Does anyone know how China's Fuijan is doing with EMALS?

By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Friday, August 14, 2026 - 05:21 pm: Edit

"It's not like steam is a pet project of Trump."
Well, he has spoken about it several times. The war zone reports he brought it up already in 2017. At that time it was a reasonable idea to let the technology mature more. Now? Not so much.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Saturday, August 15, 2026 - 10:47 am: Edit

Using FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles, Ukraine hit and severely damaged the Progress Rocket Space Center in Samara, which is the only assembly point for Soyuz-2 rockets (which puts Russia's Rassvet program - their equivalent of Starlink - in a bind).

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Saturday, August 15, 2026 - 06:21 pm: Edit

Russia sent a mixed battalion of armored vehicles including T72B3A tanks into combat last July using the newest revision of the ARENA self-defense system designed specifically to stop drones. (Drones are slower than other incoming weapons and ARENA had to be calibrated for the slower targets. If this worked, it would change tactics -- a lot. Each tank has a dozen interceptors, which would force Ukraine to use a hundred drones against a typical tank company instead of 20.) The system failed and the battalion was ripped apart by drone attacks that ARENA failed to stop. Despite that, everyone knows that this is the way to the future. Tanks need counter-drone weapons, and this was another test (not the first). Sooner or later, someone will find one. Then the other side will try to build better drones.
THE MILITARY SHOW.

By MarkSHoyle (Bolo) on Saturday, August 15, 2026 - 06:22 pm: Edit

How long before Ukraine builds anti-satellite weapons....

Several authors had them in the books back into the 60s.... Several war games from the 80s used them....

By Burt Quaid (Burt) on Saturday, August 15, 2026 - 11:11 pm: Edit

The US has already built one, then didn't make more I think. Wasn't there a missle that could be launched from an F-15? And now we have some that our ships can fire, but I don't know how high then can reach.

burt

By Douglas Lampert (Dlampert) on Saturday, August 15, 2026 - 11:40 pm: Edit

A standard missile 3 destroyed one of our own malfunctioning satelites at an altitude of 247 kilometers, which is lower than starlink and much lower than GPS. The Russian GPS equivalent is in eliptical orbits which are lower over the southern hemisphere (which makes them spend a lot more time over the northern hemisphere) and would thus be very hard targets from Ukraine.

Officially, the SM3 hit on a satelite was not an antisatelite weapon test but out of concern of the danger of the Hyrdrazine tank surviving reentry and being a hazard on the ground, and you can believe as much of that as you like.

By Jeff Anderson (Jga) on Sunday, August 16, 2026 - 12:04 am: Edit

Lasers from converted passenger jets. Fly up at thirty thousand feet and roughly 75% of Earth's atmosphere is under them. Laser can easily fry cameras and might even be able to burn a hole in propellant tanks.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Sunday, August 16, 2026 - 05:35 am: Edit

This morning in Moscow, two Wildberries warehouses were hit by drones and burned to the ground, each a total loss. One was the single biggest Wilberries hub in Russia, about 2.5 million square feet. Flames reached fifty feet into the air, the smoke columns reached two miles high. Wild berries is on the verge of bankruptcy, putting one hundred thousand Russian entrepreneurs out of work and into bankruptcy, altogether costing Russia 3% of ts tax receipts.
DENYS DAVIDOV, YouTube.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Sunday, August 16, 2026 - 06:02 am: Edit

The 2.5 million square hub is at Kolodino, the other was an independent warehouse leased to Wildberry.

Wild berry bingo now shows, in order of square feet, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 21, 25, 29, and 30 destroyed.

Suchomimus, YouTube

By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Sunday, August 16, 2026 - 07:26 am: Edit

Love that Bingo card. It doesn't say who will win and lose the war, but it is good propaganda.

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Sunday, August 16, 2026 - 11:02 am: Edit

wouldn't want to work at Wildberries #4, 10 or 15...

By A David Merritt (Adm) on Sunday, August 16, 2026 - 01:18 pm: Edit

---

Quote:

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Sunday, August 16, 2026 - 11:02 am: Edit

wouldn't want to work at Wildberries #4, 10 or 15...

---

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Sunday, August 16, 2026 - 05:28 pm: Edit

Two hundred percent.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Sunday, August 16, 2026 - 05:30 pm: Edit

4 or 10 or 15 would be the first complete row on the bingo card.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Sunday, August 16, 2026 - 05:31 pm: Edit

Think about the guys, who, ten days from now, work at the only remaining wild berries hub.

