I think we have a different problem today. As has been established here Iran is an untrustworthy negotiator, and President Trump has not made any preparations for an invasion. The President keeps talking about a negotiate6 peace.

So what are we likely to get that isn't really any better than a new JCPOA?

Note that even if President Trump does somehow have an effective, and enforceable treaty, will future presidents enforce it?

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Wednesday, May 06, 2026 - 10:33 am: Edit

For that sort of reason, I think regime change is a FAR better outcome than any deal.

The problem is actually achieving it.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 06, 2026 - 12:00 pm: Edit

William, I can only agree.

Mike E, as I said before, the JCPOA was designed to fail and letIran build nuclear weapons.

With that, further discussion of JCPOA is pointless and a waste of time. No further discussion of that fake treaty. Focus on how we end this war.

The IRGC is running Iran and doesn’t care if its people are reduced to the Stone Age. They won’t give up terror proxies. They won’t give up their nuclear dream. How do we remove them?

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 06, 2026 - 12:12 pm: Edit

I would say a Marine landing on Kharg Island is one card to play.

A ground invasion to march to Tehran would take more troops than the US has active. It would take six months to activate ten national guard divisions, at least.

By the June driving season gasoline prices will average $5.

Trump needs to end this or the midterms will end Trump. That’s very high on his mind.

Iran’s only offer to date is the US gives up ALL of its bargaining power first, then endless talks.

By MarkSHoyle (Bolo) on Wednesday, May 06, 2026 - 12:50 pm: Edit

Oil down $11 in two days....
Have to see where the yo-yo goes
before $5 gas....

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 06, 2026 - 03:51 pm: Edit

Surface Forces : American Carrier Breaks A Record
May 6, 2026: Recently the American aircraft carrier Ford/CVN 78, broke a record as it remained at sea for 295 days. This was a record for time at sea. Previous records were set by the Midway/CVA 41 in the 1970s and the Coral Sea/CV 43 in the 1960s.
The Ford was in the Eastern Mediterranean and then moved to the Caribbean where it was present to assist in the capture of former Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro. Later Ford was transferred to the Middle East and eventually the Red Sea. While there, a fire in the ship’s laundry forced the carrier back to the Mediterranean Sea for repairs.
The extended deployment is set to last until May and could rival Vietnam-era deployments in the 1970s. Overall the Ford endured an eleven month long deployment.
A carrier strike group is a gauge of American combat power. It does not include training while at sea, or delays because of medical emergencies, as was the case during the Covid19. Between 1920 and 2021, the crew of Nimitz/CVN 68 was at sea for 341 days, with periods ashore to prevent the spread of Covid19
Since 1964, the longest deployment was 332 days, a record held by the former Midway/ CVA 41 while active in the Gulf of Tonkin from 1972 through 1973 in support of U.S. operations during the Vietnam War,
Ford’s eleven month extension continues a trend of East Coast carrier deployments that consistently go beyond the seven-month deployment phase of the Navy’s optimized fleet response plan.
The last six deployments from the port of Norfolk averaged just under nine months with American carriers operating in the Mediterranean as a discouragement to Russian aggression following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, then in defense of commercial ships being attacked by Yemen based Houthi forces following the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attacks in Southern Israel, and now the conflict with Iran. Norfolk carrier Bush/CVN 77 is currently at sea off the coast of Africa, ready to join naval forces in the Arabian Sea.
The extension of Ford to support Caribbean Sea operations and then manoeuvres in the Middle East has also raised concerns of maintenance schedules at the Norfolk Shipyard.
Earlier this year, there were problems with the return of the Ford because of the schedules for maintenance availability. The carriers are ready to go to sea once more.
The carrier Eisenhower/CVN 69 is in the midst of an overhaul at the shipyard after completing a 2024 deployment, while Truman/CVN 75 is being repaired at Norfolk ahead of its own availability. Both carriers’ most recent deployments were almost nine months. It’s unclear whether the fire Ford suffered will extend the carrier’s availability.
Nimitz class carriers like the Bush cost over $6 billion. These carriers displace 102,000 tons, are 333 meters long and are powered by two nuclear reactors. Top speed is 56 kilometers an hour. They carry a crew of 3,532 personnel plus 2,480 aviation personnel to operate and maintain the 90 combat aircraft and helicopters.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 06, 2026 - 03:52 pm: Edit

Submarines: US Navy Submarine Scandal
May 6, 2026: It was recently revealed one of the earliest Los Angeles-class nuclear attack submarines will be inactivated after waiting more than a decade for an overhaul.
USS Boise/SSN 764, currently in a drydock at the Newport News Shipyard in Virginia, had been scheduled for a regular overhaul in 2016. While waiting for a slot at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Va., the 34-year-old submarine lost its dive certification in 2017. After years at the pier, the Navy decided to enlist HII/Huntington Ingalls Industries to repair the submarine at Newport News. The boat was towed to Newport in 2018, back to Naval Station Norfolk and back again to Newport in 2020. From then, Boise waited until the service awarded a $1.2 billion contract to HII for the work in 2024. Combined, the Navy has invested about $1.6 billion in Boise.
Currently, after 11 years of doing nothing on the Boise, the Navy intends to inactivate the submarine and focus the resources on other new construction and repair projects. Faced with a ship that has been idle for more than a decade, the cost for the repair versus other efforts wasn’t worth it, the sea service said.
Financial resources and personnel associated with the planned overhaul of the Boise will be redirected to support other Navy priorities, including timely delivery of newer Virginia-class submarines.
HII announced that it would cooperate with the Navy to implement this decision in an efficient, cost-effective way. It was anticipated that there will be no impact to our workforce and will shift shipbuilders currently assigned to Boise to other work underway at Newport News Shipbuilding. Boise has been the public emblem of the service’s submarine maintenance backlog in its four public shipyards that focus on work in order of ballistic-missile submarines, aircraft carriers and attack submarines. In 2021 the backlog for submarines at the four public shipyards was due to maintenance availability getting longer and not enough workers at the public yards.
On average, after overhauls, Virginia-class submarines have returned to operations almost nine months later than expected, on average. Los Angeles-class submarines have taken four and a half months longer than scheduled, on average, to return to the fleet. As a result, some submarines have missed deployments or had their deployments at sea shortened. The delays have reduced the number of submarines that the Navy can put to sea, idling expensive ships and their skilled crews.
While the Navy has made efforts to improve workforce and schedules in the public yards, the fundamental problems at the shipyards have continued to linger.
The Navy has selected private yards including HII Newport News and GD\General Dynamics Electric Boat in Connecticut to take on maintenance availability in addition to submarine construction.
GD Electric Boat completed a three-year overhaul on USS Montpelier\SSN 765) in 2019 and was awarded a contract in 2022 to repair USS Hartford\SSN 768, which is continuing. Newport News Shipbuilding was awarded work for USS Helena\SSN-725 which was delivered in 2022 and USS Columbus\SSN 762, which is ongoing, as well as Boise.
Work at the private yards has been more expensive than the public yards with the shipyards hiring repair workers who have a different skill set than new construction workers.
The same workers that weren’t repairing Boise aren’t the same people that are going to build new submarines. It was agreed that the Navy’s decision to redirect the resources to repairing submarines that could stay in the fleet longer with the same level of resources.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 06, 2026 - 03:53 pm: Edit

