Archive through July 29, 2026

Star Fleet Universe Discussion Board: Non-Game Discussions: Real-World Military: Archive through July 29, 2026
By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 27, 2026 - 03:25 pm: Edit

It would be nice if the media, the government, the congress, the talking heads, and the military would stop thinking red/blue, but that's a dreamworld. On planet Earth, it must be dealt with. I am long since tired of everything Trump does being described as "horrible, a war crime, incompetent, corrupt, threat to democracy," or whatever else, when previous presidents of both sides did the same thing or worse. I didn't start it, and I'm not even 1% of the forces keeping it going, I'm just dealing with it. I am not going to stop mentioning it until the professional talking heads on the telley stop using it.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 27, 2026 - 03:31 pm: Edit

Forces: American Combat Engineers Use Drones
July 26, 2026: American Army combat engineers are using a new Mule 28 octocopter drone weighing 20.4 kg and carrying a payload of up to 90.7 kg. The drone carries a sensor package capable of recognizing faces, vehicles, and weapons. The drone navigates by obtaining map coordinates from its video feed and using trigonometry to precisely land where it needs to be to destroy enemy obstacles. This is much more efficient than the traditional methods that employed Bangalore torpedoes.
Twenty-four years ago, the American Army began replacing the century-old Bangalore Torpedo mine-clearing system with a lighter and more effective device, which has become a crucial bit of equipment in the face of growing Taliban use of landmines. The APOBS/Anti-Personnel Obstacle Breaching System was introduced in 2002 after eight years of development. Weighing only 57 kg, compared to the older 205 kg Bangalore Torpedo, the APOBS could be carried by two men, whereas the older system required ten or more. APOBS can be set up in under two minutes. It uses a rocket system that carries a cable with explosives attached. The explosion clears mines and bombs from a 45-meter-long and one-meter-wide path.
Britain has a similar system, called Python, but it is not light enough to be carried by troops, which is important in many combat situations. Britain used Python for the first time in Afghanistan. Python uses a rocket that carries an explosives-filled 228-meter tube filled with 1.4 tons of explosives. When the tube lands, the explosives detonate, destroying over 90 percent of mines and other explosive devices in an area 180 meters long and 7 meters wide. The cleared area has to be double-checked for mines or devices that survived Python, but this can be done quickly, and troops and vehicles can rush through the cleared lane if they are under fire.
The Python is basically an update of a similar system developed in the 1950s: Giant Viper. The Americans had a similar system, the Mk 154 Mine Clearance System, which uses rockets to propel a cable stuffed with explosives down a road. The explosives are detonated, and all mines and roadside bombs are detonated or disabled over an area of 14 by 100 meters. The Mk 154 was originally designed to quickly clear mines during combat. But it turns out to work against booby traps and roadside bombs as well.
All these systems were developed from the Bangalore torpedo. This system used explosives-filled tubes that had to be pushed into position. The original Bangalore torpedo was developed before World War I for quickly clearing booby traps. A few years later, it was found to be highly effective at clearing barbed-wire barriers during World War I and remained widely used during World War II.
APOBS received a Mod 2 upgrade in 2006. Each APOBS system costs about $52,000. The Army and Marines ordered over 10,000 and used most of those in combat and training.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 27, 2026 - 03:32 pm: Edit

