I suppose South Korea now join Taiwan wishing they had nukes. I wouldn't be surprised if they both started crash programs to make some.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, August 17, 2026 - 09:34 pm: Edit

Both signed the Non Proliferation treaty and efforts to create nukes would be noticed very quickly. In all seriousness, neither would nuke China because the retaliation would be total destruction.

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Tuesday, August 18, 2026 - 01:48 pm: Edit

The problem with all the bluster is that other nations quickly got sick of it and called his bluff. Canada, South Korea, Greenland, etc.

As for nukes, BUILDING one is not difficult. Enriching the Pu or U and getting a small enough form factor is very hard. Plus delivery is hard unless you put it in a Connex and ship it there...

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, August 18, 2026 - 04:01 pm: Edit

We could have Wildberries ship it...

Wait, that couldn't be it....

Ukraine is shipping bombs through Wildberries and Putin blew up his own warehouses to stop the attack?\

Say it ain't so...

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, August 18, 2026 - 04:04 pm: Edit

Air Weapons: Bullseye Cruise Missile
August 18, 2026: General Atomics, the firm that developed the revolutionary Predator and Reaper over two decades ago, just introduced the jet-propelled Bullseye cruise missile. Developed for the USMC, each one weighs 450 kg and is about four meters long. The max range is 300 kilometers, and the warhead is either 114 kg or twice that, with a range of about 200 kilometers. The Marines will use these missiles against land and naval targets in the West Pacific.
Other factors also shape the Marine transition in the West Pacific. Over the past twenty years, the USMC underwent a significant reorganization. The most recent effort involves adopting drone warfare, which continues to evolve in the Ukraine War. The Marines have received thousands of drones over the last year. Marines were trained to maintain, operate, and optimize their new drone capabilities. Many young Marines, familiar with video games, are well-prepared to handle drones, a trend also observed among Ukrainian soldiers.
Drone adoption, however, encounters existing challenges. Over recent decades, Marine weapons and equipment have become heavier, as demonstrated during joint operations with Army units. This has made the average Marine combat unit less mobile for amphibious operations. In response, Marine commanders advocate for a smaller force focused on its core mission: amphibious and commando-type operations.
The reorganization process, underway for several years, has led to the disbandment or transfer to reserves of many tank, artillery, aviation, engineer, and military police support units. Three of the current 24 Marine infantry battalions and one regimental headquarters are also being deactivated. The Marine Corps is now prioritizing the Pacific and potential conflicts with China, aiming to return to World War II-style operations, when Marines excelled at capturing fortified islands from Japanese garrisons.
The pre-reorganization Marine Corps, which gained significant armor, engineer, and artillery units, evolved in 2001 to support major operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other regions, requiring forces similar to the Army’s. The last major reorganization occurred in the 1980s, when the Marines transformed their divisional and regimental headquarters into administrative units and created new fighting organizations. Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) became reinforced infantry battalions, while Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) were brigades with support units for independent operations. Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) served as headquarters to control MEUs and MEBs. During large operations, traditional regimental and divisional designations were used, but units were essentially MEBs under MEF control. This task-oriented structure persists, and the Army adopted a similar brigade-focused model nearly twenty years ago, with divisional headquarters serving as tactical command for brigades.
Many Marines have been dissatisfied with their role as an Army auxiliary since 2001. The Marines view themselves as specialists, while the Army is seen as generalists who, notably, conducted more amphibious operations than the Marines during World War II. By 2013, Marines comprised a quarter of America’s active-duty ground combat forces. Including the larger Army Reserve force, Marines accounted for 18 percent of ground combat forces. The Marines never wanted to be just another component of American ground forces, leading to internal tensions. Some commanders sought to maintain a broad range of skills, sparking disputes over developing and procuring specialized equipment, particularly amphibious and armored vehicles. Ultimately, traditionalists prevailed, and the Marines are now returning to their World War II roots.
The Marines are also concerned about their relationship with the U.S. Navy, which has formed its own ground combat force. To understand this dynamic, it’s important to clarify the relationship between the Navy and the Marine Corps. The Marines are not part of the Navy, as often described, but both are components of the Department of the Navy. Unlike the Departments of the Army and Air Force, which each oversee a single service, the Department of the Navy oversees two: the fleet and the Marine Corps. These services are closely intertwined. For example, the Navy provides support functions for the Marines, such as medics who serve in Marine units and wear Marine combat uniforms. This allows a higher proportion of Marines to serve as combat troops than in the Navy, Army, or Air Force, fostering a distinct Marine ethos.
Over time, the Marines have gained increasing autonomy from the Navy. When the U.S. Marine Corps was established over two centuries ago, Marines were sailors trained as infantry, fully integrated into ship crews. This changed in the late 19th century with the advent of all-metal steamships, which reduced the need for Marines. Facing potential elimination, the Marines adapted, serving as State Department troops in Latin America from the late 19th century to just before World War II, addressing civil disorder and nation-building. During World War I (1914–1918), Marines provided a brigade for ground combat in Europe, showcasing exceptional combat skills.
In the 1930s, as World War II loomed, the Marines embraced amphibious warfare, preparing for assaults on fortified Japanese islands. During World War II, the Marines formed their first division-sized units and ended the war with six divisions organized into two corps. Only four divisions survived post-war demobilization; one is now a reserve division.
After World War II, the Marine Corps evolved from a minor Navy component into a de facto fourth service by the late 20th century. However, the Navy retained amphibious ships carrying Marine battalions

