| By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 07:14 am: Edit |
Ukraine has continued the Azov campaign, and has now hit 90 total ships. Some were sunk, some were disabled, other suffered varying degrees of damage. Four large ferry boats used in the Kerch Strait have been disabled.
| By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 08:01 am: Edit |
On their return today, members of the U.S. Senate are going to push for new sanctions on Russia in honor of the late Sen. Graham, who had been part of a bipartisan announcement of intent for said sanctions this past Friday; his desk will be covered with a black cloth, upon which will be a vase of white flowers in memoriam.
| By Mike Erickson (Mike_Erickson) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 10:56 am: Edit |
Maybe they'll sanction all the European nations who buy Russian natural gas delivered by pipelines or by tankers from Yamal?
--Mike
| By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 11:05 am: Edit |
IIRC, those nations are explicitly allowed to buy Russian natural gas.
And a lot of them have worked hard to reduce imports.
Google AI " the EU has formally legislated plans for a total phase-out of both Russian LNG and pipeline gas by early 2027..."
| By Mike Erickson (Mike_Erickson) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 11:58 am: Edit |
The Jan 2027 target is self-set by the EU. So they graciously allow themselves to buy Russian energy and give the Russians hard currency that they can then use to buy equipment and supplies to fight Ukraine.
And bear in mind, the various EU energy targets have moved before, and may do so again based upon the circumstances.
All told, European purchases of all Russian energy are around $10B USD equivalent for 2026 so far.
--Mike
| By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 02:37 pm: Edit |
Record Ukrainian Drone Attacks In June
July 14, 2026: Last month, Ukrainian drones hit more than 200,000 Russian targets. This killed or wounded nearly 30,000 troops and, increasingly, demoralized the survivors. This explains the growing number of Russian deserters and surrenders to Ukrainian soldiers.
The number of attacks has been growing over the last few months, causing panic in the Russian High Command. The attacks have made it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to deliver supplies and reinforcements to Russian front-line units. Long-range Ukrainian drones have, over the last year, continued attacking economic and military targets deep inside Russia. This has caused fuel shortages for civilians and the military alike. The attacks have caused thousands of civilians to leave the Crimean Peninsula. The Russian response has been weakening, with Ukraine carrying out up to 60 percent more drone attacks. On the ground, the growing use of wheeled or tracked ground drones has made it easier to resupply Ukrainian soldiers. Armed combat drones are covering more of the front line. The drone operators are dozens of kilometers away, but each operator can monitor the camera feeds from several drones and activate the drone weapons as needed.
Ukraine uses 30 percent more drones than Russia. In the first half of 2025, there was a sharp increase in Russian use of attack drones, primarily FPV\First Person View drones. The Ukrainian drone advantage slowed, stopped, and sometimes reversed the momentum of the Russians' offensive operations
It’s a similar situation with the daily percentage of drones operating with FOG\Fiber Optic Guidance. These drones are controlled via a fiber-optic cable that can be many kilometers long. FOG drones cannot be jammed. For Ukraine, 32 percent of drones use FOG guidance while the Russians use only 24 percent. Use of FOG drones by both sides has been so extensive that birds use discarded fiber-optic wires for bird nests.
The Ukrainians were faster at developing innovations in drone design. The Russians imitate this progress but are always a few months or more behind.
In some parts of the 1,100-kilometer front line, the Russians can concentrate more drones than the Ukrainians have for offensive operations. There are fewer Russian offensives due to high casualties, troop shortages, and declining troop morale. The Ukrainians have taken advantage of this and are reclaiming more territory from the Russians. At this rate, the Russians might be pushed out of Ukraine by 2027. One factor making this possible is the increasing number of long-range attacks against Russian refineries, pipelines, weapons, and electronics manufacturing. Last month, in a particularly bold move, Ukraine sent nearly a hundred drones against the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, which is 1,500 kilometers from Ukraine. While the Russians admitted they had to delay some operations at Plesetsk, it remains unclear how much, if any, damage the drones caused to the facility.
These Ukrainian attacks deep inside Russia are disrupting Russian efforts to use their air defense systems effectively, or at all. The S300 and S400 air defense batteries have to be moved by rail or barge to new locations. The Ukrainian drones are now equipped with guidance systems that can attack one of several targets, depending on which has the fewest air defenses protecting it. The air defense crisis also means that front-line troops are often left with little or no air defense systems.
For Russia, the most damaging Ukrainian innovation in drone warfare is their use of AI/Artificial Intelligence for drone targeting systems. The AI drone contains a targeting system that finds targets. The AI drone operator confirms which targets are real, and once a target is confirmed, the AI targeting system needs no further communication with anyone. It is resistant to all forms of jamming.
Modern warfare has been radically changed by the introduction of FPV drones. These drones are an omnipresent aerial threat to armored vehicles and infantry on foot. Each FPV drone costs less than a thousand dollars. Operators use the drone's video camera to see what is below and locate targets. Armed FPV operators are several kilometers away to decide when their FPV drones will drop explosives on an armored vehicle, which has thinner armor on top, or on infantry in the open or in trenches. To do so, the drone operators often operate in pairs, with one flying behind the other and concentrating on the big picture while seeking a likely target. When the reconnaissance drone finds such a target, the armed drone is directed to it. The two FPV drone operators are usually in the same room or tent and can take control of new drones, which are lined up and brought outside for launch when needed. The reconnaissance drones are often unarmed, so they can spend more time in the air searching for a target.
