Many Russian targets were protected by such cages. They probably do help a little. But when it comes to drone strikes, offense is way ahead of defense.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, July 21, 2026 - 04:16 pm: Edit

Jean built a cope cage around my office to protect me from Iranian drones, but she forgot to give me the key and I need to go to the bathroom.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Thursday, July 23, 2026 - 11:53 am: Edit

Houthis managed to hit and burn two Saudi tankers in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Oil is now over $100 per barrel again, and civilian transit of the strait has come to a standstil.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Thursday, July 23, 2026 - 01:16 pm: Edit

The situation cries out for Ukraine-type competence with drones from the US side. Attacks to kill the people manning an IRGC checkpoint, for example, or destroy a supply vehicle, without hurting civilians who in many cases are likely pro-US.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, July 23, 2026 - 04:25 pm: Edit

Identifying an IRGC checkpoint might be tedious, and any drone strike on it will kill nearby civilians. Just accept that if you want to hit such things.

Remember the dynamic model. If you start doing that, the IRGC will make their checkpoints harder to identify and fill them with civilians.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, July 23, 2026 - 04:41 pm: Edit

Ukraine seems to be getting creative with targeting. Russia has a thing called WILDBERRIES which is their version of Amazon. It has six major (square mile structure) distribution hubs and 30 minor ones. So far, four of the six big ones have burned to the ground, each costing half a billion dollars.

I know what would happen to Trump if American women could not get their Amazon packages. Can Putin survive the wrath of the Russian women?

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, July 23, 2026 - 04:46 pm: Edit

Peace Time: NATO Unprepared For Drones
July 23, 2026: Ukraine has shared its war experiences and knowledge with its NATO supporters, and that led to some NATO nations establishing factories to produce drones for Ukraine. One thing NATO nations were concerned about was how they could defend themselves against hostile drones as well as the many ballistic and cruise missiles Russia had used against Ukraine. NATO nations had no defense against such weapons and, given continued Russian aggression, these weapons might one day be used against a NATO nation bordering Russia.
Some NATO nations, such as France, Britain, Germany, Italy, and the Americans, developed and built weapons for export. These nations had no enemies until Russia attacked Ukraine. As part of NATO support for Ukraine, member nations sent weapons they built for their own use and export. This included many air defense weapons seeing their first use in a near-peer war between two nations with equal technical capabilities. Contributors noted their weapons' performance and modified them to improve their effectiveness. The manufacturers could now export their air defense weapons as combat-proven in Ukraine. That’s very encouraging to potential buyers. One missing item is equipment to integrate air defense systems across multiple countries. This would also provide each country with an electronic display of its entire air defense network as well as the location of any intruders.
The problem for NATO armed forces is that they cannot currently launch the kinds of drone offensives that Ukraine and Russia are using. NATO is also incapable of defending itself against any sort of drone offensive. Russia has already indicated that after the Ukraine war is over, an attack on NATO is likely by 2030 or later. Russia is losing in Ukraine, and Vladimir Putin is already developing an Information War plan to minimize the impact and perhaps conceal the reality of defeat. For this reason, Ukraine is again making its case for joining NATO, adding a member with combat experience and a proven ability to innovate to defeat the Russian invaders.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, July 23, 2026 - 04:47 pm: Edit

Information Warfare: Russia Losing Its Information War
July 23, 2026: As a result of personnel, fiscal, and emotional losses during the war in Ukraine, the Russian government has been struggling to deal with angry civilians. The government is blacklisting writers, movie producers, and entertainers who fled the country because of the failed invasion of Ukraine. Putin is particularly angry because of a new film, Minotaur. This film depicts the deceptive methods local officials used to get young men into the army and then Ukraine, where half of them have been killed, wounded, deserted, or simply went missing. The film won awards in the West, including the Grand Prix and the Cannes Soundtrack Award, and was popular among Russians who could see it. The same thing happened with the 2025 film Mr. Nobody Against Putin. The film showed how a rural school was transformed into an army recruitment center by training children and having some of them build drones. The film sent a message to Russian parents that Vladimir Putin did not appreciate.
Putin has been supporting filmmakers who will create works that justify the war. There have been few takers. He can order such videos to be produced, but he can’t always get the desired results. Rather than risk more anti-war protests by jailing filmmakers, he uses his uneasy control over social media and the internet to generate support using bots and foreign operatives to create favorable messages. This is quickly seen as astroturfing and ignored. Putin has also shut down internet access in parts of the country where opposition is most active. These shutdowns cannot last too long because the Russian economy cannot operate without internet access.
Before 2022, Russia had a small but vibrant independent media. Once Ukraine was invaded, that media fled rather than face shutdowns or assassination. Many of these Russian journalists established a presence on the internet from the country of exile. From there they provided honest news in Russian and Ukrainian. The Ukrainian media did the same thing, and Russian families often found out what had happened to their missing sons by consulting Ukrainian internet sites that maintained photos of dead Russian troops and whatever information they had about them. There were also lots of videos posted. The age of cellphones makes it impossible to hide what is going on anywhere.
With the war now in its fifth year, most Russians are trying to ignore it. The war has crippled the Russian economy, and there is growing unemployment. The forcible kidnapping of young men for the army still produces the occasional fistfight between the kidnappers and angry Russian civilians. But the kidnappers are armed, and a few shots into the air halt the fight and scatter the protesters.
The growing war fatigue has left exiled Russian journalists with an audience that wants news about anything but the war. When their town or neighborhood is hit by a Ukrainian drone, the locals turn to social media for news and explanations.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, July 23, 2026 - 04:48 pm: Edit

