Yeah, pity there was no warning of the need for deeper stockpiles.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 01, 2026 - 03:16 pm: Edit

Surface Forces : Singapore Building Two More MRCVs
June 1 ,2026: Singapore, an island city-state in southeast Asia, is responsible for security of the 223 kilometers long and 19 kilometers wide Singapore Strait that connects the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. Singapore is a 736 square kilometer island with a population of six million and a GDP of $565 billion. That comes out at about $94,000 per capita, the fourth highest in the world. The military consists of 51,000 active-duty personnel and 252,000 reservists. Israel helped Singapore establish its armed forces and supplied personnel to help train personnel. Israel continues to sell weapons to Singapore.
Over a thousand ships a day traverse this seaway. To help with that, last year Singapore launched Victory, the first of six locally built, 8,000 ton Victory-class MRCV\Multi-Role Combat Vessel warships. These ships are armed with 32 VLS/Vertical Launch Cells containing Aster and Mica VL surface to air missiles, a 76mm gun and two remotely controlled 30mm autocannon. The helicopter deck and hangar contain a Seahawk manned helicopter and two smaller unmanned helicopter drones. Electronics include a sea/air search radar and a hull mounted sonar. Anti-submarines weapons consist of lightweight torpedoes launched from the helicopter and/or from several of the VLS cells. MRCVs are designed to function as Motherships for a range of unmanned systems. With an operational range exceeding 12,000 kilometers and an endurance of over 21 days, the MRCVs enable the RSN\Republic of Singapore Navy to deploy several types of drones to protect Singapore’s SLOC\Sea Lines of Communications.
Surface submerged and aerial drones deployed from the MRCVs will work together to expand the surveillance and operational reach of the ship across air, surface, and underwater areas. This enables one MRCV, with its fleet of unmanned technologies, to complete missions which would currently need multiple manned warships. Each 8,000 ton MRCV is 150 meters long and 21 meters wide. Top speed is more than 40 kilometers an hour. Range is more than 12,000 kilometers. Crew size is variable but never more than a hundred personnel.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 01, 2026 - 03:17 pm: Edit

Forces: The Russian Multinational Force
June 1 ,2026: The Russian military in Ukraine has become multinational, with nearly 50,000 soldiers from Central Asia, Africa and elsewhere serving as well-paid mercenaries for Russia. About half of these soldiers are killed, partly because Russia does not let the soldiers leave when their contracts are completed. Russian recruiters use not just financial incentives, but also pressure on migrants. Some foreigners are forced to choose between criminal prosecution and signing a contract.
According to Ukrainian intelligence, men from 136 countries have signed lucrative contracts to fight alongside Russian troops. So far, more than 3,000 foreigners remain in the military after service completion. The money may have been a factor, the $20,000 signing bonus and over $2,000 a month pay can change the lives of the poor families many of these foreign troops come from. Sometimes Russia does not make the promised payments, especially if the dead soldier has no next of kin to receive it, or no one complains when the payments are not made, including a substantial amount of cash paid for dead soldiers.
Despite the difficulties Russia continues to seek more foreign recruits. These foreigners are popular with Russian soldiers because the foreigners can be given most of the dangerous assignments.
Russia had earlier problems with foreign mercenaries. Two years ago, Russia was unable to recruit, mobilize or conscript enough Russians to fight. Even before the end of 2023, Russia sought ways to deal with this problem. One solution was recruiting 15,000 Nepalese men to fight in Ukraine. The Nepalese Russia recruited were not from the Gurkha region. Gurkha soldiers are much in demand as mercenaries and battalions of them serve in the British and Indian armies. Gurkhas were not interested in fighting for the Russians in Ukraine, so the Russians turned to non- Gurkha Nepalese who needed a job, any job, even if it was a dangerous one. The Nepal recruits were given little training when they entered Russian service in mid-2023. The troops were soon in Ukraine where they suffered casualties. By 2026 nearly half the Nepalese had become casualties. Four soldiers were captured by Ukrainian forces and held as prisoners of war. Families back in Nepal appealed to Nepalese politicians to find a way they can contact their men in Ukraine. Russia did not provide any way for their Nepal mercenaries to send or receive mail to anyone in Nepal. That led Nepal to ban any more Russian recruiting in Nepal. Earlier Cuba did the same when Russian tried to recruit Cuban men to fight as mercenaries in Ukraine.
Russia has been seeking countries where they can recruit local men to be mercenaries but has had little or no success. Russia has a bad reputation because they are the ones that invaded Ukraine and now the Russians are losing, and most countries are fine with that or don’t care as long as the Russians do not try to recruit local men to be mercenaries.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 01, 2026 - 03:17 pm: Edit

