It's like the scorpion and the frog ... but it's hard to tell which one is which.


Garth L. Getgen

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Monday, June 08, 2026 - 08:21 pm: Edit

Trump's attitude towards Israel reminds me of his attitude towards Ukraine on a lot of occasions. Ask the aggrieved side to stop fighting.

The outcome is similar, too.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 08, 2026 - 08:35 pm: Edit

Paul, there is zero question who fired first, and Israel has always considered Lebanon part of the ceasefire (and Hezbollah has continually violated it). You are living in a fantasy world where both sides are bad, instead of the real world where Hezbollah is the cause of it. OH, wait, I forgot, you think that Israel started everything by existing.

William, at most Trump has asked Israel not to respond if they don't have to, and hasn't told them they have to shut up an take it. That's just not the facts.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Monday, June 08, 2026 - 09:01 pm: Edit

OK, well that's a bit better, then.

On another topic, the damage to Russia from Ukraine's ongoing midstrike campaign is tremendous. I am inclined to agree with Jessica that the war will end with a Ukrainian victory within a year, unless an agreement stops or postpones it first.

June 8, 2027. Put a pin it it. Throw egg on my face if neither of the above happens.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 08, 2026 - 10:09 pm: Edit

The theory that Ukraine could win is based on the theory that Russia will run out of "something" (men, tanks, money, something else). The chances of that happening are, obviously, increasing. Not sure how close they are.

Germany (in two wars) cracked only after a year or two of "they will crack tomorrow, they cannot imagine they can go on" predictions.

I would not be surprised if Russia has a suddenly collapse, their army running from the captured territory or surrendering en masse. I would not be astounded if a year from now we are still in the same place.

NATO and the EU could run out of patience before Russia actually cracks, but I suspect Russia is now in more danger of that.

But as I said before, things could change.

Putin could be overthrown.

Putin could pop a nuke.

Russia could come up with a new weapon.

Putin could quietly, through back channels, say to the US & EU "If Ukraine doesn't surrender in 48 hours we will deliver nuclear weapons to Iran."

Some astronomer might spot smoke columns rising from holes in the surface of Mars that look for all the world like rocket contrails.

China could invade Taiwan and throw a lot of it's military energy against Ukraine.

By Ryan Opel (Ryan) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 12:11 am: Edit

Putin could pop a blood vessal.

Putin could pop a window...

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 12:11 am: Edit

Trump did ask Natanyahu to show as much restraint as he could.

Netanyahu has only reluctantly accepted that Lebanon is part of the ceasefire because Hazbollah just cannot behave.

Netanyahu wants to bomb Hezbollah because it is very popular with Israeli voters.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 12:44 am: Edit

In other news, Several articles from different mainstream media sites are (and have) reported on drone technology transfers from Ukrainian companies to Taiwan companies.

Google inquiry shows the following:

Taiwan and Ukraine share an informal, mutually beneficial drone technology exchange. While there are no formal state-level government transfers, Taiwanese companies sell combat-tested drone software to Taiwan, and Ukraine has assisted Taiwan in developing naval and autonomous drone defense platforms.This partnership is driven by industry and private organizations to avoid diplomatic friction with China:Software and Combat Tech:

Taiwan has directly sealed deals to acquire and test combat-tested drone software from Ukraine and international companies operating there.Naval Drones:

Ukrainian engineers and manufacturers have actively advised Taiwanese industry contacts on developing sea drones and underwater defense platforms tailored to intercepting threats in the Taiwan Strait.

Hardware Exchange:
Instead of buying ready-made hardware, Taiwan relies heavily on sending its own Taiwanese-built drones to Ukraine for rigorous field testing. Additionally, Taiwanese component manufacturers and tech companies supply parts that end up in Ukrainian drones.

Global Production:
Informal business connections have resulted in Ukrainian-designed drone production facilities springing up internationally, including operations linked directly to Taiwan.

Trade Flow:
Taiwan has massively ramped up its drone exports (reaching over 180,000 units in a four-month span). These units are largely funded by charities or international governments and sent to Ukraine via transit hubs in the Czech Republic and Poland.

Given what Ukraine has been able to do using this drone technology against Russias Black Seas Fleet, China would have to be concerned about what Taiwan could do to an invasion fleet.

It is possible that the recent advances in sea drones technology, could prevent China in any attempt to invade Taiwan.

By Paul Howard (Raven) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 02:34 am: Edit

.... looks like some of the RAF's budget will be moved elsewhere....

The 12 F-35As that was announced last year may be cancelled (it can carry the B61 bomb, as the F35B's can't).

I assume the B61's in Europe are part of the 'joint useable (but US controlled) nuclear weapons for NATO (Belgium, Germany and Turkey in the past have had planes capable of delivering nuclear weapons)?

By Ted Fay (Catwhoeatsphoto) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 10:45 am: Edit

A country capitulates in war when it loses its will to fight, or when it is annihilated. Not sooner.

The "winner" could occupy a country, but so long as the occupied country has citizens willing to fight, the war is not over.

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 12:22 pm: Edit

Mt prediction for Ukraine.

More of the same until suddenly Ukraine makes a major breakthrough and drives all the way to the coast (70 -90 miles or so). Mobile warfare causes Russian positions to be scattered & logistics to just end to the Western half & Crimean portions now held by Russia. Ukraine then sweeps East as a mass exodus of Russian forces and "Russian nationals" flee empty occupied territories.

In the aftermath Ukraine has masses of prisoners they swap for Ukrainian service members & the kidnapped children. Some children never are found and returned.

Post war Ukraine declares ALAL Russian citizens PNG and "returns" them back to "Mother Russia." Via buses and with massive numbers of observers to stop any whinging about abuse.

EU and NATO membership are fast tracked. Ukraine provides huge bases for foreign forces to be based. There have to be all kinds of areas where all the locals are just gone...