July 22, 2026: The Russian SSBNs are nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. Last month, one of these, the Leopard, began sea trials after fifteen years spent in modernization and refueling. This is four or five times longer than it usually takes, and that's because of resource shortages, especially money. Leopard is to be back in service by the end of this year.
The Russian Navy is maintaining its SSBN upgrade and refurbishment program. Currently, Russia has thirteen SSBNs in service. Eight of them are Borei class, with possibly six more to come if the money is available. Russia still has seven Cold War-era Delta-class SSBNs in service, with several more being refurbished to extend their service lives.
Russia has planned a major expansion of its navy since the 1990s. This included replacing all the remaining Cold War-era ships and adding many additional new ships and submarines. That plan was disrupted by financial difficulties, less efficient shipyards than during the Soviet period, the loss of skilled workers, and disagreements over which new ships to build. There was a consensus that submarines, especially ballistic missile-carrying SSBN submarines, should get priority. SSBNs are an important component of the Russian nuclear missile arsenal. The SSBNs are even more important than the land-based missiles in silos. The SSBNs move around at sea and are more difficult to find and attack. SSN nuclear attack submarines were also important. Some were needed to escort and protect the SSBNs. At the same time, SSNs also carried some cruise or anti-ship missiles. The priority given to building new post-Soviet classes of submarines delayed the production of new surface warships until 2010. Now only surface warships of frigate size or smaller are being built.
Russia has been trying since the late 1990s to build replacements for Cold War-era warships. Most of these have reached the end of their useful lives, and many of them, while still listed as in service, rarely, if ever, seem to leave port. Russian admirals have been aware that they won't have much of a navy by the 2020s unless these older ships are replaced. The problem was that the older ships could not be refurbished or upgraded easily or cheaply, because doing so would cost more than buying new ones. These older ships are not just falling apart; because there was no money available right after the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, there were few repairs and no upgrades during the 1990s.
While most surface ships received few upgrades or refurbishments, submarines had priority for new construction even in the 1990s, but that slowed down in the 2010s. This is a problem because there is insufficient funding to build replacements for the Cold War-era Delta-class SSBNs. Instead, some Deltas underwent refurbishment to extend their useful life.
Priority was given to building eight new Borei-class SSBNs. These were delayed, and the first one did not enter service until 2013. Money was found to take several half-built Boreis and finish them. If that had not happened, the SSBN fleet would be in danger of shrinking to four subs for a while, perhaps a long while.
The Russian economy revived in the late 1990s, and parliament allocated more funding after 2000 to build enough surface ships to maintain a respectable fleet. But that revealed another problem. Most of Russia's warship-building capability, experience, and skills disappeared after 1991. Before 2014, the government thought it had a solution: to strike a deal with France to import modern warship-building techniques by purchasing two Mistral amphibious assault ship/helicopter carriers and the right to build two more in Russian shipyards. During that process, Russian shipbuilders would learn how it's done in the West. Since the late 1990s, most of Russia's construction effort has gone into finishing a few subs and building some surface ships for export. Even these subs had serious construction problems. Mainly it was quality control, and the Navy refused to accept defective ships, especially subs that could not pass sea trials. Apparently, the shipyards were ordered to devote all their efforts to the subs, and eventually some of them limped into service. But the deal to import French shipbuilding techniques disappeared when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014. France refunded the billion dollars paid for the two Mistrals and later sold them to Egypt, leaving the Russians on their own.
Boreis may be the last SSBNs Russia can afford for a long time. While Russia allocated more of its defense budget to SSBNs than to any other type of ship, the post-Cold War Navy budget continued to shrink. The Cold War ended in 1991, but Russia’s financial problems continued to get worse. Mistakes continue to get made, like invading Ukraine in early 2022. That was a major miscalculation, and the financial costs are being felt throughout the Russian military.
Despite all that, work continues, if more slowly, on numerous projects. Particularly SSBNs. The slowdowns have a cumulative effect. For example, in late 2020, Russia conducted a multiple missile launch from one of its new SSBNs. For the second time since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, a submerged Borei class SSBN fired multiple Sea-Launched Ballistic missiles or SLBMs in rapid succession. This time the SSBN was off the Pacific Coast in the Sea of Okhotsk, and the four Bulava SLBM warheads landed 5,500 kilometers to the west in the Chizha test range, a large body of water in northwest Russia near Archangel and long used as a landing zone for SLBMs fired from off the Pacific coast. The last such multiple missile test was in 2018 when another Borei in the White Sea (north of Murmansk) fired four Bulava SLBMs eastward for 6,000 kilometers, and the warheads landed off the east coast of the Kamchatka Peninsula in the Kura test range, a body of water used as a landing zone for ICBMs as well as SLBMs.
As impressive as these two tests were, they did not match the last multiple SLBM launch conducted in 1991, just before the Soviet Union was dissolved. That test involved a Delta IV SSBN launching all sixteen of its R29 SLBMs. While the solid fuel Bulava could be launched every 3-4 seconds, the liquid-fueled R29S required 14 seconds between launches. It took nearly four minutes for the Delta IV to launch 650 tons worth of missiles. The largest launch of SLBMs took place in 1998, when a Typhoon-class SSBN launched all 20 of its R-39 SLBMs, not as a test but to publicly destroy them as part of the post-Cold War START disarmament agreement. The twenty R-39s did not travel far, as they were programmed to self-destruct shortly after launch, which they did.
The Boreis were the first post-Cold War Russian SSBNs; the first began construction in 1996 and took 17 years to complete. The problem was that the capabilities of Russian shipyards had declined during the 1990s because skilled engineers and workers were free to find better-paying jobs and did so on a large scale. As a result, the Boreis currently being built take about 8 years to enter service. The last Soviet-era SSBNs, the Delta IV class, took three or four years to complete. The seven Delta IVs entered service between 1984 and 1990, and six of them were refurbished a decade ago so they could remain in service until enough Boreis were ready.
Delays in getting the new Borei SSBNs into service were exacerbated by problems with their new SLBMs that persisted after the first Borei was ready for service. There were so many missile delays that the older Delta-class SSBNs had to remain in service longer than they were designed for. That meant these Deltas could not go to sea as often, a problem partially solved by refurbishing six of them. As a result, Russia has had few SSBNs at sea since 2010. The seven Boreis now in service at sea compensate for the growing inability of the Deltas to stay out for long periods.
The fourth Borei was also the first improved Borei, or Borei A design, and construction took longer and cost more than planned. One feature, adding four more SLBM launch tubes, was deleted. Borei A includes improved electronics and changes to the hull and propulsion system to make the boat quieter and more maneuverable. There are now additional sonar arrays on the sides of the boat in addition to the usual one in the front or bow of the sub. There were significant changes to the propulsion system to improve maneuverability at low speeds. The hull now has a sleeker form without the noticeable bump behind the sail, which is the small superstructure on top of subs. One morale-enhancing new feature was a small four-seat sauna. There are also larger and more comfortable crew quarters. These changes made the Borei-A look more like a Western SSBN and perform like one. These changes made to create Borei-A were so expensive that the Navy could only afford to build ten Boreis.