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, August 18, 2026 - 04:04 pm: Edit

Mike, Trump wasn't bluffing, he was just mumbling out loud whatever thought came into his head.

By Carl-Magnus Carlsson (Hardcore) on Wednesday, August 19, 2026 - 02:27 am: Edit

Mumbling? He was loud and clear. The world listened and took him seriously. Especially now after Venezuela and Iran.

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Wednesday, August 19, 2026 - 12:09 pm: Edit

"the Departments of the Army and Air Force, which each oversee a single service,..."

1) The department/ Secretary of the Airforce oversees both the USAF and Space Force.

2) The USAF was split off from the Army immediately post WW2. Sept 1947 to be exact.

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Wednesday, August 19, 2026 - 12:13 pm: Edit

It's easy to pick on weaklings (ie Venezuela) but as Iran is showing it's not so easy to do so to nations which have significant military power and a distributed government. Venezuela was a classic dictatorship and we just "did a Panama" on it. Iran has figureheads, but control is via an entire council of religious leaders.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, August 19, 2026 - 02:12 pm: Edit

Intelligence: Japan Becomes Espionage Central
August 19, 2026: One immediate effect of the Ukraine war was the expulsion of Russian spies from NATO countries. Most of these spies were diplomats, a practice long used worldwide. In addition, firms with any connection to Russia were blacklisted. Local authorities also cracked down on foreigners' efforts to buy electronic components that could be used in weapons. These were often smuggled out through several countries before reaching Russia.
Since then, many of the Russian espionage operatives have been showing up in Japan. Their work has not gone unnoticed because most of the Russian rockets and missiles used in Ukraine contain some Japanese electronic components. This is because personnel from the secretive Russian 20th Directorate espionage activity operate in Japan under the guise of airline employees. Ukrainian diplomats complain that Japan cannot address this situation.
Japan has a sort of excuse because its legal system isn't designed for counterespionage. Japan also lacks personnel trained to deal with foreign espionage. Since World War II, Japan has been an easy nation for spies to operate in because of inadequate counterintelligence efforts and politicians unwilling to pass laws to deal with the many foreign spies operating in their mindset. As long as the spies caused no problems for the Japanese, they were left alone.
Russia used this passivity to establish links with Japanese trading companies that regularly shipped goods to Russia. Crates marked Commercial Electronics were allowed to go because Japan had been a major manufacturer of such goods for over half a century. No one considered that these electronics could be used in weapons rather than toys or household items. No one considered that rush orders of electronics were flowing to Russia aboard a few Russian government-sponsored freight airlines that specialized in this sort of thing.
Faced with mounting complaints from Ukraine and NATO countries, Japan sought to determine who was doing what and to stop it. That proved difficult because the Russians expected such efforts and had prepared countermeasures. Japan is the largest exporter of dual-use technology for both military and commercial purposes, and it exports these items daily to dozens of countries. Some of these countries are willing to forward some shipments of military-grade electronics to Russia and keep quiet about it.
Some investigations by Japan and NATO nations have uncovered instances of Russian smuggling. The Russians simply ignore the complaints and seek better ways to conceal their activities. Russian exporters regularly deny trading in prohibited military goods, and Japan does not crack down on these exports because they benefit the Japanese economy.
Japan has responded with increased efforts to find and arrest Russian operatives and expel or prosecute them. Japan has also begun sending non-weapon military aid to Ukraine. This means protective vests, helmets, vehicles, and construction equipment. Ukraine has much destroyed or damaged housing that must be repaired or rebuilt. Japan has grown concerned about the rising number of allegations of illegal exports. Japan has strengthened counterintelligence and counter-smuggling operations, recruiting and training hundreds of additional personnel to reduce and eventually eliminate illegal exports to Russia without throttling lucrative legal trade.
fyeo