FYEO
| By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 02:37 pm: Edit |
Russia: Rural Russia Versus Urban Russia
July 13, 2026: Recently, a liquid fuel shortage has begun across most of Russia. The cause was growing Ukrainian drone attacks on fuel storage sites, pipelines, and oil refineries. The drone attacks have been increasing in number over the years. The cumulative damage to Russian petroleum-related enterprises and infrastructure in general has reached unsustainable levels. This may explain reports that the war in Ukraine may soon be over.
Meanwhile, Ukrainians pointed out that drones were an unexpected development that had a huge impact on how battles in Ukraine were fought. Drones were successful because they were cheap, easily modified, and expendable. Modifications and upgrades could be implemented quickly and inexpensively. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces were soon using cheap quadcopter drones controlled by soldiers a few kilometers distant using FPV/First Person View goggles to see what the day/night video camera on the drone can see. Adding night vision is available when needed, at a higher cost per drone. These drones cost a few hundred dollars each, with the most complex models going for about a thousand dollars. Most of these drones carry half a kilogram of explosives, so operators can instantly turn the drone into a flying bomb that can fly into a target and detonate. Some drones carry more explosives depending on what is needed to deal with a target.
These drones are awesome and debilitating weapons when used in large numbers. If a target isn’t moving or requires more explosive power than the drones can supply, one of the drone operators can call in artillery, rocket, or missile fire, or even an airstrike. Larger, fixed-wing drones are used for long-range operations, often over a thousand kilometers, against targets deep inside Russia.
Drones are usually able to complete their mission, whether it is a one-way attack or reconnaissance and surveillance. The recon missions are usually survivable and enable the drone to be reused. All these drones are constantly performing surveillance, which means that both sides commit enough drones to maintain constant surveillance over a portion of the front line to a depth of at least a few kilometers into enemy territory. Longer-range drones can track Russian operations hundreds of kilometers behind the front lines.
This massive use of FPV-armed drones has revolutionized warfare in Ukraine, and both sides are producing as many as they can. Russia now produces its own drones after briefly using imported Iranian Shahed-136 drones, which cost over $100,000 each. Ukraine demonstrated that it could design and build drones with similar capabilities for less than a tenth of that cost. The Iranian drone was more complex than it needed to be, and even the Russians soon realized this and turned away from the Shahed-136 in favor of more capable drones they copied from Ukrainian designs or their own. Russia still uses its Shahed drones because they have a factory to build them, and the more airborne drones it can send on a mission, the better the chance that some will hit the target. There are also larger fixed-wing drones that can drop bombs or release smaller attack drones. These larger bomber drones can also transport supplies to troops who are otherwise hard to reach.
Ukraine has also developed land-based DV/Drone Vehicles to carry supplies or transport casualties. DVs have revolutionized combat zone transportation. The DVs are operated remotely and can often make a trip autonomously. In Ukraine, the battlefield is increasingly dominated by unmanned air and land vehicles. The operators stay in bunkers and rarely venture out. The combat zone is under constant surveillance, and if infantry advance, they do so in small groups under the protection of their own drones.
Conventional artillery, mortar, and rocket weapons have had to change the way they operate. They must fire a few rounds quickly and move before counterfire hits them. Because of this, these weapons are less effective, and drones now account for over 80 percent of casualties. Tanks and other armored vehicles are similarly constrained and have to be used infrequently lest they be swarmed by drones and destroyed or immobilized.
Military leaders in other nations have noted this and are scrambling to equip their own forces with the most effective drones. Not having enough of these to match the number the enemy has in a portion of the front means you are at a serious disadvantage in that area. These drones are still evolving in design and use, becoming more effective and essential.
One countermeasure that can work for a while is electronic jamming of the drones’ control signal. Drone guidance systems are continually modified or upgraded to address this. Most drones have flight control software that returns drones with jammed control signals to their takeoff point to land for reuse. The jammers on the ground can be attacked by drones programmed to home in on the jamming signal. Countermeasures can be overcome, and the side that does so more quickly and completely has an advantage. That advantage is usually temporary because both sides are investing significant effort to keep their combat drones effective on the battlefield.
The widespread use of drones has turned combat brigades, battalions, and companies into avid users. While Ukraine has a separate Drone Force for developing new drones and assessing the use of current ones, most drones are used by regular combat units. Some of these units are selected to test new drones or drone concepts.
Another development was the way Ukrainian-developed drones changed the nature and cost of warfare. Drones are cheap and the drone operators are rarely casualties. Ukrainian civilians and soldiers often modify their drones and share those innovations with other Ukrainians. Those concepts spread to Europe and the United States, where entrepreneurs began developing new weapons and military equipment. One entrepreneur, Elon Musk, created SpaceX, a company that put thousands of communications satellites into orbit. Musk allowed Ukrainian forces to use this satellite network for battlefield communications, giving them an edge over the Russians.
FYEO
| By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 02:39 pm: Edit |
Korea: North Korean Missile Destroyer Enters Service
July 12, 2026: The North Korean Navy has long been a ramshackle operation with a few small surface warships, lots of patrol boats, numerous miniature submarines, and a few ancient, larger ones. That is slowly changing, as North Korea recently launched the first of its destroyers, the 5,000-ton Choe Hyon, which is armed with anti-aircraft, anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles. The ballistic and cruise missiles can be armed with explosive or nuclear warheads. It is believed that the destroyers were built with Russian assistance, given the recent aid North Korea provided Russia in Ukraine. A second destroyer was completed but was damaged during a launch accident. Repairs were recently completed and the second destroyer is being readied for sea trials. North Korea also has a nuclear-powered submarine under construction. North Korea is also planning to build one or more 10,000-ton cruisers.