Air Weapons: Ukrainian Drone AI Terminal Guidance
July 26, 2026: For nearly a year now, Ukraine has been using the P1-Sun Long quad-copter interceptor drones to bring down Russian Geran attack drones. The Geran is an Iran-developed delta-wing 200 kg propeller-driven Shahed 136 drone that Iran developed a decade ago, and it was first used by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen during 2019. Since 2022, Russia has used over 50,000 Shahed-type drones against Ukraine. That is changing as the FPV/First Person View P1-Sun Long interceptor, and its AI/Artificial Intelligence guidance system, enable the destruction of incoming Shaheds nearly every time.
P1-Sun Long’s AI terminal guidance system was made possible by using over 10,000 videos of Shaheds intercepted by other types of drones. Those examples tuned up the P1-Sun Long terminal guidance system so that interceptions occurred nearly every time. Now P1-Sun Long operators guide their drone to where Shaheds are expected, and the P1-Sun Longs detect the Shahed before the operator does. The P1-Sun Long operator needs only click on the target rectangle and let the interceptor head to the target.
The use of AI has made it easier for P1-Sun Long operators to find and destroy targets. Once an operator has completed an interception, another nearby P1-Sun Long is available for interception. The AI interception software is also used for drones attacking ground targets. Russian trucks are currently the main target. This is part of an effort, so far successful, to deny Russian troops supplies of food, water, medical equipment and ammunition. These supplies must be stealthily delivered at night on soldiers' backs or in vehicles covered with blankets made of material designed to hide the vehicle's heat signature. Heat is something that Ukrainian drones have long been able to home in on.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 27, 2026 - 03:33 pm: Edit

Women In The Ukraine War
July 27, 2026: When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, attitudes towards Ukrainian women in the military quickly changed. Women wanted to serve and sometimes had to find backdoors they could slip through. While the government encouraged women to take military assignments, some women responded to online requests from Ukrainian combat units for people with critical skills. If a woman had the skills and applied, she was usually accepted. While men were conscripted, women had to volunteer, and a growing number did. Currently, about 60,000 female volunteers are in uniform, and that number was nearly 70,000 earlier in the war. Six percent of snipers are women, as are 23 percent of drone operators and support personnel. Military medical personnel are 22 percent female, and a quarter of military staff personnel are women. This includes the GUR/Intelligence Directorate and SBU/Security Service.
Experience in earlier wars demonstrated that non-combat troops often get exposed to the fighting anyway, and this was more common in the last twenty years. By being kept out of the direct combat jobs, women were much less likely to be killed in combat. Noting that many jobs women were barred from still had about the same casualty rates as those women were already in, the American army expanded the number of specific jobs women could serve in. The most visible result of the change was women serving in support efforts for infantry, tank, artillery, and engineer battalions. As a practical matter, this is nothing new. Women have served in brigade-level support units for several decades, and troops from those units often worked alongside the combat battalions within a brigade for extended periods. The women in combat battalions perform roles such as communications, supply, intelligence, health care, and various staff functions.
A lot more 21st-century women have been showing up in military jobs. Currently, women make up 18 percent of the American Army and Navy, while 24 percent of Air Force personnel are female. Women also qualify for nearly 90 percent of all armed forces jobs. That includes service with Army combat units. Not the Special Operations Forces, but often with the support troops to get the SEALS and Delta Force where they need to go and keep them informed and supplied. At the same time, many female non-combat troops are still exposed to combat and manage to perform their duties without issue.
Russia is also recruiting more women to take care of non-combat jobs. In Western forces, only 10-15 percent of troops are in combat units. In Russia, only half the uniformed forces are support troops; the rest are for combat. Recruiting more women means more men available for combat. While women are willing to join, men are still reluctant because of the high risk of getting killed.
Early in the Ukraine war, Russia revived the World War II practice of employing women as snipers and, since this is the 21st Century, drone operators as well. For service in Ukraine, qualified Russian women can make at least $1,200 a month. That’s a lot of money in contemporary Russia. Russian forces are suffering heavy casualties in Ukraine and are recruiting women for jobs that, in the past, women have been good at and willing to undertake in a combat zone.
This is not the first time Russia has employed women in combat roles. Before Germany invaded in 1941, Russia had several all-female tank battalions. Most of the Russian tank force was destroyed in the first months of the war, and as it was rebuilt, surviving all-female units were disbanded because there were plenty of other combat and combat support jobs for women. That included traffic control along roads and snipers. Women proved particularly good at both jobs.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 27, 2026 - 03:34 pm: Edit