By Mike Erickson (Mike_Erickson) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 01:52 pm: Edit

For those making predictions about Ukraine, I'd suggest perhaps being a bit more specific about what a win is?

1. Borders remaining largely similar to where they are now, with Ukraine making minor gains?

2. Ukraine making modest territorial gains?

3. Ukraine taking back Crimea?

4. Ukraine pushing Russia out of all Ukrainian territory?

I can see #1 or perhaps #2 in a year's time? I don't see #3 or #4 ever happening.

--Mike

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 02:11 pm: Edit

Iran managed to shoot down AH-64 Apache over the Strait of Hormuz. The crew has been rescued, and Pres. Trump has announced that the U.S. will respond in some fashion.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 03:43 pm: Edit

I think that IF there is not a deal, we will see substantial Ukrainian territorial gains from the current front lines. Probably all, or nearly all, of its original territory.

However, I think some sort of deal is also a possibility.

My egg-on-face date if these do not happen is June 8, 2027. I marked it on my calendar, and y'all can mock me if neither of the above happens.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 03:55 pm: Edit

TODAY'S FYEO FILES FOLLOW

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 03:55 pm: Edit

Iran: Weapons And Economics Of The Iran War
June 9, 2026: The Iran war has demonstrated the advantages and disadvantages of the American way of war. This led to suggestions about how the American military and weapons production can be modified to avoid the problems encounters in the Iran war. The biggest problem was that the American military nearly exhausted their supplies of missiles and bombs during the brief war that shut down the Iranian military and most of the government.
The war with Iran has revealed the strengths and weaknesses of the American military and proposes how the American military can be modified to more effective deal with future conflicts. The Iran conflict unequivocally revealed the problems with inadequate supplies of missiles to fight a modern war. There were also problems dealing with cheap enemy drones. Chief among these is the Iranian designed Shahed-136 drone. These delta wing airborne cruise missiles weigh 200 kg and are armed with a warhead weighing 30 to 50 kg, most of which is explosives. That’s not a lot because most cruise missiles carry warheads weighing half a ton or more. The Shahed-136 warhead will damage, not destroy, most structures it hits. Shahed-136 is launched using a rocket motor that gets it into the air and then detaches and falls away. To be effective Shahed-136 is launched in swarms, which was the case with this attack. Shahed-136 is propeller driven using a noisy gasoline engine. Aptly described as low, slow and loud, Shahed-136 is easy to detect and shoot down. Over 200 of these drones, as well as nearly 140 missiles were used by Iran during retaliation attacks against American allies in the Persian Gulf.
The recent brief Iran war, which is not completely over, featured the American use of nearly 900 Tomahawk cruise missiles and over a thousand JASSM missiles, JSOW guided bombs, JDAM guided bombs, 70 PrSM/Precision Strike missiles, about 1,400 Patriot air defense missiles, over 250 THAAD ballistic missile interceptors, over 200 SM-3 Navy ship based missile interceptors, and over 300 navy SM-6 missiles that can be used against aircraft and ground targets. All of the missiles cost over two million dollars each. The air defense missiles were much more expensive. American forces used up from half to nearly all of some missile types. It will take a year or two to rebuild stockpiles and the government wants to spend over $70 billion to pay for all this.
These high expenditures of expensive missiles have led to calls for less expensive missiles and drones. One existing example of this is the GMLRS rockets Ukraine has used so heavily in its war with Russian. Previously American forces had used GMLRS in Iraq and Afghanistan. GMLRS entered service in 2004 and the smaller, truck-based HIMARS launcher became available in 2005. The combination of GMLRS and HIMARS proved very popular with a growing number of export customers.
The 227mm GMLRS is a guided version of the original 1983 unguided MLRS rocket. After the guided GMLRS version came along, Russia and China were quick to adopt the concept of guided rockets. South Korea also developed its version; the 239mm Chunmoo guided rockets that are similar to GMLRS with a range of 80 kilometers. There is a 400mm version with a range of over 200 kilometers. These entered service in 2017 using a launcher similar to HIMARS. South Korea has received orders for Chunmoo from some NATO countries.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 03:55 pm: Edit

