(+) unaccounted for people in this country, and let's not forget those college students who attend "no Kings" rallies and parade around with Palestinian flags.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, April 30, 2026 - 04:28 am: Edit

Iran’s attacks on tankers in the Strait of Hormuz has resulted in many nations launching three new projects.

A $16 billion development road and railroad from the Iraqi coast, across Iraq and Turkey, into Europe and oil ports in the Mediterranean. This could later include a pipeline.

A $12 billion project to build a pipeline from the Persian Gulf to Israel. The would get Saudi and UAE oil to the west in three years and tie Israel and powerful countries together.

Seems unlikely but Oman and the UAE want to build a $300 billion canal across the 32km peninsula south of Hormuz. This means cutting off through a 2000 foot high mountain range. This might involve the world’s biggest tunnel.

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Thursday, April 30, 2026 - 11:50 am: Edit

I would say that taking part in "No kings" is a long way from supporting Palestinian terrorism.

That is like saying that if you hate communism, you automatically embrace Fascism; true for a few but certainly not most.

As for the idea of bad guys using ATGMs or drones; that is very scary... Heck, just put a 81 mm mortar 5+ miles away. Good chance they could even get away.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, April 30, 2026 - 01:34 pm: Edit

Mike, you are conflating. Petrick noted that there were people going to "no kings" and waving Palestinian flags, did nothing to say everyone did both, and did not say Palestinian terrorism.

I, on the other hand, being in the order of succession for the Throne of Saint James, find "no kings" rallies despicable.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, April 30, 2026 - 01:34 pm: Edit

Electronic Weapons: Commercial Electronics And Collecting Intelligence
April 30, 2026: Armed forces around the world spend countless hours training, developing policies, and applying the best operational security practices, so imagine the size of the egg on the face of the Dutch navy when reporters managed to track one of its warships for less than the cost of a pastry and cup of coffee.
The security snag was reported by Dutch regional broadcaster Omroep Gelderland. In a recent account, Omroep Gelderland journalist Just Vervaart said the broadcaster was able to track HNLMS Evertsen, a Dutch air-defense frigate deployed to help protect France’s aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle against missile threats, by mailing a Bluetooth tracker concealed in a postcard to the ship.
Per Vervaart, the Dutch Ministry of Defense makes it easy to send mail and packages to soldiers and sailors in the Dutch armed forces and posts full instructions online. It's that freely available open-source intelligence data that Vervaart employed to send the tracker to the Evertsen.
The report says the tracker remained active for about 24 hours, showing HNLMS Evertsen leaving port in Heraklion, Crete, and sailing first west along the island’s coast before turning east toward Cyprus. The tracker finally went offline a day later when the ship was near Cyprus and hasn't come back online.
According to Dutch defense officials Vervaart reported the story of how the tracker was found during mail sorting and was disabled. Still, the Ministry is apparently changing its mail policies in response to the incident and will now ban greeting cards containing batteries along with additional reviews of mail guidelines.
The ban on greeting cards containing batteries appears to be a direct response to Vervaart's test, as he chose to conceal the Bluetooth tracker in a postcard after ministry videos and mailing guidance indicated envelopes were not X-rayed, unlike packages, making that route more likely to pass through undetected.
Social media has been an absolute Operational Security disaster for armed forces because even the most innocent appearing post can accidentally include information that's incredibly valuable to the right person. Limits obviously have to be put in place to that end.
Cut soldiers and sailors off from physical mail while on deployment, though, and you're likely to have a mutiny on your hands. Technology has changed, though, and something once as innocuous as posting instructions on how to send mail to military members has to be weighed in a new light.
Currently, you can eliminate targets remotely and with great precision, but you do need to know where so, for warships in particular, you never want to reveal your location to others. This isn't just a military lesson. Technical evolution means issues that were totally acceptable in the world before may now be critical security risks that have yet to enter into your Operational Security equation.


FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, April 30, 2026 - 01:34 pm: Edit

Submarines: Russian Subs Caught Preparing Underwater Sabotage
April 30, 2026: Earlier this spring, Russian naval units from the GUGI/Main Directorate of Deep Sea Research began a clandestine operation involving suspicious activity around significant undersea infrastructure in Norwegian and British maritime areas.
A Russian Akula-class attack submarine, along with two intelligence-gathering submarines, was tracked by British and Norwegian naval forces north of Britain in the course of this operation, lasting more than a month. Russia’s attempt to carry out perverse activity over critical undersea infrastructure was ultimately thwarted and the vessels withdrew.
Britain noticed this Russian activity around its underwater infrastructure. The operation is believed to have been aimed at mapping subsea fiber-optic cables, although the precise location of the action has not been divulged.
While everyone focused their attention on the Middle East, the British armed forces concentrated more on such Russian threats north of Britain. Both Norway and Britain employed frigates, other warships, helicopters, and P-8 Poseidon maritime aircraft to track and deter the Russian navy operation. The Akula-class submarine has since returned to the Northern Fleet’s home base on the Kola Peninsula.
The British Government stated that GUGI is a long-standing Russian military program designed to develop capabilities deployable from specific surface vessels and submarines. These assets are intended to survey underwater infrastructure during peacetime and potentially damage or destroy it in the event of conflict.
Russia has a secret base in Olenya Bay, north of Murmansk, from which GUGI’s specialized operations are conducted. The facility, located on the Barents Sea coast, lies approximately 100 kilometers from Russia’s northern border with Norway. Russia is engaged in continuing efforts to develop capabilities for mapping, and potentially sabotaging, critical Western civil infrastructure at significant sea depths. These efforts are driven by aspirations to threaten the interests of Norway and its allies.
Norway has participated in a coordinated military operation with its allies to send a clear message: covert activities in Norwegian waters will not be endured. It has made clear to the Russian authorities that any attempt to target Norway’s critical infrastructure will be detected and met with consequences.

FYEO

By Ted Fay (Catwhoeatsphoto) on Thursday, April 30, 2026 - 03:10 pm: Edit

I like the idea of a king. One King in particular to whom I bend the knee.

So I, too, do not attend "No Kings" rallies.