Murphy's Law: The Chinese Unemployment Catastrophe
May 25, 2026: Recently, China's unemployment rate for non-students aged 16 to 24 was nearly 17 percent. It’s worse than it looks because China counts anyone who works a single hour per week as employed. The American threshold is fifteen hours. A Chinese university economist calculated that China's true youth unemployment rate in early 2023 was nearly 47 percent.
Older Chinese are also suffering with the 25–29 age cohort experiencing 7.7 percent unemployment. For those 30–59 it’s 4.3 percent. Overall urban unemployment is 5.4 percent. This year nearly thirteen million university graduates will enter the job market and an economy that is shrinking.
There are several causes. Investment is collapsing. Fixed asset investment has been the key to Chinese economic growth since the 1980s. This year investments grew less than two percent in the first three months. In the same period last year it was over four percent. Real estate, which once represented nearly a third of economic activity, has collapsed. Construction has stopped on millions of homes. The workers who built them have nowhere to go.
Major Chinese tech firms like Alibaba, Tencent, ByteDance and JD·com have been letting go employees for some time. For economic and political reasons, foreign companies are leaving or decreasing their operations. Then there is deflation - when prices fall, businesses earn less. When businesses earn less, they hire less or fire more. When people fear job loss, they spend less. Because of all this a generation of educated, capable, ambitious young Chinese people have no work.
The Chinese government reaction was to halt the publication of unemployment data in 2023. Over the next three years the government reintroduced unemployment numbers but using different formats and methodologies. Foreign economists, using other data sources inside and outside China were able to track what was actually going on and noticed that the employment problems were linked with the fact that the Chinese population is shrinking and is now somewhere between 700 and 800 million. The official claim is 1.4 billion and the government claims that it was 1.5 billion 12 years ago. These calculations are made using openly available economic data. Last year China proclaimed that the national fertility rate was 1.0, when a rate of 2.1 is required to sustain current population numbers. This is one of many indicators that China is running out of people, new births and Chinese willing to get married. The fertility rate, or number of children born to each woman, is among the lowest in the world and nothing the government can do seems able to change it. Last year, fewer than 8 million children were born, compared to the reported ten million in 2018. The 2025 births were the lowest since birth data was first recorded in 1949, right after the Chinese Communists seized control of the country. It gets worse because 11.3 million people died in 2025, the highest death rate since 1968. Worse, China's population officially shrank by 3.4 million people in one year. Deaths have now exceeded births for four consecutive years. There were only six million marriages last year, down from over 10 million in 2018. Fewer marriages today means fewer births in three to five years. It gets worse in the coming years and decades.
The 16 to 59 years old working-age population last year officially fell by 6.6 million to 851 million. Worse, the number over 60 climbed by 13 million to 323 million, representing 23 percent of the national population. This trend will get worse. By 2080 there will be more than one retiree for every working-age person. This will require substantial changes to the taxation of workers and the old age benefits systems. The results could be catastrophic as working age Chinese flee the country to avoid unbearably high tax rates. Without those taxes, the government would have to take extreme measures to support, or even eliminate the high number of retirees.
The Chinese government is desperate to increase the birth rate. This includes high taxes on condoms and economic incentives for couples who have children. This includes child subsidies, reduced kindergarten fees, and extended honeymoon. Marriageable age Chinese are watching youth unemployment approaching 20 percent. Even when they get a job, there is not much money left to support a child while concurrently supporting two sets of aging parents. The government is offering little in the way of help.
By the mid-2030s China’s population will decline nearly 60 million. China spent $425 billion last year just subsidizing its pension system. That number will keep growing year by year over the next few decades.
Chinese women no longer accept the traditional role of wife and mother. Many refuse to marry Chinese men, instead seeking American or European spouses. Americans are preferred because they help with childcare and housework. Most Chinese women don’t have access to foreign men and simply stay single.
China continues trying to make the best of a bad situation they cannot seem to control; a shrinking population, a workforce that is shrinking even faster and markets for its exports leveling off. The workforce shrinkage raises dire doubts about Chinese export statistics as those simply remaining where they were six years ago entails an unbelievable rate of labor productivity increases.
These three factors mean China’s Ponzi scheme economy has reached its limits with substantial declines now in progress. Other East Asian nations have similar problems, some not involving on-going Ponzi scheme financial systems, after having experienced a sustained economic boom that has moved much of the population into the middle-class. China too has prospered and given several hundred million Chinese prosperous middle class lives. This is unprecedented in Chinese history. One of the downsides of this prosperity is that couples have fewer children. When poor, families have more children because that is how people can create some support for their old age. Children do that and, in the absence of savings, children have traditionally supported their elderly parents. Because of all the prosperity, that traditional form of old age care is eroding.
A prosperous China is now suffering from this, with fewer babies born each year to replace those dying. The current Japanese birth rate is 1.39. In 2008 it was noted that China’s birth rate had fallen to 1.8 births per woman and that is way beneath the replacement rate of 2.1. It has since declined to 0.65 and, worse, the now repealed One-Child policy fatally reduced the future number of females of child-bearing age. The result is that the absolute number of new Chinese births for the rest of the century will be a small fraction of what China’s overall population would otherwise indicate. China’s total population began a rapid collapse and reached 800 million in the 2020s instead of the predicted 2030s.
The biggest current problem is the growth of retirees with a steadily shrinking number of workers to support them. Proposals to allow more births run into arguments about limited resources. Japan is way ahead in this population decline curve, and China does not want to join them, but no one has yet come up with an acceptable alternative. The impact of fewer births in urban areas over two decades ago is showing up in growing shortages of skilled labor. The costs of manufacturing high tech items is growing, forcing Chinese manufacturers to move more factories to nations with cheaper labor. The military is giving the troops a raise, especially the technicians. Otherwise, it can’t recruit them, or keep them. South Korea already has a birth rate of 1.11, which is lower than Japan’s. The American birth rate is 1.66 but most Western nations have lower rates. For Europe as a whole, the rate is .98.
Chinese manufacturing activity has been shrinking since 2022 and that is one of several indicators that the Chinese economy is in trouble. There are also some epic failures of infrastructure, with province electrical blackouts increasingly common. The problems are largely self-inflicted. The shrinking of Chinese economic activity is the result of several different economic problems, including consumers not resuming their pre-covid19 spending habits. Less consumer spending was not expected. None of this should be a surprise because all the problems have occurred in China before, but not all at once. Paying attention to Chinese history is a respected popular tradition for basing major decisions on. Chinese leader Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 and initially concentrated on reinforcing government control of the military. Xi, like most Chinese leaders, pays more attention to history than foreign counterparts do. Chinese military history is measured in thousands of years while Westerners in most cases have only a few centuries of it and don’t pay as much attention to past experiences as China does.
Chinese economic history over those long periods did not change much either. It was largely feudal and, since 1910, China has been trying to develop a form of government capable of handling economic problems more effectively. Xi Jinping has had some success and recently saw the Chinese banking sector improving to the point where it can assist in reviving the economy. The economy is still in bad shape, with too much debt, and many foreign companies pulling out of China while too many Chinese companies are barely staying in business with a growing number slipping into insolvency and bankruptcy.


FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, May 26, 2026 - 04:44 pm: Edit

Space: Starlink GPS Alternative
May 25, 2026: Without any warning, the American firm SpaceX is shutting down its improvised Starlink GPS style capability. Most of those that depend on GPS undoubtedly never realized this alternative existed. Nevertheless, an expanding number of GPS users are becoming aware of this use of Starlink as a GPS alternative
The SpaceX Starlink satellite constellation is designed primarily to provide communications services rather than an alternative to GPS and other global navigation satellite systems like the Russian GNSS and the Chinese Beidou. Recently, SpaceX revealed its Starlink satellite network would be delivering PNT/Positioning, Navigation & Timing services. Some technically adept Starlink customers had even been using Starlink PNT. When SpaceX became aware of the PNT piracy, they blocked access to unauthorized personnel.
The advantage of Starlink as a backup to GNSS and Beidou is that it’s such a different system. Starlink uses frequencies that are ten times higher, bandwidths ten to a hundred times wider, power that is a hundred to a thousand times stronger, and a much larger satellite network.
The built-in GPS location feature was earlier available through the Starlink mobile app’s Debug Data section. It allowed users to give local networks access to their Starlink dish’s precise latitude, longitude, and altitude with no verification required.
Starlink dishes have their own GPS receivers to help pinpoint their own locations so they can find the nearest Starlink satellites. But the user location feature also offered an option to solely use Starlink positioning. Some knowledgeable fans used Starlink PNT capabilities since it even worked in regions with GPS restrictions.
That has proven particularly useful for those who installed the latest Starlink dishes on recreational vehicles and boats. In one instance, a sailboat moving through the Red Sea with the Starlink Mini dish was able to exclusively rely on Starlink positioning data despite GPS jamming and spoofing.
In late April, Starlink users received email notifications telling them that dish location data would no longer be available as of May 20, 2026. There was no specific rationale given for the decision, and SpaceX did not respond to requests for reasons why this was happening.
Starlink has drawn increased attention as a navigation substitute at a time when GPS jamming and spoofing have become prevalent worldwide, impacting shipping routes from Europe to Asia and disrupting hundreds of flights on a daily basis. Jamming involves broadcasting strong signals to overpower the relatively weak radio signals coming from GPS and other global navigation satellite systems. Spoofing relies on broadcasting false signals that simulate authentic satellite signals to deceive signal receivers into calculating erroneous positions for aircraft and other users.
Global navigation satellite systems such as GPS are vulnerable to jamming because they transmit relatively weaker signals from higher orbital altitudes farther away from Earth. But Starlink and other low Earth orbit communication constellations transmit higher power signals in the Ku band with wider bandwidths that are difficult for adversaries to disrupt through jamming.
Starlink is also much more resilient to spoofing because its user dishes are phased array antennas capable of focusing in the direction of a fast moving Starlink satellite to detect its specific signal. Starlink’s PNT capability relies on roundtrip time measurements between the user dish and a single satellite at a time, Humphreys said. The two way communication between the user dish and satellite also relies on encrypted signals and can incorporate user authentication features.
By comparison, civilian GPS receivers mostly use omnidirectional antennas that passively receive unencrypted signals from many different points in the sky; they calculate a user’s position by receiving one way pseudorange measurements from many satellites at once to ensure maximum accuracy. That makes them much more susceptible to false signals from combative spoofing.
Starlink PNT’s accuracy is still limited compared with standard GPS. It has been demonstrated how a mock Starlink service can produce navigation and timing solutions with 10 meter level accuracy if Starlink supplies the real time clock and orbit corrections although only after a minutes long processing delay. Efforts have been made to refine the system so it can be done in tens of seconds rather than tens of minutes.
One challenge is that Starlink’s roundtrip time measurements are currently less accurate than the pseudorange technique used by dedicated global navigation satellite systems. That is in part because Starlink satellites have less precise timekeeping capabilities compared to dedicated GNSS or Beidou satellites equipped with atomic clocks.
The fact that Starlink PNT is limited to communication with a single satellite at a time also constrains performance, whereas receiving multiple satellite measurement signals from many different angles could improve its accuracy. That goes back to how Starlink user dishes can only form a beam to a single satellite at any given time.
Despite the current performance constraints, Starlink customers who used the location data feature have expressed dismay at losing it. But SpaceX may have decided to block access because it didn’t want to deal with the liability of giving users access to a location service with decent but variable accuracy.
Other possibilities include wanting to prevent bad actors from using the Starlink PNT capability, or SpaceX potentially cutting off free access to pave the way for Starlink PNT’s introduction. The timing of SpaceX’s decision coincides with the company’s preparations to go public with an IPO as soon as this summer. Regardless of what SpaceX chooses to do, scientists have already demonstrated how to independently harness signals from Starlink and other low Earth orbit communications satellite constellations.
In 2021, members of the ASPIN/Autonomous Systems Perception, Intelligence, and Navigation laboratory at The Ohio State University, showed how electronically eavesdropping on signals from six Starlink satellites could pinpoint locations on Earth to within 8 meters of accuracy, although that required 13 minutes of tracking rather than delivering instantaneous results.
Such opportunistic eavesdropping is challenging, because Starlink is consistently optimizing for its primary satellite Internet service by turning beams on and off, or sometimes switching beams as the fast moving satellites talk to many different users. That creates erratic jumps in the signal timing estimates that the researchers rely upon to calculate positioning data.
To tackle those challenges, experimenters use Doppler measurements of signal frequency changes that reflect satellite motions relative to the receiver, along with software algorithms to correct for timing errors. They have also deployed phased array antennas—capable of communicating with just one or two satellites at a time, in combination with low gain, omnidirectional antennas that can capture signals from nearly 10 satellites at a time. By 2025, the researchers had shown how to harness signals from an average of three Starlink satellites to deliver positioning results to within 2 meters of accuracy in just 20 seconds.
This eavesdropping strategy is not just limited to Starlink’s thousands of satellites, they have also exploited satellite signals from Orbcomm, Iridium, Starlink, OneWeb, NOAA, and the dedicated PNT constellation.
It has been demonstrated that this alternative navigation solution works with ground vehicles, a high-altitude balloon, and a drone. One of the latest tests showed how utilizing signals from both Starlink and OneWeb satellites could improve ship navigation accuracy off the west coast of Greenland in the Arctic, meaning that the practice could probably work nearly anywhere on Earth. All this indicates that the world may not have to wait much longer for new GPS replacements, whether they come directly from Starlink or third parties.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, May 26, 2026 - 04:44 pm: Edit

