Archive through June 12, 2026
Star Fleet Universe Discussion Board: Non-Game Discussions: Real-World Military:
Archive through June 12, 2026
A couple of comments is now coming out.
It seems the (now former) Minister of Defence was told on Monday was that he could expect to see the Defence Budget rise by 0.08% (and that isn't in real terms) and he pointed out, that at that level, he would have to impose cuts in some areas, to maintain spending in other areas.
It seems the attempted bribe by the Treasury was an increase in spending.... but not yet and with no dates on when you will get it.
The comment the media person made was 'Jam tomorrow, but cuts today'.
I've seen both the $3M and $4M figures for PACs. You may well be right. If I got it wrong, the fact that I got it wrong in the direction that makes my argument weaker, not stronger, should tell you something.
Similarly, Ukraine's interception rates for Shaheds have been running above 80% lately. In May they said it was over 90%, but that has not been the case in general. And I don't think you were cherry picking.
Obviously I don't and can't know if the US would succeed in defending its $10B+ ships against drone attacks. One reason for hope is that US damage control is far better than Russian damage control. But in addition to the Shahed-type drones, there is the problem of Magura and similar naval drones. Given the long history of ships being sunk by explosions near or below the waterline (mines, torpedoes, etc), this is a major threat. And it would not be surprising to see someone make a naval drone with a range that exceeds a thousand miles. In fact it would be surprising if that doesn't happen.
The US suffered tremendous loss of life on battleships before. This was the result of a technology that at the time was also showing obvious signs of becoming more impotant, namely naval aviation.
Drones, like naval aviation in the era leading up to Pearl Harbor, are also showing obvious signs of becoming more important. If one compares the two technologies and eras, the signs for drones are probably stronger and more unmistakeable.
The other reason the US suffered so much back then was that it was a surprise attack. Maguras are great for that, too.
So the warning signs are present. We need to pay attention.
I am not proposing retiring existing ships. I am saying that more gynormous ships is a bad investment. Spend the money on drone defense for the USA instead. For example, how well would we perform if whatever vessel launches 1000 FPV quadcopters at NYC tomorrow?
As I said, WJ, it's more complicated than you thought. It's nowhere near as bad, and simultaneously is so much worse.
That intercept rate on drones dropped like a rock when the new faster Shaheed made the interceptors obsolete. But new interceptors are in the works, and things work very quickly in wartime.
The DNI issue is evolving. Pres. Trump has announced that he would nominate Jay Clayton, the U.S. attorney in Manhattan and the former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, to be the next Director of National Intelligence.
Like acting Director Pulte, Mr. Clayton has no experience with intelligence. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 states that "Any individual nominated for appointment as Director of National Intelligence shall have extensive national security expertise."
I am frankly baffled why the President is unwilling to appoint someone to this critical posting who meets at least the minimum legal qualifications for the job; there are plenty of candidates available.
Surface Forces : The Last Littoral Combat Ship
June 11, 2026: Last month the American Navy has commissioned USS Cleveland/LCS 31, the last of 35 LCS/Littoral Combat Ships ships. Two years ago, the Navy decided to reverse its plan to quickly discard its remaining LCSs and instead upgrade many of them. In late 2023 it came as no surprise when the navy recently made it official that its ambitious but poorly implemented Littoral Combat Ship program would be eliminated. That came after more than a decade of effort to build at least fifty of them to replace 51 very successful Perry-Class frigates and 26 smaller mine warfare ships. Only 35 LCS ships were built and now they are being rapidly retired, often after only a few years of service. The main reason for this is that the LCS never performed adequately, and cost much more than they were supposed to. The navy saves a lot of money by eliminating the LCS ships and can use the savings to maintain or expand construction of ships that work.
