One can get far by using ones brain. The air force chief of staff have said the first flight of the F47 will take place in 2029. (wikipedia).
Ergo, pictures are highly unlikely to show the F-47.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Sunday, June 28, 2026 - 11:49 am: Edit

Here is another (ahem) view of the F47 Exorcist:

https://www.youtube.com/shorts/95GN-HvO41A

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Sunday, June 28, 2026 - 11:50 am: Edit

This view of the F47 is obviously fake as "navy" is mis-spelled.

https://www.youtube.com/shorts/2qhyLLWv8ZE

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Sunday, June 28, 2026 - 11:52 am: Edit

Here are a lot of F47 videos

https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=f47

And this one is the one I originally screen capped.

https://www.youtube.com/shorts/e7AiDmHBV0Y

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Sunday, June 28, 2026 - 11:54 am: Edit

If this stuff is AI we can no longer trust any crime scene video, so those videos of me spray-painted "housecat by the tail" on a Trump billboard are obviously fake.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Sunday, June 28, 2026 - 05:40 pm: Edit

To be honest, my worries about the F-47 come back to one thing: Boeing. They've a lousy record for development and quality control over the past decade.

By Burt Quaid (Burt) on Sunday, June 28, 2026 - 06:49 pm: Edit

I remember back in the 80s one of my favorite games to play on my friend's computer as F-117. It ended up looking nothing like the real thing lol.

burt

By Paul Howard (Raven) on Monday, June 29, 2026 - 02:17 am: Edit

Burt

Equally - wasn't there a Plastic Model Company which made and produced a F117 model, prior to it ever being seen/announced in public - which very scareily was nearly a perfect copy of the real plane?


IIRC - the offical line was the Model Company just did the same analysis as the real world did?

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 29, 2026 - 04:02 am: Edit

Iran has agreed to stop shooting at tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. The US has agreed to stop bombing Iran. At least for now.

By Jack Bohn (Jackbohn) on Monday, June 29, 2026 - 08:01 am: Edit

I don't know about an early model of the F-117, but Testors/Italeri produced a model of the "F-19" with explanations of stealth concepts on the instruction sheet. It got written up in either Popular Science or Mechanics, and some news sources and even Congress treated it as a real leak. I've heard it displaced the AMT Enterprise as the best selling model kit. (Competitor Monogram later produced an F-19 kit with a different, more SR-71 design.)

By Burt Quaid (Burt) on Monday, June 29, 2026 - 11:21 am: Edit

Oh maybe the game was F-19.

That was a minute ago and I didn’t actually own it myself. Played it at my best friends house on Friday nights.

Burt

By Jeff Anderson (Jga) on Monday, June 29, 2026 - 12:05 pm: Edit

I remember the items of disinformation about the stealth fighter very well. What was given out looked like a very round pear when viewed from above; the antithesis of what the F-117 looked like, and yes, I remember its name being given as the F-19.

At the time, I thought it was SOOO cool, but now that I know better, I recognize it as disinformation (but I also appreciate it as such )

By Burt Quaid (Burt) on Monday, June 29, 2026 - 12:57 pm: Edit

Was it the F-19 Tom Clansy used in Red Storm Rising?

Burt

By Mike Erickson (Mike_Erickson) on Monday, June 29, 2026 - 02:08 pm: Edit

There was the original Microprose F19 game in 1988 and then the updated F117 game in 1991.

There was also an NES port of F117, and then that turned into a Switch port as well.

The Switch port is available from the Nintendo store right now, as is the F117 PC version on Steam (2 versions).

--Mike

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 29, 2026 - 02:08 pm: Edit

Yes, the F19 was in RED STORM RISING, the best techno-thriller ever written.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 29, 2026 - 03:33 pm: Edit

Sea Transportation: American WorkBoat Supremacy
June 29, 2026: Saronic, an American shipbuilder recently did something unprecedented. Saronic recently launched its first Marauder, a 69 meter medium unmanned surface vessel, and moved it from design to trials in less than a year. This sort of thing has not been seen in American shipbuilding since World War II.
Marauder is a WorkBoat, specifically a MUSV\Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel designed for the American Navy, and is a real accomplishment. Saronic built something the Department of War really needs. But no one else besides the Marauder has shown up at naval trade shows or in any naval planning documents, at least not anything that can go from idea, to development and construction in twelve months.
Saronic’s Marauder is large enough to carry four shipping containers. The Marauder is nothing unique in its size and weight class
Designing, building, and launching a 69 meter aluminum workboat in under a year is not a historic feat. American yards do this every year as they build nearly a thousand tugboats, ferries, patrol boats, crew boats, dredges, barges, towboats and aluminum hulls annually. The people at Saronic created an incredible company that fills a real and urgent need, using American workers in a Louisiana location.
The Marauder has a top speed of 50 kilometers an hour and a range of several thousand kilometers. A Marauder may stay at sea for up to a month. Marauder can operate autonomously once programmed with instructions on where to go and how to get there. The ship's progress can be monitored from a shore location via a satellite connection like Starlink. Three more Marauders are under construction and each will take only a few months to complete and will include modifications and upgrades based on the experience with the first WorkBoat.
While the rest of the American shipbuilding industry is mired in delays and cost overruns, one American shipbuilder has shown that it does not have to be that way. Whether the American navy can or will act on the Saronic example remains to be seen.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 29, 2026 - 03:34 pm: Edit