Russia: Drone War Comes To Moscow
June 9, 2026: Last month, the Russian capital Moscow by its largest drone attack so far. Beginning at 4AM on the 17th there were a series of loud explosions. There was considerable property damage and three people were killed and another sixteen wounded. The primary targets were a factory that produced electronic components essential for many weapons and items of equipment. Also hit were an oil refinery and two oil pumping facilities.
As usual the Russian government did not report this attack in state controlled media. Most Russians found out about it on the internet and social media, where there were numerous photos, videos and firsthand accounts of the Ukrainian attack. Muscovites complained that the government had no air raid warning system and refused to build bomb shelters. Civilians took cover wherever they could, mainly in basement and underground car parks. The government would not allow anyone to seek shelter in the subway system. The day after the attack, state controlled media mentioned it briefly.
Independent news organizations did respond, described the aftermath of the drone attack extensively and in detail, and admitted that this would not seriously threaten the Putin government unless Russia suffers a major military defeat. That is a possibility because in the last few months Ukrainian forces have been on the offensive, regaining territory that the Russians had occupied for years. This was made possible, in part, by plummeting morale among Russian soldiers. These troops are reluctant to attack and increasingly refuse to advance. Even when on the defensive, Russian troops try to avoid getting shot and will desert if they have an opportunity. Russian officers have for several years had the authority to shoot reluctant troops. This has happened a few times, until some soldiers fired back, and then fled. To describe Russian troop morale as low is an understatement.
Two years ago the Russian government was trying to keep the reality of the war in Ukraine from the Russian people. Ukraine used inexpensive drones to regularly remind Russians that there was a war going on and that Ukrainian forces could still reach deep inside Russia. In September of 2024 Ukrainian drones attacked Moscow. This attack came in at night, when it was more difficult to spot the drones flying low to avoid radar and visual identification. While many drones crashed or were shot down, there were so many that reached Moscow and attacked designated targets, as well as random ones, to cause many explosions that could be heard and fires that could be seen. This was an embarrassment for the government, who had denied numerous other drone attacks inside Russia.
Even Ukrainian drones shot down caused problems, like temporarily shutting down one of the four airports that serve Moscow and halting traffic on one of the major highways nearby. Crashing drones were often on fire and started fires wherever they fell. The firefighters had a busy night.
Over the previous two years Russian missile and drone attacks on civilian targets have killed or wounded thousands of Ukrainian civilians and left even more homeless. Because millions of Ukrainians have fled the country, there are plenty of empty homes and apartments to house the homeless. Most Russians live outside the cities, many of them in remote rural areas. The non-city Russians comprise most of the soldiers sent to fight and die in Ukraine. That means there’s little symphony for Muscovites inconvenienced by the Ukrainian drones. While the drones attacked many rural targets, these were military or manufacturing operations that were largely idle and empty at night. The damage was very visible to a lot of Russians once the sun came up. The Ukrainians were reminding Russia and Russians that the cheap drones, manufactured in Ukraine, cause a lot of damage in Russia without any Ukrainians killed or injured. The drones are remote controlled or autonomous to deal with jamming. The drone operators in Ukraine are hard to find and usually working and living in bunkers.
The Ukrainian drone attacks are a form of psychological warfare against Russia and its people. Despite regular Russian pronouncements of victories in Ukraine, the drones keep coming and proving that Ukraine is not defeated and still very visibly fighting. In March 2024 Ukrainian long range drones were making attacks on key targets as distant as Moscow, which is 850 kilometers from Ukraine, and St Petersburg at 1,100 kilometers distant. Targets are usually industrial facilities that support the war effort. These include numerous oil refineries and oil fuel storage facilities plus facilities involving specialty steels for tube artillery and tanks. Russia claimed to have destroyed dozens of Ukrainian drones and lost a few oil facilities. There were a lot of Ukrainian drones lost, but that was because they were destroyed by hitting their targets. The drones came in low and slow to deceive Russian air defenses, which had a hard time detecting low and slow aerial targets, especially at night when most of these attacks took place. While the targets were up to a thousand kilometers from Ukraine, the drones could also move north across a corridor that is several hundred kilometers wide. Russian anti-aircraft defense systems could not cover an area that wide and long, especially when the attackers were coming in low and slow in the dark.
Russia tried to play down the effectiveness of the Ukrainian drone attacks by describing rather obvious burning refineries and fuel storage depots as accidents. In early 2024 there were a lot of such accidents and Russian troops in Ukraine had to closely monitor their fuel consumption because fuel deliveries were not as frequent and reliable as they used to be. The Russian fuel facilities also supplied the commercial and civilian market. The commercial users were important because they supply the firms producing goods needed by the military as well as consumers.
The Ukrainian drone attacks also led to disruptions of flight operations at the three airports serving the Moscow region. Russia claimed it shot down 35 drones, which were believed to be all that were involved in that day’s attacks. Ukraine had no comment on details of their drone attacks. Ukraine believes the results speak for themselves. Targets in western Russia were increasingly under attack by Ukrainian drones and the Russian government had a hard time explaining why combustible targets in the region kept exploding or catching fire. Such events were contrary to the official government reports about the Russian war efforts in Ukraine. Russia had not experienced attacks like this on the homeland since World War II, and that was something the Russian government did not want to discuss.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 03:56 pm: Edit

Surface Forces : Six Frigates for the Philippines
June 8, 2026: The Philippines has engaged the South Korean Hyundai Heavy Industries to build six 3,200 ton Miguel Malvar class Frigates. Currently two of these frigates have been completed with four more to be built. These ships are 177 meters long, have a maximum speed of 45 kilometers an hour and require a crew of 110-120 personnel.
Armament consists of 16 VLS/Vertical Launch System cells for short-range MICA surface-to-air missiles with a range of 20 kilometers, eight SSM-700K C-Star/Haesung anti-ship missiles with a range of 180 kilometers. There is one 76-mm dual-purpose cannon with a range of 16 to 40 kilometers depending on the type of shell used and one twin-barrel 35-mm Gokdeniz close-in weapon system with a range of 4,000 meters. The frigate is capable of carrying a helicopter.
Electronics include an EL/M-2258 Advanced Lightweight Phased-Array radar, as well as navigation, air and surface search radars. Navigation equipment includes GPS and seafaring software.
The current Philippines fleet consists of three Japanese Abukuma class destroyers that were built in the early 1990s and are expected to start arriving in the Philippines next year. The Philippines also has one Corvette, eight Offshore Patrol Vessels, 27 amphibious ships and craft, 16 auxiliary ships and five miscellaneous ships. The navy also has 25 fixed wing and helicopter aircraft and eight large drones.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 03:56 pm: Edit