In contrast, South Korea, with a GDP fifty times larger than the North's, has a larger and more modern Navy with 17 frigates, all of which entered service between 1992 and 2024. There are thirteen destroyers, three corvettes, and 34 patrol boats. There are also 22 submarines and 21 amphibious warfare ships. The frigates and submarines are the first line of defense along South Korean coasts. The patrol boats patrol and report what they encounter. It’s up to the larger warships to deal with any threat. The most prominent ships defending the coasts are the frigates. The destroyers and larger submarines operate much farther from Korea.
Since 2017, all South Korean navy ships have been built in South Korea. At the end of 2016, South Korea retired the last American-built warship in its fleet, a support vessel, a 3,000-ton salvage and rescue ship that entered American service in 1972 as the Beaufort. This ship retired from American service in 1996 and was transferred to South Korea, where it served as the Pyeongtaek/ATS-27 for another 20 years. South Korea put two locally designed and built ATS ships into service in 2014 and 2016.
South Korea began designing and building its own warships in the late 1970s. This began with patrol boats, advanced to corvettes and frigates in the 1980s, to amphibious ships, submarines and destroyers in the 1990s, and after 2000 to larger destroyers similar to the American Aegis destroyers. By the 1990s, South Korea had begun exporting warships to other Asian nations, and that trend continues to expand. The latest South Korean warship is the 4,200-ton frigate Chungnam, the first of six FFX-III ships.
In 2013, South Korea commissioned its first FFX frigate. The FFXs are 3,200 ton ships and are each armed with a 127mm gun, eight anti-ship or cruise missiles, three torpedo tubes, a RAM anti-missile launcher, and a Phalanx anti-missile gun system. There is space aft for two helicopters. FFX’s are for coast defense. FFX replaces older Ulsan-class frigates and Pohang-class corvettes. In 1986, one of the Pohang’s confronted and sank a North Korean gunboat that entered South Korean waters and refused to obey signals to withdraw. In a similar incident in 1996, two North Korean warships withdrew as ordered.
The 24 Pohang-class corvettes came in two variants. The first is an anti-ship version that has two Exocet anti-ship missiles, a 76mm gun, and twin 30mm anti-aircraft guns. The second is an ASW version, which has two 76mm guns, two triple 12.75-inch torpedo tubes, and two twin 40mm anti-aircraft guns.
The FFX ships are highly automated, requiring a crew of only 140. Top speed is 61 kilometers an hour. Range is 8,000 kilometers. Most of the equipment, including electronics and weapons, is locally built. South Korea plans to build at least fifteen of these ships. The first six were all in service by 2015. The first ship in the class, the Ulsan, cost over $110 million. South Korea hoped to export the FFX to many navies seeking a high-quality, low-cost warship. Meanwhile, South Korea has also built larger warships and is increasingly involved in submarine production.
South Korea has also paid a lot of attention to amphibious operations, which would be essential if there were ever a war with North Korea. In 2018, the South Koreans put the last of four LST-II-class amphibious assault ships into service. These 7,100-ton vessels can carry 300 troops and 10-20 vehicles. There is a landing pad that can hold 2 helicopters. Two smaller landing craft that can run up on a beach are also carried. The ship is 126 meters long, 19 meters wide, and has a crew of 120. Top speed is 42 kilometers an hour. Cruising speed is 32 kilometers an hour, and at that speed the ship can stay at sea for 18 days. Weapons consist mostly of anti-missile systems plus a 76mm gun. The first ship entered service in 2015. The navy has four 1990s LST-I-class ships, as well as two larger 18,000-ton Dokdo-class LPH helicopter landing ships that carry 720 marines, 10 helicopters, and 200 vehicles, which are put ashore via landing craft or hovercraft. The navy has eight of these, and four can operate from LPHs.
These LST II class ships are part of an expansion of South Korea's amphibious forces. The South Korean Marine Corps was expanded from 25,000 to 29,000 men. The South Korean Marines were initially organized into two divisions and a brigade. As part of the expansion, a new brigade and helicopter squadron were formed to help guard the North Korean border on the west coast. The aviation battalion uses 30 of the new KUH/Korean Utility Helicopter, which carries 2 pilots and 11 passengers. It can be armed with 7.62 mm machine guns. Some 60 percent of the components are made in South Korea. The 8.7-ton KUH can hover up to 3,000 meters and has a top speed of 240 kilometers per hour.
Currently, the South Korean Marines are equipped with 60 LVTP-7 amphibious vehicles, 42 AAV-7A1s, and 60 K-1 tanks. This force is officially under the control of the South Korean Navy but usually operates under the command of the army. Currently, about 5,000 Marines are stationed on the west coast, including nearby islands. The new brigade will expand this force.
In 2016, the Marines were ordered to form a special rapid deployment brigade called Spartan 3000. This unit has 3,000 Marines assigned and is trained and ready to move anywhere in the Korean Peninsula within 24 hours. Marines rotate into and out of Spartan 3000 because the work is particularly demanding. Spartan 3000 is meant to quickly respond to any North Korean attack by defeating any North Korean special operations forces that get into South Korea and also going after key targets in North Korea. To assist with that, about another 1,000 South Korean special operations troops are involved.
The South Korean Marines are considered an elite force, even though many of the troops are draftees. But all the Marines are volunteers, and the training is tough. It's considered an honor to be a Marine, and the U.S. Marine Corps, their original mentors, have long acknowledged that their Korean counterparts have learned their lessons well.
FYEO
| By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 02:40 pm: Edit |
Russian Military Regeneration After Ukraine
July 12, 2026: With the war in Ukraine winding down, Russia is finding itself short of manpower. Over four years of war have left 1.4 million dead, wounded, disabled, and missing soldiers. After the war began, Russia mobilized 318,000 civilians to become soldiers. That also triggered more than a million Russian military-age men to flee the country over the next few years.