In 2023 there were only 21 LCS ships in service, but many were not operational. In early 2022 only seventeen LCS ships were in service with only eleven fully capable. Six had operational limitations because of engine problems and were unable to go overseas or do much more than act as patrol ships in the Caribbean, interdicting illegal drug smuggling. By early 2022 six of the older LCS ships were retired early, four of them of the type that have debilitating combining gear and engine problems.
The Navy never came close to obtaining the 55 LCS ships originally planned. The failure of the LCS was not unusual because the Navy has, since the 1980s, had an impressive and disastrous number of new ship designs that failed. The LCS failure was not sudden, but the result of a growing number of construction defects and design flaws that have caused the planned number to be produced or kept in service revised downward five times. The latest reductions may be the last because a replacement ship has already been selected and ordered.
The problems began to appear when the navy was unable to decide which of the two competing LCS designs to select. One was the Lockheed-Martin monohull Freedom-class, and the other was the General Dynamics trimaran Independence-class. The first LCS built, the traditional monohull USS Freedom, completed its sea trials and acceptance inspections in 2009. The ship did very well, with about 90 percent fewer problems, usually material deficiencies, than is usual with the first warship in a class. USS Independence was laid down by General Dynamics in late 2005 and commissioned in January 2010. There were problems. The corrosion and hull cracks were expected eventually but appeared much earlier than anticipated. Eventually the navy decided to halt construction of any more of the conventional monohull Freedom class LCS ships and rapidly retire those still in service.
The fatal flaw in the monohull Freedom-class was not confirmed until 2020 when two Freedom-class ships had engine failures at sea and had to return to port at slow speed. The problem was with the ball-bearings in the combining gear, which was needed to achieve top speed by combining the power of both the diesel and gas-turbine engines. By 2022 the Freedom type LCS ships could only use their diesel engines. The navy believed it had a fix, but implementing it took several months and involved removing a lot of equipment from the engine space to reach the combining gear for ball-bearing replacement and other adjustments. This turned out to be a temporary fix. Because of the uncertainty, four Freedom class ships that were under construction or launched and ready for sea-trials were indefinitely delayed until the full extent of the combining-gear problem could be determined. In the end, the Freedom class ships were declared a failure. Note that warships use diesel engines for economical slow cruising. Gas turbine engines are used for rapid acceleration and have been around for decades. The problems with the diesel and gas turbine engines should not have happened. Both types of LCS had their own problems as well as problems common to the overall LCS concept.
The Navy surprised everyone in 2010 by choosing both monohull and trimaran designs and requesting that the fifty or so LCS ships be split between the two designs. While both ships look quite different, they both share many common elements. One of the most important of these is the highly automated design and smaller crew. Both ships have accommodations for only 75 personnel. Normally, a ship of this size would have a crew of 150-200. The basic LCS crew is 40, with the other 35 berths occupied by operators of special equipment. That was eventually changed to 73 crew as standard, with another 20 if the ship was equipped with a helicopter and UAVs or another type of mission module. Even with nearly a hundred crew the workload was heavy and the LCS had two crews for each ship, each one serving at sea four to five months before they were replaced by the other crew. The current crew size meant revising the berthing arrangements to provide berths for up to a hundred crew. The inadequate crew size problem was one of several defects that doomed the LCS.
The much smaller crew required some changes to how the crew ran a ship and how many sailors and civilians were required back on land to support a LCS at sea. It was also found that the interchangeable mission modules took far longer, two or three days instead of two or three hours, to replace. The LCS has still not seen combat and the Navy wants the first violent encounter to be successful, or at least not disastrous. It is expected that there will be surprises, which is about all that can be guaranteed at this point. It turned out that the mission modules were a flawed concept that never worked.