Russia: The Caspian Sea War Zone
June 8, 2026: The Caspian Sea is actually a landlocked saltwater lake surrounded by Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Azerbaijan. Targets are only 1500 to 2000 kilometers from Ukraine. The Caspian Sea has become the scene of more Ukrainian attacks on Russian targets in and bordering the Caspian. Last month a Ukrainian attack hit and disabled a Russian Corvette.
The Caspian is full of Russian economic targets to attack. The Caspian basin is a significant source of oil and natural gas. It is also where pipelines, ports and terminals connect the Caspian region to worldwide markets. The Caspian area is an essential intersection in the central passage trading route from China to Europe via central Asia that avoids growing risks from Russian and Iranian combat.
China considers the Caspian region an essential passage for energy supplies and its belt and road initiative is an economic/diplomatic strategy that uses infrastructure connectivity to grow China’s influence. The Caspian region corridor links China to Europe via Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Turkey, meanwhile, uses Caspian links, especially oil and natural gas pipeline projects, via Azerbaijan, to increase its influence across the Turkic world, becoming a regional energy hub.
The 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea sets out how the Caspian’s oil, gas, and fishing resources are divided among the bordering nations. Crucially, the agreement also prohibits the deployment of armed forces from third-party countries within the Caspian’s waters. This establishes a regional security order that excludes western military presence.
For Russia, the Caspian Sea is valuable as a strategic region and a bridge to Iran. There, Russia maintains the strongest navy and has used the Caspian as a platform for long missile strikes into other theatres, including against Islamic State targets in Syria in 2015.
Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine the Caspian region has provided a refuge for the Black Sea fleet via the Volga-Don Canal that enables ships to get from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea. Because of the war in Ukraine, and Iran supplying weapons and equipment to Russia, canal traffic rose substantially over the last four years. Since 1952, a 101 kilometers long canal, linking the Don and Volga rivers, gave the Caspian Sea access to the Black Sea and the world's oceans.
The Caspian Sea plays enables strategic coordination between Russia and Iran. As a geographically enclosed maritime space with its own specially designed legal status, it provides a direct logistical and economic corridor between the two nations that is largely protected from western military presence.
The Caspian region not only has energy collaboration and trade but also the movement of technologies and materials relevant to sustaining Iran and Russia despite the economic sanctions. The Iran war has accelerated this trading pattern.
In late March 2026, Israeli airstrikes hit numerous Iranian Caspian Sea naval targets such as missile boats, a corvette, a shipyard and a command center. The strikes are likely to have severely disrupted the Caspian logistics corridor that links Russian ports to Iran’s port at Bandar Anzali, the largest and oldest Iranian port on the Caspian Sea. It also degraded Iran’s ability to receive supplies via this route. This could force both countries to rely more on riskier overland routes via Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan.
In other words, the Caspian’s attribute as a haven for the two allies is threatened. That might force Russia and Iran to spend more on multi-level air defense systems and drone monitoring. They might even need to move military forces to the region. This would significantly raise the cost and complexity of using the Caspian as a safe space for military and naval assets and a bridge for trade.
The Caspian Sea has become an increasingly important strategic connector linking two conflicts that are usually thought of as separate. The war in Ukraine and the war in Iran are not isolated theatres but parts of an emerging Eurasian conflict system in which Russia and Iran are mutually dependent. The Caspian Sea underpins this arrangement by providing a relatively insulated corridor for coordination, logistics and economic exchange.
Recent events, such as Ukrainian and Israeli strikes, however, reveal the limits of this strategic function for both rri and Iran. At the same time, other countries, notably China and Turkey, are investing in the middle corridor. This is raising the value of the Caspian Sea, both economically and in terms of its geographical connectivity.
The Caspian Sea faces an uncertain future. Its north–south Russia–Iran strategic and military axis is increasingly contested by their adversaries. Its east–west trade and energy role, meanwhile, holds the potential to rebalance regional power dynamics towards economic connectivity, rather than conflict. Or, to put it another way, this body of water could become either a theatre of strategic confrontation or a corridor of trade and exchange. The latter, of course, would be better for all concerned.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 03:57 pm: Edit

Artillery: Cheap Missiles Versus Drone Swarms
June 7, 2026: While drones have come to dominate military planning worldwide, there is still a case to be made for cheaper missiles. While drones are cheap and can be guided using a variety of technologies, they are propeller driven and relatively slow with speeds of between 50 and 200 kilometers an hour, though faster jet-powered drones are emerging. Much larger Ukrainian multi-ton drones can hit targets over 2,000 kilometers distant while flying low to avoid air defense radars.
Cheap ballistic missiles are a work in progress. Iran developed the Fattah-2 ballistic missile that is touted as costing only about half a million dollars each. That does not include development costs or the costs of launchers, crews as well as storage and support facilities. These items push the per-missile cost up to nearly $2 million. This includes the elaborate guidance system that enables the missile to avoid air defenses and hit specific targets where the most damage will be inflicted. This is what Fattah is costing Iran during the current wartime conditions. Only a few Fattah-2’s used to attack Israel did any damage and the Israeli response was to go after the factories producing components needed for the missile. This has made Fattah-2 much more expensive because of the added expense of rebuilding factories and smuggling in components Iran does not produce.
A Chinese commercial firm developed the $100,000 YKJ-1000 hypersonic missile that can be adapted for use in air defense or bombardment. This missile has a range of up to 1,300 kilometers, with a smaller warhead. In America, this type of weapon would be designed quickly and put into production only during wartime. Chinese commercial producers of weapons are encouraged by the government and allowed to export their weapons to anyone who can pay. This was the same philosophy the Ukrainian government followed with drones, which were developed to defeat the Russian invaders.
Ukraine later developed inexpensive interceptor drones that could take down long-range Russian attack drones as well as GPS guided bombs. What these interceptors could not deal with were ballistic missiles of any kind. For that the Ukrainian use American Patriot missiles and modified versions of air defense missiles provided by other NATO countries. The next major advance in air defense technology is a laser or microwave beam system capable of damaging or destroying incoming ballistic missiles. Israel already has an effective laser system against drones and cruise missiles. A version of this for ballistic missiles is being developed but progress is slow because several new technologies have to be invented, tested and perfected.
Iran developed its delta-wing 200 kg propeller-driven Shahed 136 drone a decade ago and it was first used by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen during 2019. After the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine began, Iran provided Russia with Shahed 136s. By the end of 2022 Iran agreed to assist Russia in building a factory in Russia that would produce a Russian version of the Shahed 136 called Geran. Until late 2024, when the Geran factory in Russia was operational, Iran manufactured the Geran and received help from Russia in upgrading the Shaheed drones. Since 2022, Russia has used more than 50,000 Shaheds and Gerans against Ukraine. During 2025 that meant Ukraine had to deal with five to six thousand Gerans a month. Ukrainian interception methods were quite effective, and only about ten percent of the drones reached their targets. Each of these drones costs Russia about $20,000.
To improve the effectiveness of the Shahed, Russia developed a turbojet engine propelled version of their Geran. These drones operate at speeds in excess of 700 kilometers an hour compared to 140 kilometers an hour for the propeller version, and at higher altitudes. The Ukrainian drone interceptor is propeller driven and has a top speed of only 450 kilometers an hour. This means this interceptor can no longer chase down the jet-propelled drones.
The Iranians have developed a drone interceptor missile called 358, which costs about $100,000 each. This system has not been seen in action yet and may be another of the many hypothetical weapons Iran announced but can’t get into service. Iran has used jet powered Shahed recently in the Persian Gulf.
If given enough incentive, like a major war, the industrialized countries could develop and build cheaper, more effective ballistic missiles in large quantities. These missiles would cost from $100,000 to half a million dollars. Ukraine is already doing this on a small scale, as is Russia, to reduce the cost of hitting defended Ukrainian targets.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 03:57 pm: Edit