Those who do end up in the Russian army received little training and often little more than boots, a combat uniform, a cloth cap or maybe a steel helmet, and little else. These men were expected to scrounge or receive more equipment before they reached the battlefield. Once there, plenty of well-equipped dead soldiers were available to plunder. During the first year, the Russian army suffered heavy casualties against the better-trained, equipped, and led Ukrainian forces.
The Russian government realized that something more was needed to obtain willing soldiers. To do so, Russia relied more on existing military enlistment contracts. New soldiers would receive a signing bonus of anywhere between $2,500 and $15,000. This was impressive as the average civilian wage was about $5,000 a year. Once in the army, the soldier would receive $2,200 to $3,000 a month, depending on rank and skills. If the soldier were killed, his family received about $80,000, which local officials often stole some or all of it and told the family that the money was lost in the system and they were looking for it as soon as they got back from their vacation to Spain.
The size of signing bonuses varied depending on where the new soldier lived. For most of the war, the amounts have already been described. But in the last year, recruiting reached Moscow, St Petersburg and other large cities where signing bonuses of $50,000-$75,000 were required. So far, nearly 600,000 soldiers have been mobilized via cash inducements. Another source of recruits has been convicts, 200,000 of them so far. They are offered less money, but the assurance of a pardon and freedom if they survive at least six months of combat. Few did. Other sources included about 50,000 Central Asian recruits on paper. North Korea sold Russia the services of over 20,000 combat and support troops.
Throughout the war, Russia had problems obtaining enough sergeants and officers. These combat leaders suffered heavy casualties at the front, and it was difficult to replace them. Early in the war, the officers were veteran professionals. Most of those were lost by late 2023. Sergeants, or any soldier showing potential, were offered officer rank. Most accepted but didn’t last long in Ukraine. Eventually, word filtered back to Russia that service in Ukraine was a virtual death sentence. In reality, only about half the Russian troops sent to Ukraine became casualties or went missing. Good jobs were hard to find, so many men took a chance, and the money, and tried their luck in Ukraine.
Russia won’t officially admit it yet, but the war in Ukraine is ending, and Russia lost. Leader Vladimir Putin is seeking ways to explain away the defeat of his Special Operation without admitting that the war ruined the Russian economy and left Russia with two million fewer young men. At the same time, Putin is planning future combat operations against NATO countries to see if the NATO alliance really works and whether attacking one member will bring all of NATO into the conflict. Putin believes NATO is a house of cards that will collapse if tested. He has little to lose by testing NATO’s resolve. Russia plans to expand westward, and these tests are expected to take place by the end of the decade.
FYEO
| By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 02:41 pm: Edit |
Leadership: Russia Crippled By Corruption
July 10, 2026: The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine was supposed to be over in a few weeks but lasted longer than the Russian World War II effort to defeat the Nazis. That victory was achieved because Russia built more tanks, armed more men, and put more warplanes in the air than the Germans. American Lend-Lease aid provided many essential items Russia lacked, and the Americans kept delivering that until the Japanese were defeated, three months after the Germans surrendered.
Compared to that victory, the current war is a dismal, disillusioning, and very expensive defeat made possible by epic amounts of corruption among Russian generals and everyone down to new recruits. Government officials were even more corrupt, because they could commit their crimes without worrying about death by drone. Putin was told by his military advisers that the Ukraine Special Operation would be over in a few weeks. Putin’s associates thought this was what their boss wanted to hear and the few advisors who knew better just kept quiet.
Russia began the war with the second-most-powerful armed force on the planet. As of mid-2026, it is still, on paper, the second most powerful, after America's military power. That’s because the 1.4 million casualties suffered in Ukraine, along with 14,000 armored vehicles, 20 percent of which were modern tanks, were tolerable. There were similar losses in artillery, air defense, and electronic warfare equipment. Russia has enormous military reserves of equipment and manpower. While Ukraine's losses were so debilitating that Russia had to bring 1960s-vintage tanks out of storage, Russia still has a lot of military material in storage and lots of manpower to mobilize. To placate the essential and influential city dwellers, Russia did not recruit men from major cities for the war in Ukraine. New recruits, both volunteers, conscripts, and men grabbed off the streets, came from rural areas and prisons.
Russians living in the exempted cities did not notice the war until recently, when Ukrainian drones regularly attacked Russian cities. To many residents, this was their first indication that the war was not going well for the Mighty Russian Military. Now they have to process the new information that Russian forces are being driven out of Ukraine, and the Ukrainians are about to regain the Crimean Peninsula, which Russia has held onto for twelve years. Worse, the Ukrainians will not, as had been the case in 2014, lease the port of Sevastopol and other smaller facilities to the Russian Navy. Ukrainian aerial and naval drones now dominate the Black Sea, including the waters surrounding the peninsula. Russian commercial shipping will use the Black Sea only if Ukraine allows it.
The current problems are nothing new. Fourteen years ago, Russian military prosecutors found that about 20 percent of Russian defense spending was stolen by corrupt officers and officials. That there is corruption in the Russian military is no secret. Officers, including generals and admirals, have been prosecuted frequently for decades and that continues into 2026.
But a comprehensive investigation revealed that the extent of the thievery was greater than anyone could have imagined. This discovery is all part of a decades-long trend. In that time, the Russian government has been relentless in its campaign against corruption. Progress is slow, but every year more people are prosecuted and more corrupt practices publicized.