Air Weapons: Two New American Combat Drones
June 29, 2026: The American Air Force has agreed to put two Collaborative Combat Aircraft drones into service. The FQ-42 and FQ-44 will cost a billion dollars to get them into production by the end of the decade. The Air Force has already awarded contracts for production of the FQ-42A and FQ-44A drones. The Air Force development process began in 2024 and the prototype versions of these two drones first flew between August and October 2025. The Air Force expects to put 150 of these two drones into service by the end of the decade.
Collaborative Combat Aircraft are not new. A decade ago the Air Force demonstrated that F-16s equipped to operate as drones could successfully operate in formation with manned F-16s. This was all part of the Loyal Wingman program for eventually integrating combat drones with piloted warplanes. The F-16 drone needed software that would allow it to fly in formation and execute attack missions on its own, to avoid interference from jamming. That software worked although the initial flight tests of Loyal Wingman simply confirmed that the F-16 drones could safely fly in formation with piloted F-16s and effectively receive and respond to commands from the flight leader or other piloted F-16s. Further work involved drone software and resistance to jamming. All this live software testing would eventually be used in combat drones like the ones the navy has been testing and the air force was developing. The Army has already been testing similar software control of drones by suitably equipped attack helicopters.
Loyal Wingman came about after four years of effort to develop a drone version of the F-16. This drone version was based on the QF-16, the remotely controlled target version of the F-16. Back in 2013 the air force got its first QF-16 flying and began converting over a hundred retired F-16s to QF-16s. At the time it was noted that with a little extra work the QF-16 could be turned into a combat drone for dangerous missions like SEAD/Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses or attacking ground targets guarded by heavy air defenses. The air force was already planning to use combat drones for this but those were not available yet. It was noted that QF type aircraft use GPS to help with navigation and to insure that QFs flying in formation didn’t collide with one another. The QF-16 also carried sensors to detect near misses by missiles. Out of that came modified software and some additional hardware to enable the recent flight tests.
There were several other reasons for adapting the F-16 to be a combat drone in addition to designing combat drones from scratch. For one thing, the drone version of any combat aircraft was superior in some ways to one with a pilot in it. This was mainly because pilots black out when the aircraft makes turns too sharply at high speed. QF-16s used regularly for Loyal Wingman training also makes it possible to monitor, via additional sensors in the QF-16, how extreme, for piloted aircraft, maneuvers stress the fighters. Tests of manned aircraft have always been part of the development and testing process for new and modified aircraft. But those tests were limited by the cost of losing a lot of aircraft. By the 1960s fighter aircraft design had reached the point where the aircraft could perform maneuvers, like high speed turns, that humans could not handle. The air force discovered how effective this capability was during the 1970s, when they rigged some jet fighters to fly without a pilot and had them go up against manned aircraft. The remote controlled fighters were able to outmaneuver the same aircraft carrying pilots.
The QF-16 has already demonstrated its ability to carry out acrobatic maneuvers under remote control. This would be useful in getting into heavily defended airspace. Adding more sensors and flight control software could produce a formidable combat drone. Even after all the QF-16 conversions are completed, there will be several hundred retired F-16s suitable for conversion to combat drones.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 29, 2026 - 03:35 pm: Edit

I think that the US should produce Ukrainian drones under license, shipping most of the production to Ukraine but using this as a way to build a local drone-production infrastructure.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 29, 2026 - 03:36 pm: Edit