Paramilitary: The Importance Of Local Police
June 7, 2026: Local police are the first line of defense against Islamic terrorists, espionage and much more. For example, when police in a suburban community conduct a nighttime check of a local park, they will sometimes find a vehicle that has no reason to be there. Upon further inspection police often find criminal behavior, as well as bulk illegal drug shipments and weapons
The DHS/Department of Homeland Security has found that their most effective allies are local police. They are often the ones to discover criminal, espionage or worse activity that the FBI, CIA and NSA were unaware of, or knew that it existed and little else. Another example was the Chinese efforts to conduct espionage under the guise of Chinese tourists seeing the sights and taking pictures. It was local security personnel who connected the dots and reported that these Chinese tourists always spent a lot of time around military bases and took a lot of photos. Many of these photos caught details the Chinese could not obtain from satellite photos.
It’s not that these problems were ignored. Sixteen years ago, the SAR/Suspicious Activity Reporting system, DHS/FBI fusion centers, BI/Business Intelligence and corporate security as well as a new generation of AI/Artificial Intelligence powered systems enabled masses of surveillance data and phones in tips to be analyzed and report important security problems, or opportunities in near-real time. The Nationwide SAR system connects local police to fusion centers through standardized reporting. The problem is that its reporting criteria filter is optimized to detect Islamic terrorists. Anything else is ignored. Many local and national security officials would like to see SAR pay attention to more of the suspicious activity and send pertinent local items back to local police.
There are already examples of how this can work. Since September 11, 2001, NYC/New York City established a substantial terrorism intelligence operation. This included sending investigators and analysts overseas. Back home, NYC police set up databases of terror related information collected locally, and obtained from the FBI, CIA and other sources. The police also established informant networks among the Moslem community.
After 9/11 there was a publicity campaign for a terrorist hotline, using ads with the tagline; “If you see something, say something.” In the first few years after that over a thousand and, in one case 2,000, tips came in annually. Some of these tips led to arrests of criminals and a few involved terrorist activity. The information that did not lead to an immediate action were added to databases. Some of the people providing the tips were recruited as CIs/Confidential Informants so they regularly report what they saw. For local regular police work, CIs are an essential asset for detecting criminal activity and arresting specific criminals.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 03:57 pm: Edit

Procurement: Russian Supply Lines And The Iran War
June 6, 2026: While Western nations have to contend with Iranian efforts to block the Strait of Hormuz exit from the Persian Gulf. Iran and Russia have similar problems in the land-locked Caspian Sea. Both nations rely on oil revenue to sustain their economies and military forces. Both Russia and Iran are struggling to move forward while under debilitating economic sanctions.
Russia still pumps and transports oil to customers, primarily China and India. At the same time Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, and India are working to get construction started on the 7,200-kilometer long TITR/The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. TITR is a north-south and east-west transport route linking the land-locked Caspian Sea carrying Russian oil exports to other nations. Iran, Russia, China and the Central Asian nations propose enhancing this passage utilizing The TITR network of road, canal and river connections so that eventually more nations, particularly in Europe, could use and benefit from this transport system.
But first, Russia had to maintain and enhance the Volga-Don Canal. Three years ago, Russia brought in dredging equipment for a major dredging of this heavily used canal that enables ships to get from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea. Because of the war in Ukraine, and Iran supplying weapons and equipment to Russia, canal traffic was up 15 percent in 2022 over the previous year. In 2023 traffic increased by another 4.5 percent and traffic increased again in 2024, 2025, and 2026. This is threatened by the possibility of additional Israeli air strikes on the Volga-Don Canal as well as TITR. There is also the risk of American airstrikes, as happened recently in Iran.
Despite that threat, since 1952, a 101 kilometers long canal, linking the Don and Volga rivers, gave the Caspian Sea access to the Black Sea and the world's oceans. However, ships that can use the canal cannot displace more than 5,000 tons and be no more than 140 meters long, 17 meters wide, and have a draft of no more than 3.5 meters. Normally the canal moves over 12 million tons of cargo a year. About half of that is oil or oil products. In 2021 Russia agreed to allow Iran to use the Volga-Don Canal so that Iranian ships can reach the Black Sea from the landlocked Caspian Sea. This is the first time Russia has ever given a foreign nation free access to the canal. Russia and Iran are now using each other’s Caspian Sea ports heavily for trade and getting Iranian weapons to Russia. Both nations have agreed to establish a joint-shipbuilding operation in the Caspian Sea and cooperate in dredging the canal, something that has not been done since 1991. The prolonged lack of dredging has made portions of the canal shallower and forced ships to carry less cargo.
The 13 locks on the canal connect the Volga River, the longest in Russia that empties into the Caspian, and the Don River which empties into the Sea of Azov, which is connected to the Black Sea via the Kerch Strait. The Caspian is the world's largest lake, at 371,000 square kilometers. It is about a thousand kilometers long and 430 kilometers wide. It's saline but is only about a third as salty as ocean water. The Caspian has a 7,000-kilometer-long coastline, with the largest chunk, 1,900 kilometers, belonging to Kazakhstan.
The Ukraine War imposed some unexpected limitations on the use of the TITR because the Ukrainians unexpectedly used air and naval drones to defeat the Russian Black Sea Fleet and threaten any Russian commercial traffic entering the Black Sea via the TITR. Any Russian commercial shipping entering the Black Sea is subject to seizure or destruction by the observant Ukrainians.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 03:58 pm: Edit