The anti-corruption campaign in the military had been going on for several years. A large part of the effort is directed at firms that manufacture weapons. These companies refused to justify their wildly gyrating prices. Recently, this led to a curious confrontation in which Russian shipyards refused to build submarines for the Russian Navy. This was caused by government efforts to rein in rapidly rising prices and eliminate corruption. All this put the Defense Ministry in a difficult position.
The Russian Defense Minister was caught between conflicting orders. The Russian President was trying to reduce corruption in the military and had ordered the defense minister to do so. But in doing that, he withheld payment to many military suppliers because these firms refused to explain why prices had suddenly increased. That created problems with the President, who is also demanding that defense industries produce the agreed-upon quantities of weapons by the promised delivery dates. That did not happen as long as the defense minister was putting contracts on hold to deal with corrupt practices. President Medvedev ultimately backed whatever the defense minister wanted, which led submarine builders to threaten to shut down operations. All this accelerated corruption investigations and led to lower prices. But production was disrupted.
Aircraft and missile manufacturers were the first to agree to lower their prices, but the submarine builders claimed they could not control their own rising costs. The government believed the higher costs resulted from inefficiency and mismanagement, as well as from antiquated shipbuilding facilities. This situation was unique to Russian shipbuilding, which never, like many other Russian manufacturing industries, tried to achieve world standards of efficiency and technology. The Russian shipyards were in such bad shape that the government authorized the purchase of a new Mistral-class amphibious ship from France, as well as the manufacturing technology to build more Mistrals in Russia.
But backwardness does not explain all of Russia's shipbuilding problems; there is still a lot of corruption, and both problems have to be fixed before the Russian Navy can get affordable, effective warships from Russian yards. That's going to take a decade or more, and in 2026 it is still a work in progress.
FYEO
| By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 02:42 pm: Edit |
Space: Winning The War In Orbital Space
July 11, 2026: The situation in space is currently very favorable to America, with 50 and 60 Photo/Reconnaissance satellites, electronic surveillance satellites, LEO/Low Earth Orbit electronic monitoring satellites, and several other classified birds.
Closer to Earth, there are some complications as Russia jams GPS satellite receivers across most of Eastern Europe. China has openly threatened to destroy SpaceX (Starlink) satellites. In other words, Russia and China are attacking our assets in orbital space. They are doing this despite treaties they signed and agreements not to.
China has also caused congestion in orbital space by allowing satellites to explode or collide with American satellites. China has long been active in orbital space. Over a decade ago, Beidou/Compass, the Chinese version of GPS/Global Positioning System, was fully operational, providing worldwide coverage. China achieved this when it put the last two of its Beidou satellites into circular orbits at an altitude of about 21,800 kilometers, joining 22 others in similar orbits covering the entire planet, plus six more in 36,000-kilometer-high geosynchronous/Stationary orbits. The full Beidou network was open for business as a worldwide service.
People had their first experience with Beidou when the first few satellites became available to anyone with a Beidou GPS receiver. China expects Beidou to become a major competitor for the existing global navigation systems among civilian users. China aims to grab a major share of the satellite navigation market from the original American GPS system by 2030.
It has been a struggle to get Beidou operational. In 2013 China had only 14 of 35 Beidou satellites in service. This was sufficient to provide GPS-type service for all of China. It was expected that all 35 satellites, including spares, would be in service by 2019, and so it was, with a few weeks to spare.
In 2008, China decided to expand its original Beidou 1 satellite navigation system to cover the entire planet and compete with GPS, the European Galileo, and the Russian GLONASS. China has drawn on experience from the earlier Beidou 1 network to build the worldwide Beidou 2 system. Since 2000, China has launched 53 Beidou satellites, including prototypes, replacements, and various test models. The last two Beidou satellites were carried aloft by a single Long March 3B rocket. China put 30 satellites into orbit in 2019, more than any other nation. During 2019, only two satellites failed to achieve orbit, for a success rate of nearly 98 percent.
The Chinese Compass network incorporates the best features of the GLONASS and Galileo systems, as well as items planned for the next-generation American GPS satellites. With all that, no one has found a way to make a profit from a network of navigation satellites, at least not directly. There are plenty of ideas, but no one has yet turned any of those ideas into cash. Moreover, there are disputes among the Beidou, Galileo, and GLONASS organizations over who gets to use which frequencies first. Since GPS was first put into service, no one is contesting the frequencies it uses. But the three other players have some problems.
The success of the original GPS satellite navigation system has generated all this competition. But so far, these other efforts have found the work much more difficult than expected. A European consortium proceeded with Galileo despite rising costs and technical problems. Initially, Galileo was to be funded with private money. But the costs climbed beyond the most optimistic estimates of future income, so now Galileo is being funded with tax dollars, as were GPS and the competing Russian and Chinese systems.
Four of the EU/European Union Galileo navigation satellite system went live in 2016, but the full complement of 30 satellites, 24 active and six spares, will not be complete until 2020. Meanwhile, there have been some technical problems. Galileo first became operational during 2012. The plan was to have all 30 Galileo satellites operational by 2019, and that was only a year late.
Galileo emerged because Europeans didn't like being dependent on an American system and didn't believe the Russians could keep their GLONASS system viable. Galileo became operational because European nations were willing to pay for a system that anyone could use free of charge. Dual-signal, GPS and Galileo, receivers won't cost much more, maybe 20 percent more, than GPS receivers do. Having two separate sets of signals makes for more reliable and accurate receivers. Also, the way Galileo is being set up will improve reliability at higher latitudes and in built-up areas.