Air Defense: Europe Seeks To Emulate Ukrainian Improvisations
June 28, 2026: In light of what Ukraine has accomplished in defending itself from Russian drone and missile attacks, European nations that have been supplying Ukraine with over $100 billion in military aid plan upgrades to their own air defenses. Ukraine developed a unified air defense system using donations from NATO countries and new systems developed and manufactured in Ukraine. Now European nations are seeking to develop a similar air defense system but are stymied by incompatibilities. Each nation has its own unique system and getting all of these combined into a unified system is time consuming and expensive.
Europe must switch to affordable air defenses and do so quickly. It’s a lesson Ukraine learned the hard way as Russia scaled up its deployment of drones, including the Iranian-designed Shaheds, some of which are now built in Russia as Gerans.
Since Ukraine switched to affordable air defenses, other European nations have had sufficient warning that their tiny forces are unprepared for a new era of warfare. They ignored the indications and now have to transform while in combat.
Europe must be prepared to defend against tens of thousands of Shahed combat drone barrages day after day. Given the scale attacks, with Russia launching some 60,000 Shaheds at Ukraine in just four years, manned fighters and surface-to-air missile batteries firing guided missiles are incapable of being the main line of defense.
High-end ground-based air defenses, such as Patriot and SAMP/T missile batteries, are unavailable, unaffordable and unsuited to the task. Instead, European countries should follow Ukraine’s example and develop layered air defense in which numerous inexpensive drones are an affordable defense. Arab nations in the Persian Gulf have recently made contracts with Ukraine to purchase and set up more of Ukraine’s anti-drone defenses there.
Ukraine’s anti-Shahed system works, and it is common for Ukrainian defenders to take down 90 percent of drones during mass attacks. Ukrainians have efficiently accomplished this once or twice a week, month after month, year after year, while also fending off other aerial attacks. On March 23-24, for example, Russia launched its biggest air attack of the war using 982 missiles and drones. More than 900 of the drones were intercepted.
The Ukrainian system employs wide-area radio jamming that scrambles the satellite communication most Shaheds use for navigation. This costs a few million dollars to protect an entire city for years at a time.
The middle layer is roving aerial patrols, which don’t always involve expensive manned fighters. Instead, they might include helicopters, propeller-driven training planes, or even light cargo aircraft with gunners aiming out of their cockpits or cabins. There are also cheap, fast interceptor drones that range just a few kilometers but strike their targets with enough force to destroy them.
Ground-based light automatic gun teams form the innermost layer, taking aim at any drones that get through. The gunners might ride in pickup trucks with heavy machine guns bolted to their beds, or in German-made Gepard tracked gun vehicles first made in the 1960s. It costs a gun team a few hundred dollars in fuel and ammunition to shoot down a Shahed.
NATO countries have come to realize that the drone revolution is real and that NATO nations are unprepared to deal with it. Ukrainian military officials are beginning to change minds in NATO about the drone threat. A growing number of NATO military leaders are realizing that any future Russian attack will overwhelm NATO defenders with millions of drones. Ukraine has manufactured over five million drones since late 2023 and Russia is not far behind. When the Ukraine War ends, NATO nations will be the next Russian target, even if Russia loses in Ukraine.
Since 2022 air, land and naval drones have revolutionized warfare. These systems are evidence that combat robots have become an essential component of the military, without many people in or out of uniform paying a lot of attention. That's still the case, especially because the media and even many senior military and political leaders don’t fully understand the technology or how it is implemented. One example of this confusion can be seen with the constant reference to drones as robots. They are simply remotely controlled aircraft, something that’s been around for over half a century. But these drones are being given more and more operating autonomously robotic capabilities. This isn’t new either, as torpedoes have had this ability for over 60 years and missiles for over 50 years.
Swarms of First Person View or FPV drones revolutionized how wars are fought. There are few methods to defeat drone attacks. The primary defensive measure is electronic jamming of the control signal between the drone operator and the drone. Jamming is of limited effectiveness because active jammers are easy targets for drones programmed to detect, home in on and destroy jammers. Depending on how they are programmed, drones will either land if jammed or return to where they were launched.
Despite those defensive measures, and the small explosive payload drones carry, most of the armored vehicles damaged or destroyed in Ukraine were done in by drones. Over 80 percent of all casualties for both sides were inflicted by drones. Drone warfare is dominating the battlefield in Ukraine. Tactics and techniques are also evolving as Ukraine and Russia both experiment with drone designs. Both nations are also increasing production of drones and the number of trained operators. Russia and Ukraine realize that drones provide unprecedented surveillance of the battlefield, but only if you have enough drones and operators. One solution for this shortcoming is operator software that enables one operator to control several drones. The number of drones one operator can handle simultaneously depends on operator experience. That cannot be manufactured but must be developed. Whoever can obtain the most trained operators has an advantage.
All these drone developments make combat far more dangerous for the soldiers on the ground. Drones not only keep an eye on enemy troops but are always ready to go in and put them out of action, as in dead or wounded. Troops are still fighting each other on the ground, but now they have to worry about constant surveillance and attacks from the growing number of drones hovering over the battlefield. In addition to operators, there are the drone maintainers who repair damaged or otherwise disabled drones and service those needing a battery recharge or simply a fresh battery.
Ukraine established a Drone Academy to train drone operators in basic and advanced skills. There are courses for commanders on how best to manage and use drones. This is essential because now Ukrainian infantry battalions have over a hundred drones on their TOE/Tables Of Equipment and access to quick replacement of drones used. Americans call items like drones a force multiplier. This means a battalion with lots of drones is more effective, and lethal, than a battalion without so many drones. The Ukrainian military is the first to go so far in this direction and appear to be benefitting from the massive use of drones. Other nations are closely following this development and preparing to adopt what works for Ukraine. Russia is more conservative in how they deal with this, even though they are also using massive numbers of drones.
There are already dozens of Ukrainian companies offering training for drone operators and the Ukrainian military uses the services of these firms. In 2023 Ukraine sought to have more than 10,000 trained operators as quickly as possible. Drone operators specialize. Most learn to operate quadcopters while a large minority learn how to operate FPV drones, and a smaller number learn how to operate fixed-wing drones. Ukraine has found that the most difficult operators to recruit and train are those for FPV drones. The Ukrainian military considers drone operators as a separate military specialty like infantryman, artillerymen, or radar operator.
In early 2024 Ukraine created a new branch of their military, the Unmanned Aircraft, or Drone Force. This is in addition to the Ukrainian Air Force and its manned aircraft. The Drone Force does not control the drones Ukrainian forces use regularly, but instead contributes to developing new drone models and organizing mass production for those new models that are successful. Drones have been an unexpected development that had a huge impact on how battles in Ukraine's current war are fought. Drones were successful because they were cheap, easily modified, and expendable.
Early on both Russian and Ukrainian forces were using cheap, at a few hundred dollars each, quadcopter drones controlled by soldiers a kilometer or more away using FPV goggles to see what the day/night video camera on the drone can see. Each of these drones carries half a kilogram of explosives, so it can instantly turn the drone into a flying bomb that can fly into a target and detonate. This was an awesome and debilitating weapon when used in large numbers over the combat zone. If a target isn’t moving or requires more explosive power that the drones can supply, one of the drone operators can call in artillery, rocket, or missile fire, or even an airstrike. Larger, fixed wing drones are used for long range, often over a thousand kilometers, operations against targets deep inside Russia.
Since 2022 the use of drones by both sides has escalated and, so far, millions of drones have been put to work providing surveillance and attack services for both sides. The Ukrainians consider drones another form of ammunition that is cheaper, smarter and far more effective and lethal than guided missiles or GPS guided artillery shells.
NATO leaders, more than the distant Americans, realize that drones are a major threat. Europeans are developing a joint air defense system that now needs the ability to detect and destroy drones as well as aircraft and ballistic missiles. So many new problems and so far, so few solutions.
Currently European nations are talking about what they might do and the best estimates are that a unified system won’t be operational until 2030 or later. Sometime in the 2030s is more realistic. There is talk of Russia attacking Europe in the 2030s, despite the presence of Article 5 of the NATO treaty. This mandates that if one NATO member is attacked, all others will enter the war against the attacker. Such an attack is less likely if Europe has an operational combined air defense system. Such an attack is even more unlikely if Europe has a unified ground, naval and air defenses. Each nation would still have their own forces, but through a lot of hard work and planning efforts, these forces could be unified. This happened during World War II, when the Allied forces coordinated the forces of several nations to defeat Germany. It’s time for Europe to be united again.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 29, 2026 - 03:37 pm: Edit