By Jeff Anderson (Jga) on Sunday, August 16, 2026 - 11:53 pm: Edit

How many lives have been lost among employees at the WildBerries plants?

If they have reasonable escape routes available to them, it might be safer than the Ukraine War Front...

By Tom Lusco (Tlusco) on Monday, August 17, 2026 - 08:22 am: Edit

Paul asked:

The relevant point is - will EMALS ever be 'fixed' enough to work... or is it felt to be terminal?

Wasn't EMALS able to launch planes faster than Steam?

What I had read (and is generally supported by quick DDGoing and AI summaries, FWIW) is that EMALS enables 30% faster sortie rates. More importantly perhaps though is that it can also run at lower launch power than steam, which better supports unmanned aviation.

By Paul Howard (Raven) on Monday, August 17, 2026 - 03:21 pm: Edit

Hopefully this has been misreported - but has President Trump actually told Oman, if they come to a deal with Iran** "If Oman gets in the way, we'll bomb the @#%£ out of them"?

** - It is being reported Oman and Iran have come to a deal to re-open the Straights and an understanding has been reached (Iran is saying this -I can't see anything from Omans side yet)

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, August 17, 2026 - 04:36 pm: Edit

Unfortunately this seems an accurate report. Trump needs to get his "filter" re-tuned. We all have silly thoughts now and then; presidents would do well not to speak every thought that comes into their head. (Better to let the bombing be a surprise?)

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, August 17, 2026 - 05:10 pm: Edit