Procurement: The Dissolution of the Russian Economy
May 24, 2026: The Russian military has stumbled because of the costly Ukraine War. Military operations are costly and destroy wealth, considering the $30 billion the Americans have spent on the Iran war so far. The Russian economy depends on oil income to survive. At the same time the economy is crippled and collapsing. The current Russian GDP is $3 trillion and growth for this year is estimated to be 0.4 percent. The Ukraine War imposed enormous costs on the Russian economy, expenses that can no longer be sustained. The war led Russia to switch to a wartime economy. This distorted production, causing shortages for civilians and the manufacturing sector. Ukrainian attacks on Russian manufacturing and oil production and refining operations further disrupted the economy.
Before the Iranian economy was devastated by American and Israeli airstrikes in early 2026, Iran had become quite skilled at evading sanctions. Russia is also facing a financial crisis because its main export item, petroleum, has declined in value while Russia, because of sanctions, has more difficulty getting cut-rate petroleum to buyers. For example, in the second half of 2023, Russian oil income hit a record low of $14.4 billion while the control over oil prices of OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, had started to unravel after 64 years of controlling the oil market. A growing number of new oil exporters do not join OPEC. This further degrades OPEC’s ability to control oil prices and keep them high. While oil and natural gas prices have recently spiked due to closure of the Strait of Hormuz in the Iranian war, potential Russian export income from those have not increased because of recent significant Ukrainian air attacks on Russian refineries, export ports and oil/natural gas pipelines.
Economic sanctions imposed on Russia for invading Ukraine have also made it difficult for Russia to deliver oil to customers, so Russia then cut its oil prices. This made the illegal Russian oil imports attractive because it protected the importer against losses from sanctioned shipments that were detected and blocked by one or more of the many nations supporting the sanctions. At the same time OPEC has been losing its ability to control oil production because of the increasing number of new oil exporting nations that did not join OPEC and sell their oil on the open market for whatever they can get. This trend is overwhelming OPEC’s ability to control prices and reduces Russian oil income more each year.
This is all part of a growing assortment of economic problems imposed on Russia. Soon after Russia invaded Ukraine, Western countries united in imposing severe economic sanctions on Russia. This did some damage to the Russian economy, but not as much as the sanctioning countries expected. This is because there are always other countries with current or previous experience evading sanctions. Outlaw states tend to cooperate, or at least share sanction evasion techniques with each other. Russia found that nearby Iran, which has been under varying degrees of sanctions for decades, was a good source of advice on evading sanctions. Even before Russia went total outlaw in Ukraine, they had been cooperating with Iran, North Korea, and several other heavily sanctioned nations.
Russian oil exports, which for decades have been about eight million BPD/Barrels Per Day, vary in value depending on the world price for oil. In the last decade there have been two instances of sanction-related declines in Russian oil exports. The first was in 2014, in response to the Russian occupation of Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine. Russian oil exports fell about ten percent from their normal level. Russian oil exports recovered quickly to their previous levels, but oil income remained lower because Russia had to use discounts to get past the oil sanctions. This was because nations caught obtaining sanctioned oil could themselves be sanctioned. In 2022, Russia was hit with even heavier sanctions that caused oil income for 2022 to decline by over 20 percent compared to the previous year.
Russian oil exports cannot be ignored because Russia is the second largest oil exporter, behind Saudi Arabia. During periods when Russian oil exports are sanctioned, the primary impact is Russia receiving less for its oil. Russia managed to quickly deal with the new sanctions because of its close relationships with Iran, which was a veteran practitioner of how best to evade sanctions.
Because Russian oil exports represented a larger portion of oil exports, Russia found more major oil purchasers willing to cooperate in evading sanctions for the discounted Russian oil. Iran was also a major supplier of munitions to Russia after Ukraine was invaded and Russia found it needed more ammunition than expected. Russia expected a short war. This is a common delusion with aggressor states and now Russia finds itself taking major losses in Ukraine and unable to find an easy way out.
In the end, the war in Ukraine bankrupted the Russian economy and Iran found itself in a similar situation after the Americans and Israel decided to attack Iran and end the threat to regional peace and stability Iran had created since the 1980s.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, May 26, 2026 - 04:45 pm: Edit

Air Weapons: The Looming Chinese Drone Swarm
May 24, 2026: China has been adapting the Iranian Shaheed drone, known as the Sunflower-200, to attack American targets in Guam and the Western Pacific. China is obtaining or making one million OWA/One Way Attack drones for a constant million drone swarm campaign. The objective is to destroy or suppress American /Taiwan/allied military logistics and bases from Guam to the China coast for at least ten weeks throughout a Taiwan invasion. These would crush defenses like a modern Pearl Harbor-style strike, turning bases into what 1940 Philippines ports looked like, by day three.
Technical upgrades on Shaheed design include adding a second fuel-efficient engine to the base Shaheed design. Examples include the PD-2900, with a 2,500 kilometer range, 12-hour endurance, 250 kilometers an hour speed, and adapting the Russian Su-57-like stealth jet’s radar absorbing exterior. Chinese military planners call this aircraft the Guam killer OWA drone. China compared their Shaheed to combat-proven clones like the Sunflower-200. These are cheap, $50,000 to $200,000 each, depending on range/guidance compared to American cruise missiles like Tomahawk that cost $1.4 million each. Sunflower-200 carries precision-guided munitions. A single 50 kg thermobaric-fragmentation warhead or dispersible mines can target soft infrastructure—power, fuel, maintenance at air bases far more efficiently than one large warhead.
These improved Sunflower-200 Shaheed equivalents are being built for launch from container ships and fishing trawler fleets, enabling wide-area coverage of the entire Pacific. Combined with thousands of anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, they make close-in American operations extremely risky. In addition to inflicting crippling damage on naval bases at Pearl Harbor and in California and Washington state.
China criticizes the American military and specifically Pearl Harbor Admirals in the American Navy for being years behind. For example, the Americans have only recently been considering Ukrainian drone swarms while China was working on this a year and a half ago. American bases lack sufficient hardening in the form of concrete shelters or reverse slope mountain shelters, leaving aircraft vulnerable to Ukrainian style mass drone attacks. The only sane American strategy in the event of a Chinese attack against Taiwan is a distant blockade to defeat China without direct confrontation near its coast.
Improved Shaheed-class OWA drones are a low-cost, high-volume asymmetric weapon which will immediately neutralize American forward bases in the Western Pacific in any Taiwan conflict, forcing a reconsideration of American strategy toward distant blockade. American complacency will be overwhelmed by drones’ proven combat record and the ease with which drones can be quickly built in large quantities.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, May 26, 2026 - 04:45 pm: Edit