Both LCS designs were supposed to be for ships displacing 2,500 tons, with a full load draft of under 3.3 meters, permitting access to very shallow green and even brown coastal and riverine waters where most naval operations have taken place in the past generation. Top speed was expected to be over 80 kilometers per hour with a range of 2,700 kilometers and basic endurance of 21 days. In reality, the monohull Freedom class was a 3,500-ton ship with a max speed of 83 kilometers an hour and max endurance of 21 days. It could travel up to 6,500 kilometers at a cruising speed of 33 kilometers an hour before requiring refueling. The multihull Independence class was a 3,100-ton ship with a max speed of 87 kilometers an hour and max endurance of 21 days. It could travel up to 8,000 kilometers at 37 kilometers an hour before requiring refueling.
Basic LCS armament is a 57mm gun, four 12.7mm machine-guns and an eleven-cell SeaRam system for aircraft and missile defense. This system uses RAM, as in RIM-116 Rolling AirFrame missiles to replace the older 20mm Phalanx autocannon. SeaRAM has a longer range of 7.5 kilometers than the two kilometers of the Phalanx. An LCS can also carry two MH-60 helicopters or two slightly smaller MQ-8C helicopter drones or one of each.
In addition to basic armament and electronics such as sea and air search radars, the LCS crew was to contain specialized teams who are swapped in to operate specific mission package modules. About 40 percent of the ship is empty, with a large cargo hold into which the mission package gear is inserted and then removed, along with the package crew, when it is no longer assigned to that ship. An LCS has two crews when underway: the ship crew and the mission package crew. The captain of the ship crew is in charge and the officer commanding the mission package is simply the officer in charge of the largest equipment system on board.
Initially, there were to be quite a few mission modules including mine warfare, air defense, anti-submarine warfare, special operations, and surface warfare. These modules would allow the ships to be quickly reconfigured for various specialized missions. Crews for each module were also to be modularized so that specialized teams could be swapped in to operate specific modules. The design and crew requirements for most modules were not ready when the initial LCS models entered service Emphasis had been placed on getting the mine warfare and anti-submarine warfare modules ready as soon as possible. The mine warfare module had problems and was never ready for use. The anti-submarine warfare module had even more problems. From the beginning, many naval construction experts doubted that these modules would ever be ready for use. Both of these modules used a lot of equipment already available for use on helicopters as well as the ship. The LCS received helicopters and drones that were only used for naval patrol. Ships like destroyers have long used their helicopters equipped with submarine detection equipment and lightweight anti-submarine torpedoes.
By 2020 the Navy had selected and ordered a replacement for the LSC in the form of frigates from an Italian firm that won the competition to build two FREMM type frigates for the Navy, with an option for eight more and eventually twenty, to replace the failed LCS design. At least twenty of these FREMM ships were to be built in America as the 7,200-ton Constellation-class FFG guided missile frigate, which is optimized for ASW/anti-submarine warfare. The first FFG is to enter service in 2026. Each cost about $800 million, which is what each of the less capable and reliable LCS vessels ended up costing. If FREMM is as successful as expected, that will be the end of the LCS. The first FREMM entered service in 2012 for France while a year later the second one entered service for Italy. Eventually about a hundred FREMM type ships will be in use, mainly by France, Italy, and America. Several other countries have expressed interest in being export customers for FREMMs.
Experience so far in the Red Sea Houthi conflict has shown that every warship of the FREMM size or larger must carry its own self-defence anti-ballistic missile systems. The FREMM class frigates lack such systems and might be useless in conflicts even with lesser enemies such as the Houthi, so these were cancelled too, except for the first two. Their planned replacement will be a variant of a Coast Guard cutter.
The LCS demonstrated it could not replace the old Perry class frigates or be of much use at all. Without the mission modules, the LCS could only be used as a coastal patrol ship that was only able to detect surface ships. The LCS has actually been quite effective at the patrol work, which is all it has been able to do so far. Smaller and cheaper patrol ships are available for that sort of thing.
Since the 1990s the navy has had to deal with unworkable or too expensive ship designs like the Seawolf nuclear subs, the Zumwalt class destroyers, the LCS and even the new Ford class carriers, which had problems becoming ready for service because a radical new EMALS catapult design that was rushed into production without sufficient development and debugging. This is a track record of disasters that the Navy seems incapable of ending.