The Boreis are essential to replace the aging Delta IVs. In many ways, the Delta IVs were a superior design compared to the Boreis. There were 43 Deltas put into service between 1972 and 1990. There were actually four distinct models: Delta I, II, III, and IV. These varied in size from 7,800 to 13,500 tons and in capabilities. Russia had already built a class of subs to replace the Deltas: the enormous 24,000-ton Typhoon/Akula-class SSBNs. These proved too expensive to build and operate. Six of them entered service between 1981 and 1989, and to save money, all were retired or scrapped by 2009. One Typhoon remained in service until early 2023 to test new SLBM designs. That’s because the missile tubes on the Typhoon are so large that they can easily be modified to handle any new SLBM design. The last Typhoon retired in early 2023. The problems with the Typhoons were a foretaste of worse problems with the Borei and other planned large subs and surface ships.
The shipyards could not get it done. Part of the problem was growing corruption, which contributed to the Soviet Union's destruction, as well as a shortage of qualified managers, engineers, and construction workers to design, develop, and build these new ships. Because of all that, Russia had to adapt its plans. In the 1990s, it was decided that subs were more important than surface vessels, and that meant that, once budget and construction management problems manifested themselves after the 1990s, the subs always had priority. This led to the cancellation of several large surface ship construction plans and many modifications for submarine construction and use. More subs were retired as they became too old and expensive to operate. Money was always found to keep construction of new subs, especially SSBNs, going. There was also more patience for dealing with the seemingly endless flaws found in the new subs and their weapons. Priorities took priority.
The first three new Borei-class boats were supposed to be based in the Pacific, but only two were. One reason was the lack of funds to refurbish and reactivate the Chizha Test Range near Archangel. This facility was used to monitor ballistic missiles or SLBMs test-fired from east to west. The test range on the Pacific coast has been upgraded so that ballistic missile and SLBM testing can continue and be accurately monitored to assess the performance of test warheads. To continue testing the Bulava, one of the Boreis had to be assigned to the Northern Fleet.
During the Cold War, most of Russia’s SSBNs were based in the north, at several bases east of the Norwegian border and facing the Arctic Ocean. Russia spent over $350 million to expand and improve its submarine base on the Kamchatka Peninsula on its Pacific coast. This enabled new SSBNs to threaten China, as well as the United States.
The Boreis are the first new Russian boomers, naval slang for SSBNs, to enter service since 1990, when the last Delta IV entered service. Borei is the first new Russian sub design since the end of the Cold War. The other two Boreis, Alexander Nevsky and Vladimir Monomakh, benefited from all those delays with the first Borei and were built much more quickly.
The Boreis are more closely related in design to the Delta IVs and American Cold War SSBNs. The Boreis are 170 meters long and 13 meters in diameter. Surface displacement is 15,000 tons, and 16 Bulava SLBMs are carried. Work on the Yuri Dolgoruky was delayed for several years because the first missile being designed for it did not work out. A successful land-based missile, the Topol-M, was quickly modified for submarine use. That should have worked, but it didn’t and failed in many frustrating ways. This Bulava and its missiles are also known as the R-30 3M30 and SS-NX-30. This SLBM was larger, reducing the Boreis’ original capacity from 20 to 16 missiles. The boat also has four torpedo tubes and twelve torpedoes or torpedo tube-launched missiles. There are also tubes for launching smaller countermeasure devices resembling torpedoes. The Bulava has a max range of 10,000 kilometers with six warheads and 8,000 kilometers with ten warheads.
The Boreis have a crew of 107, with half of them being officers. This is a common Russian practice for high-tech ships, such as nuclear subs. Each of these Borei A boats cost at least two billion dollars, in part because money was spent on improved crew quarters. That was necessary to attract enough skilled and volunteer sailors to run these boats. The high cost of Boreis, by Russian standards, is partly because many factories that supplied parts for Russian subs were in parts of the Soviet Union that are not now within the borders of post 1991 Russia. New factories had to be built. All components of the Boreis and their missiles are to be built in Russia.
Without the Bulava, the only alternative was to redesign the Boreis to use the existing R-29 Sineva SLBM. This is the last liquid-fuel Russian SLBM in service and was used on the older Delta-class SSBNs. This redesign would cost billions of dollars and delay the Boreis' entry into service by several years. To many, switching to the older, but more reliable, Sineva missiles seemed like a reasonable move. Liquid fuel missiles are more complex than solid-fuel missiles, even though they use fuel that can be stored for long periods inside the missile. Unable, for a long time, to develop the technology for solid-fuel rockets, Russia made the most of this and developed some very effective "storable liquid fuel" rockets. It was only near the end of the Cold War that Russia finally mastered the solid-fuel rocket construction techniques. But only one solid-fuel SLBM entered service, the huge 90-ton R-39 for the massive Typhoon SSBNs.
Borei-class submarines have missile tubes designed to hold the Bulava, which is 12.1 meters long and 2 meters in diameter. The Sineva is 14.8 meters long and 1.8 meters in diameter. The additional length of the Sineva would require substantial revisions in the existing Borei design and the two still under construction in 2018. The only existing solid fuel SLBM that works, and is carried in the larger Typhoon, is the R-39, and it is huge, as in 16 meters long and 2.4 meters in diameter. Much too large even for a rebuilt Borei.
These delays in getting Bulava to work reliably led to many embarrassing changes. That’s because, in early 2012, Russia announced that its SSBNs would resume long-range combat patrols within a year. On schedule, the Russian Navy finally accepted its first Borei, Yury Dolgoruky, for service on December 30th, 2012. Thus, it appeared that the newly commissioned Yury Dolgoruky would be the first Russian SSBN in many years to make a long-range cruise, as soon as it had a working SLBM to arm it. Mass production of Bulava SLBMs began in 2013, with the goal of producing at least 124 of them. Yury Dolgoruky finally made its first combat patrol in 2015, although it was understood that only about half of the 16 Bulava SLBMs carried would work if launched. Since then, the Bulava SLBM is considered combat-ready, but only if you accept that about half of them may not work.
The Russian Navy has made a mess of its SSBN force and has done slightly better developing new SLBMs. This is all about what kind of SSBN force Russia will have in the future and what those SSBNs will be capable of. At the moment, the answers seem to be few and far between.
The Delta IV refurb included the SLBM tubes and launch equipment, enabling it to handle the latest MU2 version of the R-29 missile. Most of the improvements in the R-29MU2 concern the third stage, which can now carry 12 warheads, each capable of hitting a different target. Alternatively, the R-29MU2 can carry eight warheads, along with numerous decoys and penetration devices to deceive anti-missile systems. The upgrade extends the life of the Delta IV by 3- 4 years, which means that by the late 2020s only one Delta IV will still be in limited service and, depending on how much money and patience are available, as many as ten Boreis.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, July 23, 2026 - 04:49 pm: Edit