Leadership: Iranian Dispersed Leadership
May 23, 2026: The Iranian IRGC/Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is now in charge of Iran’s government. This means that after nine weeks of war with the Americans and Israel, the last Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was replaced by his son Mojtaba who was considered a lower ranking hojatoleslam. He may eventually be elevated to Ayatollah. This does not matter because the IRGC generals are now running the country.
Since its formation in 1979, the Islamic Republic has revolved around a supreme leader with final authority on all critical matters of state. The death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on the first day of the war, and the promotion of his wounded son, Mojtaba, have ushered in a dissimilar order dominated by commanders of the IRGC and marked by the dearth of a determined, respected referee.
Mojtaba Khamenei remains at the head of the system, but three people familiar with internal determinations say his role is largely to legitimize decisions made by his generals rather than issue commands himself.
Wartime pressure has concentrated power into a narrower, harder-line inner circle rooted in the SMSC/Supreme National Security Council , the Supreme Leader’s office and the IRGC, which now controls both military strategy and key political decisions, Iranian officials and analysts say.
The Iranians are painfully slow in their response, said a senior Pakistani leadership official briefed on peace talks between Iran and the Americans that Pakistan has been facilitating. There is apparently no one decision-making command structure. At times, it takes them two or three days to respond.
Specialists said the obstacle to a deal is not internal infighting in the Iranian capital, but the gap between what America is prepared to offer and what Iran’s hardline IRGC were prepared to accept.
The diplomatic face of Iran at the talks with the Americans has been the Iranian Foreign Minister, more recently joined by the Speaker of its parliament, who is a former IGRC commander, mayor of the Iranian capital and presidential candidate. This official has emerged during the war as a key medium between Iran’s political, security and clerical leaders. On the ground, however, the central interlocutor has been an IRGC commander. According to Pakistani and Iranian sources who identified him weeks ago as Iran’s pivotal figure, including on the night a ceasefire was announced.
Mojtaba Khamenei, who was severely injured in the opening Israeli and American attacks that killed his father and other relatives and left him scarred with serious leg wounds, has not appeared publicly and communicates through IRGC officials or limited audio links because of security restrictions, two people close to his inner circle said. There was no immediate reply from the Iranian foreign ministry to a request for comment on the issues raised in this article. Iranian officials have previously denied any divisions over negotiations with the Americans.
Iran recently submitted a new proposal to the Americans, which according to senior Iranian sources sees staged talks, with the nuclear issue to be set aside at the start until the war ends and disagreements over Gulf shipping are resolved. The Americans insist the nuclear issue must be tackled from the outset. Neither side wanted to negotiate, and both believed time would weaken the other, Iran through leverage over oil exports through the Straits of Hormuz and the Americans through economic pressure and a blockade of Iranian exports.
For now, neither side can afford to bend. The IRGC is suspicious of appearing weak to the Americans, while the American President faces midterm election pressure and little room for flexibility without political cost. For both sides, flexibility would be seen as vulnerability.
That caution reflects not just the pressures of the moment, but the way power is now exercised inside Iran. While Mojtaba is formally Iran’s ultimate authority, he is a figure of approval rather than command. Endorsing outcomes are forged through institutional consensus rather than imposition of authority from above. Real power, they say, has moved to a unified wartime leadership centered on the SNSC.
Important deals probably pass through Mojtaba Khamenei, but it is unlikely that anyone will overrule the National Security Council. How could anyone go against those overseeing the war effort? Hardline figures such as the former nuclear negotiator and a cluster of radical members of parliament have raised their profile using forceful rhetoric during the war, but they lack the institutional authority to derail decisions or influence outcomes.
Mojtaba owes his elevation to the IRGC, who sidelined realists and backed him as a reliable guardian of their hardline agenda. Already strengthened by war, the IRGCs growing authority signals a more determined foreign policy and tighter domestic domination.
Driven by revolutionary Islamism and a security first worldview, the IRGC see their mission as preserving the Islamic Republic and their power at home while projecting power abroad. That outlook, often shared with hardliners across the judiciary and the clerical establishment, prioritizes rigid centralized control and resistance to foreign pressure, particularly on nuclear policy and Iran’s regional reach.
In practice, the IRGC philosophy shapes strategy and decisions. With the country at war and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gone, no player inside the system has the power or scope to resist them even if they wished to, the people close to internal discussions said.
The choice facing Iran’s leadership is no longer between moderate and hardline policy, but between hardline and even harder line. A small faction may argue for pushing further still, but even that impulse has so far been kept in check by the IRGC.
The shift marks a decisive reordering of power from clerical primacy to security dominance. They’ve gone from divine power to hard power. From the influence of the clerics to the influence of the IRGC. This is how Iran is being governed.
While differences of opinion exist, discussions have consolidated around security institutions, with Mojtaba Khamenei acting as a central convening figure rather than a lone decision maker. Despite sustained military and economic pressure from the Americans and Israel, Iran has shown no signs of fissure or submission nearly nine weeks into the war. There is no evidence of fundamental rifts within the system or meaningful opposition on the streets.
That cohesion suggests that command now sits with the IRGC and security services, which appear to be driving the war rather than merely executing it. A strategic consensus has emerged, avoid a return to total war, preserve leverage, especially over the Strait of Hormuz, and emerge from the conflict politically, economically and militarily stronger.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, May 26, 2026 - 04:46 pm: Edit