Attrition: Ukraine Imposes Economic Pain
August 16, 2026: The Ukraine War, now in its fifth year, has finally caught the attention of Russian civilians. Recent opinion surveys found that the most pressing issues were high prices (18 percent), low wages (24 percent), and the war in Ukraine (33 percent) . In late 2022, about half of the respondents cited the war as their major concern. A year later, declining salaries and rising problems were the main problems. Over the last few years, increasing Ukrainian attacks on the Russian economy have led Russian civilians to realize that their economic problems were not going away until the war ended. Russian leader Vladimir Putin insists the war will go on until it is won. He does not believe that and is seeking a way out of the war without admitting defeat.
The war in Ukraine disrupted Russian manufacturing activity as production shifted toward military needs. The large number of Russian men mobilized for the war caused labor shortages. Then there were over a million Russian men lost, killed, disabled, deserted, or who fled the country to avoid military service.
The labor shortage is exacerbated by the shortage of high school and university graduates with technical training. Too many of those grads concentrated on the humanities rather than industrial and software engineering. As a result, firms that manufacture products requiring extensive technical skills cut production. The government has responded by proposing laws that would limit enrollment for humanities students. It would offer bonuses and other benefits to students studying technical subjects.
Most of these measures can be attributed to the war in Ukraine. This conflict caused enormous economic damage to both countries. Ukraine's GDP declined by 30 percent in 2022, while Russia’s declined by about 3 percent. Russia was hit hard by economic sanctions in 2014 for taking Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine, and sanctions for its 2022 invasion made it even more isolated from the global economy. Russia’s only arms imports now come from equally poor North Korean artillery shells and rockets and cheap Iranian missiles. Payment is by barter. North Korea gets badly needed food and oil supplies while Iran receives modern jet fighters and other military tech. China and India help fund it by purchasing heavily discounted Russian oil and natural gas.
Three years ago, Western sanctions were expanded, blocking Russia from obtaining much industrial equipment for factories or establishing new ones. Russia now has a harder time getting machine tools and components needed to build weapons. These include motors and other drone components, as well as lithium-ion batteries that power most drones. Many of these banned components for weapons are also used in non-military items. These are called dual-use items, and the new sanctions also ban them to help ensure no supplies are available to build weapons. This includes complex systems such as missiles, which require specific chemicals to fabricate solid-fuel motors.
Alternative sources for sanctioned items exist, but they cost more, take longer to deliver, and don't guarantee regular shipments. Using smugglers to circumvent sanctions is expensive, but Russia must pay more to keep essential wartime industries running.
Dealing with sanctions also requires substantial funds, and Russian government debt is more expensive to raise because lenders charge higher interest rates on what they call high-risk default debt. That forces Russia to be selective in what military equipment it purchases. For example, the government won’t buy many new rifles for its combat troops because it still has lots of older weapons in storage. That does not always work as intended because many of these old rifles were so poorly maintained that they were often visibly rusty and barely operational. The newly mobilized troops complained, but the federal government recognizes that most of these poorly trained and equipped soldiers won’t last long in combat. Local governments in the places where many of the new troops came from suffered most of the blowback and often organized efforts to raise local funds to buy new weapons and other equipment for locals now in the army.
Foreign suppliers were few and provided low-quality weapons. This included Iranian Shaheed propeller-driven small drones armed to perform as slow-moving cruise missiles. They also used cheap, often aging North Korean 152mm artillery shells to keep the fighting going. The Iranian missiles were not as useful as predicted because the Ukrainians shot down most of them. Debris from intercepted missiles that exploded on impact still caused damage. When Russia used a lot of cruise missiles in an attack, most crashed in urban areas, where the wreckage damaged Ukrainian infrastructure.
By early 2024, Russia’s enormous pre-war artillery munitions stocks were depleted, and its production facilities couldn't expand. Before 1991, much Soviet-era 122mm and 152mm ammunition was produced outside post-1991 Russia. That includes Ukraine, Belarus, and other countries that have halted production and dismantled production facilities. Russia was not expecting a long war in Ukraine and did not have sufficient artillery munitions to supply all the artillery it deployed in Ukraine over the past three years. On the front lines, Ukrainian troops have noted much fewer Russian shells fired at them. Ukrainian artillery, a combination of old 152mm and new 155mm guns, also used more effective tactics than the Russians.
Russia has used up its own supplies of ballistic and cruise missiles; the few remaining were not enough to reverse the progress Ukraine was making in rebuilding its production capabilities. Ukrainian reconstruction was focused on keeping the lights on, along with other utilities such as water, sewage disposal, and heating. Because so much housing was damaged or destroyed, twenty percent of Ukrainians had temporarily left the country, leaving enough unoccupied housing for those needing temporary shelter until their bombed-out homes were repaired or rebuilt. Some of the foreign aid consisted of building supplies to speed the restoration of war-damaged housing. Russia experienced a smaller population exodus. Most were military-age men avoiding mobilization or unemployed Russians with skills who could get jobs anywhere. These refugees were sufficiently numerous to cause labor shortages inside Russia, forcing the government to import North Korean workers to deal with the problem.
Neighboring Belarus was technically an ally, but the relationship was more like Belarus being an unwilling donor of resources to Russia, which makes no secret of its plan to absorb Belarus once it conquers Ukraine. Most Belarussians are pro-Ukraine and want to maintain independence from Russia. The pro-Russia Belarusian leaders and their security forces, reinforced with some Russians, keep Belarus from more actively supporting Ukraine.
Central Asian nations that also became independent of Russia in 1991 see themselves as on the Russian acquisition list too, and adopted wary neutrality towards the Russia-Ukraine war while supporting Ukraine. This limited Russian economic opportunities in Central Asia. China accelerated its efforts to replace Russia as the Central Asian states' major foreign trading partner.
China has generally avoided increasing its pre-war trade with Russia because of all the sanctions but has quietly increased its trade with North Korea and Iran. China does not give things away but is willing to sell to anyone who can pay. Iran has oil and North Korea has coal and minerals plus whatever its hackers can steal. China allowed these hackers to operate from China as long as they paid their own way and did not hack Chinese targets. The North Korean hackers have become quite good at stealing cryptocurrency that China or Russia accepts as payment.
By 2026, widespread Ukrainian air attacks against economic targets and major cities brought the war home to millions of Russians. Despite government censorship efforts, cellphone photos and videos of the attacks reached most Russians. The more desperate Russia's economic situation became, the more they had to improvise to survive. That’s an old Russian tradition that must be relied on more often than most Russians want.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, August 17, 2026 - 05:11 pm: Edit