Air Weapons: American Navy LRASM
July 22, 2026: American B-2 long-range bombers have been configured to carry the AGM-158C LRASM/Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles. Other aircraft capable of using LRASM are the B-1, F-15E/EX, F-18, F-25, and P-8. The missiles can also be launched from a VLS cell or, possibly, a HIMARS vehicle. The 1.25 ton LRASM carries a half-ton warhead and a range of nearly 400 kilometers. Cost per missile is over $1 million, and the missile, in flight, looks like a drone with swept-back wings and one upright tailfin.
Seven years ago, B-1 bomber units began receiving the LRASM, which was essentially a new version of the existing AGM-158 JASSM/Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile. This was recognized in 2015 when the air-launched version of LRASM was given the official designation of AGM-158C. This followed a 2014 decision to deploy the LRASM research project as a stopgap until a more advanced successor to the Tomahawk cruise missile was ready in the mid-2020s. The Air Force adapted other bombers and fighter-bombers to use LRASM. These included the F-18.
LRASM was based on JASSM missiles, which are 1,045 kg weapons that are basically 455 kg JDAMs, i.e., GPS-guided bombs with a small turbojet added. JASSM was designed to target enemy air defenses or deep targets in heavily defended enemy territory. LRSAM was based on JASSM ER, the version with the longest range, 930 kilometers, but because of the additional sensors and electronics, LRASM weighs 1,100 kg with a 450 kg warhead and a range of 560 kilometers. The air-launched version used from ships or land has a booster rocket added to get the LRASM moving and high enough into the air so that the turbojet engine can take over.
LRASM began as a research project in 2009 to develop a stealthier cruise missile. LRASM was part of an effort to develop autonomous hunter-killer missiles that can seek out targets without remote control and in the midst of enemy countermeasures, electronic and otherwise. The LRASM underwent its first field test in 2013, when one was launched from a B-1B bomber and sent toward three destroyer-sized unmanned ships that were moving about. LRASM flew via GPS waypoints for several hundred kilometers and then began flying a search pattern, seeking electronic or visual signs of one of the target ships. One was found, and LRASM, armed with an inert warhead, hit it.
LRASM was not only equipped to seek out targets in a general area of several thousand square kilometers but was also fitted with electronics to resist GPS jamming and other anti-missile electronic defenses carried by warships. LRASM also has a highly accurate INS inertial guidance system that cannot be jammed and serves as a backup to GPS. The ultimate LRASM design will also incorporate stealth features, a special shape, and largely passive sensors. The original LRASM development model was basically an existing long-range bomb, JASSM ER, with a much-improved guidance system, and it turned out to work.
One reason JASSM was selected as the basis for LRASM was that it had undergone a tortuous development process. Work on JASSM began in the late 1990s and was expected to enter production by 2002, but the entry was delayed by 2 years. Then there were more delays, lots of delays. From 2006 to 2009, the U.S. Department of Defense was on the verge of canceling the $6 billion JASSM program. Lobbying, pleading, large orders from Australia and South Korea, and the growing possibility that the missile would be useful against Iranian, Chinese, or North Korean air defense systems gave the program a few more lives.
JASSM is stealthy and uses GPS and terminal infrared guidance to zero in on heavily defended targets such as air defense sites. The terminal guidance enables the missile to land within three meters of the aiming point. If there were a war with North Korea, for example, JASSM would be essential to taking out enemy air defenses, or any other targets that have to be hit early in a war before air defenses can be shut down. This capability apparently attracted the South Koreans, who now have F-15K aircraft capable of carrying JASSM.
JASSM was designed to handle the most modern Russian surface-to-air missiles, which are also being sold to China. North Korea has older air defense systems and can't afford the newer Russian SAMs. But even these older air defenses can be dangerous and are best addressed with long-range missiles. So, there was a need for a missile like JASSM.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, July 23, 2026 - 04:50 pm: Edit