Morale: Russian Government And Economic Morale Crisis
May 23, 2026: Russia’s war effort in Ukraine is ruining the Russian economy. Increasing evidence indicates that Russia’s war against Ukraine is turning to Russia’s disadvantage. This is exhibited not only in the theater of war, but also in the state of the Russian economy. A growing number of independent sociologists observe that the Russian President’s popularity ratings are falling amid internal problems and foreign policy failures. The Russian government’s policies of blocking messaging apps and imposing internet shutdowns are adding to this decline. Russians are especially alarmed by the government's unwillingness to alter course and reliance on repression of any manifestation of dissent. This has drawn condemnation even from serious groups within the elite, including staunch supporters of the war.
Russian internet portal Military Review, which is close to the Russian Ministry of Defense, published an article in mid-April about reliance on imported CPU chips and the unlikelihood of creating a sovereign internet. The article has since been taken down from the portal. The article argues that it is impossible to create a sovereign internet in a country where the entire cycle of computer manufacturing and AI/Artificial Intelligence development is completely dependent on foreign producers. This includes the design and production of microchips, neural network architecture, training datasets, and infrastructure.
All Russian supercomputers featured in the top 500 list are built on NVIDIA and AMD platforms. Taiwan’s TSMC manufactured the Elbrus and Baikal processors. After 2022, TSMC ceased operations. Russia lacks the lithography capabilities to produce even 28-nanometer chips, let alone the 7 or 5 nanometer nodes upon which modern AI relies. Creating one’s own AI without drawing on global scientific advancements is impossible. Russia is itself, however, cutting off its access to such advancements by designating leading Western universities as unsuitable organizations.
Ultra-conservative Russian television channel Tsargrad also unexpectedly came out in favor of internet freedom. It noted that the accelerated creation of digital sovereignty, under the leadership of the Ministry of Digital Development, has already led to alarming consequences, ranging from technological dependence on Chinese components to panic within the banking sector. The Russian government appears to be ignoring these signals as it continues its assault on internet freedom. Earlier this year, the Russian Ministry of Digital Development began to develop proposals to restrict Internet provider licenses, which will lead to the exit from the market of the few telecom operators at the municipal and regional levels. The Association of Regional Small Telecom Operators has already protested these programs, sending a formal appeal to the Russian leader, the Prime Minister, and the Russian Prosecutor General.
Independent media reports that sources within the Presidential Administration, speaking anonymously, admit that the security services’ actions to block the Internet are shunned. This pertains not only to practical hassles, but also to the outlook for upcoming elections. The restrictions are leading to a decline in the popularity of the Russian President's United Russia party, even though the responsibility for election results lies with government political strategists. Some of these strategists do not support the blockages and continue to operate on Telegram. Neither deputies nor the government officials, however, will openly oppose Russia’s FSB/Federal Security Service. The emerging situation clearly refines the conflict between the security services and Russia’s Presidential Administration.
Telegram channels linked to the latter openly note that economic repression and labor market contraction reinforce protest sentiment among a population normally loyal to the government. Independent journalists also note this tendency. An article from the independent Verstka portal says that anxiety and annoyance are growing among the core electorate of United Russia, namely the elderly, women over 55, low-income citizens, and the residents of small towns. Political strategists acknowledge these difficulties, although for the time being do not consider them critical.
Increased internet restrictions at a time when support for the Russian government is weakening could lead to more outward protests for ending Russia’s sustained war against Ukraine and uncertainty across Russia. An American university professor suggests the primary factors for the development of post-war Russia are maintaining internal stability and the possibility of achieving the war’s stated objectives, with the occupation of regions of Ukraine and the limitation of its sovereignty. Analyzing various combinations of these factors, the professor concludes that a serious transformation of the Russian government is likely in just one of four scenarios, in which it fails to achieve its military objectives, leading to internal instability. Otherwise, the Russian regime will remain a repressive dictatorship. Should the military objectives not be achieved or should serious fissures emerge within the elites, Russia will be forced, at the very least, to seek to normalize its relations with Western countries.
Russian society and the elite’s attitudes depend on the government’s success in selling the termination of hostilities against Ukraine as a victory. It is, however, quite difficult to predict how this would be accomplished. Internal stability and an intensification of elite infighting following the end of the war appears to be the most likely scenario. Disagreements within Russia among the FSB, the military, radical patriots, big business, and Russian technocrats are growing, creating the very internal unpredictability which could disrupt the Russian government once the war ends.
FYEO

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Tuesday, May 26, 2026 - 05:42 pm: Edit

Paul Howard:

Timing is why.

Japan has its own issues, and has been trapped in an unfortunate economic cycle apparently because of their inability to make the changes necessary for a number of reasons, including several that are highly political. The liquidation of u.s. treasury instruments has been a long term process and not a recent change.

China has been trying to destabilize the western economy for years (without significant measurable success.)

As SVC pointed out, China is apparently preparing for war.

Their problem may be the widespread collapse of the economy might occur before they can win the war and capture Taiwan and Siberia.

F.Y.E.O. Report reposted above might actually turn out to be an understatement of the problems China faces.

The root cause is the same that doomed the former U.S.S.R. And Czarist Russia, namely massive corruption and incompetence of high government officials chosen for political reliability over merit.

By Cookfcc on Wednesday, May 27, 2026 - 01:33 am: Edit

Authentication Error

By Paul Howard (Raven) on Wednesday, May 27, 2026 - 04:21 am: Edit

Jeff

So China's Internal problems in selling Dollars are 'are a financial attack on the US' and Japans Internal problems are just that?

But, on preparing for War - you can understand it - when the US has attacked two nations (rightly or wrongly) in the last 12 months, has blockaided a third (Cuba) and has threatened military action against an Ally (Denmark/Greenland)?

China might well want to be more aggresive, as the US has shown what you can do by being aggresive against friend or foe.

Do I want China to be stronger - no - but equally, the US hasn't exactly been a friend to the UK or Europe recently, so having a balancing power might be good for the World.

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Wednesday, May 27, 2026 - 07:34 am: Edit

"after the 2028 election" Why would China wait when the current administration has ben openly flirting with withdrawing from defensive alliances and has been cozying up to authoritarian countries like Russia, China, Argentina, and Hungary?

I'd think now, with the current administration, would be the time to act

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Wednesday, May 27, 2026 - 07:52 am: Edit

"The Oshkosh JLTV is a light armored vehicle that provides a high, MRAP level of protection against roadside bombs and mines while also carrying a crew of two"

Umm, no.

The JLTV carries up to 5 (most typically 4). The 5th guy is NOT a comfortable seat, but stands in the roof hatch in lieu of a RWS. There is a rare variant that hold just 2, but it is not liked; much better is to just bring a LMTV with the armored cab kit. My guys installed hundreds of these at Bagram. Basically you whip off the regular LMTV (or MTV) cab and install an armored one that came prebuilt in a big crate (like 8 x 8 x 12 feet

I've actually driven several JLTV, LMTV and HUmmers "outside the wire" between Spann & DehDadi II on various occasions with one of our Majors or LTC acting as TC. We just locked the doors. I was told to just run over anyone that tried to stop us. Never happened

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Wednesday, May 27, 2026 - 07:59 am: Edit

"The three JTLV designs were all improvements on the HMMWV. "

This is deceptive; the JLTV is BETTER than the HMMWV, but it is basically a clean sheet design with little in common with the HUMMER.

I was the EHS guy for the contractor (for AMC) that basically did all maintenance, repair & upgrading in Afghanistan. Other than "unit maintenance."

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 27, 2026 - 12:38 pm: Edit

Now would be a bad time. China wants a weaker president.