Russia's answer to GPS, GLONASS, was at full strength, 24 satellites, in 1996, shortly after the Cold War ended. But the end of the Cold War in 1991 meant the end of the regular financing for GLONASS. Maintaining the system required launching replacement satellites every 5-7 years. By the end of 2002, only seven GLONASS birds were still operational. However, the Russian economy recovered, providing funds for a series of launches in 2003 that increased the number of active satellites to 12. That went to 18 by the end of 2007, and Russia had 24 GLONASS satellites in orbit by 2011, with the system fully operational by 2012. As a result, GLONASS was the first real competitor for GPS. However, GLONASS was not fully operational until 2016 due to delays in building all the ground control stations.
The money for GLONASS is coming from the Russian government, which does not want to be dependent on the American-controlled GPS system. But the money is only there because of high oil prices. Most GLONASS receivers in use are actually combined GPS/GLONASS receivers. Russia will have to invest billions of dollars in GLONASS over the next few years to keep the system fully operational and then spend even more to maintain the satellite network. GLONASS is widely used in conjunction with GPS. In other words, many systems, including cell phones that already use GPS, added GLONASS and Galileo to provide better coverage and fewer instances of signal unavailability.
Beidou is a more restricted system. Services available to anyone are less accurate than those in other systems, but Beidou also has a special, more accurate system that allows military-mode texting and is only available to the Chinese and Pakistani militaries. China will try to monetize its GPS service, which really would make it unique compared to the others.
FYEO
| By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 02:42 pm: Edit |
Iran: Collateral Damage In The Iran War
July 11, 2026: The American-Israeli war against Iran proved more complicated than expected, and its most critical combat zone was outside Iran. The Americans and their allies showed how they could strike Iranian targets, and Iran made them pay for it.
All the firepower expended on Iran soon revealed another problem: the Americans and Israel were using up all their readily available weapons. The war against Iran brought forth a lot of support from America, especially in terms of weapons, ammunition, military equipment, fuel, and much more. These shipments included thousands of missiles of several types, as well as smart bombs and autocannon munitions, and have increased, but keeping them coming may be a problem. All these shipments came from existing stockpiles, known as War Reserve Stockpiles. Over the last decade, NATO members have been copying the American efforts to build sufficient reserves of key weapons and munitions just in case.
The basic idea is to rebuild stockpiles of ammunition and equipment for use against a large, well-equipped force in a war. These stockpiles are also referred to as the War Reserve, as they consist of large quantities of munitions and spares stockpiled to keep troops going during the initial 30-60 days of fighting until production can be increased to sustain the fighting. These stockpiles must contain the most useful munitions and other supplies and be positioned so they can be moved to the combat zones as quickly as possible. Without adequate logistics, as in the right supplies delivered in time, wars or at least battles, are often lost early and often. The Americans must keep the weapons coming to keep the Iranians down until a long-term peace agreement can be secured.
Once the Iran War began, there were suddenly many decisions to make and preplanned operations to implement. All participants were embroiled in these masses of details. The Americans and Israelis were able to handle. The Iranians, suffering from major losses of upper and middle management military, political, and economic leadership, were suddenly paralyzed and improvising in fits and starts as best they could. Allied disruption of Iranian communications was another major factor.
Trying to negotiate with Iran was complicated because several groups claimed to be the supreme authority, with communications disruption being a factor there too, plus the Allies could and did detect where the communications were coming from and promptly bombed those again. The IRGC\Islamic Republican Guard Corps and the allied Basij militias were scattered across the country to keep the population under control. Destroying or severely reducing the IRGC/Basij ability to keep the Iranian religious dictatorship in power was a major Allied objective. There is only one Ayatollah left, and he was rarely heard from. Iranians had already learned that Islam was the problem and mosque attendance was down 80 percent from a decade ago. If Islam disappeared from Iran in the wake of the war, it would be a victory for Iranians and the world.
FYEO
| By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 02:44 pm: Edit |
Winning: Pacific Area Denial Strategies
July 10, 2026: America has created a new military command, the 1 st MDTFMDC/Multi-Domain Task Force, the Multi-Domain Command. Consisting of a Stryker-wheeled armored brigade from the 7th Infantry Division, this army unit has HIMARS missile launchers, airborne and naval surface surveillance/attack drones, as well as EW (electronic warfare) equipment. The soldiers, along with their binoculars, radar, and electronic monitoring equipment, will identify targets. MDTFMDC communicates and coordinates with air, naval, and land units in the Western Pacific from Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan
The American army units are backed by air force and carrier aviation as well as warships and USMC amphibious assault ships. Three years ago, the Marines, after years of planning and preparation, activated its first of three Littoral Regiments in Hawaii. This one is called the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment because it was built around the existing 3rd Marine Regiment in Hawaii. The Littoral Regiment is capable of operating throughout the Pacific and moving to a new area very quickly. The Littoral Regiment has three components: battalion-sized units called teams. The combat team consists of a Littoral Infantry battalion augmented by a missile battery firing guided rockets that can sink ships as well as destroy land targets
The U.S. Marine littoral combat team infantry element consists of small platoons that can operate independently or together with two or three other platoons. These platoons can be flown quickly to a combat zone or hot spot and collect information on the area, including selecting targets that can be hit by littoral regiment missiles or by missiles launched from warships or aircraft. A primary task of these platoon-size teams is to remain hidden. The team uses encrypted satellite communications. These small teams are mobile enough to quickly change location to prevent an enemy action.
The second littoral team is a battalion-sized anti-aircraft unit, while the third team handles logistics and support for the entire regiment, especially the infantry battalion teams. These teams combine skills the Marines have used in their Force Recon units and Scout Sniper teams, consisting of two snipers, to not only scout for a larger unit but also kill key enemy individuals they encounter.