Jessica, I don't know but I suspect that the Laptop Lie, in which 51 of the top intel people signed a letter stating what turned out to be (and they knew it at the time) a politically-motivated lie, has created a situation in which Trump needs a "clean" nominee untainted by the endemic corruption. I would never say so, but I would imagine if you asked Trump your question he would say: "Jessica, whatever stupid news agency you represent, you just want me to appoint someone who is a corrupt liar who politicized his job in a successful criminal attempt to prevent me from being elected." I suspect he would be very very impolite to you, adding a few nasty quips to my guess at his comment.
Nigeria: American War Against Terrorism In Nigeria
June 11, 2026: Last month America and Nigeria revealed that they had killed Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, who was in charge of the ISWAP/Islamic State West Africa Province’s GDP/General Directorate of Provinces. ISWAP is one of the most destructive Islamic terrorist groups in Africa. This was not the first time al-Minuki has been described as dead or missing. American forces intervened in late 2025 with air strikes, followed by ground forces in 2026. While the Nigerian ground and air forces had been successful in finding and attacking Boko Haram and ISWAP militants, the addition of American airpower and surveillance capabilities make it possible to track and attack Islamic terrorists more quickly and with deadlier results. The late 2025 American air strikes killed as many as 300 Islamic terrorists. The subsequent ground operations left as many as 200 more Islamic terrorists dead. America had long been conducting air strikes on Islamic terrorists in East Africa, using Reaper drones operating from Djibouti, but the current attacks in West Africa are a new front in the war on Islamic terrorism.
Last year there was an increase in Islamic terrorist activity, particularly by ISWAP and Boko Haram. Including ethnic fighting between farmers and herders in northwest Nigeria, there were about 150 deaths. In 2024 it was noted that since 2020 the Islamic terrorism groups faded away while ethnic tribal violence became responsible for most casualties. In 2024 kidnapping increased with over 600 people kidnapped for ransom. Most of this took place in the northern states of Borno and Kaduna. There were nationwide protests over cost-of-living increases. The Islamic terror groups’ main activity was staying alive, and they did so via banditry. Back in 2004, Islamic terrorist violence in the northeast appeared and created some lasting problems. There are still millions of refugees plus substantial economic damage in northeastern Borno State, where it all began. There seems to be no end in sight because of local corruption, but more competent leadership in the security forces reduced the violence. All this was caused by a local group of Taliban wannabes calling themselves Boko Haram. Their activity in the capital of Borno State grew for a decade until by 2014 it seemed unstoppable. It took over a year for the government to finally muster sufficient military strength to cripple but not destroy Boko Haram. This did not get much media attention outside Africa, even though in 2014 Boko Haram killed more people than ISIL did in Syria and Iraq. The main reason for Boko Haram gains in 2014 and 2015 was corruption in the army, which severely crippled effective counterterror efforts. By itself Boko Haram was too small to have much impact on a national scale but the inability to deal with this problem put a spotlight on the corruption that has hobbled all progress in Nigeria for decades.
A new president was elected in 2023 and made considerable progress in changing the corruption. This included problems with tribal feuds and growing unrest throughout the country. This has been especially bad down south in the oil producing region of the Niger River Delta. Violence against oil facilities continues, in part because local politicians and business leaders are part of the oil theft business. Northern Moslems want more influence over the federal government and a bigger share of the oil money. In northern and central Nigeria, you have increasing violence as nomadic Moslem herders move south and clash with largely Christian farmers over land use and water supplies. For the last few years these tribal feuds have killed more people than Boko Haram. The situation is still capable of sliding into regional civil wars, over money and political power. Corruption and ethnic/tribal/religious rivalries threaten to trigger, at worse, another civil war and, at least, more street violence and public anger.