Leadership: Ukrainian Military Reforms
August 17, 2026: When Russia annexed Ukrainian Crimea 14 years ago, the Ukrainians were jolted into making a nearly continuous string of military reforms to the present. These began with accepting NATO offers to retrain the Ukrainian military to operate using more innovation and flexibility. These were advantages the previous Soviet Union-style military lacked. Ukraine became independent in 1991 when the Soviet Union went bankrupt and collapsed.
Ukrainians recognized the importance of initiative and entrepreneurial spirit. Once in the military, new soldiers reached back home to friends and family for needed equipment, especially drones. The development of drones in Ukraine was enhanced by all the friends and family members of Ukrainian soldiers who didn’t just send their soldiers what they said they needed, but searched around on the internet, social networks, and among friends for ideas and help in developing those ideas into something useful in a combat zone.
The Ukrainian army is organized into brigades, and each brigade commander and his staff can deal directly with manufacturers to obtain new equipment or items developed by soldiers. Not just drones but additions to combat uniforms, anti-drone nets, and anything the brigade members found useful with their handmade prototypes of new items. The brigade commander has a budget for this, which is often augmented by the friends and families of soldiers under his command. While army-wide standardization suffers, the combat gains and other brigades' ability to copy successful ideas make it all worthwhile. This is obvious when you read the internet and social networks chatter of soldiers who survived because of some civilian’s crazy idea that worked.
Ukrainian drone proliferation began when many individual Ukrainians, or small teams of civilians, designed and built drones. The drones became candidates for widespread use and mass production. This proliferation of designers and manufacturers drove rapid evolution in drone capabilities and uses. Those who could not keep up were less successful in combat and suffered higher losses. Each month, Ukrainian factories and home workshops built nearly 400,000 drones. Most of these workshops are informal, located in spare rooms, garages, barns, empty industrial space, or anywhere protected from the weather and aerial surveillance. Russia will hit any drone manufacturing sites they can identify.
One result of the Ukraine War was the emergence of inexpensive drones as a decisive weapon as well as a reconnaissance and surveillance system. In 2023, a year after Russia invaded Ukraine, the Ukrainians were building their own drones, often at home or in scattered workshops. By late 2024, Ukrainians were producing over 15o,000 drones a month. In 2025, Ukraine produced over 4 million drones. By purchasing components in bulk, thousands of Ukrainian men and women are building these drones for the armed forces or for someone they know in the military. Troops at the front also build and modify drones to fit their immediate situations. For the soldiers, designing better drones is often a matter of life or death.
This competitiveness led to First Person View (FPV) drones, as well as drones guided via Fiber-Optic cable Guidance, or FOG. Electronic jamming was useless against the FOG drones. The only limitation was cable length. This meant the operator had to be at one end of the kilometers-long cable. Operators could be farther away if they had time to lay another kilometer or two of cable farther back. Ukrainian drone operators often worked in drone workshops before entering the military and were accustomed to upgrading drone operator equipment while in the combat zone. They shared successful innovations with workshop operators across Ukraine.
This is how the Ukrainians maintain a lead over the Russians in drone technology and production. The Russian government discourages, or even outlaws, individuals building drones and centralizes drone production. This gives the Ukrainians an edge in drone quantity and quality. The Ukrainians are defending their homeland, and Russia is having an increasingly difficult time justifying continued fighting and over a million Russians killed or disabled in Ukraine.
NATO countries are trying to adopt drone technology and use it for their own armed forces. Ukraine has received over $200 billion in military and economic assistance from NATO countries and shares their drone experience and technology with their benefactors. Drones have revolutionized warfare and are causing 70 percent of casualties in Ukraine. The war in Ukraine is a battle between industrialized countries employing modern weapons. It is the war of the future, and all armed forces must adopt it to remain competitive.
Last year, Ukraine equipped its combat brigades with ground-based combat and transport robots in addition to drones. The ground robots come in different versions. Some are used for planting and removing landmines. Other drones advance along the ground while firing remotely controlled machine guns. These systems can fire accurately at moving targets day and night. Drones also transport supplies to the front lines and carry casualties back to first aid stations and field hospitals. The growing number of Ukrainian drone systems were developed based on reports from the front line troops. They quickly put those ideas to use because of wartime urgency.
Last year, Ukraine once more made it legal for military-age men to leave the country. In 2021, 20 million Ukrainians lived outside Ukraine. Since 2022, that number has increased each year; last year, the Ukrainian population was about 39 million, and the government has been seeking ways to improve morale while sustaining the fight against Russian invaders.
One implemented proposal was establishing universal training for 18- to 22-year-old men. For those still in school, universities and other post-high school institutions now offer mandatory training for male students as a standalone subject. Training consists of 90 hours of theoretical instruction followed by 210 hours of practical training. Subjects include basic methods of military service, first aid, and operational tactics before they move to hands-on exercises in specialized training centers. This approach is meant to make trainees more confident about military service and less likely to flee the country out of fear of what might happen if they went to war.