By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Wednesday, May 27, 2026 - 01:26 pm: Edit

Canada has ordered the Saab GlobalEye AWACS. The exact number ordered is not known yet, but there is a need for six aircraft. The competitor Boeing offered the E-7 wedgetail.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 27, 2026 - 02:31 pm: Edit

Attrition: The Chinese Family Collapse
May 28, 2026: Foreign experts regularly scrutinize Chinese population trends, including its pronounced inability to get the birth rate up the to 2.1 children per mother, which keeps population size about even. The population is shrinking, causing labor shortages and a growing number of elderly Chinese who must be provided for. One decisive demographic trend in China is the change of China's family composition. The reason for this oversight is apparent. China, like other modern governments, simply does not collect information on family structure or family ties systems so the government does not think about the issue and its consequences. Foreign researchers have modeled simulations of China’s past and prospective relationships and trends in kinship networks.
Researchers then use the results from these simulations to probe, evaluate, and ponder about their consequences for China’s social, economic, and political future. This is the first study to deliberate through the far-reaching effects of the results of demographic and kinship network modeling for a national population of a major economy and major nation worldwide. The simulations show that the Chinese family is about to undergo a radical and historically extraordinary evolution, as extended kinship networks weaken across the nation and close blood relatives disappear entirely for many.
This fraying of the extended family and atomization of the nuclear family comes at an almost exquisitely inconvenient moment in China. Social needs are soaring alongside the rising tally of elderly dependents and the shrinking numbers of people on whom the elderly can rely. There are two social statistics poised for inevitable collision in the years immediately ahead. Indeed, the waning of the Chinese family as we now know it will make for new and unfamiliar challenges at every stage in the life cycle, for both Chinese people and the Chinese state. The simulations revealed several major findings.
In terms of sheer quantity, Chinese networks of blood kin were never before nearly as thick as at the start of the 21st century. Due to dramatic increases in survival, men and women in their 30s as of 2020 have on average five times as many living cousins as in 1960. China’s kin increase may be a significant, previously overlooked factor explaining the Chinese economy’s astonishing performance since Mao Zedong’s death.
The kin explosion has reached its peak, and China is now on the cusp of a severe, unavoidable, and relentless kin crash, driven by its sustained and progressively steep sub-replacement fertility relationships. The implosion of consanguineous family networks, in the models, means that China’s rising generations will likely have fewer living relatives than ever before in Chinese annals.
Population simulations also project a radical inversion within the nuclear family, with living parents and in-laws outnumbering offspring for middle-aged Chinese men and women. Further, due to the surplus of baby boys under the notorious 1980–2015 One-Child Policy and declining age cohort sizes, growing numbers of men in the decades ahead will enter old age without spouses or children. This customary provides support for the elderly.
China’s coming transformation in family structure stands to overturn inherent social arrangements taken for granted today. The focus of the family in China will predictably be redirected from the raising of the young to the care for the elderly. The reliability and endurance of familial bonds of duty will be an increasingly crucial question, perhaps even a matter of life and death for many, including frail and struggling elders in the remote Chinese villages.
Despite this, the looming macroeconomic consequences of old- age dependency burdens, the most significant economic impact of China’s coming revolution in the family, may actually concern the micro-fundamentals of the national economy. Since earliest recorded history, China’s guanxi/social & business networks have helped get business done by reducing uncertainty and transaction costs. Just as propagation of blood relatives likely proved a powerful stimulant for growth during the era of China’s extraordinary upswing, the severe coming plunge in living biological kin in China between now and 2050 may prove an economic depressant.
The looming revolution in Chinese family structure promises to have political consequences as well. If the waning of the family requires China to build a huge social welfare state over the coming generation, as expected, then China would have that much less capability at its disposal for manipulating events abroad through economic diplomacy and defense policy. In addition, the simulations indicate that by 2050, close to half of China’s overall pool of male military-age manpower will be made up of only children. Any encounter by China’s security forces involving significant loss of life will almost inevitably foretell lineage extinction for many Chinese families.
Autocracies are typically accepting of casualties, but this may always be the case in the only-child China of today and the coming decades. Analysts and decision makers in China as well as worldwide have scarcely begun to think about the many implications of this great disruption for China’s future. Negligence of Chinese family structure is a blind spot, quite possibly a fateful one.
Dramatic demographic changes are underway in China, and they bear directly on the country’s economic, social, and geopolitical outlook for the decades ahead. China’s official announcement in January 2023 that deaths slightly exceeded births in the PRC/People’s Republic of China in 2022, and that total population for the country fell for the first time since the Great Famine of 1959–61 caused by Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward, are only the latest reminders that population trends are continuously reorganizing the trajectory of China’s rise.
Researchers and decision makers in China and the West pay close attention to many major Chinese population trends and their consequence. Among these are pronounced and continuing sub-replacement fertility, shrinking working-age manpower, rapid population aging, and emerging surpluses of marriageable men, partly due to sex-selective abortions. Yet those convey only some of the demographic headwinds facing the world’s largest economy and most densely inhabited society. One historic demographic trend in China has as yet attracted almost no interest, the transformation of the country’s family structure. Inattention to Chinese family structure is a blind spot and quite possibly a tragic one.
Chinese family structure is about to suffer a radical and historically unprecedented transition as extended kinship networks waste away across the nation and close blood relatives disappear altogether for many. This fraying of the extended family and atomization of the nuclear family come at an almost exquisitely unfortunate moment in China. The social needs are soaring with the rising calculation of elderly dependents and shrinking ranks of those on whom elderly can rely. These are two social indicators ready for collision and rapid decline.
The withering of the Chinese family as we now know it will make for new and unfamiliar trials at every stage in the life cycle, for people and for the Chinese state. We have barely begun to think about the many consequences of this great disruption for China’s future. The impending disruption in Chinese family structure is by now effectively unstoppable. A new family order is inescapable for China’s emerging young generations. Because their parents had fewer children and they had fewer siblings, their children will necessarily have few aunts, uncles, and cousins.
This upheaval promises to be massive in magnitude, replete with far-reaching reverberations and it is coming remarkably soon. Why has such an enormous, and potentially revolutionary, demographic change gone overlooked by China’s formidable cadre of academics, researchers, and advisers, and their counterparts worldwide? The answer unfortunately is obvious. China simply does not gather information on family structure or kinship networks. As a result, the government does not think about the issue and its outcomes. China plans for fewer people, not fewer nieces. Such oversight is hardly new, nor is it peculiar to China.
Existing governments have never regarded data on family as relevant to statecraft or security. Empires and states have been conducting censuses for thousands of years, with the earliest of them in the Mediterranean and China. But in antiquity, these population counts were designed for taxation and military mobilization. As a result, the focus was on households and head counts. That ancient design still informs modern statistical authorities everywhere. Although their techniques for surveying populations may be vastly more sophisticated nowadays, and although the sheer volume of demographic data at their disposal may likewise be exponentially greater, current governments worldwide still fail to ask for information about kinship from their citizens and subjects. Outside those working with the closely guarded population register data in some Scandinavian countries, who must apply clever approaches to count kin, the kinship systems linking whole societies remain unseen.
China’s revolution in family structure is more complicated than usually thought. Scholars, specialists, and members of the public certainly appreciate that the country’s family experience is changing. China’s notorious fertility-control policies in effect from the 1970s to 2015 are well-known, for instance, and it is not a leap to reason about such policies. Other demographic reversals discussed above signal considerable change in family structure. But how such policies and trends fit in the context of China’s shifting family landscape, how much has changed in the past 80 years, and just how much is likely to change again in the next 80 years is a largely untold story.
The study’s simulations revealed earlier unseen implications of these patterns. One immediate, and highly counter intuitive, result concerns China today, for it appears we are living through the era of peak family in mainland China currently, rather than in earlier times. The received view of traditional China, of course, is that young and old alike typically had a large contingent of siblings, cousins, and other kin on whom they could rely and who conversely could come to them for assistance. This seems to make sense since we know that birth rates were high in China under the old order, with five births or more per woman. Yet while births may have been plentiful, live kin were much scarcer, given the poor survival rates of the past, with many children dying before they could talk, play, or take on the roles of, for all intents and purposes, siblings, cousins, or other relatives. Researchers’ calculations of mortality rate, which highlights the likelihood that children become adults is unfortunately only readily available for the modern period. The average number of children surviving to age 5 peaked in the 1970s, and the number surviving to 40 followed a similar but displaced pattern reaching its observed peak in the 2010s. These results highlight that only in the current era have very high numbers of surviving adult children been available to older adults. Surviving children are, however, only one component of family composition. What about other kin types?
As recently as 1950, only about 7 percent of Chinese men and women in their 50s had any living parents; the corresponding number in 2020 exceeds 60 percent. On the other hand, a decidedly larger fraction of Chinese men and women in their 70s and 80s have two or more live children today than around the time of the 1949 liberation. They are also more likely to have a living spouse nowadays than in that much less developed era. Therefore, men and women in their 40s are three times more likely to have two or more living siblings today than they were in 1950. In 1950, only one in four Chinese in their 30s had 10 or more living cousins; today that share would be an incredible 90 percent or higher. And practically none of today’s 30-somethings lack cousins altogether, as opposed to about 5 percent of their counterparts in 1950.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, May 27, 2026 - 02:31 pm: Edit