Winning: Others Can Copy The Ukrainian Spiderweb Air Strike
June 28, 2026: The dramatic success of the Ukrainian Operation Spiderweb has inspired other countries to do something equally bold. Iran previously used their propeller-driven Saheed drones. Those low, slow and loud weapons with a range of 2,500 kilometers have been used to attack a British airbase in Cyprus. Russian electronic warfare has misdirected Ukrainian drones into NATO airspace, causing local airports to be closed until it was clear what had happened.
With Iran taking a beating in its war with Israel and America, it won’t be long before vengeful Iranians use more Shaheeds to torment nations within range. Europe is still trying to build a unified air defense system and continued incursions by Iranian Shaheeds will promote rapid completion of that system.
And lest we forget what started all this, Spiderweb was the June 2024 Ukrainian attack on Russian airfields deep inside the country. Last year SBU/Ukrainian Security Service recently revealed more details on this operation but withheld some details involving items that might be used again. Spiderweb was mostly about solving logistical problems. The drivers of the trucks were Russians who never knew they were working for the Ukrainians. The drivers simply delivered the crates containing the drones to specified locations and left. The operation was delayed a month because the drivers went on binge over Easter and were unavailable for the original operation dates. The Russian FSB/Federal Secret Police eventually discovered where the Russian drivers lived, arrested them and tortured the drivers for information the drivers never had. In fact, the drivers did nothing illegal. They drove cargoes of sealed crates to specified locations and left them there. The drivers didn’t learn what happened until much later.
The final staging area for the truck drivers was in Chelyabinsk, which is 2,100 kilometers from Ukraine. The trucks were stored in a garage one block from the FSB headquarters in Chelyabinsk. Since the trucks were Russian, as were the drivers, and the cargo was just wooden crates, the FSB never suspected a thing.
Another detail the Ukrainians revealed was that the warheads of those drones were armed with Shaped Charge devices. Normally these are used to penetrate armor. These shaped charges were used to penetrate the bomber's metal skin and penetrate deeply enough to hit a fuel line or tank and ignite whatever fuel was in the aircraft. This way the bombers supplied the flammable liquids needed to destroy or seriously damage them. Another revelation was that the SBU had made plans to keep the drones in the crates warm if the attacks were made during the winter.
The SBU spent nearly two years planning Spiderweb and it worked. Ukraine was able to launch a surprise drone attack on five Russian air bases located all over Russia. The farthest target was about 9,600 kilometers from Ukraine. One base was at Murmansk in northwestern Russia while another was in Amur Oblast near the Pacific coast. Two more, Ryazan and Ivanovo, were near Ukraine while Irkutsk was in central Siberia near the Mongolian border.
The attacks destroyed 41 aircraft, nearly 35 percent of the Russian long-range bomber fleet. Several other bombers were damaged but repairable. Most were Tu-95 and Tu-22M strategic bombers. Ukraine estimated the destroyed aircraft were worth $7 billion. Actually, these bombers are priceless because none of the destroyed bombers are manufactured anymore. Even making repairs is difficult because few of the aircraft components are still being made.
Ukraine called this operation Spider's Web because it involved smuggling 117 drones worth about half a million dollars. The drones were transported on several tractor-trailer trucks hauling standard cargo containers. These containers were modified so that the tops would be raised by remote control and the drones inside launched. The drones were FPV/First Person View models and the controllers were in Ukraine. There was not a lot of control to do because the drones had targeting systems that sought images of specific aircraft and landed on or near the aircraft fuel tanks before detonating. The remaining fuel in those tanks did most of the damage. Two or three drones were assigned to each target,
The Russian heavy bombers carry up to eight Kh-101 missiles each. These missiles are like the 1983 American Tomahawk but did not enter service until 2010. Tomahawks have a range of up to 2,500 kilometers while the Kh-101 can travel as far as 5,500 kilometers. During the Ukraine War most of these missiles carried less fuel and larger 800 kg warheads. The missiles were usually launched about a thousand kilometers from the Ukrainian border so the launching heavy bombers could avoid being shot down by Ukrainian aircraft or Patriot missiles.
While somewhat stealthy, they travel at subsonic speed and Ukrainian air defenses soon became quite proficient at shooting them down, usually with Patriot or other missiles. Ukrainian aircraft carrying long-range anti-aircraft missiles have also accounted for a lot of Kh-101s. In response Russia is using more inexpensive drones while developing high-speed Kinzhal hypersonic missiles. Kinzhal is more likely to reach its target but costs five times as much as Kh-101 and entered service in 2018. Ukrainians air defense experts found ways to intercept Kinzhal, but not as frequently as Kh-101s.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 29, 2026 - 03:37 pm: Edit