Ukrainians have been fighting the Russians for nearly five years and are seeking to institutionalize the military lessons they have learned. The Russians are now short of resources and still operate under economic sanctions. Ukraine believes that with improved training for all their personnel, they will reduce their own casualties while increasing those of the Russians. Vladimir Putin vowed to keep fighting for as long as it took. That will be an empty promise if Putin discovers that a major change in troop quality makes Russian military efforts futile and very costly in men and resources.
Ukraine already has some units that adopted these improved methods before the war but never had time or resources to retrain everyone. Over the last year, Ukrainians have standardized troop training and adopted methods that combine what they've learned so far. They did this by adopting what worked, discarding what didn’t, and gradually retraining units that weren't using the most effective methods. All new recruits would be taught the new techniques, even if it lengthened basic training.
NATO nations add individual training for sergeants and officers, some of it delivered via videos, including interactive versions. European NATO members play a larger role in this retraining because they are close enough, often adjacent, to Ukraine to receive Ukrainian trainees and send them back quickly after training is complete.
The Americans have been using the Center for Army Lessons Learned, or CALL, since the 1980s. CALL personnel have been compiling and organizing lessons learned in Ukraine for the Ukrainian. The CALL concept and its implementation were among the factors behind the revised training program. The reduced casualties encouraged more Ukrainian men to join and persuaded some military-age men who fled the country to return.
By 2023, the Ukrainian military had grown to 700,000 troops plus over a quarter million police, border guard, and reserves available. By 2025, that grew to 900,000. About fifteen percent of these personnel were women who, except for some snipers, handled support tasks. Several hundred thousand civilian workers also handled support tasks. This was a Soviet military practice. When Ukraine became independent as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it retained some Soviet military practices. Unlike the Russians, who continue to send barely trained recruits into combat, Ukraine learned from NATO, particularly American, experience. Ukrainian soldiers received considerably more training than their Russian counterparts and were more lethal and less susceptible to combat losses.
Ukrainian military reforms took different forms. Two months after Russia invaded, the fighting in eastern Ukraine (Donbas) has been continuous since April 2014, despite a February 2015 ceasefire agreement. That ceasefire was supposed to lead to a resolution of this conflict but failed to do so and intensified in 2022 when Russia invaded. The Donbas fighting led to reforms in the Ukrainian military that played a major role in stopping the 2022 invasion meant to conquer all of Ukraine.
Russia used irregular warfare to take Crimea in 2014 and parts of Donbas a few months later. Russia used special operations forces and lots of money to grab territory but failed in Donbas after working in Crimea and a 2008 operation in Georgia. The Russian 2014 attacks quickly transformed the disarray of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as untrained and under-equipped as they really were, into a potent fighting force as a surge of Ukrainian nationalism and improvisation mobilized a force that stopped the advance in Donbas.
In addition to thousands of combat and support volunteers, the government mobilized local defense industries to supply the weapons, ammo, and equipment Ukrainian forces needed. This was helped by the fact that Ukraine still had conscription. Most males 18 years and older had some military experience. Despite the surge in patriotism during 2015, some 50 percent of men drafted that year refused to show up. At the same time, up to 16,000 Ukrainian troops in the Donbas area deserted. This lack of faith in the traditional Ukrainian military was justified by its outdated bureaucracy and culture, which emphasized large numbers of unwilling troops forced to do whatever they were told. It soon became obvious in Donbas that a flexible approach to warfare was needed, one that motivated volunteer soldiers. That was a refreshing change for the Ukrainian military. Since independence in 1991, Ukrainians were not enthusiastic about military service. After conscription, fewer than 20 percent of conscripts showed any interest in a military career. This was often for financial reasons, not just lack of enthusiasm for the Ukrainian military.
Change was needed, and Ukrainian military leaders realized that. In 2006, military training in Ukraine was focused on developing mobility and combat readiness and participating in international exercises. This was all about a Ukrainian attempt to reform its military and reequip its forces to defend against any future threat from an increasingly hostile Russia. But the plan came at the worst possible time, as the 2008 financial crisis not only made the reforms impossible to implement but also left the Ukrainian military unable to maintain current levels of training and equipment. Unit training declined because units equipped with tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) halted most training because the military could not afford fuel. This had a similar impact on aircraft training, as the average number of flight hours per pilot fell by half. The result is that Ukrainian pilots entered the 2014 war with badly degraded skills. Very few pilots were qualified to fly at night, in bad weather, or to carry out strikes against ground targets. Using all resources available once the Donbas war began, the Ukrainian armed forces partially recovered soon after the war started. But combat-ready forces remained well below their pre-2008 strength. In early 2014, Ukraine only had 6,000 combat-ready soldiers out of its 130,000 active military personnel.