Morale: Azerbaijan And The Iran War
May 5, 2026: Azerbaijan and Iran seem to have reconciled after Iran bombed Azerbaijan on March 6 and the latter’s president angrily demanded explanations and an apology. Prior to that, the Azerbaijani President had visited the Iranian Embassy in the capitol to offer condolences over the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei following Israeli and American airstrikes. Four days later, in a telephone conversation with the Iranian President, the Azerbaijani president again conveyed condolences and expressed readiness to provide compassionate aid to Iran. Then Iran bombed Azerbaijan and the fur started to fly.
They have since made up as the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry declared that that Azerbaijani territory would not be used for attacks against Iran and called for the conflict with the Americans and Israel to be resolved through negotiation. The Azerbaijani president chose to keep the presidential channel open and frame the relationship in terms of crisis management despite severe regional escalation.
Azerbaijan implemented measures to secure its territory and evacuate its citizens. By early March, the Foreign Ministry said the Cabinet of Ministers’ task force had allowed Azerbaijani citizens in Iran to return unhindered by land, and that about 300 had already crossed back into Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani official coverage also reported that embassies were operating at heightened capacity and that the state was using both the Azerbaijani and Turkish land borders for the exit of Azerbaijani citizens from Iran. Azerbaijan has treated the war as a direct consular and border-management emergency requiring centralized state coordination rather than solely an external diplomatic crisis.
Azerbaijan quickly became a transit link for third-country evacuations from Iran. Citizens and diplomats from Russia, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Algeria, Pakistan, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Tajikistan, and Austria fled Iran through Azerbaijani territory in the first days of the crisis. On March 10, the Dutch Embassy in Iran also announced that it would temporarily operate from Azerbaijan. On March 11, Russian President Vladimir Putin thanked Aliyev for Azerbaijan’s prompt assistance in evacuating Russian citizens from Iran. Azerbaijan’s security role was not limited to self-protection. It also emerged as a functioning regional safety valve during the crisis.
The Astara border crossing transitioned into a managed humanitarian corridor for aid flows into Iran. On March 10, approximately 30 tons of Azerbaijani food, pharmaceuticals, and medical supplies sent on Aliyev’s instructions crossed into Iran. Eighty-two additional tons of Azerbaijani aid reportedly crossed through Astara a week later. The Iranian Red Crescent Society described Azerbaijan as one of the first countries to send humanitarian aid and said other states were also channeling assistance to Iran via Azerbaijan. This turned Azerbaijan from a passive neighbor into a hub between Iran and outside actors.
Azerbaijan expanded the Astara corridor’s function by enabling third-country humanitarian shipments to Iran. A Russian Emergencies Ministry Il-76 carrying over 13 tons of humanitarian cargo landed in Lankaran on March 12, after which the supplies were moved onward to Iran through Astara. An Azerbaijani media outlet later documented additional Russian aid convoys moving to Iran via Azerbaijani territory. Azerbaijan securely organized transport, customs, and border access so that Azerbaijani territory could serve as a controlled corridor rather than a destabilized frontier.
Azerbaijan has sustained diplomatic channels with Iran despite strained relations. Azerbaijani official behavior after the outbreak of war suggests that Azerbaijan’s method was not simply impartiality, but a method to keep the border functioning, preventing spillover, refusing participation in military action against Iran, preserving state-to-state communication, and using Azerbaijan’s geography for evacuation and aid under strict state control.
Azerbaijan would not enter the conflict, but it would actively manage its consequences. Azerbaijan’s approach to security management during the war has thus far included containment at the border, controlled diplomacy with Iran, and conversion of Azerbaijani territory into a regulated evacuation and humanitarian corridor. Rather than explicitly aligning with any side or escalating tensions, Azerbaijan acted as a practical stabilizer by securing its borders, evacuating civilians, enabling the safe transit of foreign nationals, and channeling humanitarian aid into Iran through controlled border crossings.


FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 06, 2026 - 03:53 pm: Edit

Submarines: Long Range South Korean Submarine Cruise
May 5, 2026: a South Korea submarine recently arrived at Guam, concluding the first stage of what will be the longest voyage of a South Korean submarine to date.
ROKS Dosan Ahn Chang-ho (SS-083), the first of Seoul’s KSS-III-class of diesel electric submarines, departed South Korea last month for Canada ahead of drills with the Royal Canadian Navy in support of South Korea's proposal for Canada’s 12 attack submarine package.
The South Korean participation will demonstrate South Korea’s bid in the Canadian Patrol Submarine Program. Canada currently relies on an aging fleet of four submarines that were previously in service with Britain before entering RCN service in the 1990s-2000s.
Since the program’s onset in 2021, Canada has evaluated its choice between South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean KSS-III and Germany’s Thyssen-Krupp Marine Systems Type 212CD. The two firms have pledged to support local submarine infrastructure efforts, create tens of thousands of jobs and quickly deliver the 12 attack boats in bids to win the $20-$40 billion program. The first vessel of this future class is expected to be delivered by 2035.
The deployment of this South Korean submarine will be the farthest away a South Korean submarine has traveled. Korea claims that the KSS-III will sail up to 14,000 kilometers. To sustain the voyage, the submarine will conduct another replenishment stop in Hawaii before arriving in Canada. The attack boat will also pick up two Royal Canadian Navy submariners for the final leg for observations of the Hanwha Ocean submarine while underway.
The South Korean submarine will later reveal maritime security and defense cooperation between South Korea and Canada through these joint exercises.
The submarine will arrive in Canada by June, coinciding with Canada’s expected decision on the winner of the patrol submarine program. After activities with the Royal Canadian Navy, Dosan Ahn Chang-ho is slated to join Rim of the Pacific 2026 naval drills around Hawaii on its return voyage home.
South Korea’s bid for the KSS-III submarine in Canada’s program is one of the many international pitches being made by South Korean shipbuilders in a broader strategic sale strategy to place the country’s arms on the international market. While initially conceived to support South Korea’s counterstrike efforts in the event of a war with North Korea, Hanwha Ocean has offered export variants of the KSS-III in its various bids.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 06, 2026 - 03:54 pm: Edit