Logistics: Drones Eliminating Russian Road Access To Crimea
June 27, 2026: Russia seized the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in 2014. To make matters worse, Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Now, five years later the Russian invasion has failed and Russian leader Vladimir Putin is seeking a way to explain the failure of what he initially called a Special Operation lasting a few days. Russia suffered 1.4 million casualties, lost nearly 14,000 armored vehicles and much equipment. In the last year Ukrainian air strikes using drones have devastated oil production and refining facilities in Western Russia along with the destruction of a Tu-142MR over-the-horizon radio relay aircraft used for communication with submerged submarines. Earlier Ukraine had carried out a long range attack that destroyed most of Russia’s heavy bomber fleet.
Now Ukraine is preparing to make Crimea Ukrainian once more. To make this happen the few roads linking Russia and Crimea are under attack. Modern combat drones, which Ukrainians developed to fight the Russian invaders, are now being used to destroy Russian military bases, Air Defense Systems, roads and port facilities in Crimea. Most Russian civilians in Crimea have returned to Russia during the last year.
Since 2024 Russia has spent nearly $12 billion to improve the roads and other transportation connecting Crimea to Russia. Now the Ukrainians are blowing it all up, day by day. Satellite photos show more and more burned out Russian trucks along roads that are now missing vital bridges but covered by regular patrols by Ukrainian attack drones.
Ukrainian political and military leaders admit that the liberation of Crimea and occupied provinces in eastern Ukraine is going to happen sooner rather than later. This year it is Ukrainian forces that are regaining ground while Russia has been unable to recruit enough new soldiers to replace those lost in Ukraine. Russia has been at war in Ukraine longer than it was during World War II fighting and defeating the German invaders. This is something that is unpopular in Russia and the reason why Russia can’t find enough men to replace losses in Ukraine.
There have been some peace talks, but Vladimir Putin is still looking for a suitable, for himself, way to admit defeat. The Russian people and economy have struggled through four years of economic sanctions and most Russians, according to polls and Russian bloggers, just want the war to be over. They don’t care if Ukraine gets all its territory back, they just want the war and all its attendant privation to end. One day soon, Ukraine and Russia will simply announce that the war is over.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 29, 2026 - 03:39 pm: Edit