Ukraine got some foreign help. By early 2015, Ukraine, the U.S., Britain, and Canada established JMTG-U (Joint Multinational Training Group – Ukraine) and set up three new training sites in Ukraine. To prevent further territorial losses, Ukraine desperately needed updated weapons and equipment. Fortunately, Ukraine was where the pre-1991 Soviet Union concentrated most of its weapons and equipment reserves during the Cold War, for battles with NATO that never happened. Ukraine also contained a large share of Soviet factories that produced military equipment, and these, along with the stored weapons, became Ukrainian when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and Ukraine became independent. Corruption in Ukraine did not help because some of the best weapons were sold off and government officials stole much of the money instead of using it to defend Ukraine. By 2016, due to much improved training, 77 percent of its 260,000 active military personnel (75 percent of then conscripts) were combat ready. Ukraine’s troops also received more modern tanks, APCs, and other combat equipment.
The Russian-backed Donbas rebels, calling themselves the United Armed Forces of Novorossiya, consisted of many different armed groups that were run by the Donetsk Operational Command. Russia established this headquarters in May 2016. While the rebels were primarily militia, they eventually formed two tank battalions and several other specialized units, while the rest were light infantry. Eventually, rebels formed two corps headquarters, one for DPR and one for LNR. The rebel militias initially used only equipment produced in Ukraine before 2014. By the end of 2014, that changed, and the rebels began using weapons that were not available in Ukraine. This eventually included Russian military equipment that had never been exported.
The DPR received more of these obviously Russian-made weapons, including late-model MLRS (multiple launch rocket systems) and tanks. Despite this, Russia continued to deny supplying arms to the rebels, despite Ukrainian forces capturing some of it and publishing photos. A growing number of “rebels” were also captured who admitted they were Russian soldiers. Among such obviously Russian equipment encountered (and sometimes captured from the rebels) were armored vehicles modified with Russian components. These included T-72B3 and T-72BA tanks, BTR-82AM infantry fighting vehicles, BPM-97 armored personnel carriers, Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft systems, GAZ Vodnik multipurpose vehicles, late model MT-LB (M1970) Multi-Purpose Tracked Vehicles, MRO-A self-contained, disposable single shot 72.5 mm rocket launchers, Kornet anti-tank missiles, ASVK anti-materiel rifles, and VSS sniper rifles. The conflict in Donbas was notable for the large number and multiple types of armored vehicles operated by the rebels. Still, there was no evidence that the rebels had established facilities to repair or upgrade so many vehicles.
While Ukrainian forces were resolute and brave in halting the Russian-supported rebels, it was obvious that Ukraine would have to be supplied with more effective weapons and equipment to deal with the increasing quantities of artillery, armored vehicles, and electronic warfare gear the rebels were receiving from Russia. Before 2014, the Ukrainian government refused to upgrade and expand the domestic arms industry because of the expense and opposition from corrupt procurement bureaucrats. The upsurge in patriotism in Ukraine during 2014, which also surprised the Russians, enabled Ukraine to quickly and effectively enact production and procurement reforms. This was remarkably effective, and by mid-2015 the Russian-backed rebels, despite all their new weapons and seeming endless supplies of ammo, were confronted with a stalemate that has become a military buffer zone between Ukraine and Russia. This rearmament focused on using Ukraine's existing weapons infrastructure and repairing and refurbishing existing equipment. By February 2018, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were larger and better equipped than ever before. At that point, Ukraine had 200,000 active-duty military personnel. This included successfully integrating most of the volunteer territorial defense battalions into the armed forces.
Diplomatic developments also discouraged the Russians. In February 2019, amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution took effect, confirming Ukraine’s intention to join both the European Union (EU) and NATO. To prepare for joining NATO, Ukraine advanced significantly in maintaining and developing its internal arms industry (keeping money circulating in Ukraine) and donating or selling surplus equipment and spare parts to users of Soviet-manufactured equipment that Ukraine already uses. Examples include decommissioned tanks, helicopters, and both transport and combat aircraft. In addition to tanks, Ukraine developed new equipment such as the BTR-4 APC. Since the beginning of fighting in Donbas, BTR-4s were successfully deployed by the Ukrainian ground forces and proved to be highly effective on the battlefield.
By April 2019, with a total of 250,000 personnel, Ukraine’s military forces were the third largest in Europe. Those forces were primarily composed of ethnic Ukrainians, making the military more cohesive than the general population. The Ukrainian military was now mostly a volunteer force, mainly because everyone was convinced of the benefits of highly motivated recruits rather than many unenthusiastic conscripts. This large force was necessary to monitor and guard key locations in Ukraine, such as the eastern border to Donbas, access from the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait to the port of Mariupol, and the Ukrainian Navy base in Odesa.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, August 17, 2026 - 05:11 pm: Edit