And then there is the major threat in the West Pacific. China is developing an aircraft carrier fleet. By the end of 2025, China had three carriers, one of which entered service in late 2025. China currently has more ships than the American Navy, although the American Navy is much larger in tonnage due to its 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and their escorts. The Americans also have more experience at sea and in combat, and have been the world's dominant naval force for nearly a century.
The Chinese navy has also been active off Japan and South Korea, just to remind these neighbors that the Chinese fleet was growing and keeping its ships at sea for longer periods. In the West Pacific, China has militarized more of the Spratly Islands: Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef. Mischief Reef is the largest at 663 hectares. Subi Reef is about 70 percent the size of Mischief, and Fiery Cross about half the size of Mischief Reef. All these reefs have air strips and docking facilities. Subi Reef recently received two radar domes like those on the other two reefs, which gives the Chinese near-total radar coverage of the seas and airspace around the Spratly Islands. All three reefs have had their surface area expanded and built up to include upgrades to ELINT/Electronic Intelligence systems, weapons emplacements, housing and related infrastructure. Empty weapons and vehicle emplacements on these islands enable the Chinese to quickly fly or ship in vehicle-mounted weapons and radar/fire control sets. The emplacements can also handle anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile launchers.
Last year saw the Chinese ramming Filipino coast guard ships as well as using water cannons against them. The ongoing territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea continue to escalate as the Chinese openly and aggressively drive Filipino navy ships from areas the Philippines has long controlled. In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Netherlands ruled that, under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Philippines had won its 2013 case that China's claims and activities in the South China Sea were unlawful. China had claimed 90 percent of the South China Sea. Over the last sixteen years, China has been increasingly aggressive while asserting those claims. While this recently escalated to using water cannons and ramming, past efforts are more tangible, like the artificial islands built throughout the South China Sea and garrisoned with heavily armed Chinese forces.
FYEO
| By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 02:44 pm: Edit |
Air Weapons: Airborne Attack Drone Carrier
July 10, 2026: Ukraine recently revealed a new naval drone, as yet unnamed, so we call it the MND/Multipurpose Naval Drone This one appears to be nine or ten meters long and two meters wide. In the rear, there is a dispersal bay for naval mines or explosive charges that were recently used to damage or destroy Russian natural gas well platforms in the Black Sea. In the bow of the MND there are three impact fuze mechanisms mounted on the top side. These would apparently be armed and used to detonate an explosive charge in the bow. The MND, as well as the four aerial drones it carries, are operated by controllers on land, on a ship, or on an aircraft.
Ukraine has been developing submerged naval drones since 2023, when the Toloka2 TK-150 was introduced. This drone was 2.5 meters long and equipped with a sensor mast that remained above the surface for navigation and target identification. Toloka2 could carry a small explosive warhead. Subsequently, Ukraine developed the larger 6-meter-long Marichka drone, which is 1 meter in diameter. In 2024, Ukraine developed the Sea Baby. These were made of a material that is nearly invisible to radar. Each carries up to 850 kg of explosives. Fewer explosives could be carried if you want the Sea Baby to travel farther. With a smaller load of explosives, it could reach targets up to 1,000 kilometers distant. Top speed is 90 kilometers per hour, but for economical fuel use, the cruise speed is about half that. That means it would take the Sea Baby about twenty hours to travel a thousand kilometers. That is a one-way trip to a target, such as a naval base or any ships docked there, which is then attacked. Sea Baby navigates using several devices, including GPS, INS, and short-range sensors to detect and avoid obstacles. These sensors can also be programmed to identify and attack a specific target, such as a ship or another naval base facility. Sea Baby can also be equipped with short-range weapons, such as explosive rockets that can hit targets up to 1,000 meters away with thermobaric/fuel air warheads. When used to launch rocket attacks, the Sea Baby can escape and return to base for reuse. Some Sea Babys are equipped with video cameras to carry out reconnaissance and surveillance missions. In this case, communications equipment must be carried to transmit video or individual digital photos back to the Ukrainian base. The Ukrainians have been very imaginative and flexible in their use of these unmanned seagoing vessels.
Ukraine has three operational naval drones. These include Sea Baby, Mother, and MAGURA. At the end of 2023, Cossack Mamai was introduced, with a top speed of 100 kilometers an hour. Manufacturing of naval drones takes place in underground facilities to provide protection from Russian missile and guided bomb attacks.
MAGURA carries 320 kg of explosives while Mamai carries 450 kg. These drones are no longer used only to deliver explosives against a target; they can also be used for reconnaissance when equipped with video cameras that broadcast what they see back to the drone operator. Sea Baby has a range of over 700 kilometers, making it suitable for operations at sea. Endurance is about 60 hours, and top speed is over 70 kilometers an hour. MAGURA has similar characteristics. Mother was used in the long-range attack on the distant naval base at Novorossiysk on Russia’s eastern Black Sea coast, which is 1,000 kilometers from Crimea.
Sea Baby was used in the mid-2023 Kerch Strait Bridge attack and was carrying 850 kg of explosives that inflicted enough damage to render the bridge unusable. The bridge is a key transport route for delivering supplies to Crimea and, as of early 2024, remained unusable.
The drone revolution, which began during the current war in Ukraine, has forced armies and air forces to rethink how they operate and adapt to dealing with thousands of cheap drones rather than traditional weapons like artillery and tanks. Ukraine defeated and largely destroyed the Russian Black Sea fleet with a few anti-ship missiles and hundreds of aerial and naval drones. Ukraine never had a navy, aside from some patrol boats, but by using drones, it defeated Russian naval forces that had long dominated the Black Sea and blockaded Ukrainian ports that handled the export of Ukrainian grain and other agricultural products, as well as vital imports.