Murphy's Law: Why The Iran War Will Never End
June 27, 2026: The Iran war will never end because of Islam. In part this is because relations between Moslems and Infidels/non-believers allows believers to use various forms of deception and deceit to defeat the non-believer. One of these techniques is hudna. This is not viewed as a path to permanent peace, but rather as a tactical maneuver to be employed when Muslims find themselves in a position of weakness.
If you, the Muslim, are weak and the infidel is too strong, you can give him temporary peace. Then, if the infidel falls asleep on guard, you can do whatever you like to him, even within the time of the temporary peace, because this is what Muhammad did.
This interpretation suggests that a hudna is less a genuine peace offering and more a strategic pause, a time for regrouping and improving your situation. It's an outlook that illustrates the complexity of current peace negotiations in the Middle East, raising questions about the long-term practicality of accords based on this hypothesis.
Some dispute this view as it distorts difficult theological and historical beliefs, potentially aggravating relations between groups. Advocates for hudna believe that understanding the hudna in its original form is necessary for genuine diplomatic commitment.
The implications extend beyond mere semantics. In an era where the West often seeks permanent resolutions to conflicts, the concept of hudna introduces a fundamentally different approach to peace, one that is fundamentally temporary and provisional. This lack of understanding can lead to misinterpretations and futile negotiations.
Moreover, the concept of hudna is intertwined with the broader Islamic notion of jihad, which is not just a military struggle, but much more as it includes economic, educational, and even media-based strategies to advance Islamic interests.
As the Middle East continues to be the central locus for worldwide geopolitics, knowledge of things like hudna become more important. Western diplomats and government officials must deal with situations which view peace not as an end in itself, but as a means to an end.
The challenge, then, is to overcome these problems. Can temporary truces serve as stages to actual and long term peace agreements? Or does the very nature of hudna prevent such an option? As the region teeters between conflict and uneasy calm, these questions take on renewed importance.
In the chess game of Middle Eastern diplomacy, understanding the true nature of hudna may well be the key to avoiding perpetual stalemate. For those seeking lasting peace in the region, it's a concept that cannot be ignored or misunderstood.
No matter what peace deals Iran establishes with Israel and the largely Christian West, hudna allows Iran to justify, at least to fellow Muslims, violating these agreements. In the Persian Gulf, the Arab States fear Iran, which for thousands of years has been the lone Indo-European superpower. These Arab states advise their Western allies, and customers for Arab oil, that Iran cannot be trusted and must always be watched carefully, while a large Western/Israeli retaliation force stands ready to punish any Iranian misbehavior.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 29, 2026 - 03:40 pm: Edit