Note to Trump: speak softly, they all know you have a big stick.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, August 17, 2026 - 05:12 pm: Edit

Russia: Fears Drone Attack On SSBNs
August 16, 2026: A year of unrelenting Ukrainian air attacks, especially on air defense systems, has left Russian air Defenses in disarray and short of missiles. Worse, many soldiers and sailors have been transferred from support or technical jobs to infantry duty in Ukraine. At this point, Russia fears Ukraine will launch drone attacks on one of its primary strategic weapons, SSBN nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles.
The White Sea in Russia’s extreme northwest is a large 90,000 square kilometer body of seawater with an average depth of sixty meters. It is the southern inlet of the Barents Sea surrounded by Karelia to the west, the Kola Peninsula to the north, and the Kanin Peninsula to the northeast. The entire White Sea is under Russian sovereignty and is considered part of Russia's internal waters. This makes the White Sea ideal for conducting sea trials for new nuclear submarines, such as the fifth Yasen-class submarine, Arkhangelsk. This submarine was built at the Sevmash shipyard near the port city of Severodvinsk on the White Sea. It is the only shipyard in Russia that builds nuclear-powered submarines. Yasen-class SSNs are nuclear-powered attack submarines, the Russian answer to the American Virginia-class. The Virginias are a more recent design, while the Yasen is a late Cold War effort that had some tech upgrades in the two decades it took to build the first one. This Yasen entered service in 2014, followed by a second and third in 2021. The fourth Yasen entered service in 2023 and the fifth one in 2025.
With five Yasens completed, seven more are still on the way, if the Russian shipbuilding budget can pay for them. Each Yasen costs over $700 million. The first Yasen entered service in 2017; currently, only five have been completed, and seven more are being built. That’s all Russia can afford. The first American Virginia Class SSN entered service in 2004. So far, 24 have been built, with 10 more under construction, and plans to eventually have 66 in the 2030s. Each Virginia costs $1.8 billion.
The 13,800-ton Yasens were built after the Cold War but are updated Cold War-era designs armed with Kalibr anti-ship or cruise missiles and ten torpedo tubes (eight 650mm and two 533mm). What Russia has not been able to do is keep up with the pace of silencing and detection (sensor) tech. American sub commanders aren't overconfident about all this, but base their assessments on growing opportunities for the quieter American SSNs, especially the Virginias, to detect a Russian SSN (or diesel-electric boat) and stalk it for days or weeks without ever being discovered.
This was a Cold War practice, and the U.S. Navy discovered in the 1980s that the latest Russian SSNs were much quieter. But there are few of them, and now improved American sensors make them easier to detect. The U.S. was apparently able to detect and stalk the Yasen, getting a good sense of how much quieter it is, but apparently not enough to avoid detection by the Virginias. As improved as Yasen is, it had lots of problems getting into service.
Russian submarine building has been on life support since the Cold War ended in 1991. Many subs under construction at the end of the Cold War were canceled, and the few which avoided it spent a decade or more waiting for enough money to resume construction. The first Yasen crew was formed in 2007 and spent years training and waiting. The crew of 85 finally got their new boat in 2014, after record delays and time spent in the shipyard getting tweaked. Subsequent Yasens took less time to complete, but only five are in service, compared to 22 American Virginias. The Virginias have a crew of 135. Russian nuclear subs have always relied more on automation, so they can have smaller crews.
Another difference between Virginia Class SSNs and the new Russian submarines is that the Yasens are SSGNs, meaning they carry more missiles launched from their larger 650mm torpedo tubes. The Yasens are larger, displacing 13,800 tons submerged compared to 7,800 tons for the Virginias, except for the last ten Block 5 boats, which will each displace 10,200 tons. The Block 5 Virginias also carry more cruise missiles launched from twelve vertical tubes. The Yasens carry VLS tubes for 40 missiles and 24 torpedoes for their ten torpedo tubes.
Meanwhile, Russian submarine personnel near the White Sea scan the sky for swarms of Ukrainian drones that many believe will come eventually.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, August 17, 2026 - 05:13 pm: Edit