Information Warfare: Americans And Chinese Both Fear AI
June 6, 2026: AI/Artificial Intelligence is increasingly regarded as a worldwide threat. Industrialized nations like America, China, all of Europe, Russia, Japan, South Korea and several other countries, are the source of the problem and the need to come up with security measures. These nations usually have military operations devoted to offensive and defensive AI powered CyberWar capabilities. During peacetime the major activities are building CyberWar weapons and developing ways to defend against them. Since AI systems power these efforts, the major producers of AI system components, especially America and China, are in a constant race to come up with new electronic components before anyone else does.
Then there are the people who create or cope with all the mayhem. In addition to millions of knowledgeable programmers, hackers and teenage troublemakers, there are growing instances of the wrong people poking around in vulnerable spaces like communications infrastructure, industrial control networks, and computer-based control systems throughout the economy. For many of these CyberWar trespassers it’s a lark. But more malevolent practitioners are seeking details of these systems, the better to eventually bring them down for fun, profit, or to serve a foreign foe.
AI and AI powered systems like Grok, Claude and ChatGPT can be used by attackers to inflict widespread damage, and by defenders to prevent this from happening. An example of this is the American military effort to upgrade its AI capabilities to match the levels of China, Russia, and allies like Israel. The Americans have been collaborating with the Israeli military, which has made substantial progress in adapting AI software to integrate with their combat control systems, utilizing new drone warfare weapons and techniques, and gathering intelligence on enemy identities, locations, and capabilities. Amid these advancements, the new system, called Refaim, can coordinate attacks on detected targets across army, air force, and naval units.
This has put pressure on the Americans to develop AI technology its military can use for propaganda and influence operations against enemy troops and populations. Current AI technology enables mimicking the voices of enemy officers to send confusing radio messages to their subordinates. As a result, enemy forces may move in the wrong direction or fire artillery at incorrect targets, including their own troops.
AI can also assist commanders in making decisions more quickly. New technology does not gain widespread acceptance until it proves its usefulness and trustworthiness to users. This was true for the telegraph in the late 1800s, broadcast radio in the 1920s, and television three decades later. In fact, the development of more effective telegraph systems coincided with efforts to create commercial radio and television services. In the 1970s, PCs/personal computers were developed. The idea seemed absurd at first, but as tinkerers and hobbyist developers produced the first functional PCs, a new industry was born. By the late 1970s, Apple, Radio Shack, and other firms were selling PCs to an enthusiastic and sizable audience. Decades of American government and military work on the internet became commercially available in 1995, making the maturing PC industry a must-have product.
In the 21st century, AI became a viable product, and as it reached more users, new and marketable applications emerged. Some uses were illegal, dividing the programmer and user community into good White Hat and bad Black Hat factions. Hacking soon became a military and intelligence asset. Many Black Hat programmers became national assets after being hired to protect American commercial and government networks from foreign Black Hats. Programmers who performed both Black and White Hat tasks were sometimes called Grey Hats. The spectrum of roles expanded as programmers developed new tools and applications, particularly with AI software produced by firms, individuals, or small groups who modified commercial AI software and offered it on the black market. These malicious offerings evolved into marketable products, quickly transitioning from the black market to legitimate, though sometimes restricted, markets due to their applications.
AI products like ChatGPT, Claude, Grok and related tools made it easy to create and modify malware, as malicious hacker software came to be known. ChatGPT also became a major source of antidotes for this malware. The fact that the lights are still on and bank accounts remain largely secure indicates that White Hats currently have the upper hand. However, some less visible damage goes unnoticed. Several hacks have stolen billions of dollars from banks or individual firms, often carried out by nations at odds with the Americans, such as North Korea and Iran. These countries, facing increasingly crippling economic sanctions, rely on Black Hat hackers to fund their governments. Their Black Hat hackers are recognized as national assets and are well-compensated for their work. In North Korea, where few citizens can travel abroad, successful Black Hats live in relative luxury and can travel internationally whenever they wish.
Sometimes North Korean Black Hats need to examine what Western hackers are doing. Software trade shows feature special sections for malware and its antidotes, though malware is traded covertly. No one can legally sell malware openly. Malware can be transported on thumb drives or smaller SIM chips used in cell phones, which are easily concealed and transferred to new owners. Payments can be quickly made to and from bank accounts using smartphone, tablet, or laptop apps. Trade shows are preferred venues for these transactions due to the variety of people and unexpected opportunities they offer.
New developments are often best discovered at trade shows. Hackers from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and other nations have been using OpenAI systems. Microsoft and OpenAI believe these nations initially used AI for routine tasks, but this quickly escalated to cyberattacks. Some hackers with ties to foreign governments are using generative artificial intelligence in their attacks. Instead of creating exotic attacks, as some in the tech industry feared, hackers have used AI for mundane tasks like drafting emails, translating documents, and debugging code. These countries leverage AI to enhance productivity.
Microsoft, which committed nearly $23 billion to, and is a close partner with, OpenAI shares threat information to document how five hacking groups tied to China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran used OpenAI’s technology. The companies did not specify which OpenAI technology was involved. OpenAI shut down these groups’ access after learning of the misuse.
Since OpenAI released ChatGPT in 2022, concerns have persisted that hackers might weaponize these powerful tools to exploit vulnerabilities in new and creative ways. Like any technology, AI can be used for illegal and disruptive purposes.
OpenAI requires customers to sign up for accounts, but some users evade detection through techniques like masking their locations. This enables them to develop illegal or harmful AI applications. For example, a hacking group linked to the IRGC/Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps used AI to research ways to bypass antivirus scanners and generate phishing emails. One phishing email pretended to come from an international development agency, while another attempted to lure prominent feminists to an attacker-built website on feminism. In another case, a Russian-affiliated group used OpenAI’s systems to research satellite communication protocols and radar imaging technology to influence the war in Ukraine. Russia has long relied on a large propaganda organization to attack and weaken enemies, and AI is now another tool in their arsenal.
Microsoft tracks over 300 hacker organizations, including independent cybercriminals and AI operations conducted by various nations. OpenAI’s proprietary systems make it easier to track and disrupt their use, according to executives. They noted that while there are ways to identify hackers using open-source AI technology, the proliferation of open systems complicates the task.
When work is open-sourced, it becomes difficult to know who is using AI technology and whether they adhere to responsible use policies. Microsoft did not uncover any use of generative AI in a recent Russian hack of top Microsoft executives.
In combat situations, AI has been used increasingly over the past decade. As AI improves, it is employed more effectively and frequently in combat. For example, a Ukrainian firm developed an AI system that can accurately distinguish between Ukrainian and Russian soldiers in the distance, reducing instances of friendly fire. Friendly fire, when troops accidentally fire on their own, is an unfortunate and recurring aspect of modern warfare that no one likes to discuss. AI-assisted targeting reduces the likelihood of such incidents.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 03:58 pm: Edit