Electronic Weapons: American Army Lasers
July 21, 2026: The American Army recently adopted and purchased 8,936 DAGIR-V1 Multi-Platform Systems. These systems will be issued to the troops next year. DAGIR-V1 uses a NIR/Near-Infrared illuminator and visible aiming lasers in a sturdy aluminum enclosure. Other features include an over-bore 40 mW IR pointer and dual 350 mW VCSEL-based IR illuminators that can pierce dense photonic interference and high ambient light. Users can adjust beam divergence and output quickly without losing their grip on the weapon.
This system runs on the MINIRVA diode platform, which uses VCSEL tech for tighter beam projection and sharper illumination. That means better target ID and situational awareness in the field. SOCOM/Special Operations Command has already used DAGIR, having adopted the V1 under the SAL-UHP program and the V2, which adds a visual laser override button.
DAGIR-V1 is a step up from the red laser spotting devices for rifles that have been around for over three decades, but superior (in many ways) green laser versions began to appear a decade ago. These have many advantages over red lasers and are now frequently used by the military and police. Despite the superiority of green lasers, red lasers appeared first because their beams were easier to generate and required less energy. But now technology has advanced to the point where green laser devices are as compact and sturdy as red ones.
While the green laser dot can be seen twice as far, 50 meters with the naked eye, 100 meters or more via a scope, as red laser, it also creates a more prominent laser path, which leads right back to the shooter. But in many combat situations, the longer range and better visibility for the shooter are crucial advantages.
But there is another type of light pointer that is even more effective. This has long been present in the American Army's MFAL/Multi-Functional Aiming Light. This looks like a small flashlight and attaches to the rifle. But this device can emit visible or invisible IR/infrared light. The invisible IR light (except to the shooter or anyone else viewing the scene through IR-sensitive lenses) maintains the element of surprise.
There are other advantages to IR. When using IR, you go into a cave or dark room, providing light only you can see, with your night-vision equipment. If you are really quiet, you have a big advantage over the enemy soldiers trying to hide in the dark. This rig also allows you to see any booby traps the enemy may have laid for you. MFAL also emits a red laser-pointer dot. The MFAL was developed with feedback from combat troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Mounted on the rifle like a scope, the ILWLP/Integrated Laser White Light Pointer provides an infrared aiming light out to 600 meters and an infrared illuminator for 300-600 meters, depending on how much moonlight is available. The infrared illuminator can also light up an interior space of about 45 square meters. For the infrared illuminator, you need infrared lenses on your goggles to see what the infrared light illuminates. A red dot laser is also built into the unit and has a range of 10-25 meters, depending on the lighting conditions. There is also a white-light flashlight capability that enables facial recognition out to 25 meters. Naturally, the ILWLP costs more than ten times as much as the Surefire White Light. A green dot can be added to these devices, as some green dot pointers weigh only 29 grams, including batteries.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, July 23, 2026 - 04:50 pm: Edit