Russia: How Russia Is Losing In Ukraine
July 27, 2026: There are clear signs that Russia is losing the war in Ukraine. Of the two million casualties suffered by both sides so far, 70 percent of them were Russian. The ratio of Russian to Ukrainian casualties has changed over the last three years from 2-1 to the current 8-1. The Ukrainians have long made the most of being on the defensive. Ukraine has developed specific tactics for this, and Ukrainian soldiers are trained to be very effective at causing lots of Russian casualties. Until this year, the Russians were able to mobilize enough new troops to replace losses. That is no longer the case, and in the last few months Russia has only been able to replace about 90 percent of losses. This is getting worse.
The deteriorating Russian situation also shows up in advance rates, which were 50, 70, and 90 meters per day during three recent battles. These are some of the slowest rates of advance in any conflict since the start of World War II.
The primary source of Russian losses has been Ukrainian drones. These drones come in an increasing number of types, and new models appear rapidly. Russia has been unable to compete. To make matters worse, Ukraine has developed an effective drone interceptor, further diluting Russian offensive efforts. Over the last year, Ukrainian long-range drones have intensified their attacks on military and economic targets in western Russia, including major cities like Moscow and St Petersburg. These attacks are bringing the war home to Russian civilians who have been told for years that Russian forces were winning.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 27, 2026 - 03:34 pm: Edit

Iran: The Navy In 2026
July 25, 2026: Currently, the Iranian Navy has about 90 ships. Not all of them are operational, and more are facing destruction or debilitating damage every day. Before the war the Iranian Navy benefited from improvements over the last five years. These included adding a few more submarines and surface warships. This year, that all changed as 13 of 18 submarines were destroyed, all eight corvettes and frigates were sunk, as were most of the 46 patrol boats and 41 amphibious and logistics ships and 28 aircraft. Then there are the IRGC/Islamic Republican Guard Corps and their force of 40 missile and torpedo boats as well as over a thousand speed boats that can carry machine guns, shoulder-fired anti-ship or aircraft rockets. These boats can also carry naval mines, which are currently a problem in the Persian Gulf. The Iran War included efforts to sink all of the IRGC speedboats, but that proved difficult as the Iranians concealed many of these boats or stored them far from the coast and brought them to the coast as needed.
The Iranian Navy has long been a work in progress. Five years ago, the Iranian Navy put the fourth Moudge\Mowj class frigate, the Dena, into service. The latest of these ships was the Dena, described as a Light Frigate. It was sunk on March 4, 2026, by the USS Charlotte, an American nuclear attack submarine. The Moudge-class ships are actually heavily armed, haphazardly equipped corvettes. Iran plans to put seven into service, and three more are under construction, with uncertain service dates due to difficulty finding the required warship components.
The first Moudge, the Jamaran, entered service in 2010 after at least six years under construction. The second one, the Damavand, entered service in 2015. This one was built in a Caspian Sea shipyard and took six years to complete. In early 2018, it ran aground while entering port in bad weather. Satellite photos showed it partially submerged. The ship was refloated and towed to a shipyard for repairs, where it was declared complete after 18 months. Despite this, the ship is not yet back in service. This may be due to problems with equipment damaged when the ship was partially sunk. Getting necessary electronic and mechanical components is always a problem when building these ships. For example, the third Moudge, the Sahand, entered service at the end of 2018 after eight years of construction efforts. This one was more heavily armed and equipped for long-distance voyages of up to 150 days if accompanied by a supply ship. To demonstrate this, Sahand recently traveled to the Atlantic, accompanied by a tanker/supply ship. This was mostly a publicity stunt.
It is unclear how long the latest Moudge was under construction because Iran carries out much of the work in a shed to protect the new warship from the elements for five or more years. Iran is now trying to keep quiet about its warship construction efforts due to unpredictable delays.
Iran has had limited access to foreign shipbuilders since the 1980s and, by 2000, had developed the capability to build its own warships. These are crude, but they float, and their weapons generally work. Construction takes place in the commercial shipyards that Iran has developed since the 1990s to repair existing commercial ships and build smaller tankers and cargo carriers. This eventually led to the development of warships, a common trend among nations seeking to build their own. Before the monarchy was overthrown in 1979, Iran bought modern warships from foreign suppliers, a practice still common among Persian Gulf oil states. Only the UAE has developed some warship construction capability, mainly as part of its effort to prepare the economy for less dependence on oil income.
The locally built Iranian surface ships are small craft, 1,500-ton corvettes and 2,200-ton frigates, while the submarines are largely of the miniature variety. Construction of warships is a sideline in the commercial shipyards, and only a few warships are being built at a time. Construction is also proceeding slowly so that, apparently, mistakes in the previous ships can be discovered and fixed.
Currently, the only major surface warships it has are three of the new corvettes/frigates, three elderly 1,540-ton British-built frigates, and two American-built 1,100-ton corvettes. There are about fifty smaller patrol craft, ten of them armed with Iranian versions of Chinese anti-ship missiles. Chief among these is the Nasr 1. There are a few dozen mine warfare, amphibious, and support ships. The three most powerful ships in the fleet are three Russian Kilo-class subs. Most of the foreign-built ships are serving way past their retirement date. This includes the Kilos and most of the 50 mini-subs, most of which were built in Iran. There are several thousand marines and twenty or so aircraft and helicopters.
The Iranian Navy is led by officers who think along more conventional lines than their government. Western ship commanders generally have good professional relationships with their Iranian counterparts, even when the Iranian Navy is under orders to give Western ships a hard time. If an Iranian captain reports by radio that He Has His Orders, it means he will follow through on whatever bizarre actions he has been ordered to carry out but will be apologetic to his foreign peers.
The Iranian Navy has fewer options than the Revolutionary Guard simply because it has fewer, larger ships that are easier to spot and hit. Since 2005, the navy has generally been stationed in the Indian Ocean and the Caspian Sea, while the IRGC/Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps navy has been responsible for the Persian Gulf and for protecting Iranian oil facilities along the coast. Actually, the Revolutionary Guard is there more as a threat to Arab oil fields and tankers because the Arabs and their Western allies have control of the air and can destroy Iranian oil fields and tankers that way. What the IRGC hopes to do at sea is create as formidable a threat as possible, even if this threat, in the form of suicidal speedboats and missile boats backed up by shore-based anti-ship missiles, is short-term. In the long run, any Iranian naval power is toast.
In Iran, the IRGC has its own Navy of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. The main job of the IRGC is to protect the religious dictatorship from the Iranian armed forces and a growing number of angry Iranians. As a result, the IRGC Navy has 23,000 personnel, including marines and naval aviation personnel, compared to 18,000 in the Iranian Navy. Iran’s two navies are very different from each other. The traditional navy exists alongside the less well-equipped, but more fanatical, forces of the IRGC. Both forces are equipped, trained, and led very differently. The IRGC force is sworn to defend the religious dictatorship, while the regular navy strives to defend Iran.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 27, 2026 - 03:35 pm: Edit