Attrition: Russian Ukraine War Efforts Diminished
May 4, 2026: In Russia President Vladimir Putin announced this year’s 32-hour-long Easter truce in his war against Ukraine in the same manner as in spring 2025. It was, however, not a forerunner to a lasting ceasefire, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy suggested. Neither was it a signal of Moscow’s interest in resuming talks on a peace deal, despite some cautious sponsorship in the mainstream media. President Putin merely sought to pacify public opinion, where support for continuing the war is very weak, particularly among younger age groups. He also found it timely to move in step with the pause in the Gulf conflict, which Russian experts did not expect to last even two weeks. The talks in Pakistan and the consequences of their breakdown are attracting prime international attention, so little attention has lately been given to the changes in Russia’s seemingly static war against Ukraine, which could be decisive.
The Russian Spring offensive in Donbas has yielded no territorial gains and has even suffered several retreats driven by Ukrainian counterattacks. Official Russian commentary ignores this setback, but partisan bloggers have been making a lot of noise about the lack of reserves needed to regain momentum. The main cause of this transformation of the battlefield is the new edge Ukraine has gained in drone warfare by combining saturation of the tactical zone with FPV/First Person View drones and mid-range strikes, so that the effective kill-zone is expanded to some 120 kilometers from the front line. The balance of territorial advances may have shifted slightly, but it effectively undercuts Putin’s claim that the whole Donbas will be occupied either through a deal or by force.
The failed attacks and crippled logistics result in record numbers of casualties in the Russian army. The documented number of 208,755 fatalities hardly makes half of the real losses of life. Since the start of the year, Russia’s commercial recruitment system has been unable to attract a sufficient number of new recruits and foreign mercenaries to compensate for mounting losses, and this gap keeps widening. Neither the spreading campaign to recruit students, nor the pressure on the fresh draftees conscripted since April 1 to sign contracts for combat units, can yield the required volume of manpower. Regional authorities are compelled to raise bonuses for signing contracts, but the supply of volunteers still cannot meet demand. These payments add considerably to regional budget crises, and taxation increases bring widespread discontent, worsened by the underfunding of responses to various local crises, such as the foot-and-mouth epidemic in Southern Siberia.
Ukraine in March managed to gain an advantage over Russia in the number of long-distance drone attacks, setting the mark above 7,300 strikes. The data on these activities is quite unreliable, but the devastating impact of Ukrainian drone hits on Russian energy infrastructure, including platforms in the Caspian Sea, is beyond doubt. Repeated attacks on oil terminals in Novorossiysk, Primorsk, and Ust-Luga have effectively denied Russia the opportunity to profit from the spike in oil prices driven by the conflict in the Gulf. A new feature of Ukrainian drone warfare is the increased targeting of Russian air defense systems, including radars, which weakens the protection of many crucial assets exactly when the intensity of the threat goes up.
Russian attempts to resort to nuclear blackmail or show its strategic muscle have also notably declined. Putin has avoided any nuclear bragging in his infrequent public appearances, and partisan social media has turned to debates over the prospects of arms control. Dmitry Trenin, an advocate for nuclear escalation, has been promoted to president of the Russian International Affairs Council and has transitioned to a more sober discourse. Russia has also cut down on its hybrid attacks on its European neighbors and has refrained from any countermeasures against the arrests of its shadow fleet ships. A demarche by the Russian Foreign Ministry was the only step taken after the claim that the Baltic states opened air corridors for Ukrainian drone strikes on Primorsk and Ust-Luga, and Russian media noted that it was flatly turned down.
The first quarter of 2026 officially registered a contraction of the Russian economy, which is the strategic center of gravity in this war of attrition. The altering of statistics camouflages the true depth of the recession, but the sustained decline in investment activity ensures that the crisis will only deepen. Alarm bells about the extraordinary expansion of the budget deficit may be temporarily silenced by the expected growth in petroleum-revenues, but the volume of additional income is clearly insufficient to address the unfolding financial disaster. Putin has no plan to address the economic decline, and his plan to tax extra-high profits clashes with the reality of losses reported even by corporations enjoying the most-favored status. The total of these changes’ amounts to a strong new incentive for Russia to end this unwinnable war.
The top Ukrainian negotiator has therefore suggested that a compromise peace deal can be reached soon and implemented quickly. His point was instantly picked up by the Russian media. Putin, however, operates on a different rationale centered on ensuring his grasp on power. He is less concerned about the regime’s survival than, for instance, the Iranian leadership, which refuses to moderate its ambitions in the talks with the United States, but is much more obsessed with personal safety. He finds the risks of taking responsibility for ending the war, and by extension, for starting it while standing in the way of the peace process equally disturbing. Fear worsens his usual reluctance to make hard decisions, but delaying it only adds to the gravity of his political dilemma.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 06, 2026 - 03:55 pm: Edit

Procurement: Russian Unfunded Mandates Madness
May 4, 2026: In Russia President Vladimir Putin has enforced a system of unfunded mandates on Russia’s federal regions to pay for his war against Ukraine and prevent criticism. He has ordered the regions to finance various programs without the required funding, either by allowing them to keep more taxes that they collect or restoring more tax money to them. The most notorious of these mandates is the Kremlin’s call for the regions and republics to pay massive bonuses to those who volunteer to serve in the military. Many regions can now no longer fund healthcare, housing, and other basic services. This is a development that has sparked widespread anger and even significant protests. This has contributed to the serious decline in public support for Putin and his policies.
Private citizens in the regions are not alone in their anger. Many opposition party advocates and regional officials are as well. That has prompted Putin to attempt to show his concern, not by providing the necessary funds, but by requiring that regional officials eliminate the causes of public discontent. Some of these officials are likely to point out the obvious source of these problems. The unfunded mandates have come together to oppose Putin’s position on them. This is especially dangerous when elections are looming, and opposition parties are exploiting popular anger, despite the Kremlin’s control over regional leadership.
On April 3, in a transparent effort to suggest he was concerned about the results of his optimisation program, Putin instructed the leaders of ten federal subjects to take instantaneous action to eliminate the causes of public dissatisfaction with healthcare services. His decision to single out only ten regions suggests an effort to present the problem is limited, even though most regions face similar pressures. Those chosen to have promised to implement Putin’s plans, but opposition parties, the population, and commentators doubt that there will be any meaningful developments until the issue of funding is addressed. This is something unlikely to happen as long as Putin is struggling to pay for his war against Ukraine and appears willing to cut services for ordinary Russians to do. Explanations condemning the unfunded mandate measures reflect not only the personal opinions of their authors, but also the frustration of many in the population and the regional leaders over Moscow continuing to take two-thirds of all tax money collected while returning only a small portion in federal funding. At the same time, Moscow demands that the regional governments finance additional obligations such as bonuses for soldiers who enlist to fight in Ukraine. Furthermore, some Duma deputies are now questioning whether unfunded mandates can continue given their negative effects in the regions. Some regional leaders have ended the optimization program locally despite federal pressure, forcing them into deeper debt and raising questions about future financial stability.
Funding for healthcare operations has become increasingly contentious since Putin launched his optimization campaign to close smaller medical centers and support systems a decade ago. Strains on public services have intensified since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, when forced optimization hit schools, post offices, and local infrastructure. Such complaints have gained purchase not only because they are causing real suffering in many parts of Russia, where people no longer have access to nearby medical care, but also because saving or restoring such medical points is viewed by many Russian experts as essential if Russia is to overcome its demographic decline. Opinions that might otherwise be viewed as direct opposition to the government can and have often been presented as supportive of Putin’s other goals.
Putin’s decision to call on regional leaders to focus on public unhappiness over systemic medical problems is a response to polls showing a decline in his popular support ahead of upcoming Duma elections in September. The KPRF/Communist Party of the Russian Federation and other opposition parties are highlighting problems in healthcare caused by Putin’s unfunded mandate system to gain support, and they are likely to increase their rhetoric as the elections approach. Putin clearly wants to show that he is concerned with the problems of the Russian people, but if his United Russia party is to avoid embarrassment in the elections, they need to address this funding issue. That will likely lead some regional leaders to talk, as they have in the past, about a more practical distribution of resources and about more money being retained in their federal subjects or returned to them as grants to quell the expressions of discontent Putin is now acknowledging.
Given the federal government’s enormous and exploding deficit this year, largely as a result of Putin’s war against Ukraine, there is little chance of that outcome as long as the Russian leader remains in power and his war continues. This issue may seem minor, but it could spark a new discussion about the need for more genuine federalism in the Russian Federation. This discussion will focus on the effects of Putin’s power, including the extraction of ever more resources from the federal subjects and the return of ever less funds to support local populations. Propaganda moves, such as Putin’s call for 10 regions to figure out how to overcome public dissatisfaction, will not be enough to resolve such problems. They may very well become yet another example of how Putin, in pursuit of an outcome he seeks, risks producing unintended consequences.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 06, 2026 - 03:55 pm: Edit