Russia: Ukrainian Birds Bomb Russia
July 21, 2026: The latest Ukrainian innovation is mechanical birds capable of destroying ground targets. Ukrainian engineers designed, developed, and fabricated a swarm of biomimetic drones that resemble a flock of migrating birds. A flock of these birds was used against the Engels-2 airbase in Saratov Province, just east of Ukraine. These drones are designed to simulate the migration shapes and flight formations of birds. Russian radar systems are programmed to ignore things like migrating birds. Then the flock dived towards the airbase, where some irreplaceable Russian Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers were severely damaged by secondary blasts as the hangars and aircraft support equipment also went up in flames.
Ukraine has been developing new long-range drone attack systems since the war began. Four years of Ukrainian long-range drone attacks on targets throughout western Russia have had a cumulative impact. It was obvious that Ukraine needed a locally produced drone that was free of any target restriction imposed by the United States on the use of long-range missiles sent to Ukraine. Ukraine is now producing its own locally designed and manufactured Flamingo drone. This is a three-ton drone with a range of 3,000 kilometers, a speed of 900 kilometers per hour, and a 1.1-ton warhead. Production began in mid-2025, and during 2026, monthly production will eventually reach 300-500. Each drone costs about $500,000. The most recent attack drone is the FP-7.x.
Ukraine has lots of experience with long-range drone attacks on targets inside Russia. Ukrainians maintain timely information on the deployment and capabilities of Russian air defense systems. Then there is BDA, or Battle Damage Assessment. This means obtaining accurate data on the effectiveness of your long-range attacks. Ukraine depends on the American surveillance satellite network and reports from Ukrainian operatives inside Russia to verify BDA, though the French have started helping too.
Determining the targets of a long-range drone campaign can be tricky. For example, the World War Two American/British strategic bombing campaign against Germany made a crucial mistake. When selecting which targets to hit and when, one critical set of targets was omitted. The Allied target planners ignored German electrical generating plants because they incorrectly assumed the plants were interconnected in a system resistant to aerial bombing. After the war, it was discovered that power plants were the most vulnerable targets because key components could not be easily replaced and because Germany lacked an interconnected system. Bombing a few of these plants in a region would halt production for up to a year for much of that region. Adding power plants to the target list could have shortened the war in Europe by up to a year. The Ukrainians are still refining their target list to get the most economic damage out of each drone attack campaign but have consistently hit Russian petroleum storage and refining sites.
With its extremely long range, Flamingo can hit nearly 90 percent of the targets that produce weapons or export income for the Russian military effort. The Russian capital is 850 kilometers from northern Ukraine. It is 1,100 kilometers to St. Petersburg on the Baltic Sea and 2,000 kilometers to the bases of the Russian Northern Fleet in Murmansk, near the Arctic Circle.
Targets are usually industrial facilities that support the war effort. These include numerous oil refineries and oil storage facilities, as well as facilities that produce specialty steels for artillery tubes, railroad car coil bearings, and tanks. The drones came in low and slow to deceive Russian air defenses, which struggle to detect slow-moving aerial targets, especially at night, when most of these attacks occur. While the targets are up to 3,000 kilometers from Ukraine, the drones can also move north through a corridor several hundred kilometers wide. Russian anti-aircraft defense systems cannot cover an area that wide and long, especially when the attackers are coming in low and slow in the dark.
Russia tries to play down the effectiveness of the Ukrainian drone attacks by describing rather obvious burning refineries and fuel storage depots as accidents. There have been a lot of such accidents, and Russian troops in Ukraine have to closely monitor their fuel consumption because fuel deliveries are not as frequent and reliable as they used to be. The Russian fuel facilities also supply the commercial and civilian market. Commercial users are important because they supply firms that produce goods needed by the military and consumers. Agricultural crop yields are highly dependent on fuel to produce fertilizer and pesticides, sow and reap harvests, and transport them to market.
The Ukrainian drone attacks also led to disruptions of flight operations at the three airports serving the Moscow region. Ukraine does not comment on details of its drone attacks. Ukraine believes the results speak for themselves. Targets in western Russia are increasingly under attack by Ukrainian drones, and the Russian government has a hard time explaining why combustible targets in the region keep exploding or catching fire. Such events are contrary to the official government reports about the Russian war efforts in Ukraine. Russia has not experienced attacks like this on the homeland since World War II, and that is something the Russian government does not want to discuss.
Ukrainian drone strikes have also hit Russian air bases where Russian MiG-31 fighter-bombers as well as bombers like the Tu-22M and Tu-95 are found. So far, at least six of these aircraft have been damaged or destroyed by Ukrainian drone attacks deep inside Russia. The attack on the Savasleyka airbase highlights the vulnerability of military infrastructure to drone attacks. The attack drones come in low and slow at night. This made it difficult for airbase air defenses to detect and destroy many of the drones. These attacks demonstrated how much air warfare has changed because of the use of reconnaissance and attack drones by both sides.
Before Russia invaded, military analysts worldwide did not anticipate such a widespread use of drones and how it would change ground, air, and naval warfare. Long-range attacks by drones were terrifying because the attacker was not risking the lives of highly trained pilots. Pilot training costs over a million dollars per pilot. Skilled pilots lost in combat cannot be quickly replaced. Drones have no pilots, and the men and women who build, program, and, in some cases, operate them are far from the combat zone. Ukraine's annual drone production is now roughly equal to Russia's annual artillery shell production.
Because of the extensive use of drones, warfare has fundamentally changed. Ukraine and Russia are both competing to keep up with new drone designs and uses. The long-range drone attacks on Russian munitions and fuel depots as well as air bases are examples of that. Russian missile and drone attacks on civilian infrastructure and population centers are the only response they can muster. Ukraine has hidden its stockpiles and combat aircraft more effectively than Russia. Moreover, Ukraine can quickly receive emergency resupplies of fuel and munitions from NATO allies. Russia has a more difficult time because they were subjected to severe economic and military sanctions after it invaded Ukraine.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Thursday, July 23, 2026 - 07:35 pm: Edit