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, August 19, 2026 - 02:13 pm: Edit

Submarines: Seabed Security
August 19, 2026: In order to make American submarines more effective, the American Navy is working on developing Seabed Superiority. Current operations in the Baltic Sea and the North Atlantic trade routes. This depends on having a sensor network on the seabed, something similar to the Cold War-era SOSUS
This year, China operates 64 well-equipped oceanographic research vessels, most of which were built in the past 15 years. This modern fleet is larger than the combined fleets of the U.S. Academic Research Fleet, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s research fleet, and the U.S. Navy’s oceanographic survey vessels. China’s fleet includes polar-capable ships, fisheries research vessels, and ships designed for autonomous unmanned vehicle, remotely operated vehicle, or manned submersible deployments. A technological showpiece is the Zhu Hai Yun, which operates as a mothership for more than 50 unmanned vehicles, including aerial drones, autonomous surface vehicles, and underwater gliders. Its unmanned vessels can operate simultaneously, providing persistent surveillance of an area extending 160 kilometers across, 4 km above the surface, and 1.5 km below the surface while the mothership remains underway.
China has developed five XLUUVs (Extra-Large Unmanned Underwater Vehicles) measuring 15 to 20 meters long. These vehicles can sense physical data, map the seafloor, and carry torpedoes or mines. The XXLUUVs are large enough to carry towed-array sonars and voyage across the Pacific.
For persistent surveillance throughout the water column, China’s Haiyan and Haiyi gliders can operate for months, travel thousands of miles, and periodically transmit their locations and observations of temperature, salinity, and depth via satellite. The US has long used its equivalents, some of which China has obtained because so many have washed up on stray Pacific beaches after accidents. A military variant of the Haiyan glider is equipped with vector acoustic sensors that can determine a bearing line to a sound source, as well as magnetometers for submarine detection.
On the seafloor along the First Island Chain, China’s cabled seafloor observatory, the National Seafloor Scientific Observation Network, serves the dual purposes of environmental research and acoustic monitoring of marine traffic. The East China Sea segment is focused on the shallow continental shelf, while the South China Sea segment reaches depths of 3,000 meters. The network consists of acoustic arrays, seismometers, physical and chemical sensors, and navigation beacons that provide docking and acoustic navigation for underwater drones. Because acoustic arrays and gliders can serve as tripwires for submarine detection, the network is viewed as an underwater Great Wall of China.
To improve ocean and acoustic forecasting, global and regional ocean models assimilate data from ships, satellites, unmanned vehicles, and moored sensors to initialize them more accurately. In 2025, China achieved a major breakthrough in ocean modeling with the LICOM K++ model, which provides 1-km horizontal resolution for three-dimensional, global ocean simulations. This is significantly better than the US models, which simulate global conditions with only 4-km to 9-km resolution. LICOM K++ can simulate fine-scale processes such as oceanic internal waves and microscale eddies—processes that operational U.S. global models must approximate mathematically.
With sustained funding and a blurred line between civilian research and military applications, China has closed the gap in a domain in which the United States has long held a significant advantage: stealthy naval operations. By the end of its current Five-Year Plan, China may achieve parity with U.S. naval capabilities in the western Pacific.
Thirteen years ago, China began installing underwater passive sonar systems in its coastal sea areas. This enabled China to monitor submarines operating off its coasts and, presumably, in the South China Sea. South Korea did the same when it announced it was installing underwater submarine sensors off its coasts, and apparently completed this in 2013. The South Korean effort was in response to North Korea using a small submarine to torpedo a South Korean patrol ship in 2010. China simply wants to keep foreign warships as far away as possible, even if it means trying to force them out of international waters.