Air Weapons: Recent Ukrainian Drone Tactics
July 25, 2026: This year, the Ukraine War turned into a strategic bombing campaign against economic, military, and political targets throughout Russia. This came as a surprise to many Russian civilians, who were told by the government that victory was near. If the Ukrainians were nearly defeated, how were they able to attack so many targets inside Russia, especially prominent ones like the capital, Moscow, and other major cities like St. Petersburg and nearby military facilities on Kronstadt Island?
It got worse when Russian civilians found long waits at petrol stations, where you had to wait hours, or even days, to get refueled. Some station personnel demanded bribes to fill your tank. It was worse near the Ukrainian border, where drones were attacking bridges, barge canals and tunnels in an effort to block or disrupt efforts to supply Russian forces in Ukraine. Soldiers were phoning home to complain that they were often without food, water or ammunition because of what their officers described as transportation problems. Many Russian soldiers knew what was really happening as they tried to drive any kind of vehicle anywhere within 20 to 30 kilometers of the front line. Ukrainian drones seemed to be hunting for targets around the clock. While Russian drones sought the source of these attacks, they increasingly ran into Ukrainian drone interceptors. Behind this was the fact that Ukraine was producing millions more drones than Russia and many new drone types.
The drone offensive has also hit key targets in the Crimean Peninsula. In addition to road traffic, the drones are going after military targets while allowing fleeing civilians to drive back to Russia. Radars, air defense systems, electronic warfare equipment, ports, shipyards, barracks, munitions storage sites, airbases, and anything else the Russian military could use were being systematically destroyed. Ukrainian guerrillas operating in Crimea give detailed reports of the damage, from close personal inspection. The guerrillas are also preparing to support a Ukrainian ground invasion of Crimea and a campaign to make Crimea Ukrainian again after twelve years of Russian occupation. Other Russian-occupied portions in eastern Ukraine are also threatened, and some pro-Russian militia groups are negotiating to switch sides and escape post-war prosecution.
Russian leaders are distracted by economic and political problems at home, including the growing Russian dependence on Chinese economic and military support and the problems caused by the current Iran War. China gets most of its oil from Iran, and currently those shipments are blocked by the American Navy. Iran, China, and North Korea were the three major sources of military support, and all three are currently busy solving their own problems.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 27, 2026 - 03:36 pm: Edit