Earlier this year Boko Haram embraced digital technology using encrypted apps like Telegram and WhatsApp to communicate. This went beyond carrying out new attacks. These apps also allowed Boko Haram to not only communicate securely but to also recruit new members, plan attacks and coordinate operations. One important operation is to spread disinformation on apps or social media sites that a lot of Nigerians frequent. Most of the messages go out in Hausa, the language of the Moslem north. Most Nigerians understand a local dialect of English and standard English is the official language for government, education, and business. Boko Haram exploits this widespread use of English to share their propaganda with more than a billion English speakers worldwide. Although Boko Haram literally means Western Education is Forbidden, this Islamic terrorist group educates themselves, or recruits’ members who are well educated, to help with communications and propaganda.
Unencrypted apps like TikTok, along with propaganda videos in Social Media sites, can enrage Muslims who will then attack their Christian neighbors. Boko Haram regularly spreads false accusations of Christians abusing Moslems and, before the accusations can be proven false, a lot of mayhem, deaths, injuries and tarnished reputations can occur. Given the nearly universal adoption of cellphones in Nigeria, this Boko Haram propaganda and other messages find a large audience and an endless supply of new recruits or supporters.
The oil-rich west coast African nation of Nigeria continues to have problems with Islamic terrorist groups Boko Haram and especially the local ISIL/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction known as ISWAP. The latest disaster was an early May 4 ISWAP attack on an army supercamp in northeastern Yobe State. This attack featured the ISWAP use of motorbikes instead of 4x4 vehicles. Yobe State terrain is flat with little cover. ISWAP found motorbikes more effective than larger vehicles. The attack on the supercamp left four soldiers dead and many more wounded. ISWAP gunmen vandalized part of the camp for several hours. They got away with weapons, ammunition and other supplies. ISWAP has stuck with its strategy of concentrating on the security forces and doing so by assembling a large enough number of gunmen to ensure, most of the time, a quick victory.
The continued prevalence of corruption and incompetent officers in the Nigerian army has contributed to continued chaos and lawlessness in northern Borno State, where most of the population was displaced by Boko Haram violence in 2014-15 and when Boko Haram control was broken by 2017. After that government programs to revive the economy and restore law and order collapsed under the usual corruption and incompetence of local officials and security forces. Even a reform-minded president who was a former general and Moslem was unable to push military reforms far enough and fast enough. Boko Haram is not winning; but the government is failing to finish off a defeated Boko Haram and take advantage of an opportunity to regain the trust and loyalty of the local population. ISIL took advantage of similar conditions to quickly overrun more than a third of Iraq in 2014. Many Nigerian leaders are well aware of how that worked but the corruption is so entrenched and widespread that reform moves slowly and that left the army and government officials vulnerable to a well-organized Boko Haram comeback.
ISWAP is also known as the Barnawi or AL Barnawi faction of Boko Haram. ISWAP has apparently received a lot of useful technical and tactical advice from ISIL veterans of fighting in Iraq, Syria and Libya. Boko Haram persists in the northeast in large part because of its willingness to experiment, innovate and take advice from foreign ISIL veterans. The Barnawi faction follows the current ISIL doctrine of concentrating attacks on security forces and government officials, preferably the corrupt ones. That makes it easier to extort more cash and other goods from the local population.
In 2019 the Barnawi faction had over 3,000 active gunmen and operated mainly in the far north of Borno state near Lake Chad and the borders of Niger and Chad. The smaller Shekau faction has about half as many armed men and operates further south near the Borno State capital of Maiduguri and the Sambisa Forest. Both factions rely on the fact that the years of Boko Haram violence in Borno State, where Boko Haram originated in 2004, has increased the poverty and corruption the Islamic terrorist organization was founded to eliminate. Many potential recruits are discouraged by stricter standards and a more fanatic approach by Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Compared to the original Boko Haram, the most hard core Islamic radicals are drawn to the more extreme groups and that way Boko Haram persists.