China and South Korea did not reveal technical details, but this sort of system is similar to the passive sonar system the United States deployed on the seabed in key areas during the Cold War. SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System) consisted of several different networks. The CAESAR network covered the continental shelf areas bordering the North Atlantic. In the North Pacific, there was COLOSSUS plus a few sensors in the Indian Ocean and a few other places that no one would talk about. The underwater passive sonars listened to everything and sent their data via cable to land stations. From there it was sent back to a central processing facility, often via satellite link. SOSUS was accurate enough to locate a submarine within a circle no wider than 100 kilometers. That's a large area, but depending on the quality of the contact, the circle could be reduced to as little as ten kilometers. The major drawback was that it did not cover deep-water areas beyond 500 kilometers from the continental shelf edge. This is not a problem for the South Korean or Chinese systems, as both cover only coastal waters or shallow offshore areas, such as the South China Sea.
SOSUS systems are very expensive to maintain. SOSUS survived the end of the Cold War by making its sensors available for civilian research and adopting cheaper, more powerful electronic and communications technology. While many parts of the SOSUS have been shut down, additional portable SOSUS gear has been put into service and deployed as needed.
South Korea benefited from U.S. help with SOSUS and in collecting and processing submarine sound signatures in the area. The U.S. also helped South Korea obtain more sensitive passive sonar systems that can locate submarines more accurately. The U.S. has been conducting research in this area and knows that such cooperation would provide American access to the South Korean SOSUS. South Korea also has the design and manufacturing capability for this sort of device. The first South Korean SOSUS system was placed off the west coast, near the North Korean border. North Korean submarines, traveling underwater, using battery power and near the coast, are very hard to detect. The South Korean SOSUS will help even the odds. China’s Internet-based espionage efforts have probably already stolen a lot of American SOSUS secrets, and that helped a lot.
If there were a war with China, one of the main goals would be to disrupt Chinese shipping with submarines, especially the quiet and heavily armed Virginia nuclear-powered submarines that operate in the Pacific. As China became a potential threat, the Pacific Fleet received more Virginia-class submarines. The Virginias were there to shut down Chinese trade on short notice by deploying hundreds or thousands of naval mines near Chinese ports. Their primary weapon will be naval mines. China’s mine-clearing capability is believed to be limited.
Since the end of the Cold War, a growing number of American naval officers and civilian experts have urged greater attention to naval mines. The United States was not alone, and in 2012, it led the U.S. and over 30 other nations in a joint mine-clearing exercise called the International Mine Countermeasures Exercise 2012. These training events aimed to counter Iranian attempts to block access to the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz. That exercise led to another being held annually ever since. While Iran is the most immediate user of naval mines, it is not alone. North Korea, China, and Russia have large naval mine stockpiles, but these three are not boasting of how and when they would use them,
Iran insists that because of its mines and other weapons, it has no trouble blocking the export of oil via the Straits of Hormuz. Some 35 percent of the world's oil shipments pass through these straits, which comes to about 15-20 tankers a day. The Persian Gulf is a busy waterway. It is 989 kilometers long, and the average depth is 50 meters. Naval mines are Iran's best bet for shutting down the straits. Iran's problem is that it has a small navy, an obsolete air force, and a poor track record of shutting down tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf or the Straits of Hormuz. They tried once before, in the 1980s, when they were at war with Iraq. The two nations began attacking each other's tanker traffic early on to cut off each other's oil sales. Iran didn't want to completely shut the Straits of Hormuz because that would have stopped its own oil revenue, only to impede it to force the United States to make Iraq stop its attack on Iran’s own exports. Over 500 ships were attacked, 61 percent of them tankers. Only 23 percent of the tankers attacked were sunk or immobilized. The attacks, using fighter-bombers and warships, only hit about two percent of the ship traffic in the Gulf. Iran lowered its oil prices to cover the higher cost of ship insurance. In 1986, Russia and the United States intervened to protect Kuwaiti and Iraqi tankers, which were taking most of the damage.