Air Weapons: AH-64 Attack Helicopter Launches Drones
May 27, 2026: Weapons manufacturer Anduril developed a new drone weapon for the Apache attack helicopter in only six months. This weapon was tested when an AH-64 launched this drone for the first time. It flew 457 kilometers and had an impact similar to a Hellfire missile.
The AH-64 helicopter gunship entered service as the AH-64A in 1986. Numerous planned upgrades to the B and C standard were planned during the 1990s but stalled because of budget reductions after the Cold War ended in 1991. These upgrades were incorporated in the 1997 AH-64D Block I. The AH-64D Longbow models began appearing in 2002. Mass production of the E model and conversion of D models to E began in late 2013. The American Army began receiving AH-64Es in 2012.
AH-64Es have more powerful and fuel-efficient engines as well as much improved electronics. AH-64Es also have Internet- like capabilities enabling these gunships to quickly exchange images, video, and so on with other aircraft and ground troops. Each AH-64E can also control several drones and launch missiles at targets spotted by these drones. The AH-64E radar has longer range and onboard computers are much more powerful than earlier ones. The electronics are easier to upgrade and maintain. The combination of improved fire control and Internet capabilities greatly increases the combat effectiveness of the AH-64. The 10-ton AH-64E carries a pilot and a weapons officer, as well as up to 16 Hellfire missiles plus the 30mm automatic cannon. Sorties average three hours. The AH-64 can operate at night and has a top speed of 260 kilometers an hour.
FYEO

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Wednesday, May 27, 2026 - 11:15 pm: Edit

Further information concerning the policy changes from China Communist government:

Google:
Quote “ eight Chinese government agencies launched a coordinated joint enforcement crackdown on unauthorized cross-border stock trading, heavily restricting how mainland citizens can access unapproved foreign investment platforms.This major policy shift directly impacts how Chinese citizens invest abroad by choking off "underground" investment routes while expanding legal, government-monitored channels.The Crackdown on Offshore BrokeragesThe China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and other top financial, internet, and banking regulators targeted popular unapproved offshore brokerages—such as Futu Holdings, Tiger Brokers, and Long Bridge Securities—fining them a combined $330 million for operating on the mainland without a license.The new rules explicitly dictate that:No New Purchases or Deposits: Existing mainland Chinese clients using these offshore platforms are now strictly prohibited from making new foreign investments or depositing additional funds.Mandatory Liquidation Window: Mainlanders can only sell down their existing global stock positions and withdraw their capital. The government has mandated a two-year grace period for these platforms to completely shut down all mainland-facing apps, websites, and data servers.Tightened Onshore Restrictions: Banned brokerages are completely barred from marketing, fund settlements, or offering technical and customer support within mainland China.Why is Beijing Doing This?The primary driver is massive capital flight. Propelled by a sluggish domestic real estate market and a weaker domestic stock market, Chinese citizens shifted an estimated $1 trillion in unauthorized capital out of mainland China into U.S. and Hong Kong equity markets. The strict crackdown seeks to slam the door on these unapproved channels to preserve the country's foreign exchange reserves and stabilize domestic financial markets.The Exception: Approved Legal Channels Still OpenThe announcement does not mean Chinese citizens are completely blocked from buying foreign investments; rather, it forces them exclusively into heavily supervised, state-sanctioned programs.To balance the crackdown, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) expanded the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) program quota to $176.2 billion. This allows mainland citizens to legally buy global equities and bonds, but only by purchasing approved global mutual funds managed by licensed domestic banks and securities firms. Retail investors also retain monitored access to specific Hong Kong assets via the official Southbound Stock Connect and Wealth Connect cross-border programs.

AI responses may include mistakes. For financial advice, consult a professional.”

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Wednesday, May 27, 2026 - 11:23 pm: Edit

Paul Howard:

You should find a more reputable source for your information.

What China has done is now spreading to other nations treasury instruments, as yields are rising around the world in the aftermath of the announced policy change.

If China intended to damage the United States ability to sell treasury bonds, it over shot the mark.

You may be in love with China, but these actions China has taken are not friendly.

By Paul Howard (Raven) on Thursday, May 28, 2026 - 04:24 am: Edit

Jeff

Copying a whole paragaph with poor punctation makes it very hard to read - but I can't see anywhere the Chinnese Government is 'attacking' the US Financially - critially though, the post you made even states $1 trillion was in unauthorised captial leaving China- so you could say, China was wanting their money back?

Or wanting to refloat their economy from the same paragraph.

But 'attack Financailly' - where does it state that?

Secondly, you stated that the rising non-US Yield increases was due to other political aspects (26th May " In short, the rise in European debt yields shows that buyers demand a greater rate of return on their investment.") and now state what China is doing is now spreading to others.