Current ISWAP strength is closer to 4,000 fighters. Boko Haram is still around, with fewer gunmen than ISWAP. Both of these Islamic terrorist organizations have been fighting each other since 2021. The army has taken advantage of this, but corruption and frequent incompetence have enabled the Islamic terrorist groups to continue surviving. The government has tried to exploit the Islamic terrorists’ civil war.
Back in 2020 some army commanders in the northeastern Borno State tried to blame foreign NGOs/Non-Government Organizations for providing a steady flow of reports, documented with pictures and videos showing army misbehavior and mistreatment of civilians. The foreigners were also accused of spying for Boko Haram and deliberately spreading false reports of army misbehavior to hurt the morale of troops and loyalty of local civilians. These accusations tended to be quickly withdrawn when senior officers back in the national capital heard of it. The generals in the high command knew the NGO reports were true because these reports were often quietly double-checked by high command investigators. Such retractions were just another reminder of the problems the military faces and is unable to fix in the northeast.
FYEO
Under the heading of “old news” the Nimitz class carrier, U.S.S. Dwight D. Eisenhower, CVN-69 has also had its decommissioning delayed to 2029.
She is to be replaced by the U.S.S. Enterprise CVN-80.
The ship is conducting training in the Atlantic prior to its next deployment, but it is reported that she could be tasked with possible upcoming operations in and around Cuba. (Negotiations are ongoing between the U.S. and Cuban diplomats).
The other possibility is that the Eisenhower will reinforce the forces in the persian Gulf if combat operations continue or escalate.
Unlike the U.S.S. Nimitz, which currently operates a reduced combat air wing of some 60 aircraft, the eisenhower still operates a full wing of 90+ aircraft.
"By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Thursday, June 11, 2026 - 01:16 pm: Edit
I've seen both the $3M and $4M figures for PACs. You may well be right. If I got it wrong, the fact that I got it wrong in the direction that makes my argument weaker, not stronger, should tell you something."
Cant you both be right?
$3 million was the cost to buy them in the 2010's and early 2020's....and they have all been fired off.
$4 million and the effect of inflation, is the cost to buy them now, to replace what has been fired off?
Simple 
On the UK MoD - another Minister has resigned - and we do have a new Secretary of Defence - Dan Jarvis..... will no doubt find out about him tomorrow.
Issue is - he will be a PM supporter and might just say 'yes' to what ever he and the Chancellor want - not what is best for the MoD?
Paul is probably right, but in all seriousness, military accounting is designed to confuse and mislead people, and you can make any weapon cost any amount you want by just leaving out different parts, like research, maintenance spares, the cost of tools and dies, contractor profits, and so forth.
Will and I were kinda pulling each others toes on that cost thing anyway.
Steve, the President can and will say whatever he wishes, but the fact remains that Mr. Clayton is objectively unqualified under the law for nomination to the office of Director of National Intelligence. There are quite literally members of this BBS - including both you and I - who come closer to meeting the legally-required qualifications than does Mr. Clayton. There are considerable numbers, well beyond the "Signatory 51" (for lack of a better shorthand term), of fully qualified individuals from both the civilian and military world. Sadly, I suspect that your prediction is accurate regarding the President's response should he be questioned on the matter.
Over the past few weeks, Ukraine has greatly increased efforts to isolate Crimea. Four different bridges linking it to the mainland have been hit, with varying degrees of damage. Two ports on the Sea of Azov have been hit, with some ships on Azov sunk. Trucks bringing fuel to Crimea are frequently destroyed. Some people have taken to moving petroleum in private cars.
The Kerch Bridge is still operational.
Jessica, the Filthy 51 were not the only corrupt intel officials. I don't know but I suspect Trump believes that he would have to go way down the list of "qualified" people (beyond 510) to find someone who had the administrative skills and was not corrupt. I turned the job down due to my health.