The Iranian military is in worse shape today than it was in the 1980s and would not last long trying to attack ships. That leaves the Straits of Hormuz. This is a 30-kilometer-wide deep channel. Normally, ships stick to narrow channels, going in and out to avoid collisions. The main Iranian threat has always been seen as the use of naval mines. The Arab states have more mine-clearing equipment and larger air and naval forces than Iran. In addition, the United States and NATO forces are in the area. The problem was that none of these mine-clearing forces had ever practiced under wartime conditions. In short, it has long been unclear exactly what it would take to deal with Iranian mines in the straits. Many of those questions were finally answered in 2012, during subsequent mine-clearing exercises and since the US attacked Iran in March 2026.
For an Iranian attempt to mine to succeed, it would have to place mines at the bottom of the straits and then prevent the rest of the world from clearing them. That would be difficult, as would Iranian attempts to plant additional mines. Such attempts would not be impossible, as Iran has small submarines and speed boats along with sailors willing to carry out suicidal missions to deliver the mines. Even that may not be sufficient, as this sort of fanaticism failed against the Americans in the 1980s. While Iran has worked to overcome their shortcomings, most of the solutions appear to be publicity stunts mainly meant to make the Iranian population feel better.
Iran has a few thousand naval mines, which is a small arsenal compared to Russia, China, and North Korea. Most agree that these mines pose a serious danger. While often ignored, naval mines are a formidable weapon. But these passive weapons don't get the respect they deserve. The historical record indicates otherwise.
Modern naval mines were first widely used over a century ago, during the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War. These were contact mines, floating in shallow water and kept in place with an anchor and chain. When the tide was right, they would be just below the surface, ready to explode whenever struck by a ship. Some 2,000 of these mines were used to destroy sixteen ships during the Russo-Japanese War. That's one ship lost for every 125 mines used.
During World War I (1914-18), modern mine tactics and clearing methods evolved. Thousands of mines were laid as defensive barriers against enemy movement in the North Sea. They also used mines offensively, secretly placing them across known enemy sea routes. More than 1,000 merchant ships and warships were lost because of the 230,000 mines used. That's over 200 mines used for every ship lost.
During World War II, there was a major effort to develop better mine-clearing methods to deal with even more mines. During World War II, a total of 2,665 ships were lost or damaged by 100,000 offensive mines. That's one ship for every 37 mines. Some 208,000 mines were used defensively to inhibit enemy movement and tie up his resources.
Naval mines achieved several striking successes during World War II. In the Pacific, naval mines proved more destructive to the Japanese war effort than the atom bombs. Between April and August 1945, 12,000 mines were delivered to the Japanese coast by American bombers. These destroyed 1,250,000 tons of Japanese shipping. Some 670 ships were hit, with 431 destroyed. That's 18 mines for each ship hit. The Americans had air superiority, so losses during these 1,500 missions amounted to only 15 planes, most of them accidents. Had these missions been flown against opposition, losses would have been between 30 and 60 aircraft, plus similar losses to their fighter escorts. Either way, it was a stunning success for naval mines,