Information Warfare: Ukrainian Attack Cripples Northern Fleet Communications

June 26, 2026: In late May, Ukrainian drones recently attacked Taganrog Airport, which was near the Black Sea coast. The attacks destroyed a Tu-142MR over-the-horizon radio relay aircraft used for communication with submerged submarines. Russia only has about a dozen MR aircraft and is unable to build new ones due to Western sanctions. Each loss makes it more difficult for the Navy to keep in touch with its nuclear submarines. Most of those submarines are in northwestern Russia near the Kola Peninsula, where the Northern Fleet was based.
After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, there were a hundred nuclear submarines in the Northern Fleet that needed scrapping. By 2022, most of the work had been done, but the Russian invasion of Ukraine brought that to a halt and left at least two radioactive submarines spewing radioactivity into Arctic waters.
The Northern Fleet can’t seem to break its cycle of calamities. Twenty-six years ago, another Russian submarine went down, the then pride of the Northern Fleet, the 14,000-ton Kursk. This was not the first such disaster to plague Russia's Northern Fleet, which has always been a hard-luck outfit. A lot of that has to do with the fleet's location, near the Arctic Circle. Murmansk and Vladivostok in the Far East are Russia’s only two naval bases with year-round unhindered access to the high seas. But Murmansk was cold most of the year, and had too much darkness in Winter and too much sunlight in Summer. It's a dreary place. Nevertheless, Murmansk has long been Russia's largest naval base, with half the submarine fleet operating from there.
But since the end of the Cold War, fleet operations and shipbuilding have declined, and much of Murmansk’s economic activity has become decommissioning older Russian nuclear subs. Even though some 90 percent of the ships in the 1990 Soviet fleet had been taken out of service, Russia was having problems funding and manning the remaining ships. For decades, the main source of sailors was unenthusiastic and lackadaisical conscripts. This has led to safety problems, especially with nuclear-propelled ships. But this was nothing new for the Northern Fleet. For a long time, Russians told a chilling joke, How do you recognize a sailor from the Northern Fleet? He glows in the dark! Radiation sickness from poor shielding and accidents in submarine reactors was so common that there was a special hospital to treat the many victims. There were other problems. Lax supervision and bad safety practices also led to several nasty accidents in ammunition depots. One massive explosion in 1984 destroyed so many essential naval munitions that the fleet was unready for war for some six months.
The end of the Cold War also made naval service much less attractive to career sailors, especially officers, who had previously kept the Northern Fleet going. The lower quality of personnel and leadership was one reason for the decommissioning of so many ships. Even then, there still weren't enough capable crews to keep all of the ships operating effectively. Likely, the Kursk went down because of poorly maintained munitions and equipment. Russian ships have suffered onboard explosions because of this before. The 3M45 Shipwreck cruise missiles on the Kursk were particularly tricky beasts. They were launched underwater and then flew at several times the speed of sound to their targets. These missiles carried several tons of highly volatile rocket fuel and explosives. An accident with a Shipwreck was known to be likely fatal, and was with the Kursk. Ditto for most Russian torpedoes as those are temperamental and carry massive warheads. Ironically, Russian subs are carefully designed to survive a torpedo hit, but these design features are useless if a torpedo detonates inside the sub. Unlike the Shipwreck missiles, Russian submarine torpedoes are often worked on by technicians while their sub is at sea, and problems with cranky torpedoes are not unknown.
But Russia's main problem was not bad crews, quirky weapons or poor leadership. No, the main problem with the Russian navy was that Russia doesn't need a navy. Russia is a classic continental power, one that can do without control, or even use of, the high seas. Indeed, during the five hundred years that Russia has existed, a navy has rarely been a national priority. Every few generations, the nation gets bit with the navy bug and an attempt is made to build a fleet. These endeavors have always ended badly. Always. Even when foreigners were hired to help out, it didn't work. American naval hero John Paul Jones served for a while as a Russian admiral before he fled what he saw as a disaster waiting to happen. The Turks regularly humiliated the Russians at sea. The Japanese defeated a Russian fleet in 1905. During World War II, the Russian submarine fleet lost more boats than it sank. This was a unique record for underachievement, but the sort of thing that was common in the Russian navy.
While Britain and American sailors have a tradition that scares enemies, the Russian fleet suggests just the opposite. After years of operating against Soviet ships during the Cold War, American sailors became openly contemptuous of their potential foes. But the Russian navy has become a matter of national pride in Russia. Few will openly argue that Russia does not need a navy, and the loss of the Kursk was unlikely to change that. Thus, ironically, the Kursk disaster makes the Russian navy a force to be feared. Not so much for what Russian ships can do to anyone else, but for what they can do to themselves and anyone unfortunate enough to be nearby.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 29, 2026 - 03:41 pm: Edit

Air Weapons: Using Drones For A SINKEX
June 26, 2026: Last year the American Navy used four aerial drones and a single naval drone in a SINKEX\Sinking Exercise. The target was a retired frigate. The drones attacked the frigate several times before the ship went down. The methods used to carry out a SINKEX have been around for half a century and have been largely unchanged. Two years ago the American Navy disposed of two retired amphibious ships by having ships and warplanes fire on them. The two ships were equipped with electronic sensors to record the progress of the damage and transmit it to nearby technicians.
The Navy does not conduct SINKEX exercises every year. For example, from 2015 to 2024, no SINKEX were carried out in 2017, 2019, 2021, and 2023. During the six years when there were SINKEX events, a total of eight ships were sunk.
The American Navy uses SINKEX exercises to gather information needed to improve techniques for handling ships damaged in future combat. Some exercises are conducted while towing a 40,000-ton burned-out ship to the scrap yard. A battle damage assessment team was put aboard the ship to record damage as they would in wartime. The assessors had never been on the ship before and were able to perform a realistic assessment. The ship in question was wrecked by a shipyard fire in July 2020 and decommissioned in April 2021.
For half a century, the Navy has conducted SINKEX training. In the last two decades, one or two ships a year were sunk, most off the coast of California or Hawaii. SINKEX enables the Navy to test new theories on how vulnerable or invulnerable modern warships are and how effective new or current weapons are. With the advent of smaller, cheaper, and more reliable sensors and broadcasting gear, it's possible to get a lot more data out of a SINKEX target and monitor the damaged ship as it is hit until it goes under. This leads to changes in ship design and damage control techniques. From now on, the ship to be sunk will first be damaged by a smaller explosion, and a damage assessment team will be put in place to assess the damage. After that, the SINKEX will be completed using ship or aircraft weapons.
Increasingly, the navy is equipping the SINKEX ships with sensors that transmit back to the SINKEX control staff what happened and when. This information is used to modify existing ships, tactics, onboard techniques, and the design of future warships. This makes SINKEX more productive for the Navy and encourages staging more SINKEX exercises, perhaps using foreign ships scheduled for disposal.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, June 29, 2026 - 03:42 pm: Edit