More to the point, I suspect that Trump wants someone who is not only not corrupt, but will start kicking the 509 corrupt officials out. I think you suspect that too. I think that the current appointee is someone who got into Trump's confidence and "talked a good game" and I think you think that too.
Ukraine stopped using the Kerch Bridge for fuel tanker convoys a year ago as this made it a huge target. Ukraine is watching for fuel convoys to resume so they can smack the bridge at just the right time.
The lie about the laptop does not give me confidence in our intel apparatus. But Trump's last pick was Tulsi Gabbard, who pushed Russian talking points. So I don't have confidence in his picks, either.
Gabbard sample:
"Biden can very easily prevent a war with Russia by guaranteeing that Ukraine will not become a member of NATO."
To William's original point: I hear what you are saying about large ship vulnerabilities to drones, but I'd push back a little bit on how bad the threat is and how USN is doing.
- USN successfully repelled all the Houthi combined drone/missile attacks in the Red Sea in 2023-2024. It cost a lot of money but they were successful
- In the current Iran war USN hasn't been overwhelmed by drones, even though Iran supposedly has umpteen thousands of them available for launch
And there are a number of upgraded non-VLS drone defense systems in various stages of maturity and deployment on the Burkes:
- Upgraded Mk 38 Mod 4 30mm cannon with airburst ammo and Aegis integration
- SEWIP Block 3 EW system (mickey mouse ears)
- Better integration of MH60 surface search radar with Aegis for small targets
- 5" Gun improvements (MADCAP/HVP, better Aegis integration)
- JAGM-MR deck launchers and proximity warheads
- Coyote (v1 v2 v3) drone deck launchers (or Roadrunner)
- Replacement of Phalanx with longer ranged RAM/SeaRAM
- ODIN low power lasers
- High powered microwave (HPM)
- Aegis and SPY improvements to increase sensitivity to small objects
Also, just moving a fleet 100-200nm miles out to sea adds a tremendous amount of protection:
- Drones quickly move over the horizon from the launching point, thus requiring OTH communications, remote targeting, fixed targets, or targeting autonomy with effective local sensors
- Travel distance largely eliminates lower endurance drones from reaching the target
- Prevailing winds, weather, and sea state further prevents lower end drones from reaching the target
So all things considered my sense is there's more naval drone defense available than meets the eye, and more is rolling in. If we were to project 10 years out into the future (when the hypothetical Trump BB might be launched), my sense is a lot of this drone defense stuff just becomes routine. Current drones just seem to be exploiting fairly easily coverable gaps in sensors and weapons.
--Mike
"I think that the current appointee is someone who got into Trump's confidence and "talked a good game" and I think you think that too."
In that, Steve, I believe we're in full agreement.
Procurement: Missile Replenishment Problem
June 12, 2026: The current Iran war began at the end of February and continues into June. America has spent over $12 billion since the war began, most of that went for missiles, drones and other munitions. This conflict was noted for the massive use of missiles and drones by both sides. Patriot and THAAD/Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense are used to intercept Iranian missiles and drones. During the first two weeks, the Americans used more than 6.000 offensive and air defense missiles. This involved nearly half of the ATACMS and its successor PrSM/Precision Strike Missiles. Some 40 percent of the supply of THAAD missiles were used. The major offensive weapon, the Tomahawk cruise missile, saw a fifth of the American stockpile fired in a missile barrage that cost nearly $2 billion. The air force used some 1,100 of their JASSM air to ground missiles in the Iran war. Each of these missiles costs $750,000 and it will take two years to replace those expended against Iran. Overall America used about half its missile and drone stockpile on these attacks and it will take two or three years to replenish the stockpile.
In response to Israeli and American March air strikes, Iran retaliated against the Arab Persian Gulf countries. The attacks began during the first week of March. The UAE/United Arab Emirates were hit by 1,688 systems, including 1,422 drones and 246 missiles during March 1- 8, which was the largest Iranian attack launched on any one Persian Gulf neighbor. Bahrain and Kuwait also received heavy attacks because of their proximity to Iran and the presence of American military facilities.