Winning: Ukrainian Drone Wisdom
May 31, 2026: The Ukraine War has been a revolutionary event in the annals of war. In Ukraine, swarms of FPV/First Person View drones have dramatically changed how wars are fought. There are few methods to defeat drone attacks. The primary defensive measure is new, inexpensive drones that collide with incoming drones. There is also the earlier technique of electronic jamming of the control signal between the drone operator and the drone. Jamming is of limited effectiveness because active jammers are easy targets for drones programmed to home in on and destroy jammers. Depending on how they are programmed, drones will either land if jammed or return to where they were launched. Another technique is to equip an FPV with a kilometer or so of thin fiber optic cable. This cannot be jammed, although occasionally the cable breaks before the drone has carried out its attack.
Despite those defensive measures and the small explosive payload drones carry, most of the armored vehicles damaged or destroyed in Ukraine were done in by armed drones. Over 90 percent of all Russian casualties are the result of drone attacks. Drone warfare is increasingly common and dominates most ground combat. Tactics and techniques are also evolving as Ukraine and Russia both experiment with new tactics, and drone designs. Both nations are also increasing production of drones and the number of trained operators. Both Russia and Ukraine realize that drones provide unprecedented surveillance of the battlefield, but not all of it. That requires more drones and operators.
In 2024 Ukraine established its Drone Force to coordinate production and operator training efforts. By 2025 Ukraine was producing nearly 400,000 drones a month and has managed to triple that in 2026. The Drone Force coordinated the production of drones by civilians. This was done in homes, barns, garages or any space where production of a few dozen or a few hundred drones could be carried out.
Ukraine also supported civilian drone building operations efforts to become commercial. Currently there are over 30 commercial drone manufacturers, many of them underground or in abandoned tunnels to protect them from Russian drone or missile attacks. Then there’s the Killhouse Academy, run by the Ukrainian Army 3rd Corps. They run a six to ten day course that is free to members of the 3rd Corps but costs everyone else about $200. The course includes the basics of operating, repairing and even building your own drone. This is not very difficult, because all you have to do is modify a consumer quadcopter or fixed wing drone. The course also features a large abandoned industrial space with mockups of typical battlefield obstacles and targets for drone operators to practice on. Students learn to operate an FPV drone and how to avoid being spotted and attacked by a Russian drone. Students are also given demonstrations of what electronic jamming can do to an FPV drone and how to deal with that.
Killhouse also offers more technical, and more expensive, advanced courses. Graduates of these courses include teenagers expecting to be in the army eventually as well as those who want to start building drones for the troops, often soldiers they know. Many students are just curious about drones and their use in the Ukraine War. This has attracted journalists as well as elderly Ukrainians with grandchildren in the army.
In 2023, a year after Russia invaded Ukraine, the Ukrainians were building their own drones, often at home or scattered workshops. By late 2024 Ukrainians were producing over 150,000 drones a month. In 2025 Ukraine produced more than four million drones. By purchasing components in bulk, thousands of Ukrainian men and women are building these drones for the armed forces or for someone they know in the military. Troops at the front also build and modify drones to fit their immediate situations. For the soldiers, designing better drones is often a matter of life or death.
The Ukrainians have kept ahead of the Russians in drone technology and production. The Russian government discourages, or even outlaws, individuals building drones and centralizes drone production. This gives the Ukrainians an edge in drone quantity and quality. The Ukrainians are defending their homeland and Russia is having an increasingly difficult time justifying continued fighting given the death and disablement of over a million Russians in Ukraine.
All these drone developments make combat more dangerous for the troops on the ground. Drones not only keep an eye on enemy troops but are always ready to go in and put them out of action, as in dead or wounded. Troops are still fighting each other on the ground, but now they have to worry about constant surveillance and attacks from the growing number of drones hovering over the battlefield. In addition to operators there are the drone maintainers, who repair damaged or otherwise disabled drones and service those needing a battery recharge or simply a fresh battery.
Ukraine’s military has established a Drone Academy to train drone operators in basic and advanced skills. There are courses for commanders on how best to manage and use drones. This is essential because now Ukrainian infantry battalions have nearly as many drones as troops. The American military likes to call this a force multiplier. That is, a battalion with lots of drones is more effective, and lethal, than a battalion without so many drones. The Ukrainian military is the first to go so far in this direction and appear to be benefitting from the massive use of drones. Other nations are closely following this development and preparing to adopt what works for Ukraine. Russia is more conservative in how they deal with this, even though they are also using massive numbers of drones. There are already dozens of Ukrainian companies offering training for drone operators and the Ukrainian military uses the services of these firms. Ukraine seeks to have more than 10,000 trained operators as quickly as possible.
Earlier in 2023 Ukraine revealed that it planned to spend over half a billion dollars on drones but did not reveal the extent of their efforts to add more capabilities to commercial drones as well as the growing number of drones being manufactured by Ukrainian companies. Ukrainian developers and manufacturers are often small groups of civilian hobbyists that proved capable of creating new features for drones, both commercial and hobbyist-created models. The Russian invasion spurred a lot of innovation, mainly among Ukrainian developers. Among the items available to commercial customers are a lot of digital video camera items as well as lighter, miniaturized computer components that can be assembled and programmed by users to perform essential tasks, like using AI apps and data from onboard video cameras of enemy forces, even if they are camouflaged or in underground bunkers. Constant combat use of these systems enables developers to address shortcomings and continually improves the hardware and software carried on these hunter killer drones. Earlier in the war two drones were needed for this but now all that tech and weapons can be carried and used by one drone. The Ukrainian military also holds competitions to find the most skilled drone operators and honor them with promotions and more challenging assignments.
Wartime developers are able to improve their tech and hardware more rapidly because there is continuous feedback from users. Ukraine has an edge here because many of these developers are hobbyists who know little about peacetime development, its bureaucracy and counter-productive over-supervision. Ukrainian developers are often creating these new drone techs for friends or family members who are now in the military and eager for whatever help they can get. The Ukrainian military sees this entrepreneurial spirit as an advantage, not some form of insubordination or recklessness the way the Russian military regards unauthorized innovations. Despite that, some Russian innovators have appeared and been allowed to work. Russian commanders and civilian officials are less willing than their Ukrainian counterparts to encourage individual initiatives. Another problem is that the economic sanctions have made it more difficult for Russians to obtain the commercial tech that Ukrainians still have access to and frequently
Such free access to Western and Chinese components means Ukraine can build very capable and lethal drones that are designed to carry out one or a small number of missions. That is why Ukraine and Russia are each losing thousands of drones a month. Cheap, useful, and expendable is now the rule with most battlefield drones.
This innovation explains the greater success of Ukrainian drones against Russian targets on the battlefield or deep inside Russia. Despite all the innovation, the majority of these drones are basically loitering munitions that can be sent out to areas where there is known or suspected enemy activity and kill it when they find it. In the past a separate surveillance drone was needed to spot targets, usually enemy troops, and vehicles. These drones have video cameras and a link to operators who view the video on a tablet or via goggles containing small video screens while the operators have a form of handheld game controller to maneuver the drone and select a target for the drone to collide with and explode. The video comm link was a vulnerability the Russian exploited as they developed new types of electronic jammers that could disable these comm links. The new Ukrainian drones that combine finding and killing capabilities on one drone that can also detect and destroy these Russian jammers.
You can see how this works in Ukraine, where the Ukrainian troops are better trained in the accurate use of rifle fire. It was Ukrainian troops who frequently used commercial quadcopters equipped with grenade or small bomb carry and release mechanisms. The Ukrainian soldiers often bought commercial drones for this and spent hours at a time sending out their quadcopter to search for targets. The quadcopter would have to frequently land to recharge. That demonstrates another 21st century development; the proliferation of electronic devices an infantryman can and often will take with him into combat.
Input from Ukrainian engineers was essential because many of the most effective Soviet-era weapons engineers were Ukrainian. That meant Ukraine had a tradition of pragmatic and innovative weapons development that was mobilized after the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea and part of Donbas. The capabilities of the Ukrainian engineers were not exactly a state secret, just not newsworthy. Foreigners familiar with weapons development knew about the Ukrainian skills and those who visited Ukraine for whatever reason, like American and other NATO military advisors, got a closer look at what those Ukrainian engineers, as well as civilian hobbyists, could do.
Those skills became even more important after the invasion began and suddenly engineers and scientists in other fields began applying their skills to rapidly develop new weapons and equipment to protect Ukraine from the Russians. After the invasion began the capabilities of the Ukrainian engineers became part of the reporting on how the Ukrainians stopped and turned back the Russian attack.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 01, 2026 - 03:19 pm: Edit