Submarines: Russian Doomsday Sub Update
June 5, 2026: The Khabarovsk, the first of a second class of very large Russian SSN/Nuclear powered attack submarines was recently spotted. This sub is armed with an enormous Poseidon subsurface drone that can reach any ocean port in the world and destroy it with its 2 megaton nuclear warhead. Sea salt made radioactive by the detonation would poison any land area it lands on for years. Poseidon weighs about 100 tons and is 20 meters long and two meters in diameter. It is powered by a nuclear reactor. These drones are designed to be stealthy and can only be detected, while travelling at 55 kilometers an hour, by American Virginia class submarine sonar 3 kilometers away. Each Poseidon costs over $100 million and Russia plans to eventually build 30 of them for use on the Khabarovsk and Belgorod class SSNs.
Two years ago, Russia’s 14,000 ton Khabarovsk predecessor Belgorod showed up. Commercial satellite photos showed the Belgorod on the surface off the northeastern Russian coast, where several ports used by the Northern Fleet are located. Russia earlier reported that Belgorod was testing mockups of its primary weapon, the Poseidon torpedo, to make sure they could be carried and launched by Belgorod. These tests also confirmed that the nuclear propulsion system worked as expected. Belgorod is a larger and heavier Oscar class sub but it still uses the same power plant as the other Oscars. The Poseidon is too large to be carried inside Belgorod and launched from a torpedo tube, and are instead affixed to the underside of the sub and released by the sub commander. The size and weight of the Poseidon attached to the bottom of the Belgorod changes the performance characteristics of the Belgorod and tests were done to note and fix any problems.
Belgorod was launched in 2019 and entered service in 2022. Between 2019 and 2022 Belgorod had special equipment installed and tested before this modified Oscar class SSGN/nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine was ready for service. Belgorod won’t work for the navy like other subs, but for the GUGI/Main Department of Deep-Water Researches which works for the intelligence services and is attached to the Navy for ship and crew support.
Belgorod has come a long way since construction began in 1982. At one point the sub was canceled while still under construction. In 2006 Russia announced it would not finish construction of the Belgorod, the last of nine Type 949A SSGNs. Known in the West as the Oscar II class, these boats began entering service just as the Cold War ended. Three were in commission when the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991. Construction continued on six more, and by 1997, eight were in service. But, at that point the navy had run out of the money, with the Belgorod not quite complete. Another $100 million was needed to complete Belgorod and the government, not the navy, felt it wasn't worth it. Seven Oscar IIs remain in service as the Kursk was lost in 2000 to a well-publicized accident. Work then resumed on Belgorod. That did not last long because the money was not there and not likely to be in the immediate future. Then in 2012 it was announced that the Belgorod, which had not been scrapped but put in storage, was once more scheduled for completion. This time there would be some major revisions that turned Belgorod into something more than an SSGN.
The original Oscars were designed as aircraft carrier destroyers with long-range cruise missiles that could, in theory, take out an American aircraft carrier. The Oscar II class boats have a surface displacement of 14,000 tons. They have eight torpedo tubes. four 650mm, four 533mm, and 24 SS-N-19/P-700 Shipwreck missiles. These anti-ship missiles have a range of 550 kilometers, a speed of 1600 kilometers an hour, and a 750 kg high-explosive warhead, or a nuclear warhead of 350 or 500 kilotons. The Oscar's crew of 107 contains 48 officers. That's because of the high degree of automation, and the need to offer officers’ pay and accommodations to attract the technical talent required to keep these boats going.
The new Belgorod was 11 meters longer, at 184 meters, and several tons heavier than the other Oscars. It no longer carried the 24 cruise missiles but instead was equipped to handle a number of new systems. These included four to eight Poseidon drones programmed to travel autonomously to enemy coastal cities, detonate underwater and somehow create large waves that cause enormous damage and spread radioactivity along the nearby coasts. The Poseidon can travel up to 10,000 kilometers underwater on its own, at speeds of up to 100 kilometers an hour before detonating the two-megaton warhead while on the seabed of the continental shelf.
Belgorod can also transport a new, smaller, 65 meter long, and nuclear-powered Losharik mini-sub underneath it. This mini-sub can perform various operations using remotely controlled arms. It carries a crew of 25 to depths of up to 6,000 meters and has a top speed, for emergencies only, of 72 kilometers an hour. Losharik is believed to be for checking Russian underwater data cables for bugs or damage in general and tampering with underwater cables and other equipment belonging to the Americans and other Western states. Because Losharik can dive deeper than any other sub and is quite large for a deep-diving sub, it can find and retrieve useful items that end up in very deep waters like electronics from Western aircraft or ships. Losharik can also survey very deep sea-bottoms for suitable sites for placing various electronic devices.
Belgorod can also transport and install an underwater nuclear power plant that can be placed on the ocean floor to power the Harmony system of underwater sensors or any other new tech that needs to be powered for a long time. Nuclear power supplies similar to this have been used in space satellites that require a lot of power, like those equipped with radar.
Belgorod is also equipped to carry combat divers. similar to American SEALS and Harpsichord drones that are the size of standard torpedoes but contain side-scan sonar and other sensors that can operate while up to 2,000 meters underwater. Belgorod is also designed to tow objects behind it. These can be a towed array sonar or other items.
Russia already has some specialized subs equipped for special operations. These are conversions of existing subs while Belgorod was custom designed and built for the special operations tasks. In late 2016 Russia finally sent its second special operations SSN, the Podmoskovie, to sea for trials. This sub is actually a Delta IV class SSBN that began its career in 1986 as K64 Podmoskovie. Since 1999, K64 has been undergoing conversion to BS64, which appears to be something similar to customized American SSNs that have been in service since the 1970s. The current American example of this is the USS Carter, a Seawolf-class SSN converted to be 30 percent longer and 20 percent heavier than the other two Seawolfs. The additional space was to hold mini-subs for the fifty SEALs it can carry, or to tap into underwater communications cables and perform other intelligence gathering tasks. The Carter entered service in 2005 and replaced Parche, an older Sturgeon class SSN that entered service in 1991 and was retired in 2004. The Parche replaced earlier SSNs that had performed these intel missions throughout the Cold War.
The 13,500-ton Podmoskovie had its 16 ballistic missile silos replaced with facilities for launching remotely controlled mini-subs for intelligence missions. The renovations resulted in the sub becoming about five percent longer. This meant that the converted Podmoskovie was somewhat lighter, probably about 12,000 tons. The first Russian SSBN to undergo a similar conversion was the K129 Orenberg, a Delta III class SSBN whose conversion to BS136 began in 1994 and entered service in 2008. The Delta III is about the same size and displacement as the Delta IV but the Podmoskovie conversion seems to be more extensive than the Orenberg. Both the Orenberg and Podmoskovie carry the Losharik minisub beneath it.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, June 09, 2026 - 03:59 pm: Edit