Leadership: Russian Centralization Versus Ukrainian Adaptability
July 24, 2026: The Ukraine War has always been about Russian Centralization Versus Ukrainian Adaptability. For centuries, Russian governments were referred to as the Center. All things good and bad emanated from the capital, Moscow
When confronted by the unexpected Ukrainian-driven drone\UAV revolution, Russia did something different. In mid-2024, they created Rubicon. The full name is Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies. Rubicon was given access to the best technical, manufacturing, and military assets they needed to develop and produce new drones that could overwhelm Ukrainian drone forces. This included adding AI/Artificial Intelligence capabilities to Russian drones and counter-drone systems.
Rubicon got all the resources it wanted to turn the tide in the drone wars inside Ukraine. Ukrainian forces soon noted that the Russian drones were becoming more capable, as were the Russian electronic warfare operations used to disrupt Ukrainian drones. Rubicon developed technologies and tactics that enabled Russian drone operators to find and destroy more Ukrainian drone controllers. The Ukrainians found that Russian electronic warfare against Ukrainian drones was becoming more effective.
By mid-2025, the Rubicon initiative was turning the tide in the drone wars. At that point, it was up to Ukraine to come up with effective countermeasures in terms of new drones and improved electronic warfare.
Russian drones briefly had the initiative, and it was increasingly difficult for Ukrainian forces to operate within 30 kilometers of the front line. As quickly as the Ukrainians moved to upgrade their drone operations, Rubicon found ways to keep Russian forces ahead. That’s because Rubicon was designed to carefully observe changes in Ukrainian equipment and tactics and quickly match and surpass it. The Ukrainians then managed to match and surpass Rubicon to the point where Russian chances of winning the war faded into insignificance and defeat.
And then there was Ukrainian adaptability. When a country is at war, and the situation becomes desperate, speedy innovation is the only way out. Ukraine managed to adapt because its population has a higher proportion of technically adept people than Russia or most Western nations. Ukraine also put most of its drone production operations underground. This includes warehouses for storing drone components, areas for developing new drone technology, and spaces for monitoring current drone use and operations.
Ukraine also uses bottom-up control of drone use. Platoon commanders and members of that platoon are allowed to make drone use decisions on the spot. That includes when and how often to use electronic jamming and other countermeasures. Worse for the Russians is that the Ukrainians are significantly faster at updating and modifying their drone designs and tactics. Whoever is first to use a new technology or tactic tends to prevail.
Russian soldiers still wait for orders before acting. No orders mean nothing happens on the Russian side. This is one reason the Russians are running out of infantry. Russia can barely cover the 900-kilometer front line, and the current number of Russian ground attacks is minuscule.
This is Russia’s own fault. They persisted in making frontal assaults, often with ill-prepared and poorly trained soldiers. It barely worked in World War II, and it was noted then that by 1945 most Russian soldiers were from Central Asian regions. These men were rarely trusted to serve as front-line infantry, but by the end of the war, few Slavic Russians were available. In Ukraine, history has repeated itself.
Ukraine conserved its manpower while accelerating the development and deployment of remotely operated weapons. Ukrainian drone operators and support personnel are kept safely away because they are the key personnel needed to defeat the Russians.
Ukrainian drone operators operate from whatever location is suitable and available. This can be from a civilian car or truck, as well as a bunker or the wreckage of bombed-out buildings. Vehicles are preferred because they can quickly move drone control equipment, jammers, electronic warfare systems, and drone supplies to portions of the front line to stay within radio range of their drones. In some sectors of the front, drones inflict 90 percent of the casualties. Drones are responsible for nearly two-thirds of Russian casualties and equipment losses.
Most of these drones are the FPV/First Person View model that allows the operator to see where the drone is going. Another surveillance drone records the attack by an FPV drone, which destroys itself along with its Russian target. Ukraine constantly adds new models to its drone force. In 2025, Ukraine obtained four million drones. This year, that will nearly double, to seven million drones, including a growing number of land and naval drones.
The drones are considered rounds of ammunition, like a bullet, artillery shell, or hand grenade. Ukraine also received American satellite surveillance and intercepts of Russian electronic communications. That flow of information is sometimes interrupted by American political disputes. The Ukrainians have dealt with that as well, at least for short periods.
Another advantage is the American-based SpaceX Starlink satellite network overhead. Ukrainian forces have Starlink ground terminals, which consist of a small satellite dish, a controller, and a battery. Each of these can be carried in a soldier's backpack and set up anywhere within minutes. Russian troops still lack suitable, reliable radios, and the Russian space satellite networks have deteriorated over the last decade into a barely functioning, unreliable state.
The Russians know that they are in trouble, but their leader, Vladimir Putin, will deny it to the end. With help from their only allies, North Korea and Iran, Russia can still launch an occasional large-scale bombardment with missiles and drones. These usually cause little damage because the Ukrainians detect their approach and have developed a constantly evolving air defense system. When pressed, Russia blames these problems on NATO assistance. The last thing Russia wants to admit is that they are being defeated by Ukrainians.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 27, 2026 - 03:36 pm: Edit