SVC, don't underestimate the potential precision of an FPV drone. Ukraine has gone so far as to kill Russians on horseback without harming the horses. Not every time, but they've done it more than once.

The checkpoint problem should be easier as the degree of separation is greater. You get some control the timing, too.

Another scenario that has happened is that people notice the drone and start running away. Now the people you don't want to kill may become separated from the people you do want to kill. Ukraine has repeatedly rescued prisoners that way.

There are also drones that carry guns, so you can put a bullet exactly where it needs to be.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, July 23, 2026 - 08:52 pm: Edit

William, I wish you were correct and it was so simple. It's just not that easy.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Thursday, July 23, 2026 - 10:08 pm: Edit

Not claiming it's easy.

You need constant drone surveillance over the region, people who can watch said surveillance and draw appropriate conclusions, skilled pilots who can pull off tricky missions, competence in manufacturing, a wide variety of drone models for different missions (day/twilight/night, short/long range), rapid iteration of improvements, supply chains to get the right drone to the right place at the right time, and IT to coordinate all of the above.

Ukraine has all of that.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Friday, July 24, 2026 - 12:30 am: Edit

Not really. They have various kinds of drones, but no one has or could reasonably build enough to blanket a whole country.

Most of the drones you speak of have fairly short range, most about 50 miles, some 100, fewer 250, then you are into the really big drones which aren’t designed for your plan. The few long range birds have far more important jobs. Given the geography, you might have access to ten percent of Iran, be able to cover one percent.

Even that would at least be a start. If you used six months of production you could cover are roads and major streets and spot these check points you speak of, there really aren’t that many and they are a mix of military, police, and guards. Assume you can tell the apart, you might start dropping the small attack drones, which would be equivalent to hand grenades, which will get some but miss some guards ten feet away, and hit the odd civilian 40 feet away.

Most guards are not at these roadblocks, but in offices you might find, or prowling neighborhoods looking for trouble and you’d never find 98% of those.

Ask yourself. Why hasn’t this been done already? You really think a few thousand military professionals who do target selection never thought of it? Trust me, they have. Why haven’t they done it? Because other ideas are more productive? Because you have to start by building a drone factory and that takes time?