Which is it?

On source of data - Might I suggest you take that up with the US Department of the Treasury and Google - but I would agree Google on similar searches can come up with different answers (The biggest sell off when I first looked was China and Japan - similar wording now comes up with China, India and Saudi Arabia - I am guessing 'biggest' and 'most notable' might change in Googles Algorirthm from being $ based Sales to % Sales?).

I'll give you that point therefore - Data can easily change based on the exact question and also be interpreted depending on what information the provider of that data wants to show and so it can affect the depth or quality of that information.

Which does lead to a seperate point - and we might be both right, in that China may be just wanting to return capital to China to help it's economy (like Japan and possibly India is doing) - and there is the side benefit is that it effects their key Economic, Political and Military opponent, in a negative way?

Yes, it's could be perceived to be aggressive (just like the US over Greenland), but I would not say it's an attack.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Thursday, May 28, 2026 - 05:32 am: Edit

As to “Attacking Financially”,

Wow, are you not able to think through a rather simple process?

1. Higher treasury yields is a symptom.

In plain english, it literally means that governments all over the world are accepting less total money to sell their debt instruments.

It just means that their cost of selling the instrument increases at the same time the revenues received decreases.

2. Again, in simple terms, higher costs and reduced money received puts stress on governments, not just the United States, but it is happening all over the world.

If left unchecked, or gets worse, the governments of the world could ultimately end up competing with each other for a finite amount of buyers willing to pay for said debt securities.

If the nations of the world can’t sell their debt to the world market, they will need find alternatives.

That means raise taxes, or tariffs or other fees (examples of which are countries that charge for use of canals like Egypt or Panama for access to the Suez or Panama Canals.)

Worse yet, is it could cause an international trade war in the same way the Smoot-hawley act precipitated the Great Depression back in the 1920’s.

For those who may not be familiar with economic history, Smoot and Hawley were two U.S. senators who sponsored a trade bill that raised tariffs.

France, responded by raising their tariffs, and other countries followed with also raising tariff's.

This happened at about the same time Germany (normally a country that participated in world trade) was dealing with War Reparations from WW1.)

At the same time, (roughly) wall Street had its black friday financial collapse in 1927, that brought about the Great Depression.

It affected employment of people all over the world sparking bankruptcy of large numbers of businesses.

In short, there is the potential that China’s desperate attempt to stop the flood of yuan out of its economy could result in a lot of unintended consequences.

3. It should also be remembered that the single biggest drain of money, from China, has been family members of the Chinese Communist Party, transferring wealth out of China.

This has been reported over a number of years by such media organizations as the New York Times, Wall Street Journal and other international media sites.

It is an attack, but it might not have been intended as such.

We could be looking at a classic “we are up to our butts in alligators because some people wanted to drain the swamp.”

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Thursday, May 28, 2026 - 10:48 am: Edit

I wonder how the "Child per woman" number is calculated

Kids born / total number of women nation wide?

Kids / number of women of childbearing age?

Kids / half of the total population?

Does the number of kids used reflect how many reach adulthood? Just live long enough to get a birth certificate?

Is there still a disparity in male vs female births?

I can see how ways the inputs are selected can wildly vary the results. And can see why researchers might use starting numbers pools that might distort results.

For example, if I am lazy (or have crappy data available), I'd take the official number of birth certificates as the number of kids. Is there a reason for this number to be manipulated? Do hospitals get paid differently if a fetus survives vs is still born?

What is the child mortality rate? A child which doesn't graduate" into the cohort of reproducing adults skews results.

"Women" is also difficult; birth rates among girl children and post menopausal women is effectively zero.

Ideally, you could sort and women would only be those between (say) 18 to 40 (yeah I know). Kids would only count those that reach some actuarial milestone. And of course you'd have to normalize the data to reflect any gender disparity.

Isn't someone on the BBS a statistics/ math whiz?

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Thursday, May 28, 2026 - 10:58 am: Edit

I would state that perceptions of how weak or strong any given President is vary wildly between US parties and foreign governments/ peoples.

I know many supporters of President Trump believe he is very powerful, respected, and feared by our adversaries (real or potential) and other nations.

And many detractors domestically and abroad think the opposite.

Everyone here knows my and SVCs opinions differ; what matters how foreign great power leadership perceive the situation.

By Paul Howard (Raven) on Thursday, May 28, 2026 - 11:26 am: Edit

Jeff

Your rude and arrogant and therefore I will no longer respond to you.

You have repeatedly stated my facts are wrong and I should use better sources - and yet your most recent post has two major errors.

1) The Wall Steet Crash was 1929, not 1927.

2) The Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act was in 1930 and so how could it have "precipitated the Great Depression back in the 1920’s." (Yes I know the Depression was in the 1930's).

Pot and Kettle (or those living in Greenhouses shouldn't throw stones) springs to mind.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Thursday, May 28, 2026 - 12:20 pm: Edit

Paul Howard, as he is no longer responding, has again made still more errors:

The great depression was not one day, but lasted for a period of years.

The second depression in 1937 was arguably far worse than the initial shock.

Oddly, the second phase was to an extent triggered by the then President of the United States FDR, seeing a partial recovery, tightened monetary controls that retarded the recovery. Fascinating subject for anyone interested in economics.

In response, concerning 1927 verses 1929, the causes of the great depression did not (as implied by Paul Howards post above) did not happen on the Thursday before the Black Friday crash, but were a number of factors over a period of at least two years.

The Dust bowl years resulted from poor farm practices that abused the land and resulted in huge dust storms that spread across the north American continent. This resulted in the migrations as people abandoned family farms, see Steinbeck’s “the Grapes of Wrath” novel for details. There was also a 1930’s movie starring Henry Fonda with the same name.

Huge speculation in the stock market, fueled by low margin requirements where people (from several categories of social classes) were able to “buy” stocks on margin (very low percentage of the per share price) were financially broken when share prices dropped and margin calls were executed for which the “owners” were expected to pay more money to satisfy the requirement.

In short, Paul Howard is attempting to debate issues in Economics, banking, international trade and utter lack of appreciation of the nature of communism as currently practiced in China in todays modern world.

By Paul Howard (Raven) on Thursday, May 28, 2026 - 12:54 pm: Edit

Sorry Jeff, I reserve the right to respond when your talking BS.

You stated "At the same time, (roughly) wall Street had its black friday financial collapse in 1927, that brought about the Great Depression."

and

"In response, concerning 1927 verses 1929, the causes of the great depression did not (as implied by Paul Howards post above) did not happen on the Thursday before the Black Friday crash, but were a number of factors over a period of at least two years."

You stated the crash was 1927 - when history states it occured in 1929.

Where did I make any reference, implied or not about 'Thursday' or the Crash being an instant effect?

Please don't make statements which are untrue about my posts.

Thank you