Winning: How Ukraine Recovered Crimea
July 24, 2026: Fourteen years ago, Russia swindled its way into owning the Crimean Peninsula. It started with Ukraine leasing parts of Crimea to host bases used by the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Then Russia snuck several thousand Russian Spetsnaz special forces into Crimea in 2014 and grabbed it by force. Ukraine is presently completing its reconquest of Crimea. To make this happen, the few roads linking Russia and Crimea are under attack. Modern combat drones, which Ukrainians developed to fight the Russian invaders, are now being used to destroy Russian military bases, air defense systems, roads, port facilities, and fuel infrastructure in Crimea. Most Russian civilians in Crimea have returned to Russia during the last year.
Since 2024, Russia has spent nearly $12 billion to improve the roads and other transportation connecting Crimea to Russia. Now the Ukrainians are blowing it all up, day by day. Satellite photos show more and more burned-out Russian trucks along roads that are now missing vital bridges but covered by regular patrols by Ukrainian attack drones.
Russian political and military leaders admit that the liberation of Crimea and occupied provinces in eastern Ukraine is going to happen sooner rather than later. This year it is Ukrainian forces that are regaining ground while Russia has been unable to recruit enough new soldiers to replace those lost in Ukraine. Russia has been at war in Ukraine longer than it was during World War II, fighting and defeating the German invaders. This is something that is unpopular in Russia and the reason why Russia can’t find enough men to replace losses in Ukraine.
There have been some peace talks, but Vladimir Putin is still looking for a suitable way for himself to admit defeat. The Russian people and economy have struggled through four years of economic sanctions, and most Russians, according to polls and Russian bloggers, just want the war to be over. They don’t care if Ukraine gets all its territory back; they just want the war and all its attendant privation to end. One day soon, Ukraine and Russia will simply announce that the war is over, or ignore the situation and just move. Putin does not want to admit defeat, and as long as Ukraine gets all its Russian-occupied territory back, doesn’t care about an official declaration of victory.
Russia didn’t vigorously defend Crimea because the Ukrainians had tied up most Russian military resources by a year-long series of attacks on economic and military targets deep inside Russia. The Russian people are angry about a war that cost them so much in terms of lives lost and a growing poverty rate. Millions of Russian men were killed, disabled, or deserted, while many more fled the country to avoid it.
FYEO