Air Weapons: Ukraine Shows Nato How It Is Done
May 31, 2026: In late March the NATO commander, with a team of analysts and experts, visited the Ukrainian capital. The first meeting provided a nasty surprise, when the NATO team was told that currently Europe is not prepared to defend itself against Russian forces armed with drones.
The Ukraine War confirmed that Europe cannot sustain a near-peer war between industrialized nations. Ammunition is being spent faster than it can be produced, and European stockpiles, production, and preparations were assembled for limited operations, not sustained medium-intensity war. Ukraine is expected to produce nearly 10 million drones this year. NATO must similarly shift to mass drone production on a scale, where affordability and the capability to upgrade production matter as much as the technological development of systems. Experts believe there is a crucial need for NATO members to increase their air defenses since large-scale modern warfare, as seen in the Ukraine and Iran wars, includes strikes on oil storage and refining, internet facilities, and logistics facilities in addition to conventional military targets.
Another aspect of the demonstration was Ukraine’s exceptional military experience and expertise, plus its emphasis on training. These activities lead to success in combat and make possible a growing number of drone attacks on petroleum and electronic manufacturing targets deep inside Russia.
In May 2025 Ukraine and NATO participated in the Hedgehog-25 exercise in Estonia. Four Ukrainian combat veterans demonstrated to representatives from thirteen NATO armed forces the realities of drone warfare. NATO operated as they customarily did and were quickly surprised as Ukrainian drones mined the roads NATO forces used. Another type of Ukrainian drones was sent to put NATO forces under continuous surveillance. Over the next three days the Ukrainian drones destroyed, on paper, most of the NATO military vehicles present as well as NATO tactical headquarters and logistics.
During the years of war in Ukraine, NATO moved from training the Ukrainian military to receiving training from Ukrainian forces. NATO members who led sessions for Ukrainian troops primarily have experience with counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. NATO member countries have not fought a full-scale war against a major industrial military since World War II, Korea and Vietnam.
Two years ago, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister declared that Europe did not know how to fight wars. A year later the commander of the Officer Training Institute at Austria’s Theresian Military Academy, declared that the European defense industry has produced nothing comparable to Ukraine’s FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile. A former Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief claimed that only three countries are prepared for large-scale modern warfare—pro-Western Ukraine and anti-Western Russia and Iran.
Western military instructors lack experience in full-scale 21st-century combat against a major military power. Latvia adopted Ukrainian military experience into its training at its annual joint multinational exercises in early 2026, where for the first time in the history of these exercises, the program was entirely based on presentations by a Ukrainian Special operations unit.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy noted that Poland, NATO’s highest military spender as a share of its gross domestic product, could only shoot down four out of 19 drones during Russia’s September 2025 incursion. In the first few days of the current Iran conflict, the United States and its Gulf allies used nearly 1,000 Patriot interceptor missiles, which cost approximately $3–4 million each, against Iranian Shahed drones, which cost $20,000–$50,000 each. In four years of war, Ukraine has received only 600 Patriot interceptor missiles. Ukraine has signed defense contracts with three Gulf states and Jordan to supply Ukrainian anti-drone interceptors, which cost $1,000–3,000 each.
With a shortage of Patriot missiles, Ukraine’s producer of Flamingo missiles and drones, is cooperating with European countries to produce a low-cost air defense system against missiles to rival the U.S. Patriot system by 2027. It has been noted that the Ukrainians are even better at using the Patriot than the Americans. Few expected that Ukrainians would be able to master the Patriot quickly. Now NATO air defense forces are learning from the Ukrainians.
Some analysts have argued that Ukraine has gained the upper hand in the attritional war with Russia since late 2025. Ukraine’s success on the battlefield is becoming recognized by NATO and the Gulf states. As of late March, Ukraine has been killing Russian soldiers at a faster rate than Russia can recruit replacements, not to mention wounded and operational losses. Russian President Vladimir Putin is fearful that moving from voluntary recruitment to full mobilization would be politically destabilizing. Ukraine has increased the volume of its drone attacks and changed to targeting soldiers rather than military equipment. Ukraine’s top drone commander claims that one Ukrainian can kill 400 Russians using unmanned systems for just $878 per kill in materials. Throughout the war, Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded at more than twice the rate of Ukrainian soldiers. Earlier this year, Ukraine killed or wounded over 6,000 Russian troops in only four days.
Ukraine’s recent battlefield gains have been assisted by the denial of Starlink access to Russia and Putin’s decision to ban the Telegram social media app in Russia. Both steps have empowered Ukraine’s military and security forces and undermined Russian military communications. In August 2024, during Ukraine’s military intervention into Russia’s Kursk oblast, Kyiv pioneered the combination of electronic warfare to disable Russian drones and the deployment of swarms of drones to target Russian forces, followed by ground forces moving in and securing territory. In the past three months, Ukrainian forces have recaptured most of Dnipropetrovsk province from Russia and retaken lost territory in Zaporizhzhia province. In Kharkiv province, fighting continues without significant Russian gains. Ukrainian forces are preventing Russian advances in Donetsk oblast. Russia’s 2026 offensive has been slowed along the long front line—this year’s Ukrainian counteroffensive has yielded Kyiv its largest territorial gains since 2023.
Since late 2025, Ukraine has greatly expanded its medium and long-range drone and cruise missile attacks against Russian forces. Ukraine is targeting Russian staging areas and military bases, repair facilities, military factories and warehouses, air defense, Black Sea Fleet vessels, aircraft, helicopters, and energy facilities. Ukraine is destroying Russian air defenses faster than Russia can replace them, and this destruction opens the path to subsequent attacks against other military targets. Ukraine is using domestically produced drones BULAVA and RAM-2X , CDET, Ukrainian Armor, UDI, and SpetsTechnoEksport that have smaller payloads and are decimating Russian air defense systems, including Buk, Tor, Strela, and ZU-23. Ukraine’s longer-range RUBALKA and FP-2 have larger payloads. These strikes have long been conducted by HRU/Ukrainian military intelligence as well as SBU/Ukrainian Security Service, Special Operation Forces, and Unmanned Systems Forces.
Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure are having a greater impact than Western sanctions, particularly after the Americans reduced sanctions on Russia following its conflict with Iran. Ukraine is attacking energy facilities thousands of kilometers inside Russia, along with Russian shadow fleet tankers in the Mediterranean Sea from covert Ukrainian bases in Libya. Russian oil exports through Baltic Sea ports have been completely halted after daily waves of Ukrainian drone strikes in Leningrad province closed the Russian Baltic ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga. Russia has been unable to profit from the increased price of oil due to closure of the Straits of Hormuz because Ukrainian attacks have reduced the capacity of Russian oil export infrastructure.
Ukrainian military technology is welcome in Western stock markets and urgently in demand by the Gulf states in the American conflict with Iran. Swarmer, the first Ukrainian defense company to be listed on Wall Street, had an IPO value of $67 million and had a market cap of $670 million after trading was opened, with initially priced shares of $5 closing at $31. A partner of Green Flag VC, a venture fund focused on Ukrainian defense companies, said the listing broke a barrier for the American investor, recognizing and understanding and having access to the talent of Ukrainian defense tech. Ukrainian defense startups have the capability to take their tech globally now that there is interest in them, and this sets a path for others in the market to emulate.