I have said several times I want a deal with Ukraine to build the entire Firepoint catalog under license. We could sell Ukraine half of the production and issue the rest to the new US Drone Force.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Friday, July 24, 2026 - 01:11 am: Edit

On 19 July, Ukraineian drones hit the biggest dam in Belgorod, causing a devastating flood in the river below the dam. Attempts to repair the dam have been hampered by further drone attacks every day. There is a thirty foot hole in the spillway gate. Damage to the road on top of the dam has made it hard for repair crews to reach the damaged section.
THE MILITARY SHOW

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Friday, July 24, 2026 - 07:05 am: Edit

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Quote:

I have said several times I want a deal with Ukraine to build the entire Firepoint catalog under license. We could sell Ukraine half of the production and issue the rest to the new US Drone Force.

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By Douglas Lampert (Dlampert) on Friday, July 24, 2026 - 10:56 am: Edit

The US attempts to build a frigate to foriegn design show that we're perfectly capable of screwing up even when we have a cheap and working foreign design to start with.

You just decide that you absolutely must have a particular added capability, and start modifying the design, and then the system needs to be bigger, which means you can't use the original hull or propulsion, and soon you are at least as badly off as if we'd done it entirely in house.

We could do the same thing with Ukrainian drones. It's even easier to have an added X mean that you need a bigger frame and more powerful propulsion on a drone.

What if we need to use it at high altitude? What if we need it to have longer range? What if the enemy deploys interceptor drones and it needs to be able to outrun them?

You need to find a way to stop procurement mission creep, where every system needs to be all things to all people and all users. The problem exists in the entire system, from Congress on down,

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Friday, July 24, 2026 - 01:14 pm: Edit

Douglas:

Good point, but it needs to be pointed out that the U.S. was able to produce many weapon systems to a standard design (and “locked” the designs ) during both world wars.

Oh, yes. There were some exceptions:discontinuation of the Fletcher Class Destroyers and placed into to production the Gearing class destroyers, Worcester class light cruisers replaced the earlier Cleveland class, “Short hull” Essex Class Carriers replaced by the “long hull” that were replaced by Midway Class Carriers.

Same with Tanks, Aircraft etc.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Friday, July 24, 2026 - 11:00 pm: Edit

The Sherman was not nearly as "locked" as the Panzer-IV. There were about 30 versions of the Sherman in the US Army during 1943-45.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Saturday, July 25, 2026 - 01:13 am: Edit

According to a YouTube site (GXPOV) that I cannot verify, a Ukrainian Flamingo FP5 drone hit Avatech, the only Russia factory that builds ejections seats for military aircraft. The factory also builds key parts of several Russian cruise missiles.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Saturday, July 25, 2026 - 01:26 am: Edit

Will J: My understanding is that most of the stuff the EU is sending to Ukraine is sold, not gifted, so Ukraine can pay us for drones.

Jeff. the 58 Sumners were between the 175 Fletchers and 98 Gearings.

None of the three could be considered totally locked. Many ships had one of the two torpedo racks replaced by a 40mm AA mount, later Fletchers lost the B gun to a hedgehog launcher, most of these gained more 20mm AA in various unofficial refits, engines were better in later boats of all classes.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Saturday, July 25, 2026 - 07:55 am: Edit

SVC:

I believe Douglas Lamperts basic point is valid.

That screwing with the designs of each unit produced does not create uniformity or contribute to any sort of production efficiency.

Your comment actually validates the point that, in ship production, production runs of 175, 98 and 58 individual classes of ships were large enough to maximize the number of hulls built in a finite number of slipways (which actually isn’t true in the historic sense as not all ships were built the same way). some were slid down slip ways stern first, others were slid side ways into the water, and I believe others (like the escort carriers built in the Pacific Northwest) were built in new ship yards that didn’t exist at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941.

Each of the modifications you mentioned 40mm AA mounts, hedgehog ASW launchers etc were also fitted to other ship classes that existed prior to the war start.

You could have also mentioned that at least one Destroyer was fitted with a catapult and a sea plane and a crane for recovering said aircraft.

It does not mean that there were not any modifications to any design, just that the process was used to maximize the number of various units produced in a particular period of time.

That is why the 175 units of the Fletcher class are considered to be a single class, in spite of the modifications, and not 175 near sister ships that all came out all slightly different from each other.

In honesty, you also have made a good point about the changes to various designs. In war, sometimes “good enough” needs to be tweaked when in pursuit of “perfect”.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Saturday, July 25, 2026 - 04:22 pm: Edit

SVC, the EU gave Ukraine a 90 billion Euro loan, but no repayment is required until after the war.

From Ukraine's point of view, that's almost as good as a gift.

Furthermore, many individual support items, typically from individual countries, are indeed gifts.

Lastly, if this is in reference to a drone deal, it is normal for the party with the tech, in this case Ukraine, to collect a fee. I am saying that it would make sense for the US to be generous with this fee, for a host of reasons.