Procurement: Commercial Shipbuilding Surge
May 3, 2026: W orldwide orders for commercial shipping construction have ascended to the highest level in nearly two decades, as a wave of tanker contracting and continuous new building demand across the 2020s continues to reshape fleet dynamics.
An analysis by BIMCO, the largest global direct membership organisation for shipowners, charterers, shipbrokers and agents’ analysis, shows the global shipbuilding order book reached 191 million CGT/Compensated Gross Tons by the end of the first quarter of 2026. This is equivalent to 17 percent of the existing fleet, the highest ratio since 2011.
Worldwide order books have been boosted by higher newbuilding having contracted throughout the 2020s and most recently been slammed upwards by the highest quarterly demands for large new ships since the Suez Canal was closed by the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
This surge was driven by the tanker sector. Newbuilding contracting rose 40 percent year-over-year in the first quarter to 17.6 million CGT, fueled by a tripling of crude tanker orders and a rebound in LNG carrier activity. Tankers accounted for 32 percent of all new orders, their largest share since 2017.
Momentum showed signs of cooling on a quarterly basis, with total contracting down 17 percent compared to the last quarter of 2025, reflecting a pullback in dry bulk orders after a late-2025 spike in certain vessel demand.
Zooming out, the trend is unmistakable. Newbuilding activity so far this decade is running 47 percent above the average levels seen in the 2010s, supported by stronger freight markets, a larger global fleet, and a growing need to replace aging vessels.
That replacement cycle is particularly evident in tankers. BIMCO notes that 21 percent of the crude tanker fleet and 17 percent of the product tanker fleet are now over 20 years old, at an age where scrapping becomes increasingly likely. By contrast, only 4 percent of container ships and 8 percent of LNG/Liquid Natural Gas carriers are over 25 years old, though both segments are expected to see stronger long-term demand growth.
Order books in several sectors are already stretching historical norms. The orderbook-to-fleet ratio has reached 22 percent for crude tankers, 19 percent for product tankers, 37 percent for container ships, and a striking 40 percent for LNG carriers. This highlights the scale of tonnage set to hit the water in the coming years.
Shipyard capacity is also tightening. Chinese yards continue to dominate global contracting, capturing 70 percent of orders in the first quarter, while South Korean builders secured 20 percent, supported by LNG carrier demand. Japanese yards, meanwhile, have seen their share collapse to just 1 percent, the lowest level in decades, amid limited capacity and reduced competitiveness.
Despite the surge, BIMCO cautions that the current orderbook expansion may eventually sow the seeds of a slowdown. Long lead times, elevated newbuilding prices, and mounting geopolitical uncertainty—particularly around the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz—are already weighing on forward contracting decisions.
The swelling order books across several large shipping sectors could contribute to a slowdown in new building contracting. There is uncertainty around fuel transitions and disrupted trade routes as additional headwinds.
For now, however, the message is clear, the global fleet pipeline is filling fast, and the next wave of tonnage is already locked in.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 06, 2026 - 03:56 pm: Edit

Surface Forces : More South China Sea Aggression
May 3, 2026: Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea has been blockaded by Chinese use of ships and a blockade to tighten control of the entrance amid roiling tension with the Philippines over the disputed feature. Scarborough is one of Asia’s most fiercely disputed maritime sites, where some diplomats and analysts fear evolving frictions and conflicts could degenerate into armed conflict.
The presence of four fishing boats, a Chinese naval or coast guard ship and a new floating barrier comes as the Philippines sends its own coast guard and fisheries vessels to support its fishermen frequently driven away by larger Chinese patrols.
In early April the fishing boats were anchored along the entrance to the shoal, in addition to a floating barrier stretching across it. China’s defense ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment on the barriers to the entrance to the shoal or its timing.
The traditionally rich fishing ground of the Scarborough Shoal lies entirely within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, but China also claims it as part of its territory.
Last year, China approved the establishment of a national nature reserve by their security officials, who called the move an obvious pretext for occupation.
The Chinese government had installed a 352 meter floating barrier at the entrance in early April.
Six Chinese maritime militia vessels were detected within the shoal, while three others were seen outside, seemingly obstructing the entrance to the area. Officials were referring to the shoal by its Philippine name of Bajo de Masinloc, while China calls it Huangyan Island.
While the Philippines coast guard has cut barriers in the past, the Chinese side appears to have removed the latest one since the weekend, but the Philippine Navy says its patrols continue. According to Philippine assessments, the Chinese exhibit suspicion whenever they monitor a group of Filipino fishing boats. Ten Chinese coast guard vessels were sighted at the shoal in early.
Despite the competing claims, sovereignty has never been proved, and the shoal is effectively under Chinese control even if Philippine boats still try to operate there.
In January, the militaries of the Philippines and the United States moved through the shoal in the 11th such drill by the treaty allies.
Military engagements between them have soared under Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who has pivoted closer to Washington in response to China’s growing presence in the busy waterway of the South China Sea.
Thousands of troops from both countries are set to begin major operations across the Philippine archipelago this month, including in Zambales, whose coast is about 216 kilometers from the Scarborough Shoal.
The drills and broader tensions are being closely watched amid fears that China could take benefit because of observations that the U.S. is distracted by the Iran conflict and its effort to re-open the vital Straits of Hormuz waterway.
China has kept a deployment of coast guard and fishing trawlers at the shoal since seizing it in 2012 after a standoff with the Philippines. The Philippines stated that Chinese maritime militia operate some trawlers at the shoal and other disputed areas of the South China Sea, but Beijing has never acknowledged this.
A landmark 2016 ruling on various South China Sea issues by the Permanent Court of Arbitration backed Manila, but establishing sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal was outside its scope.
The court said China’s blockade there violated international law as it was a traditional fishing ground for several countries, including China, the Philippines and Vietnam.
Chinese military, mainly naval, operations in 2025 concentrated on several areas. These include the South China Sea, Taiwan, trade routes across the Pacific, the Persian Gulf and Europe. China is also making use of the Sea Route along the north Russian coast. China is also developing an aircraft carrier fleet. By the end of 2025 China had three carriers, one of which entered service in late 2025. The Chinese navy has also been active off Japan and South Korea, just to remind these neighbors that the Chinese fleet was growing and keeping its ships at sea for longer periods.
In the west Pacific China has militarized more of the Spratly Islands; Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef. Mischief Reef is the largest at 663 hectares. Subi Reef is about 70 percent the size of Mischief and Fiery Cross about half the size of Mischief Reef. All these reefs have air strips and docking facilities. Subi Reef recently received two radar domes like those on the other two reefs, which gives the Chinese near total radar coverage of the seas and airspace around the Spratly Islands. All three reefs have had their surface area expanded and built up to include upgrades to ELINT/Electronic Intelligence systems, weapons emplacements, housing and related infrastructure. Empty weapons and vehicle emplacements on these islands enable the Chinese to quickly fly or ship in vehicle-mounted weapons and radar/fire control sets. The emplacements can also handle anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile launchers.
Last year saw the Chinese ramming Filipino coast guard ships as well as using water cannons against them. The ongoing territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea continue to escalate as the Chinese openly and aggressively drive Filipino navy ships from areas the Philippines have long controlled. In 2016 the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Netherlands ruled that, under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Philippines won their case in 2013 that Chinese claims and activities in the South China Sea were unlawful. China had claimed 90 percent of the South China Sea. Over the last sixteen years China has been increasingly aggressive while asserting those claims. While this recently escalated to using water cannon and ramming, past efforts are more tangible like the artificial islands built throughout the South China Sea and garrisoned with heavily armed Chinese forces.
The United States and other Western and local allies like Australia, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Singapore send warships and aircraft into the disputed areas to confront the Chinese. The message is that if China wants to start World War 3 in the South China Sea, the opposition will be substantial and include most of China’s neighbors.
The Philippines increased its military presence and activities in the South China Sea, especially around the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal, where it claims sovereignty over parts of the disputed waters and features. The country has also received support from its allies, such as the United States, Japan, and Australia, in conducting joint exercises and patrols, as well as providing military assistance and equipment. However, China has also intensified its operations and use of coercion in the region, deploying more ships, aircraft, and missiles, and building new structures and facilities on the artificial islands it occupies.
The risk of miscalculation and escalation remains high as China continues to ignore a 2016 ruling by the international Permanent Court of Arbitration. China had previously agreed to abide by the terms of the court ruling but denied knowledge of any previous agreement when the Philippines resisted Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. The international support the Philippines received to confront China has stalled the Chinese plans to occupy and fortify all the islands in the South China Sea,
The Philippines has maintained a balance between its alliance with the United States and its economic ties with China. The Philippines reaffirmed its commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States, which provide for mutual defense and security cooperation, as well as access to military bases and facilities. The country has also welcomed the U.S. support for its maritime claims and rights in the South China Sea, as well as the U.S. sanctions against Chinese officials and entities involved in the disputes. However, the Philippines has also sought to improve diplomatic relations with China, which is its largest trading partner and a major source of investment. The Philippines sought to manage and resolve the territorial disputes through dialogue and diplomacy, rather than confrontation and arbitration.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 06, 2026 - 03:56 pm: Edit