Ukraine has sent 201 military experts to the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait to assist in countering Iranian attacks, with another 34 experts available for deployment. Ukraine produces 2,000 drone interceptors per day and only requires half of them to counter Russia’s daily drone attacks. Ukraine’s production could be increased if funding is made available.
Ukrainian drone interceptors cost between $1,000 and $3,000 apiece and are more cost-effective than Patriot surface-to-air missiles which cost $3–4 million each. Ten Ukrainian companies produce drone interceptors which include the STRILA, STING, OCTOPUS, P1-SUN and BAYONET. The new JEDI interceptor is also AI-guided to targets but carries a heavier 4-kilogram payload and flies at a speed of 320 kilometers an hour.
[Editor – the first European computer was the British “Bombe” used to decode German Enigma traffic.]
Ukraine has reached this stage because of the legacy of its Soviet military-industrial complex, a large number of technology specialists, and its development in a fundamentally different way from Russia since its independence in 1991. For example, the first computer in Eastern Europe was invented in Kyiv in 1951. The Institute of Cybernetics within the Soviet Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was launched in 1957. The first Encyclopedia of Cybernetics in the world was published in Kyiv in 1973. The Ukrainian information technology sector is valued at over $7.8 billion.
Ukraine’s democratic society is constructed horizontally, allowing for the flourishing of a competitive private defense sector, volunteer groups, and amicable society–business–government relations. Russia’s governments and society are built vertically and where the defense sector remains, as in the Soviet Union, state controlled. Putin is fearful of losing control, as seen in his banning of social media. The Telegram ban has negatively affected the already low level of volunteer recruitment for the Russian army.
Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine has mobilized within the country and abroad an army of hundreds of thousands of software developers and engineers who assist the development of military technology and undertake cyber warfare. Competing ideas developed by programmers are sent to tech labs, incorporated into prototypes for the Ministry of Defense, and then tested on the battlefield in a rapid turnaround, which NATO planners are closely studying.
Ukraine’s Delta communication system has been praised by NATO. Western militaries have no equivalent and are plagued by secrecy between branches of the armed forces and between member states’ commands. As seen in the Hedgehog-25 exercise in Estonia, Delta provides Ukrainian armed forces with a real-time display of air, land, and sea conditions on digital maps. Ukrainian forces can communicate with one another securely through Delta’s messenger, which allows for the sharing of intelligence within and outside brigades.
Zelenskyy’s goal is for Ukraine to become a hub for the development of military technology in the West. The goal is to make Ukraine the arsenal of the free world. The investments of many European countries in Ukraine’s defense sector and the proliferation of joint military ventures are assisting this goal.
Ukraine’s new defense sector no longer resembles the Soviet military-industrial complex. It is dominated by the private sector with small defense start-ups brought together in the Brave 1 platform, which Kyiv founded in April 2023 to promote competition and innovation. In March, NATO and Brave 1 launched the first joint innovation program between Ukraine and NATO to bring together defense companies to build solutions tested in war, such as countering drones, strengthening SIGINT and electronic warfare, and autonomous targeting systems. Joint ventures that bring together Western and Ukrainian defense companies are proliferating. In contrast, Russia retains its Soviet era state-controlled military industrial complex, with joint ventures only established with authoritarian Iran, the People’s Republic of China, and North Korea.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has yielded key lessons for NATO to prepare for future wars with Russia. Ukraine’s message about the long-term role it could play in European security, however, is only partly getting through. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland are presented as Europe’s new defense core. Only Poland, however, spends the NATO-recommended percent of its GDP on defense. Despite these countries making steps to improve their militaries, they still have a long way to go, and Ukraine’s experience can serve as a model for these developments.
Militaries are notoriously slow to change, especially when their business model has been based on decades of large-value purchases of military equipment. Germany’s largest military producer, Rheinmetall, relies on the sale of tanks that are still produced without anti-drone protection, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and other expensive military equipment.
NATO militaries often rely on expensive equipment that is unable to adapt quickly. Software on Ukraine’s battlefield equipment is updated roughly every two weeks. NATO member-state militaries have typically taken years to update software. In November 2025, the Swedish and Ukrainian defense ministers signed a letter of intent to combine Sweden’s industrial and technological strengths with Ukraine’s battlefield experience and, based on Ukraine having the world’s greatest experience of quickly developing new military technology, reduce the length of Sweden’s innovation cycle.
Before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia claimed it had the second-best army in the world and would defeat Ukraine in three days Russia failed to secure any of its 2022 objectives in Ukraine. Russia continues to have a Soviet-style, state-controlled military industrial sector, unlike Ukraine, where the defense sector is dominated by private companies. More innovative companies will likely replace large, older military-industrial companies in the near future, as evidenced by Ukraine’s booming defense industry over the past four years.
Russia’s war against Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in Iran demonstrate the importance of cheap drones and drone interceptors costing between $1,000 and $3,000 each. America and its partners fired 1,802 Patriot missiles costing $3 million each in 16 days, twice as many as Ukraine received in four years of war. The expensive U.S.-manufactured Switchblade 300 was sent to Ukraine in 2022, where it produced limited damage in strikes and was brought down by Russian electronic warfare. Similarly costly U.S. Skydio drones failed in combat and were glitchy, hard to repair, brought down by Russian EW, and sometimes could not take off or complete missions.
America has not responded to Ukrainian offers to assist in unblocking the Strait of Hormuz. Ukraine had already carried out a similar mission when Russia tried to blockade the Black Sea. Ukraine has experience with escorting commercial vessels, demining, protection from air attacks, and overall coordination of such operations.
Ukraine’s defense sector is valued at nearly $70 billion and is rapidly growing in high-tech areas such as air, ground, and sea drones, EW, radars, and software. Ukraine produces 2,000 drone interceptors a day, 1,000 of which can be exported. Ukraine has signed defense contracts with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, and is negotiating with Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman. On March 17, it was confirmed that Ukrainian interceptors had downed Iranian drones during the ongoing Iran conflict. Ukraine will produce air defense systems, drone interceptors, and anti-ballistic missiles domestically, without foreign components, by 2027.
Ukraine has one million mobilized in its armed forces, national guard, and intelligence services. This number would be reduced to between 300,000 and 350,000 during peacetime. The militaries of NATO members will need to be expanded during both peace and war. Some NATO members are considering the unpopular step of reinstating conscription. In preparation for a potential future war in Europe, NATO countries have much to consider based on what Ukraine has learned in the past four years.


FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 01, 2026 - 03:21 pm: Edit

China: Chinese Capital Allocation Crisis
May 30, 2026: Inefficient investment distribution within China's economy is having an adverse impact on growth and transformation. Excessive amounts of corporate debt impede investment in more efficient sectors of the economy, creating economic unpredictability. The government, in the form of the CCP/Chinese Communist Party, presides over the economy and is responsible for what works and much more that doesn’t.
Another economic problem is the SOEs/State-Owned Enterprises that overwhelm essential portions of the economy. This frequently results in misallocation of capital and diminished competitiveness. The ongoing real estate disaster has siphoned funds away from more promising things like technology and manufacturing. More than a hundred billion dollars was lost during the 2020 Chinese real estate bubble. Then there is the MSS/Ministry of State Security, which has its own list of investment needs. This includes internet security and hacking foreign networks. The MSS hackers also seek valuable IP/Intellectual Property, so they turn these breakthroughs into Chinese accomplishments.
Since the 1980s, China has invested 40 percent of its GDP each year, largely through SOEs and local governments. By the early 21st century those investments produced ten percent annual growth. In subsequent decades that declined to four percent and will continue to decline through the end of this decade.
In a Western, free market economy such a situation would be resolved by the banks carrying those bad loans shutting them down and at least trying to make subsequent investments more prudent and productive.
In a country like China, where the government with its SOEs and many officials meddling in economic affairs, temporary fiscal emergencies are now allowed. Bad investments will continue, building millions of housing units in places no one wants to live. The roads and bridges built to reach the unwanted housing are little used.
Side effects of this mismanagement include Chinese households that are among the most indebted worldwide when measured by per capita GDP in the world relative to their incomes. Another looming disaster is more Chinese workers retiring while cash available to provide old age benefits shrinks. One reason for this is that many SOEs and non-government corporations have amassed too much debt at the expense of their suppliers.
By combining private and public debt, China is already far more indebted than the Americans and appears unable to escape a growing mass of non-producing investments. This Chinese financial mess also shows up in their equities markets. The Shanghai stock index is still below where it was nearly twenty years ago and delivers trivial returns compared to the American markets.
Meanwhile the Americans invest only 17 percent of their GDP each year to achieve up to 2.5 percent growth. American stock markets are rising while the country attracts investments worldwide. Unlike the Chinese CCP intervention in economic affairs, the American free-enterprise system has developed methods to efficiently allocate capital because the state doesn't meddle excessively. America has a massive advantage with GDP per capita seven times higher than China's and consumption per capita twelve times higher.
No matter how you calculate it, American consumption per capita remains seven times higher than in China. This will never get better for China because their birth rate is below the replacement level. The American population continues to grow because of a higher birth rate and a growing immigrant population.
Militarily China is in a bad position with too few young men and women willing to join. Those that do serve are untried and the CCP worries that using their military against the experienced Americans would be a disaster. The one potential war, over Chinese efforts to incorporate Taiwan as another Chinese province, is doomed to failure for military and economic factors. The Taiwanese military is built on the American model using combat tested weapons and tactics. Worse, any Chinese effort to take Taiwan by force would risk an economic catastrophe. American nuclear subs can plant mines outside major Chinese ports, halting trade. That is catastrophic for the world’s second largest exporter. It would also be destabilizing for the world economy. But the rest of the world has greater resources and rapid recovery skills. Everyone would suffer, but China would suffer the most and require more time to recover. During that period many Chinese export customers would find permanent replacements for Chinese products. Chinese economists keep the CCP updated on this problem and the reality of a Chinese economic catastrophe because of a Taiwan invasion attempt. Taiwan and the Americans watch, wait and continue to upgrade Taiwanese defenses.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 01, 2026 - 03:23 pm: Edit