Air Weapons: Americans Use Drones Against Drug Smuggler Boats
June 5, 2026: Last April the American navy conducted exercises off the Florida coast to test the use of surface and aerial drones to detect drug smuggling speed boats. Once alerted, MH-60 helicopters from American LCS/Littoral Combat Ships would arrive to either capture or destroy the speed boats.
So far America has used combat aircraft or armed helicopters to destroy more than a hundred drug smuggling boats in the Caribbean and off the Pacific coast. To aid in these operations a new Tsunami naval drone has been ordered. These 1.7 ton vessels are 11.3 meters long and four meters wide. Powered by a 400 HP engine, they have a top speed of 74 kilometers an hour. Payload is about half a ton and range is about a thousand kilometers. These drones carry daylight and infrared cameras. The communications system enables land, air or ship based controllers to issue new or modified instructions to the drones. Used against drug smugglers, these boats would participate in the search and they would accompany the drug boats until armed personnel in boats or helicopters show up to capture the drug smuggling boat.
Then there is STAKE/Surface To Air Kinetic Engagement. This is an anti-drone system that uses the 70mm APKWS Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System which was introduced in 2012. There are now several versions of the 70mm air-to-surface and surface-to-surface versions. Developing a guided 70mm rocket took so long because the manufacturers underestimated the technical difficulties of getting the laser seeker and flight control mechanisms into that small a package, at a weight and price the customer could afford. The price of the new 70mm missile is about $22,000 each. This is typical for these weapons and about a third less than a smart bomb and less than a quarter of what a Hellfire missile costs.
The guided 70mm rocket is used against targets that don't require a larger 49 kg Hellfire missile but still needs some targeting precision. In tests the APKWS hit within a meter of the aiming point, about what other 70mm missiles are capable of. The 70mm missile makes an excellent weapon for large drones, especially since you can carry more of them. The launcher for carrying these missiles is designed to replace the one for Hellfire but can carry four APKWS instead of one Hellfire.
All these 70mm guided rockets are basically 13.6 kg 70mm rockets with a laser seeker, a 2.7 kg warhead, and a range of about six kilometers when fired from the air. Laser designators on a helicopter, or with troops on the ground, are pointed at the target and the laser seeker in the front of the APKWS homes in on the reflected laser light.
Bringing all these military grade sensors and missiles to find and destroy, or capture, drug boats is expected to make operating these drug boat fleets much more expensive and difficult to recruit men to operate the boats. While some of the boat operators have been captured, most have been killed. With the addition of Tsunami drones armed with APKWS, the chances of surviving a mission to deliver drugs by boat to the American mainland go from difficult to nearly impossible.