Air Defense: Ukrainian Air Defense Supremacy
May 2, 2026: Ukraine’s air defenses are spectacular and getting better, so it is no surprise that European and Arab states are knocking on Ukraine’s door. While others have serious air defense questions, Ukraine has the answers.
April 3 was a horribly familiar day for many Ukrainians. Russia was launching hundreds of aerial munitions against key targets with its usual, cold disdain for civilian casualties. By the day’s end, 579 missiles and drones had been launched. It wasn’t the worst attack ever, the Russians can now assemble up to 1,000 a day, but it was dangerous enough. Destruction and death were scattered across the country, but there was some comfort to be had. Ukraine’s air defense system had brought down 541 elements of the swarm.
Of course, there is only limited satisfaction in the recognition that things could have been worse. It still meant 38 missiles and drones had made it through the net, and these often do very serious damage. Yet the air raids have changed in scope and nature, and something cheering is emerging. Ukraine is getting much better.
Russia has enormously increased the volume of attacks and has now moved away from a largely night-only pattern to a 24-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week sequence. Despite record launch volumes, Russian hit rates declined, indicating improved interception capabilities, including the growing role of interceptor drones, mobile fire groups, and layered defense systems.
April 3rd was somewhat better than most days; six percent made it through to their targets compared with an eight percent average during March. This is an abrupt fall from last fall, when some months saw almost nineteen percent of drones hitting their targets.
Air defense used to mean firing expensive missiles at expensive threats. That remains true, especially as calls for Patriot interceptors are greater than ever. But the character of aerial warfare is changing, as America and its allies have been reminded in recent weeks. In Ukraine, and increasingly across the Middle East, the fight now also includes mass-produced drones hunting mass-produced drones.
In February, the Ukrainian Defense Minister pointed out that the aim was to detect all aerial threats in real time and intercept at least 95 percent of incoming missiles and drones, while building a multi-layered air defense system and raising interceptor production to better protect cities and critical infrastructure. So far, the numbers seem to suggest Ukraine is on track.
In March, Ukrainian interceptor drones destroyed over 33,000 enemy drones, twice as many as the previous month, in reference to drone attacks both behind and on the frontline.
Ukraine pointed out that its air defenses destroyed or suppressed 89.9 percent of Russian aerial targets in March, up from 85.6 percent in February and 80.2 percent in December. This increased interception rate is also combined with an increase in Russian launch rates, as there was about a 28 percent increase from February, which was the second straight monthly increase.
There are just more launches happening, often in periodic waves one after another.
Russia’s emphasis on quantity has been visible for months. In September 2025, Russia was able to launch more than 800 drones in a single night. But as Russia scaled its offensive capacity, Ukraine was scaling production and improving the use of its interceptor drones.
In effect, both sides are now locked in an industrial drone race. For Ukraine, the challenge is to build interceptor drones cheaply, in large numbers, and with steadily improving kill rates. For Russia, it is to manufacture more attack drones while constantly adapting with countermeasures designed to evade interception.
The technology is advancing in many different ways, as a drone pilot from the Bulava unit reportedly destroyed two Shahed drones with a Sting interceptor from 500 km away. One in three Russian aerial targets over Ukraine is now destroyed by interceptor drones.
But Ukraine’s success also drives Russia’s search for countermeasures. Most interceptors are manually flown. They use thermal cameras to see drones at night. This may be a reason why Russia is doing some daytime attacks now, as the sun can damage a thermal sensor. Each side is adapting to the other’s methods in near-real time.
If you want the 50-100 kg warhead on the Shahed to explode in the air, a one kg or greater payload is likely needed. Adding mobile fire teams with machine guns and thermal imagers can reduce costs even further. The fundamental challenge in modern air defense is not just capability; it’s cost and volume. Even tens of thousands of low-cost interceptors can dramatically reduce the pressure on high-end systems like Patriot by taking on the bulk of drone threats.
The search for cheaper interception is not limited to drones. The Ukrainian defense company behind the Flamingo missile is in talks with European partners to create a lower-cost alternative to the Patriot system, with the goal of reducing the cost of intercepting a ballistic missile to under $1 million.
A cheaper domestically anchored option would ease pressure on Western-supplied interceptor missiles, worth millions, while making Ukraine’s broader air defense shield more sustainable.
Yet higher interception rates do not eliminate the danger. As Russia modifies its drones with larger and more specialized warheads, the consequences of even a small number of penetrations become more severe.
Russia has adapted its warhead loadout for various targets, from standard and enhanced high-explosive fragmentation warheads to thermobaric and heavier 90 kg warheads, which increases the destructive effect but often reduces the range.
Ukraine’s improving defense model is the result of sustained effort. A layered air defense network against Shahed drones has been built in parallel to greater propeller-driven interceptor drone output. That combination has made the current model far more effective.
Aircraft-type interceptors are better suited for longer loiter times and more complex targets. The key is not one superior system but matching the right tool to the right threat and doing it at scale. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that its newly acquired Mirage jets are achieving a 98 percent hit rate against drones and cruise missiles.
There is also a more serious challenge emerging. Russia is increasingly moving toward Shahed and Geran variants fitted with jet engines, effectively turning them into low-cost cruise missile-like weapons that are harder for propeller-based interceptors to stop. Countering that will require a different set of solutions, above all, cheap short-range missile systems and, over time, potentially laser-based defenses.
Still, Ukraine’s response shows how quickly necessity can reshape battlefield conditions. Under sustained Russian pressure, Ukraine has learned not only to field cheaper interceptor drones at scale, but to apply the same logic of rapid wartime adaptation to more advanced systems such as missile systems. The result is an air defense model that began with Ukrainian drones but is rapidly expanding across a variety of technologies.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 06, 2026 - 03:56 pm: Edit