Murphy's Law: Putin Deluded About Reality
May 30, 2026: As if Russia didn’t have enough problems in Ukraine, it’s emerged that the Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s assistants, advisors and staff are hiding or downplaying what is actually happening with the economy from the Ukraine War and being deceived by the growing Ukrainian victories and the plummeting morale of Russian soldiers. Desertions are up and instances of Russian suicides among distraught solders more frequent. Families of soldiers complain that they are having problems getting the corpses of their sons for burial. Now all parents often receive their child’s head. The war is now in its fifth year with the Russians losing and Ukrainian forces regaining territory that cost Russia over a million casualties to conquer.
After fighting a war against Ukraine longer than it took the Soviet Union to defeat the Nazis, Russia is confronted with a cascade of worsening military, economic, and political problems. The Russian President chooses to deal with these problems in a style amazingly evocative of the last years of the Soviet Union. Back during the 1941-45 Great Patriotic War, few errors were acknowledged and these were dealt with by shooting unsuccessful officers in order to inspire the others. Russian President Vladimir Putin maintains power by using long-time associates to run the FSB/Federal Security Service, the MFA/Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Rostec, the nation’s major manufacturer of weapons and military equipment.
Currently, what matters most to Russian civilians is the deplorable state of the economy. After four years of spending too much on the military, the economy is distorted and unable to produce what the Russian people want and need. Before the war military spending was 4.3 percent of GDP. In 2022 the GDP was $1.8 trillion, and 4.5 percent was military spending. In 2023 it declined to $1.7 trillion, 5 percent military and in 2024 grew to $1.75 trillion, 5.2 percent military. Last year it was $1.8 trillion, 5.3 percent military and this year is expected to reach $1.85 trillion, 5.4 percent military. The stagnant GDP growth is due to the economic sanctions imposed by NATO nations and the economic distortions caused by all the military production that pushed aside manufacturing of commercial and industrial items.
Russia has descended into a stubborn recession while Putin refuses to reduce federal expenditures as he expects oil revenue to increase because of the Strait of Hormuz blockade. This plan isn’t working due to constant Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil depots and refineries.
And then there is the internet slowdown and shutdown. This created enormous public outrage. The government insists these limitations are needed to block terrorist communications but clearly does not grasp the economic costs of rolling back digitalization, which has become crucial for running a business, principally in Moscow. Bloggers may be a tiny minority in the complex urban social organization, but their outraged voices have a major impact
The emotional exhaustion caused by the Ukraine War is creating a desire for change among Russians. These sentiments are heightened by diminished prospects of a peace deal, which has apparently slid down in the list of American priorities. Russia’s partisan reporters’ primary proposition is to muster greater resources to turn the tide in stalemated battles. Putin is unwilling to incur the economic and political costs of such an escalation. Putin has stopped meeting with senior generals and Defense Ministry officials, who are taught to keep creating accounts of victorious advances. Civilians soon learn that these victories were undone by victorious Ukrainian drone warfare as reported on the internet and social media. That is why Putin wants to curb the use of the internet and social media in Russia.
Most Russians’ appeals to Putin are begging rather than demanding. Public anger is aimed at his ministers, generals, and governors who are not telling him the whole truth about increasing problems. Attempts to attract the benign attention of the leader are typical in autocratic political culture, which in Russia is reinforced by a long monarchist tradition. Putin may find comfort in this still solid credit of public confidence, but must worry about the next phase, his loyal subjects’ finding that he has little power to address their troubles and does not really want to hear about them. Putin’s reading of Russian history is selective and superficial, but he should remember at least a few of its many records of absolute rulers swiftly turning into reviled losers. Procrastination is often a wise political choice, except when troubles are brewing and time is running short.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 01, 2026 - 03:24 pm: Edit

Intelligence: Ukrainian Electronic Intelligence Innovation
May 29, 2026: Ukraine innovations hac led remarkable ELINT/ELectronic INTelligenc developments. At the start of the Ukraine War. In 2022, Ukrainian EW/Electronic Warfare meant individual jamming groups distributed across the front. Operators called and jammed targets. The system was a collection of instruments. Currently this has been replaced by something profoundly different.
We are now talking about a complex of electronic support that merges electronic intelligence and electronic warfare in a single system. The key accomplishment is the incorporation of three functions: detection, identification, and suppression of targets.
The system intercepts the drone’s video feed during detection meaning it can verify in seconds whether a drone above is Russian or Ukrainian before determining whether to engage. Everything is managed through a consolidated situational awareness server, allowing remote control of dozens of systems and over-the-air software updates.
EW has become an operating system. That single theoretical shift defines almost everything else and the kill chain is reduced to seconds The performance gain over previous architectures is concrete and operationally significant. In the old model, a EW intelligence operator physically relayed target parameters to an EW jamming operator, eliminating the usual minutes of communication delay. Frequency is no longer the primary challenge
For most of the war, the EW question for any new Russian drone variant was, what frequencies does it use, and can we jam those frequencies? For modern intelligent EW, the technological center of gravity has moved and the center of gravity has shifted from hardware to software, algorithms, and analytics. Whoever adapts faster, executes changes more quickly, and uses their advantage to gain an edge.
The true assessment of the Ukrainian advantage depends on who currently has the technological advantage, Ukraine or Russia. This requires a calculated answer that is more revealing than a triumphalist one. From a technological standpoint the advantage is with the Ukrainians. When asked which misunderstanding about EW hinders the Ukrainians most, the experts are explicit.
The most dangerous myth is that EW doesn't work. This does not correspond to reality. EW is a magic wand, but when the need is greatest, EW is what you need to succeed. While closing the sky is technically possible Ukraine could completely close its skies to small drones, the experts answered in a way most policymakers don’t expect. Technically it’s possible. The question is answered by having enough money and proper organization of layered defense.
The transformation in customer demand reveals where the entire industry is heading. Earlier, customers ordered mostly equipment. Now they need comprehensive solutions. Ukraine must supply not just hardware, but full service including operator training, for round the clock operations
The experts concluded their assessment with a strategic outline that deserves close attention from anyone watching where Ukraine’s economy is heading after this war. Ukraine does not have large reserves of oil or gas. But they have other sources from their NATO allies.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 01, 2026 - 03:24 pm: Edit