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Monday, July 27, 2026 - 03:38 pm: Edit

Oh good grief:

Reporter: "Zelenskyy says that Russia is giving Iran satellite imagery of US bases in the Gulf to help them target. What can you do about that?"

Pres. Trump: "We'll find out if that's true. I'll ask Putin about it. We'll find out. Venezuela had all Russian equipment. How did that work out? Not too good. So they may be giving, but if they are, it hasn't worked out because they have no army, they have no air force, they have no navy, they have no nothing. So it hasn't worked out well. I don't think they've been doing it, certainly not at a high level. And if they have, it has been very unimpactful."

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 27, 2026 - 03:40 pm: Edit

I heard a mention during another report that sometime in the next month or two, Ukraine will start using its own (new) ballistic missile which supposedly has enough range to hit Moscow. My guesses....

1. They won't try to hit Moscow as that city has anti-ICBM missile defenses and can be hit by Flamingo cruise missiles easily enough.

2. The missile will be available in small numbers for the rest of this year, then more and more. I would hazard as guess that firing 12 during any given month would be unusual.

3. The really fun part is that Ukraine could then hit anything at will, dropping a big warhead into the middle of a refinery or a Wildberry warehouse or something else.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, July 27, 2026 - 04:09 pm: Edit

What kind of answer did you want, Jessica?

launch a nuclear war?

Invade Russia?

shoot down Russian satellites?

Order the NSA to use ESP to make Putin stop.

Order the CIA to inject hormones into Putin's carrots so make his hair fall out. (Oh, yeah, we did that one already.)

We give such intel to Israel and Ukraine and South Korea and Japan and the Brits all the time. I'm sure Putin is annoyed but that would HE do about it?

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Monday, July 27, 2026 - 04:20 pm: Edit

What answer?

That's ridiculously easy.

Punish Russia by supporting Ukraine.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Monday, July 27, 2026 - 05:30 pm: Edit

Sure, why not?

It is not like Russia has been helping Putin out at all.

For example, back in 2022 Russia could have won the war in a week if everything had worked out as planned. Obviously it was Russia’s fault for not getting the job done as promised.

It could just be that everything that has happened since the botched invasion has been planned by Putin to punish Russia…

\irony off….

Dang, that didn’t work erither.

By MarkSHoyle (Bolo) on Monday, July 27, 2026 - 08:03 pm: Edit

Ukraine could always order a pallet of Israeli
Pagers......

By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Tuesday, July 28, 2026 - 04:26 am: Edit

SVC, no small part of the Red vs Blue thing in the US is because how the political system incentives a two party system. Politics is what it is but polarization is significantly reduced in systems with proportional representation and multiparty systems. These tend to form blocks, but the parts are distinct enough to the public.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, July 28, 2026 - 07:52 am: Edit

I think I just discovered why Europe didn’t meet its potential.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, July 28, 2026 - 09:49 pm: Edit

During July 24-26, three Russian drones entered Romanian airspace. (This was not the first time. These incursions might be accidental or deliberate attempts to map Romanian air defenses and radar coverage.) Romania responded and had fighters (F16s) shoot the drones down, the first shots fired by Romania in the Russo-Ukrainian War. All were Shaheeds, one was the new jet-powered one.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Wednesday, July 29, 2026 - 09:42 am: Edit

It's about time Romania shot down Russian drones.

This is far from the first incursion.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Wednesday, July 29, 2026 - 11:29 am: Edit

"What kind of answer did you want, Jessica?"