A conventional submarine campaign was also waged against Japanese shipping using mines. Comparisons between subs using mines and torpedoes are interesting. A hundred submarines were involved in a campaign that lasted 45 months, from December 1941 to August 1945. Some 4.8 million tons of enemy shipping were sunk with torpedoes. For every US submarine sailor lost using submarine-launched torpedoes, 560 tons of enemy ships were sunk. During the mine campaign, 3,500 tons were sunk for each U.S. fatality. On a cost basis, the difference was equally stark. Counting the cost of lost mine-laying aircraft or torpedo-armed submarines, we find that each ton of sunk shipping cost six dollars when using mines and fifty-five dollars when using submarines. This data was classified as secret until the 1970s. It suggests that mines may have been more effective than torpedoes, even when delivered by submarine.
The Germans waged a minelaying campaign off the east coast of the United States between 1942 and 1944. Only 317 mines were used, sinking or damaging 11 ships. This was a ratio of 29 mines used for each ship hit. More importantly, eight major ports were closed for 40 days. One port, Charleston, South Carolina, was closed for 16 days, tying up not only merchant shipping but also the thousands of men, warships, and aircraft involved.
American submarines also waged a limited mine campaign in the Pacific. For 658 mines used, 54 ships were sunk or damaged at a cost of 12 mines per ship. No subs were lost. Japan tied up considerable resources dealing with the mines. On the Palau atoll, the port was closed by the mines and not reopened until the war ended. Even surface ships laid mines. Three thousand mines were laid by destroyers. Only 12 ships were hit, but these were barrier fields, not the ambush-type mine fields that a submarine can create by sneaking into an enemy-held area.
In Korea during the early 1950s, the Soviets provided North Korea with 3,000 mines, many of 1904 vintage. They used them to defend Wonson harbor. It took several weeks for UN forces to clear these, at the cost of a dozen ships being hit. Half of these ships were destroyed.
During the Vietnam War, over 300,000 American naval mines were used, primarily in rivers. Most were not built as mines but as aerial bombs equipped with magnetic sensors instead of fuzes. These bombs/mines used a small parachute to ensure they landed without damage. In shallow water, these makeshift weapons sat on the bottom and performed like mines. Haiphong Harbor was actually mined with 11,000 of these destructors, as the US Air Force called them. Haiphong Harbor was completely shut down for months, and it took years to clear all the American mines. The destructor mine design was so successful that it is still in use, using more modern electronics, such as the Mk 62 mine.
During the 1991 Gulf War, the Iraqis laid over a thousand mines off the Iraqi and Kuwaiti coast. The predominantly US naval forces did not have sufficient mine sweeping resources to deal with this situation, and a helicopter carrier and cruiser were damaged while trying to clear the area. This effectively prevented any US amphibious operations, although the Marines were not going to be used for a landing anyway. After the fighting stopped, it took over a month of mine clearing to eliminate all the mines. In the meantime, two U.S. warships were damaged by these mines. In 2003, the Iraqis again tried to use mines, but were hampered by prompt American, British, and Kuwaiti action.
In any future war, naval mines will once again surprise everyone with their effectiveness. It is feared that terrorists might get their hands on some bottom mines, but so far, there do not appear to have been any attempts.
Meanwhile, the 2012 international mine-clearing exercise prompted the United States to improve its mine-clearing capability. The U.S. Navy ordered several dozen more of the expendable SeaFox UUVs/unmanned underwater vehicles. These are used to destroy bottom mines that sit on the seabed. These UUVs were deployed in the Persian Gulf to address Iran's potential use of naval mines. The Seafox UUVs are already deployed on Avenger mine-hunting ships in the Persian Gulf.
SeaFox is a small, battery-powered sub measuring 1.4 x 0.4 x 0.2 meters, weighing 43 kg, and connected to a surface ship or hovering helicopter by a fiber-optic cable. There, the controller can move the SeaFox close to a suspected mine using a small sonar unit, then turn on a spotlight for a video camera to examine the object and determine if it is a mine. If it is, SeaFox gets closer and detonates a shaped charge explosive, destroying itself and the mine. SeaFox has an endurance of about 100 minutes, a top speed of 10 kilometers an hour, and can dive as deep as 300 meters.