Iran: The Iranian Migration
May 29, 2026: Since the 1978 Iranian revolution that installed a religious dictatorship, the country has experienced the migration of some five million Iranians. That means some seven percent of Iranians are exiles. Over three million Iranians have been displaced from their homes because of the current war with Israel and the Americans. The cause of these population movements has been poverty and government repression inside Iran and government attempts to prevent further population loss. Most of the exiles headed for Europe as well as north and south America. The migration attempts are continuing, in spite of the religious dictatorship's efforts to contain it. More ominously, a growing number of Iranians are abandoning Islam. Less than a third of Iran’s Mosques are still operational. There are at least half a million Christians in Iran, practicing their faith in secret while attracting more converts. There is also a movement inside Iran to older faiths, like Zoroastrianism, which emerged before Judaism and Christianity and heavily influenced these two religions. When Islam arose in the 7 th Century, many Persian Zoroastrians moved to India, where they thrived and became merchants, bankers, scholars and an asset to the Indian economy. Currently there is Tata, the Group, a $166 billion a year operation founded and managed by Zoroastrians. About half the world’s 120,000 Zoroastrians are Indians, only about 24,00 survive in Iran. That number is increasing as more Iranians abandon Islam and embrace Zoroastrianism and the idea of Iran once again being known as Persia. A growing number of Iranians want to be done with Islam and all it represents.
Then there is the Baha'i religion that emerged in 19th Century Persia as a religion that preaches the essential value of all religions and the unity of all people. Currently there are only about eight million Baha’i worldwide, with 400,000 in Iran, where they continue to be persecuted and harassed.
Religious and ethnic persecution have long been present in the Middle East. Two decades ago there was unrest among the Arab population along the Iraqi border. At the time Iran was actually a multi-ethnic empire, with a core of ethnic Iranians surrounded by other minorities. North of the Arabs are Kurds and Azeri Turks. In Western Iran there are Afghans and Baluchis. These minorities comprised over a third of the population. The Arab minority, however, was special, as they sat on top of most of Iran's oil. Saddam Hussein thought these Arabs would rise in rebellion when invading Iraqi troops entered the area in 1980. That didn't happen. But the Arab-Iranians did maintain their culture, and the Iranian majority had never been happy with this. This unrest was caused by government efforts to control the Arab language media. A lot of this censorship was not just being hard on Arab media, but the continuing efforts of the Islamic conservatives to stamp out dissident media. There was no press freedom in Iran, and hadn't been any for over two decades. Iran was blaming foreign media, and, of course, the Americans, for the unrest. Al Jazeera media operations in Iran had been shut down, and other foreign media threatened.
While the population, largely unhappy since the 1980s because of a religious dictatorship, was not rebellious, but it was becoming a lot more unruly. The lifestyle police continued to struggle against women dressing provocatively; at least is, by modest Western standards, illegal alcohol consumption, people who did not pray, and Internet users who said what they believed. The women, drinkers, impious and bloggers were being arrested, in selective cases, to try and intimidate everyone else. But it wasn't working, and never had. The people become bolder and more unruly.
Iran attempted to censor what the 21 million Iranian internet users could access. Using China as a model, Iran imported special software and training as well as Internet Police to make it all work. Iran was particularly incensed with bloggers, and accused some of them of being spies. Iran was particularly angry about Iranian bloggers describing the reality of the armed forces, and the incompetence of civil servants. The military was generally a fraud, with poor equipment, training and leadership. This was very contrary to the government propaganda, which regularly announced new weapons which were never seen in action, and military exercises that were propaganda events, with little training value.
Meanwhile, Iran tried to use the media, both at home and internationally, to push its warped view of reality. Internally, this was ignored by the majority of the 70 million Iranians. But 20 to30 percent of the population accepted it and provided essential support for the dictatorship. Externally, the IRNA/Iran Republic News Agency was largely a hoax, providing fodder for speculation about what the Iranian spin masters were trying to do.
Then there were substantially more announcements of new high tech weapon systems. The systems described were usually mockups, prototypes or imaginary. Iran did produce weapons that worked as these were elementary things like rifles, mortars, unguided rockets and some licensed missiles and rockets from China and North Korea. Iran had few scientists and engineers, because the religious dictatorship did not accept anything modern, and most Iranian professionals had fled to the West. A lot of these new weapons appeared to employ students, and recent graduates, for the technical work. Lots of inspiration, but little that could be built and function reliably. The best Iranian technical talent was working on ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Both of these projects were using lots of technology imported from China and North Korea.
While Iran made a lot of noise about the need for Israel to be destroyed, Israeli intelligence officials successfully conducted a global media and information campaign to make it clear that Iran was trying to build nuclear weapons, and where the components and technology was coming from. All this might not stop Iran from building a nuclear weapon, but it certainly delayed it. This gave Iran yet another reason to dislike Israel.
Pretty much out of sight, a most crucial war was being fought to cripple the Iranian smuggling operation that supplied their weapons programs, especially nuclear weapons. For years, the Americans were systematically cutting Iran off from the international banking system. This forced Iran to engage in more illegal access to banking services. This put Iran's money at risk, as funds could be seized when illegal transactions were detected. Iran had also used the banking system to support terrorist operations and this made Iranian bankers even more vulnerable.
FYEO

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Monday, June 01, 2026 - 04:54 pm: Edit

The international bond markets are experiencing massive sell offs of bond positions.

Bond Yields are rising and the U.S. and U.K. Are both affected, as buyers of said government bonds are taking advantage of the long term investment opportunity reposition portfolios.

At same time, many developers of AI technology are competing with government Bonds for money to fund their operations.

Since most corporations can’t afford to compete with nations (such as U.S. and U.K.) some companies may not be able to attract the level of investment needed.

This is another indication of increased inflation in the future.

Oh, and just because some individuals may not see what this has to do with real world military, wars are funded by many different sources, bonds being very common, and a government unable to finance debt also tends to run out of money when most needed.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Monday, June 01, 2026 - 08:55 pm: Edit

U.S. Defense News (a internet media site and newspaper company founded in 1986) posted an article two days ago, reporting that the U.S. Navy has “Reopened” the design process for Ford Class Carriers, specifically CVN#82 and CVN#83 (respectively named for Presidents Clinton and Bush).

Among the reasons are to re-examine the decision process in view of real world data of the early Ford Class ships, cost to produce, reliability issues concerning several of the highly technical changes from the Nimitz class ships and manning issues.

Not explicitly stated, any change from the EMALs catapult system would be a massive change to the design as the only other serious design is a reversion to steam powered catapults. It would be an enormous, expensive and possibly a very difficult process to undertake.

The older Steam catapults were far more difficult to operate, less efficient and complex to maintain.

The personnel required to man a Nimitz class carrier compared to a Ford Class hull reportedly is 500+ depending on variables not listed.

One other factor is the Ford Class carriers have fewer sailors in the crews and are reportedly finding it difficult to complete all of the normal maintenance duties that the larger crewed Nimitz ships were better able to complete.

No reported completion date for this review was stated.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Monday, June 01, 2026 - 11:22 pm: Edit

Ukraine wants to manufacture PAC-3 interceptors. The US has failed to grant it a license.

This is inexcusable.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 01, 2026 - 11:34 pm: Edit

Failed is the wrong word and highly politicized.
The US declined a license due to concerns that Russia would get access to their technology.
That is entirely excusable.