What I want is for the President of the United States to stop making excuses and/or equivocating for Vladimir Putin, full stop.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, July 29, 2026 - 12:00 pm: Edit

Okay, so the answer could be "He should not be doing that. We're going to have a problem that needs to be discussed."

Then nothing happens.

No US president is going to war over intel sharing.

How to punish Russia? Well, more sanctions (none left to speak of), oil embargo (wreck world economy, can't wait to hear Jessica blame that on Trump), unfriend him on Facebook?

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Wednesday, July 29, 2026 - 01:01 pm: Edit

Not going to lie: I'll pay higher prices at the pump if it means starving out Russia's oil economy. Unlike the fiasco in the Persian Gulf, I'd outright cheer Trump on if he were willing to do that.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, July 29, 2026 - 02:25 pm: Edit

Yes, Jessica, you will cheer as Trump loses the midterms. I fear he knows that all too well.

There is an old joke that political prediction polls will get so good that they don't need elections, just to call one voter. I suspect you are on that "call" list.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Wednesday, July 29, 2026 - 02:55 pm: Edit

SVC,

Would supporting Ukraine somehow fail to punish Russia?

In particular, more support of its strike drone operations.

Am I missing something?

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, July 29, 2026 - 02:59 pm: Edit

Russia: Sanctions Erode Russian Aviation
July 29, 2026: Russian aviation manufacturers face growing maintenance and production challenges. For example, last month, an air force Tu-22M3 heavy bomber crashed during a training flight. The preliminary cause was a technical malfunction of the aircraft. This was the third Tu-22M3 loss due to malfunctions in three years. Similarly, last month, a Russian Boeing 737 nearly crashed over the Black Sea due to engine failure while en route to Arkhangelsk. At the last moment, the plane was able to return to its departure airport.
These incidents make clear the growing problems with aircraft maintenance in Russia . NATO sanctions have restricted access to essential parts, reducing efforts to properly maintain aircraft. Desperate to keep their aircraft in the air, Russia has resorted to taking parts of some aircraft and relying on expensive smuggled parts. With fewer aircraft flying more often, there is greater risk of accidents .
Problems first appeared in 2023, after a year of heavy combat. Then Ukraine used missiles and drones to attack airfields close to the Ukrainian border. This forced Russia to move many of its heavy bombers to airbases up to 6,000 kilometers from Ukraine. This made it more expensive and time-consuming for these bombers to carry and launch cruise missiles at Ukrainian targets. The additional wear and tear on these bombers reduced their useful lives.
Then came the Ukrainian Operation Spiderweb in mid-2025. Using a plan that took 18 months to develop, Ukraine managed to send trucks loaded with drones, which appeared to be crates of commercial goods. By remote control, the drones were launched, and their operators back in Ukraine guided the drones to attack and destroy or damage about a third of the Russian heavy bombers available. This left Russia with ten Tu-22M3 heavy bombers. These are no longer produced, with the last one entering service in 1993. Russia also has over 30 Tu-160M heavy bombers, which are still in production. Older versions of this bomber are being updated. This is a slow process, taking five years or more per aircraft.
The NATO sanctions are also disrupting production of Russian fighters and fighter-bombers, such as the Su-30, Su-34, Su-35, and perhaps even the 10 new 6th-generation Su-57 aircraft. Production rates for these aircraft are only about 30 per year, which is not enough to replace training, obsolescence, and combat losses. Russian plans for a new heavy bomber are on hold because of the sanctions and the cost of the war in Ukraine.
Obviously, Russian commercial aviation is suffering similar, and in many cases worse, problems. The development and production of Russian-designed and manufactured airliners were eventually halted. Russia can no longer obtain spare parts and maintenance support for its Airbus and Boeing airliners, which account for 70 percent of Russian commercial airliners, and over 90 percent of all commercial flights are operated by these foreign airliners. Boeing and Airbus had sold or leased these aircraft to Russia and demanded their return after Russia invaded Ukraine. Russia refused, but was now cut off from manufacturer support and has to rely on smuggled parts and whatever help it can get from China. Currently, about twenty percent of these are grounded.
FYEO

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