The only American minesweepers are the four of the 13 Avengers still in service. These 72.3-meter-long ships draw only 4.8 meters of water, allowing them to operate close to shore. The crews are trained to navigate such shallow areas. The Avengers are armed with two 12.7mm machine guns, two 7.62mm machine guns, two 40mm automatic grenade launchers, and have a crew of 84. In 2012, Avengers operated in the Persian Gulf from Bahrain. Others were based in Sasebo, Japan. Some were based at San Diego, California.
The U.S. Navy needs these minesweepers because replacements in the form of more minesweeping helicopters and minesweeping versions of the new LCS ship have been delayed by technical problems. Meanwhile, the U.S. has upgraded the sonars on its Avenger-class ships. The new AN/SQQ-32(V)4 mine-hunting sonar improves its ability to detect mines on seafloors cluttered with natural or man-made objects. In many parts of the world, shallow coastal waters are used as a dumping ground for junk that won’t float ashore. This has been found to help hide bottom mines.
As of 2024, the Navy has no active minesweeper ships. Some of the LCS ships are supposed to be capable of mine sweeping, but it is unclear if they are actually ready for service
The Navy also had a dozen smaller Osprey-class coastal mine hunters (900 tons displacement, crew of 51), but it gave them to foreign navies, and the LCS and new minesweeping helicopters are to replace them.
The Navy has also equipped helicopters for mine clearing, but is having a very difficult time maintaining its force of 30 MH-53E helicopters. These aircraft are the only ones that can tow a sled carrying naval mine-detecting gear. This is called AMCM/Airborne Mine Countermeasures and is considered essential in areas like the Persian Gulf, where Iran might deploy many naval mines that would need to be cleared quickly in wartime.
The MH-53E is an update of the original 1960s-era CH-53 and entered service in the early 1980s. Fifty MH-53Es were built, and they have been worked hard ever since. That’s why only 30 are left, and few of them are fit to fly at any one time. Originally, the Navy planned to retire the MH-53Es in 2008. Replacements with lighter sleds that smaller, more modern helicopters could pull did not work out as expected. So retirement was pushed to 2012, then to 2017, and the Navy currently hopes to keep some MH-53Es operational until 2030.
Meanwhile, efforts continue to develop lighter mine-hunting equipment. Some of these projects have had limited success. The AQS-24A mine-hunting system looks like a torpedo with extra fins and attachments. It is lowered into the water and dragged by the helicopter at speeds of up to 34 kilometers an hour. The AQS-24A contains a high-resolution sonar that detects mines lying on the seabed, waiting for ships to pass over them. The bottom mine then detonates if it detects the type of ship it was programmed to attack. The U.S. Navy has been using this mine-hunting approach since the 1980s. The original sled system underwent several major upgrades and is considered highly reliable and effective. The MH-53E sled can still carry more equipment and sweep a larger area faster.
The U.S. Navy has also developed a complementary system, ALMDS/Airborne Laser Mine Detection System. Designed to operate from the MH-60S helicopter, ALMDS uses a Laser Imaging Detection and Ranging blue-green laser to detect and identify naval mines near the surface. Unlike the AQS-24A, ALMDS operates from low-flying, smaller helicopters. Surface mines are either moored or floating, and many float just below the surface. The laser operates very quickly, enabling the ALMDS-equipped helicopter to survey large areas for surface mines. Terrorists have used naval mines before, of the floating variety. Navies tend to use the more sophisticated, expensive, and hard-to-get bottom mines that lie on the bottom, in shallow water.
American allies have also developed new mine-detection and clearing tools, and some new U.S. equipment uses foreign tech. While new mine designs have become more effective, the basic problem remains: many older designs are still very dangerous, especially for the unprepared.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, August 19, 2026 - 02:31 pm: Edit