Russia: Putin Losing In The Polls
August 15, 2026: Russian leader since 1999, Vladimir Putin's recent polling numbers are slipping, reaching 66 percent in early July, from 66.9 percent a week earlier. Trust in Putin's performance fell from 76 percent to 72 percent. While these are good numbers, the growing Ukrainian attacks in or near major cities and fuel storage, refining and distribution operations are making life difficult for a growing number of civilians. Putin says Russia is winning in Ukraine, but the Ukrainian attacks inside Russia say otherwise.
Regions outside the major cities like Moscow and St Petersburg report growing difficulties obtaining fuel for vehicles and other necessities. In three months, the cold weather arrives and then fuel shortages will mean less heat. What will the government do when that happens? Several rural regions already lack fuel for vehicles. This means Russians must wait in their vehicles for hours, or even days, before fuel is available.
Putin insists that the situation is under control and that Russia will win in Ukraine. Veterans returning from Ukraine say otherwise: that fighting in Ukraine is a death sentence. The Ukrainians are now using ground combat robots, and a growing number of Russian soldiers have been surrendering to the machines and marching off to a more comfortable and less dangerous prisoner-of-war camp. The Ukrainian use of drones in the air, on the ground, and at sea means Ukrainians suffer fewer casualties. Currently, for every Ukrainian soldier killed, eight Russians are lost. Despite the $50,000 signing bonuses and even higher death benefits, fewer Russian men want to commit suicide by going to Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Ukraine is increasing its drone attacks on Russian economic and military targets deep inside Russia. Soon these raids will consist of over a thousand drones rather than a few hundred. Ukraine has become the world's most prolific drone manufacturer, producing over half a million drones a month. In response to all this, Putin’s advisors are urging him to leave Moscow for a safer location in the Ural Mountains of Central Russia.
These woes are nothing new for Putin. Fifteen years ago, Westerners were annoyed at Vladimir Putin, in part because of his authoritarian tendencies, and the fact that he is genuinely popular with most Russians. One policy that contributes to this popularity is Putin's plan to somehow reconstitute the Soviet Union, which he and many Russians really miss, as the Eurasian Union. This would be similar to the European Union, which some parts of the former Soviet Union are eager to join. Both of these organizations are primarily economic unions that encourage the free movement of goods and trade. The difference is that Russia would be far more dominant than any single nation in the European Union. Moreover, the smaller nations that broke away from the Soviet Union in 1991 no longer want Moscow to dictate to them. The economic benefits of an economic union, however, are an attraction. Then there is the willingness of Russia to back the dictators who run many of the successor states to the Soviet Union. Finally, the Eurasian Union also includes closer, and more peaceful, economic and political ties with China. That's a big plus with Central Asian nations, especially those that border China.
The then-current Russian president Dmitry Medvedev openly admitted that Putin was more popular and effective than any other Russian politician, and he remains an ally of Putin because of that. Some Russian leaders disagree, but they are a small minority. Many others are waiting to see whether Putin can address the lawlessness in the business world, which is forcing many major Russian companies to move their stock listings from Russia to Britain, amid some legal disputes. Corruption in Russia makes its stock exchanges and courts too unreliable. The criminality and chaos are hurting the economy. Fixing all this is a big job for Putin, but even an ally and rival, Dmitry Medvedev, believes Putin has the best chance of pulling it off. Putin is also expected to complete military reforms, something Medvedev has been pushing with growing enthusiasm. Those reforms have been a work in progress throughout the short history of 21st-century Russia. Twenty-six years ago, public support for the war in Chechnya was beginning to slip, with the latest polls giving President Putin a 62 percent approval rating. Most media coverage was negative.
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