Counter-Terrorism: Iranian Aversion To Terrorism
May 2, 2026: Why didn’t the Iranian revert to Islamic terrorism during the war? The Americans have long depicted Iran as the major nation the leading state champion of state supported terrorism. Iran used both the IRGC/Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps IRGC, the state entity the Americans had designated, and an array of terrorist groups, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis in Yemen, as substitutes. Iran and Iranian-backed proxies have conducted or attempted attacks in Argentina, Bahrain, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Germany, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, America, and other countries. This history spans decades and includes both spectacular international attacks and more limited operations designed to signal resolve without triggering full-scale war.
Given this track record, it would be reasonable to think that Iran would use terrorism in its 2026 war with Israel and the United States, both of which declared government change as one of their goals, a truly realistic threat to Iran’s leaders. Yet, so far at least, Iran has not used terrorism even though it has launched rocket, missile, and drone attacks on civilian as well as military targets in the region and closed the Strait of Hormuz.
What explains this surprising lack of terrorism? It’s difficult to know why something didn’t happen, but there are several nonexclusive options. Each points to a different limitation on Iranian judgements, ranging from operational limits to strategic restraint.
Perhaps the simplest justification is the best; Iran did not conduct terrorist attacks on the Americans and its allies because it was not able to do so. The Israeli and American attacks on Iran, especially the assassination campaign that killed over 250 senior Iranian political and military leaders, demonstrated a remarkable intelligence penetration of Iran. Although the intelligence required to target leaders differs from that necessary to disrupt operations, it is plausible that some of the techniques that led to the assassinations also revealed information on terrorist operations, allowing for disruption. Equally important, Iran itself was probably running scared, believing that its operations and networks might be penetrated even if they were not. It is also likely that the assassination campaign disrupted command and control, making it difficult to organize and direct operations while also hiding from American and Israeli airstrikes. In this sense, the absence of terrorism may reflect not restraint but temporary inability, an intelligence-driven suppression of Iran’s external networks at a significant moment.
A second possibility is that Iran feared escalation and retaliation from the Americans and Israel. That may seem an odd fear given the firepower unleashed in Operations Epic Fury and Lion’s Roar/the Israeli equivalent. The Americans, however, could easily have inflicted more damage on Iran. The American president was already promising to unleash destruction on an entire civilization and attack power plants and bridges, and the Americans were also sending ground forces to the Gulf region. Terrorism, particularly against the American homeland or high-profile civilian targets, risked converting a limited war into a far broader and more existential conflict for the Iranian government.
A related third possibility is the risk of blowback for Iran. The Iran war was unpopular in America, but a terrorist attack could bolster support, creating a casus belli where one was previously lacking. The conflict was even less popular in Europe and Asia, but terrorist attacks there might increase hostility toward Iran and thus support for American and Israeli attacks. Rather than dividing Iran’s adversaries, terrorism might unify them, strengthening political will, legitimizing escalation, and undermining Iran’s efforts to portray itself as a victim of aggression.
Another possibility is the most unattractive, that such attacks are in the pipeline but just haven’t happened yet. Revenge, like ice cream, is best served cold. Iran waited over a year to begin a plot to kill a former American National Security because of his role in the American assassination of IRGC Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani. That American violence pales by comparison to the scale of the 2026 killings, including the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader, intelligence chief, head of the IRGC, and many others. Iran may simply be looking for the right opportunity to exact revenge, perhaps waiting until the conflict is completely over and the risk of escalation is lower.
A final possibility is that Iranian leaders believe that they do not need to use terrorism because their current response has succeeded. Drone strikes, missile attacks, shipping disruption, and proxy warfare have already allowed Iran to impose costs and create an effective deterrent for the resumption of the war. In this context, terrorism may have been redundant, offering limited additional influence while carrying disproportionate risks.
Taken together, these explanations suggest that Iran’s restraint is contingent rather than permanent. Whether due to capability constraints, strategic caution, or timing, the underlying logic that has long driven Iran’s use of terrorism may simply be dormant, for now.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 06, 2026 - 03:57 pm: Edit

Attrition: Russia Recruits Men With AIDS
May 1, 2026: Russia is desperately short of sources for new soldiers. They have recruited Cubans, Africans, Central Asians and tried to get Indians, who were attracted to the high signing bonuses, Prime Minister Modi halted that practice. Now Russia is obtaining recruits from AIDS facilities in Russia. The government distributed recruitment posters presenting military contracts to people sick with HIV and hepatitis. These were posted in AIDS prevention locations in some areas of Russia.
The posters offered potential recruits a sizable one-off payment, debt relief, and special attention for both foreigners and those with criminal records.
Patients visiting AIDS Prevention and Infectious Diseases facilities are being encouraged to enlist in the Russian armed forces. Posted notices display information about how Russia is seeking volunteers for the Ukraine war. Russia will accept personnel with HIV and hepatitis.
Potential recruits are offered a lump-sum payment of $22,700, with contracts lasting from one year, debt write-offs of up to $133,556, and various additional benefits. According to the notice, applications from individuals with criminal convictions or from foreign citizens will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
The notice was placed directly beside the entrance to the registration desk. Nearby, another notice promoted an initiative to plant a memorial garden in some cities in honor of participants in the war in Ukraine.
Reports that the Russian military has been recruiting people with HIV, hepatitis, and tuberculosis first emerged in late 2025, when the outlet articles highlighted similar promotions on a popular classifieds website. It now appears that such recruitment efforts may also be taking place within hospitals and clinics.
Under authorized regulations issued by the Russian Ministry of Defense, HIV and hepatitis are listed among conditions that disqualify individuals from military service.
The restriction exists primarily to protect patients’ health: the physical strain and psychological stress of military life can significantly worsen these conditions. Furthermore, such patients require ongoing treatment and careful medical supervision, which are difficult to maintain in a military environment. For example, people living with HIV must adhere strictly to a regimen of antiretroviral therapy.
Previously, it was reported that recruiters had sent individuals suffering from chronic alcoholism to fight in Ukraine.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, May 07, 2026 - 04:03 pm: Edit