By Paul Howard (Raven) on Tuesday, June 02, 2026 - 03:55 am: Edit

Question on Stockpiles

Dumb Shells seem to have a fairly long Shelf life -and a small number can always be shot each year as part of live fire training exercices.

Question 1 - What is the Safe Shell Shelf period (up to 50 years -if the propellant is part of the shell??)?

Smart Weapons (Shells/Bombs) - accepting they are much newer*, question 2, do we know what the Safe Smart Weapon Storage Period is?

* - From what I remember Copperhead started in the 1970's - but might be off abit from the Early War Games I played.

Smart Weapons (Self Powered - Drones/Missiles etc) - accepting they are even newer - question 3 - do we know what the Safe Smart Weapon storage period is?

Question 4- Which is likely to 'fail first' - the Electronics, Explosive or Propellant?

So what levels of stock piles is needed?

As we found out - the Smartest of Smart Weapons was clearly held in too small a stockpile - but was there a valid reason for this?

(All hopefully honest questions - in the UK, the 'COVID' stockpiles that wasn't used caused some public discontent (OK - didn't help some of it was not certifitied and so couldn't be used) - and even the Emergency Nightingale Hospitals was slated as a waste of money - so it was very much "your wrong" either way).

In other words - whats perceived to be the right balance of 'sufficent stockpiles' and 'approproate government spending'?

My best guess would be, the smarter the weapon - the shorter the shelf life - Batteries can be kept charged at low cost - but replacing the electronics (as they improve) is probably the issue??

Could smart weapons be made in components that are easily upgraded?

By Mike Erickson (Mike_Erickson) on Tuesday, June 02, 2026 - 06:38 am: Edit

Given how long Patriot has been deployed and operational in Ukraine, I'd bet that Russia already knows everything there is to know about it.

--Mike

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, June 02, 2026 - 07:05 am: Edit

Seeing one isn't the same as building one.

Easier to copy the engineering as it happens than it is to reverse engineer a finished item. Dozens if not hundreds of times easier.

By Mike Erickson (Mike_Erickson) on Tuesday, June 02, 2026 - 08:42 am: Edit

I wouldn't limit it to just seeing. Given the extensive Ukrainian corruption culture I'd assume access, parts, technical documentation, training materials, etc have already been sold. That's just how Ukraine is.

--Mike

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Tuesday, June 02, 2026 - 09:15 am: Edit

The problem is it's part of a pattern of choosing not to take actions that would stop Russian missile attacks on civilians. The stated reason for not selling PACs to Ukraine has been "insufficient supply". The US chose not to increase production in 2025, even though it was already saying "insufficient supply" at that time.

So the US will neither build and sell them, nor will it allow Ukraine to build them.

Ukraine also asked to buy US Tomahawks, with which it could have destroyed the Russian factories that build ballistic missiles.

Nope, the US won't agree to that, either.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, June 02, 2026 - 11:22 am: Edit

Tomahawks would be a major escalation and might trigger a much bigger war. Ukraine would probably use them against the Kremlin onion domes, and not figuratively. I might have sold them, but Biden and Trump both refused.

The US started scaling up PAC production years ago, but it is a complex process and you have to scale up lots of components production first. This is semantics. If I start scaling up production of the microchips that the missiles require, did I start the first step toward scaling up missile production? I would say yes, you would say no. We would both be right. We did help Ukraine with other forms of missile defense.

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Tuesday, June 02, 2026 - 12:35 pm: Edit

Raven, as the past EHS manager of the Ammunition contract at Camp Arifjan I will take a stab at it. NOTE, I am not an ammunitions specialist. There are career paths for those people. 89A and 890A warrants.. I think their officers are Ordinance Corps. All I ever saw was enlisted and warrants.

"Safe Shell Shelf period" depends on storage conditions. You want cool dry conditions with relatively little thermal flux.

Hence "Igloos." IIRC complex electronics need all kinds of monitoring of components; capacitors, batteries and the like.

Small arms ammunition is routinely stored in connexes out in the open. Thousands of them.

It's hard to imagine how much ammo is stored in an "ASP" (ammunition storage point" without driving around in one.

By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Tuesday, June 02, 2026 - 02:28 pm: Edit

It cheers me up seeing Russian ammo depots go up in flames.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Tuesday, June 02, 2026 - 02:48 pm: Edit

I agree that scaling up necessary components is a step towards scaling up missile production. But the US has had four years by now to do the scaling up. That should be enough time.

If the US sold Tomahawks, it could obviously have a say in targeting.

The assumption that Ukraine would target the Kremlin is unsupported by Ukrainian actions thus far. They already have the capability to do that. They have not.

Russia has huundreds of missiles against Kyiv. In light of this, using Tomahawks against missile factories in Russia ought to come under "turnabout is fair play". And why would Tomahawks lead to a "wider war", when Storm Shadows have not?

Choosing not to escalate in a corresponding fashion is what got us into this whole war in the first place. That goes back to 2014.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, June 02, 2026 - 03:07 pm: Edit

WJ (by your paragraphs):
1-It was Biden who didn't start the scale-up when it should have started. Trump/Heg is doing what they can with the time they have had. They cannot undo years of screwups in one year.
2-Obviously have a say, until Ukraine decided to just target something anyway and put the US into an awkward spot.
3-Hard to say that. Tomahawk could get through defenses their current long range drones cannot.
4-Hey, I said I was for it, and just told you why Biden and Trump said they decided not to. Don't berate me if you don't like Biden's decision.
5-That's a bit of twisted logic given which president gave away Crimea in 2014 and then which president gave away Donbas in 2022. To be fair, a different president has been trying to give away Donbas since 2025. Something about the White House food must make presidents want to give away parts of Ukraine.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, June 02, 2026 - 04:25 pm: Edit

Since Ukraine is the breadbasket of Europe, maybe the dinner table phrase "pass the bread" got misinterpreted?

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, June 02, 2026 - 04:28 pm: Edit

Paul Howard: The answer to your shelf life question is...

1. It depends (on the munition and storage conditions)

2. It varies (depending on the munition and storage conditions)

3. It could be a factor of how willing you are to give shells to your troops with a 0.001% chance of exploding in the barrel, or in the truck. Or a 0.005% chance. Or a 0.1% chance. Or a 2.53% chance.