Most of the actual fighting was done by Ukrainians operating drones, especially FPV/First Person View drones. The drone operator uses a headset that enables them to see what the drone’s video camera sees. The larger naval drones sometimes had a wireless connection to a land-based operator, but they were also equipped to operate autonomously if that link was disrupted.
Noting the Ukrainian experience, navies, especially the U.S. Navy and the Marines transported by the Navy, began to experiment with drones and experience how decision-making shifted to drone operators, who must make decisions quickly and cannot rely on a hierarchy of superiors to manage everything they do. The Ukrainian experience demonstrated that you train drone operators and then turn them loose in the combat zone.
This new form of warfare does not change the need for large naval task forces capable of moving thousands of kilometers to the combat zone quickly. Drones have had little impact on ship-to-ship warfare but have revolutionized operations in coastal and riverine environments. This is where drones dominate operations, and commanders rely on their drone operators' skills and the capabilities of the latest drone models. The Ukrainian war has demonstrated that technical improvements in drones happen frequently, and many of those changes are in response to some new tactic or technology the enemy is using.
Navies must consider how they will deal with swarms of aerial and naval drones attacking ships that get within a few or dozens of kilometers of a hostile shore.
The Chinese Navy is particularly active in developing new uses for drones. They already have a drone carrier ship and several smaller autonomous ships controlled from shore or a nearby manned ship. The Americans pay close attention to what the Chinese are doing because China expects to have a larger and more powerful fleet than the United States by the 2030s. Chinese naval superiority will rely on how well their drones perform. This is a new and as yet untested naval weapon. The Ukrainians demonstrated how effective drones could be in the Black Sea, but no one has convincingly demonstrated the use of drones in other naval theaters. At least not yet. Whoever develops the most effective drones and tactics first will have an edge in future naval conflicts. Victory will go to the side that most effectively selects and employs its autonomous drone operators.
FYEO
| By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 04:03 pm: Edit |
Mike Erickson: the various EU countries still buying natural gas from Russia are doing so because their choices at this time are (1) buy it or (2) stop cooking/heating/etc. They're working to transition off of it as quickly as possible, both by building sufficient LG terminals to import from elsewhere (including the U.S.) and transitioning to other forms of energy. The energy underpinnings of a continent doesn't turn on a dime; the inertia of natural gas-dependency is absolutely massive.
| By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 04:05 pm: Edit |
Trump has told the US Navy to start escorting tankers through of the Straight of Hormuz.
| By Douglas Lampert (Dlampert) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 04:49 pm: Edit |
It's a shame we don't have a small, shallow water craft, with an adequate radar and a bunch of light cannons and machine guns that would be excellent ship for such an assignment.
Maybe we should build one, we could call it a Frigate, or maybe a Litoral Combat Ship, or maybe some other name, but it would be really nice if we could build a warship smaller and less capable than a Burke for a modest enough price-tag and crew that we could use it for missions like tanker escort.
| By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 05:02 pm: Edit |
Maybe combine Ukraine's remote controlled boat drones with Ukraine's remote-controlled infantry machinegun systems. I would think a few mechanics could whip that up in about one weekend.
| By Kosta Michalopoulos (Kosmic) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 05:29 pm: Edit |
Pardon my cynicism, SVC, but how could you then generate the $18 billion in research, design, construction, consulting and marketing fees? You threaten to collapse the entire military-industrial-lobbying complex!
| By A David Merritt (Adm) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 05:37 pm: Edit |
Me thinks it may be time to promote the next round of Iranian leadership.
| By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Monday, July 13, 2026 - 08:17 pm: Edit |
The U.S. is reimplementing the naval blockade on Iran, confirmed by CENTCOM as beginning tomorrow morning.
Pres. Trump announced that all cargo protected by the U.S. while transiting the Strait will have a 20% fee levied against it.
| By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Tuesday, July 14, 2026 - 02:52 am: Edit |
Ah, the freedom of navigation on the seas.
| By Chuck Strong (Raider) on Tuesday, July 14, 2026 - 03:17 am: Edit |
Hey Carl -- exactly who is shooting and crippling cargo ships and killing their crew members as they try to transit to SOH and then talk to us about the freedom of navigation!
I don't exactly see any Swedish ships out there putting their troops and equipment at risk protecting the FON! Why? Because there is a cost for FON and your government isn't willing or able to do it, but they are sure willing and able to enjoy the fruits of someone else carrying the load and paying the costs.
| By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Tuesday, July 14, 2026 - 09:14 am: Edit |
Raider: as it happens, Swedish Foreign Minister Maria Malmer Stenergard made clear that Sweden is open to participation in freedom-of-navigation operations in the Strait of Hormuz as part of a NATO effort. So did Dutch Foreign Minister Tom Berendsen. However, a NATO effort would require consensus among NATO members, and some are not keen to take part in what they see as an unnecessary war that was started by, rather than inflicted upon, a member nation.
(And before you go there: do not ply me with the "Iran started this war 47 years ago" et al rhetoric. There's a reason previous presidents - including Reagan and both Bushes - didn't do this: because there was never going to be anything resembling a good resolution to such a war without converting much of Iran to glass [which itself isn't all that great a resolution], and it was always going to destabilize the Strait by showing Iran just how much they could impede shipping through it.)
| By Chuck Strong (Raider) on Tuesday, July 14, 2026 - 12:04 pm: Edit |
Sweden is sovereign and doesn’t need to wait for NATO to act so please spare us the lame cover that they would act but for unanimous NATO approval.
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