Air Defense: USN Destroyer First to Get Drone Interceptor
May 7, 2026: The American navy recently equipped one of its destroyers with the Coyote drone interceptor system. Coyote has been around since 2014, but only recently got some attention, and millions of dollars’ worth of order. Originally, Coyote was used for surveillance and reconnaissance. The fixed-wing, propeller driven drone could stay aloft for an hour at a time.
A decade ago the American army began working on reconfiguring Coyote as a drone interceptor. This version was 60 cm long with a 1.47 meter wingspan. It is launched, using compressed air, from a box shaped transporter/launcher. This Coyote cruises at 102 kilometers an hour and a top speed of 130 kilometers an hour and a 1.8 kg explosive warhead. Coyote can receive radio commands up to 130 kilometers from its launcher
The warhead is used when Coyote cannot collide with the target. The warhead explosion will damage incoming drones sufficiently to make them ineffective. There is also a more capable jet-propelled Coyote 2. This version weighs 5.9 kg and is maneuverable to come around and go after drones it missed on the first attempt. Top speed is 590 kilometers an hour and max range is 15 kilometers. Using dozens or more Coyote 2s, incoming swarms of hostile drones can be defeated, or at least reduced so that the attack does minimal damage.
In the last few years Coyote 3 has entered service. This version is launched from surface and submarine drones. Coyote 3 is similar to Coyote 1 but larger and can also be launched by American soldiers using the TOW missile found on IFV/Infantry Fighting Vehicles. This version can also be launched from helicopters.
The army is in the process of acquiring nearly 7,000 of all versions of Coyote. Two years ago the United States also sent six hundred Coyote drone interceptors to protect American troops in the Middle East.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, May 07, 2026 - 04:04 pm: Edit

Surface Forces : Russian Black Sea Problems Multiply
May 7, 2026: Since war in Ukraine started in 2022, Russia has steadily lost control of the Black Sea, and seen most of its Black Sea fleet destroyed or driven to distant refuges like the port of Novorossiysk on the east coast of the Black Sea . When Russian warships or commercial vessels try to operate in the Black Sea, they are subject to Ukrainian attacks. Last month a Russian frigate based in Novorossiysk was attacked by more than fifty Ukrainian drones. The frigate was badly damaged, but the real target was the oil export terminal, which handles about a third of all Russian oil exports. The drones lit up the terminal and did substantial damage.
Novorossiysk is the only fully equipped port and naval base Russia has left in the Black Sea. Despite being about 550 kilometers from Ukrainian territory, Novorossiysk is under constant attack by surface and submarine drones as well as the airborne ones. At the end of 2025 Ukraine introduced a new submarine version of their Sea Baby naval drone to attack a Russian Kilo Class submarine in the port of Novorossiisk. This was the first time a drone submarine attacked and crippled a manned submarine. The damaged Kilo was apparently written off because earlier in the year Russia shut down all ship repair activities in the Black Sea because of increasing Ukrainian drone and missile attacks. This includes the shipyards at Novorossiisk. The damaged Kilo could not be taken to a submarine repair facility in northwest Russia because Turkey has a treaty allowing it to refuse warships in wartime access to Turkish-controlled waters that are the only exit from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. There is another damaged Kilo stranded in a Crimean shipyard. With its latest Kilo loss, Russia has no operational Kilos in the Black Sea.
The Black Sea Kilos were used to launch Kalibr cruise missiles at targets in Ukraine. Kalibrs launched from Russia are easier to detect and shoot down. The submerged Kilos launched Kalibrs from their torpedo tubes at sea. The cruise missiles reached the surface and their engines took the Kalibrs to targets anywhere along the Ukrainian Black Sea coast and hundreds of kilometers inland.
Meanwhile Ukraine continues to develop and build naval drones to enable Ukraine to make the Black Sea unusable by Russian commercial shipping as well as warships. The freighters and tankers can use the Turkish exit to the Mediterranean only if they survive Ukrainian naval and land-based drone attacks. In 2024 and most of 2025, Russia and Ukraine avoided attacking each other’s commercial shipping in the Black Sea. But with all the Kilos gone and surface warships withdrawn to Russian ports in the distant ports of the northeastern Black Sea, Ukraine is free to threaten Russian commercial shipping in the Black Sea. Ukraine already has armed commercial merchant raiders firing on Russian commercial shipping. The Russians can launch drones and missiles at Ukrainian Black Sea ports but cannot effectively attack commercial shipping in the Black Sea.
Ukraine continues to develop, build and use drones to continue their domination of the Black Sea. Last December Ukraine introduced its Magura V7 naval drone, which weighs about 1.2 tons and can carry 650 kg of weapons. Its operational range is a thousand kilometers. The V7 can also be equipped with an electricity generator, enabling it to stay at sea for up to seven days. This model can move at speeds of up to 72 kilometers an hour. Cruising speed is 43 kilometers an hour.
Ukrainian naval drones have revolutionized naval warfare that takes place within a few hundred kilometers of a coastline. So far no other navy has shown much interest in duplicating the Ukrainian success with naval drones. The U.S. Coast Guard has used naval drones to assist in interdicting drug smuggling boats. The U.S. Navy has access to Ukrainian naval drone technology and is paying attention because the Chinese are doing a lot of work on naval drones, including a ship described as a drone carrier, equipped with aerial and naval drones.
It all began in 2022 when the Russian Black Sea fleet dominated the Black Sea and threatened Ukrainian grain exports, which accounted for 41 percent of its export income. Most of these grain products went to Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Ukraine needed to deal with the Black Sea Fleet and do it quickly. The initial problem was that Ukraine did not have much of a navy. They had some patrol boats, which were a nuisance, not an obstacle, to continued Russian control of the Black Sea.
When the current war started in 2022, the Russians happily attacked Ukrainian-flagged cargo ships carrying Ukrainian grain for export from the Black Sea for more than a year. This stopped sometime in 2023 after Ukrainian cruise missiles sank or disabled the Russian warships doing that, and both sides then exported grain through the Black Sea, plus some oil for the Russians. Eventually the Ukrainians developed surface water drones and then underwater drones capable of attacking all Russian ships in the Black Sea. Things then got interesting.
Ukraine first developed a secret weapon, the Magura naval surface drone, and used about a hundred of these drones to defeat Russia’s Black Sea fleet. When the war started, the Magura V5 was just a concept, a preliminary design for a one ton 5.5 meter long naval drone. Magura initially used a fishing boat that had a solid waterproof cover added, along with batteries for propulsion. There were sensors and a compartment for 300 kg of explosives or weapons. These include a machine-gun protruding above the drone top while two Sidewinder anti-aircraft missiles were in launch tubes, ready to be fired at Russian aircraft or helicopters. Magura has a substantial number of electronic components, including several day/night video cameras, that give the remote operator a view of what is around the drone. There is also an autopilot, so the remote operator does not have to personally maneuver the drone over long stretches of open water. Magura is equipped with contact fuses at the front of the boat
Most Magura missions are one-way, but those equipped with machine-guns and surface-to-air missiles are also used to attack Russian aircraft. In May a Magura V7 used those two missiles to shoot down two expensive Russian SU-30 jet fighters. This was the first time a naval drone had shot down warplanes. Earlier a Magura had used Ukrainian R-73 heat-seeking missiles to take down one Mi-8 helicopter and damage another.
The Ukrainian experience using naval drones to defeat the Russian Black Sea Fleet was unique. Ukraine had only surface-to-ship missiles when the war started, but eventually shifted to three new naval drones, Sea Baby, Mother, and MAGURA, or Maritime Autonomous Guard Unmanned Robotic Apparatus.
Some of these naval drones were used for a mid-2023 Kerch Bridge attack. One of the drones varied 850 kg of explosives and inflicted enough damage to halt use of the bridge. The Mother drone carried 450 kg and MAGURA 320 kg. In addition to attacking targets, these drones can also be used for reconnaissance and surveillance using video cameras that broadcast what they see back to the drone operator. Some drones have been armed with small rocket launchers. The Mother drone has a range of over 700 kilometers and can operate on the high seas. Endurance is about 60 hours, and top speed is over 70 kilometers an hour. Mother was used for an attack on the Russian naval base at Novorossiysk, which is a thousand kilometers from Crimea.
Ukraine has been developing subsurface drones and in early 2023 the first one, the Toloka2 TK-150 was introduced. This drone was 2.5 meters long and equipped with a sensor mast that remained above the surface for navigation and to identify targets. Toloka2 can also carry a small explosive warhead. Later, Ukraine developed the larger Marichka drone that is six meters long and one meter in diameter. Ukraine sought a Western manufacturer to build and weaponize Ukrainian drones.
Ukrainian drones have been quite successful in attacking and sinking or disabling Russian navy ships. So far there have been over a dozen attacks which resulted in sinking or damaging about twenty ships.
Ukrainian drone operations in the Black Sea forced the Russian Black Sea Fleet to withdraw to the eastern shore of the Black Sea. Sevastopol was no longer a safe place to be, and Russian ships could no longer launch their Kalibr cruise missiles without risking attack by Ukrainian drones. The presence and aggressive use of the drones meant that Ukraine’s grain corridor was kept open despite Russia’s threats to interfere. Beyond symbolic significance, the corridor holds critical economic importance for Ukraine and is expected to contribute up to seven percent to GDP growth in 2024 and even more in 2025 because of the grain shipments.
Russian countermeasures to Ukrainian naval drones included using aircraft and helicopters to destroy slow-moving drones before they attack, and expanding use of jamming to disrupt drone control signals. These changes made it much more difficult for Ukrainian naval drones to reach and destroy targets. But by 2025 the Russians had already lost control of the Black Sea and were not getting it back.
This left Russian warships dependent on bases in the north, near the land border with Norway, and in the Far East, near Japanese and South Korean naval bases. In a post-Cold War development, the Japanese and South Korean fleets are now far larger than the Russian Far East fleet. Before the 1990s, the South Korea fleet was largely non-existent and the Japanese fleet tiny and purely defensive. Chinese naval power began to emerge by the late 1990s but took another decade to become a significant force. Then as now, the American western Pacific fleet is the major naval power in the region.
The lessons learned by American, Chinese, Taiwanese, Japanese, Ukrainian and Russian naval commanders is that these drones have changed the rules for naval warfare. If China tries to invade Taiwan, they have to prepare countermeasures for numerous naval drones blocking the way. Everyone continues to observe Black Sea operations for details on what new tactics, techniques and drone’s designs appear. The U.S. has an edge because they are a major supporter of Ukraine and are seeking to make the most of their insider knowledge of the Ukrainian naval drone effort.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Friday, May 08, 2026 - 05:36 am: Edit