Iran extended its drone attacks to port facilities in Oman and commercial shipping using the Strait of Hormuz, the vital passage in and out of the Persian Gulf. This was a deliberate effort to halt oil exports and commercial ships delivering cargoes to the Gulf States. After March 1st, daily drone strikes averaged about 250 a day. Drones used were Shahed-136, Shahed-107, and Shahed-238 models. Only one Gulf Arab state, the United Arab Emirates, retaliated because of the Iranian attacks.
Until President Trump announced a cease-fire, aircraft from Israel and the United States continued to attack Iranian drone launching sites. Most of the Iranian weapons are $50,000 Shahed drones. These drones are downed by warplanes using autocannon, or ground forces firing million dollar Patriot missiles. Not only are the Iranian designed Shaheds cheap, but Iranian ally Russia has built a factory to build their version of Shahed called Geran. Even the Americans built a Shahed clone called Lucas and used it against Iran in the recent Persian Gulf fighting.
FYEO
Mike, what about naval drones?
The US Constitution gives the President the authority to appoint officials of his choosing with the advise and consent of the Senate. Any statue that limits that authority is simply unconstitutional.
If one doesn't like a Presidential nominee, they can take it up with the Senate.
Article II, sec 2; para 2:
“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law…”
Raider; The counter argument being that setting qualifications for appointees, is the Senate advising what they will accept in advance. i.e. If your appointee does not meet these minimums, they will not be approved.
Of course this only mattes if the Senate keeps its promise.
ADM:
Nice theory, but it is not an actual article of the united states Constitution, nor is it an amendment to the Constitution.
I would suggest that it is very much a political statement as was the original letter from the 51 named signers of the Hunter laptop document.
(And just to correct the record, it appears that there were nine other intelligence personnel that participated in the preparation of said document that did not wish to be identified. )
I am not worried about a swarm even a massive drone swarm taking out a US carrier. The drones are not attacking a single ship but a battle group of DDGs CGs FFGs and other ships. As well as patrolling aircraft. Any of those other ships will gladly take a hit to protect the carrier.
Raider: as noted by Justice Brandeis in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 265-74 (1926):
Congress has, from time to time, restricted the President’s selection by the requirement of citizenship. It has limited the power of nomination by providing that the office may be held only by a resident of the United States; of a state; of a particular state; of a particular district; of a particular territory; of the District of Columbia; of a particular foreign country. It has limited the power of nomination further by prescribing specific professional attainments, or occupational experience. It has, in other cases, prescribed the test of examinations. It has imposed the requirement of age; of sex; of races; of property; and of habitual temperance in the use of intoxicating liquors. Congress has imposed like restrictions on the power of nomination by requiring political representation; or that the selection be made on a nonpartisan basis. It has required, in some cases, that the representation be industrial; in others, that it be geographic. It has at times required that the President’s nominees be taken from, or include representatives from, particular branches or departments of the government. By still other statutes, Congress has confined the President’s selection to a small number of persons to be named by others.
Indeed, this goes back as far as the Judiciary Act of 1789, with the qualification that the Attorney General had to have been "learned in law"; this certainly suggests that the Founders did not consider such a qualification to be an unconstitutional assertation of power by the legislature.
This position regarding statutory prerequisites for various appointed offices has been upheld by the Supreme Court time and time again over the past 200+ years.
Jswile
Quote:Nice theory, but it is not an actual article of the united states Constitution, nor is it an amendment to the Constitution.
Quote: Chuck Strong (Raider) on Friday, June 12, 2026 - 04:19 pm: Edit
The US Constitution gives the President the authority to appoint officials of his choosing with the advise and consent of the Senate. Any statue that limits that authority is simply unconstitutional.
It is literally part of what Chuck posted, it in no way describes what form the advice may take.