Submarines: Chinese Submarine Supremacy Efforts
June 25, 2026: In each of the last five years China has built three or four submarines a year. During this period China built ten nuclear subs, with an average displacement of 7,800 tons while America built seven nuclear subs of similar size.
Currently China has 70 submarines, twelve of them nuclear powered and the rest diesel electric, although most also have AIP/Air Independent Propulsion. America’s 65 submarines are all nuclear powered and fourteen are SSBNs that carry ballistic missiles. China has only six SSBNs.
Desperate to gain an edge in submarine warfare, China has been building submarines with unique features, like no sail, which is the square superstructure on top of the hull which most submarines have had for over a century.
The Chinese navy has been rapidly growing since the 1980s and currently has more ships than the American navy. China has not yet caught up in total tonnage because American warships tend to be heavier. The eleven American nuclear aircraft carriers are something China may never match. China is also way behind when it comes to experience. China admits that it will take decades to match and then surpass the American fleet. China often mentions 2050 as the year Chinese naval power surpasses the United States. Meanwhile China is encountering a lot of expected, and some unexpected problems.
For example, Chinese leader Xi Jinping was shocked and surprised by the growing number of problems in his military. Xi has openly complained about corruption, poor work habits and lack of discipline. Xi ordered a purge of military personnel purportedly responsible for these problems and demanded that officials in charge of military combat and support operations make the changes, or else. Efforts to identify and eliminate corrupt practices and officials responsible for them have not been successful.
Over the last decade there have been multiple purges of corrupt officials, with over a dozen generals, nearly as many admirals and a growing number of senior aerospace and shipbuilding industry officials. This included officers and officials in charge of the rocket forces that maintain short and long range missiles. Many of these missiles were found to be, on closer inspection, inoperable. In late 2023 a former defense minister was removed from the national legislature because of corruption charges.
Xi has found that there are few officials he can trust to be free of corruption and accusations of incompetence. The dismissed senior officers obtained their positions by pretending to get things done but failing to do so in the belief that there would not be a war or threat of war to expose their misdeeds. The amounts stolen, most recently with China’s strategic oil reserves, have been so enormous as to indicate corruption even among the personnel charged with seeking it out, including the secret police. Worst of all, many of those involved with the oil reserve thefts got the proceeds of their thefts, themselves and their families out of China before the theft was fortuitously discovered when the oil reserves were needed to make up for decreased imports due to the 2026 Iran war.
This is a serious matter because the government has spent hundreds of billion dollars to build the largest fleet in the world. This process began in 2012, and Xi expected the Chinese fleet to be the world’s largest modern force by 2050. This actually happened in 2025, when the American government and navy leadership were finally convinced that Chinese naval power was a serious threat in the Pacific, and now the Chinese are seeking to become the dominant naval power in the Persian Gulf and waters between there and China.
The Chinese navy still has some serious problems. Corrupt shipyard officials and a navy commanded by corrupt admirals threatens to create an expensive and useless force. On paper the Chinese seem headed for success. Currently the Chinese navy has three aircraft carriers, four amphibious ships/helicopter carriers, 75 submarines and 300 other warships. The total number of ships is 743, including a large number of support ships so the navy can operate far into the Pacific or Indian Oceans. China has never had a high seas fleet like this before. This large naval fleet was made possible by China becoming the world's largest builder of commercial ships. Currently about half the world's supply of new cargo, tanker and specialized ships are built in Chinese shipyards. China has become the world’s largest importer of raw materials and exporter of manufactured goods, all of which is moved by ships through seas easily blockaded by ships and aircraft of the United States and Japan. China’s growing fleet is intended to deal with that if necessary.
Another problem with China’s naval expansion is obtaining the well-trained manpower to operate it. This is much truer of China’s navy than its other military services because China lacks a naval or even maritime seagoing tradition of the sort that America, Japan, Britain and a few other European nations have. Effective navies must drill at sea constantly, but that requires their ship crews to spend months at a time at sea away from their families. China has discovered a major problem recruiting the necessary well-educated young men willing to do this. The on-going collapse of China’s population size makes this recruitment problem even worse as the yearly pool of males coming of military age plummets.
FYEO