Trump says Iran has only 19% of its missile stockpile left. One media report said the actual figure is 70%. No data is available to support either number.

US analysts said Iran could economically hold out for three months.

By Lawrence Bergen (Lar) on Friday, May 08, 2026 - 01:10 pm: Edit

One way to find out is to put 20% worth of targets for them to try at. Just sayin'

Also I believe the US Analysts can hold out as well, but for how long??

By Jeff Anderson (Jga) on Friday, May 08, 2026 - 05:57 pm: Edit

Who gave the media report, and how credible are they?

And does answering that question take us into 'Gator territory?

By Dana Madsen (Madman) on Friday, May 08, 2026 - 09:39 pm: Edit

A news article yesterday in the Washington Post, and picked up elsewhere, states classified US intelligence assessment is that Iran can survive the current US blockade for 3-4 months before economic hardship begins affecting the regime (not saying that common people aren't going to hurt hard, but the regime itself isn't under significant stress now). They also estimated that Iran still has 75% of pre-war missile launchers, and 70% of pre-war missile inventory. They have managed to dig out underground storage areas that have been bombed and access missiles within them and repair them, or complete new missiles with parts.

Whether these are real numbers from someone who is really leaking intelligence assessments and knows what's in them. Whether the intelligence assessment is realistic or overly pessimistic. I make no comment on, I don't know. The Post reporters said 3 separate intelligence officials anonymously confirmed the outlines of the report.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Saturday, May 09, 2026 - 12:13 am: Edit

I suspect most people looking at Iran and its current circumstances, have largely missed the biggest fact.

As a result of the decapitation strikes, there effectively IS no remaining central government in place in Iran.

The Iranian media (whats left of it…) referred to the “Mosaic plan”, which, broadly speaking is a decentralization of all government and military functions.

What the U.S. and Israeli strikes have created, is 31 separate regions, with a IIRG commander, left to fight 31 separate wars.

When various u.s. spokesmen talk about “3-4 months” is an estimate on how long each of these Iramian warlords have enough money and resources to keep thier own troops and hangers on fed, watered, clothed and armed.

I am not a veteran, and certainly claim no military experience, but the war gamer in me is looking at this, and thinking that the Iranian forces are dug in deep, waiting for the U.S. population to get discouraged and tired of the war, whereupon they expect President trump (or his successor…) will declare victory and send the troops home.

From a gaming point of view, the U.S. Needs to give the remaining Iranian troops is an excuse to leave their nice safe holes and seek battle.

Kharg island might be an example if the u.s. occupy it.

The danger is it could become a modern version of what happened to the french when they got what the wanted in Vietnam… and lost the battle.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Saturday, May 09, 2026 - 12:58 am: Edit

Do I really have to remind people about "the laptop lie" before they stop believing media reports of leaked intel reports? There are people on both sides inside and outside the intel community willing to make up or leak or conjure up or analyze up/down anything you want. Want a report that the IRGC has a kill team on the way to assassinate PM Starmer of the UK? Give me an hour, I'll find someone who will make it up for us. Okay, got him, James Comark a former senior intel official I just made up said it's true.

By Gregory S Flusche (Vandar) on Saturday, May 09, 2026 - 08:46 pm: Edit

Steve Cole.

That is the biggest problem I am having getting info on the war in Iran and Ukraine. There is so much crap misinformation. Lies propaganda out there it is really hard to find the truth. I like what you post at it seems to be closer than anything else I see.