Venezuela could have gone the way of Iran easily enough. They would just need a few drones fired from jungle hideouts at tankers coming into the oil terminals.

Iran could and maybe would have gone the way of Venezuela except for the IRGC. Not only are they on a "mission from God" which they cannot admit was a lie, but they would be hanging from lamp posts if they gave up power.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, August 19, 2026 - 03:15 pm: Edit

The Department of the Army oversees the Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard, which most of the time think they are separate services.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Thursday, August 20, 2026 - 01:10 pm: Edit

Reported today (CBS News clip posted on Youtube):

The USS Benfold (DDG-65), an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, suffered a complete 96-hour power failure starting July 24, 2026, in the South China Sea.

The generator failure cut off critical life-support services, prompting a tow to the Philippines and an ongoing Navy investigation.

July 24, 2026: The USS Benfold lost all electrical power due to an engineering and generator failure while operating in the South China Sea.

The 4-day blackout left sailors without air conditioning, working toilets, fresh drinking water, and standard galley services. The USS Robert Smalls assisted by providing meals to the stranded crew.

July 28, 2026: The ship was towed to Subic Bay in the Philippines for emergency evaluation and repairs.

Early August 2026: Power was restored within days, and final repairs were completed by August 8 with no reported injuries or casualties.

The underlying cause of the engineering casualty remains under active investigation by the U.S. Navy.

The posted news report included conjecture that the problem may be related to extended deployments as illustrated by the the plight of the U.S.S. Lincoln (Nimitz class aircraft carrier) and its 260+ days deployment in the Persian Gulf.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, August 20, 2026 - 02:22 pm: Edit

Attrition: Daily Drone Destruction
August 20, 2026: Ukrainian engineers, entrepreneurs, and hobbyist designers, developers, and model-aircraft builders started the drone revolution. As a result, Russian losses are about 3.5 times higher. Worse, the Russians lose about eight soldiers for each Ukrainian loss. Russia has lost 1.4 million soldiers killed, disabled, and missing. In the first few months of the war, Russia lost most of its modern armored vehicles and specialized equipment. As the war progressed, losses also included air defenses protecting vital targets throughout western Russia, such as petroleum storage and refining sites, as well as manufacturers producing essential components for vehicles, drones, radars, and many types of electronic equipment.
Nearly 90 percent of the personnel losses are due to drones, which are everywhere in the combat zone, with Ukrainian drones outnumbering what the Russians can get into the air. On one day last July, Ukraine recorded and reported all of its drone activity. There were 311 Russian personnel killed or wounded. Drones detected nearly 1,600 enemy targets and attacked them. In addition, drones pursued about 4,500 Russian personnel as well as over 21,000 other targets. On the water, in ports, or on rivers, 15 Russian vessels were hit. Other land targets destroyed included: drone launch sites, 9 guns and howitzers, 337 shelters, 130 dugouts, 46 small drones, 8 land combat drones, 18 electronic warfare systems, 3 radar systems, and 98 crew antennas.
Ukrainian innovation and support for entrepreneurship have repeatedly overwhelmed Russian forces. The response was slow at first but soon had an enormous impact. Perplexed by Ukrainian tactics, the Russians persisted, thereby keeping the war going.
Drones were an unexpected development that had a huge impact on how battles were fought. Drones were successful because they were cheap, easily modified, and expendable. Forces could implement modifications and upgrades quickly and cheaply. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces soon used cheap quadcopter drones, with soldiers a few kilometers away controlling them via First Person View (FPV) goggles to see what the drone's camera saw. These drones cost a few hundred dollars each, with the most complex models going for about $1,000. Most of these drones carry a small amount of explosives, so they can instantly become flying bombs that can strike a target and detonate. Some drones carry more explosives depending on what is needed to deal with a target.
These drones are awesome and debilitating weapons when used in large numbers. A major limitation on expanding drone operations is the need for trained drone operators. Ukraine found that many soldiers frequently played video games and were quick to adapt to drone operations, especially because they could use commercial game controllers.
The war has led to massive losses for Russian forces. So far, over nearly a million Russian troops have died, deserted, or avoided military service because of Ukraine. Russia has lost most of its modern tanks along with many other armed vehicles and artillery systems.
For Russia, the most damaging Ukrainian innovation in drone warfare is their use of AI/Artificial Intelligence for drone targeting systems. The AI drone contains a targeting system that finds targets. The AI drone operator confirms which targets are real, and once a target is confirmed, the AI targeting system needs no further communication. It resists all forms of jamming.
FPV drones have radically changed modern warfare. These drones are an omnipresent aerial threat to all vehicles and infantry on foot. Each FPV drone costs less than a thousand dollars. Operators use the drone's video camera to see what is below and locate targets. Armed FPV operators are several kilometers away to decide when their FPV drones will drop explosives on an armored vehicle, which has thinner armor on top, or on infantry in the open or in trenches. To do so, drone operators often work in pairs, with one flying behind the other and focusing on the big picture while seeking a likely target. When the reconnaissance drone finds such a target, the armed drone is directed to it. The two FPV drone operators are usually in the same room or tent and can take control of new drones, which are lined up and brought outside for launch when needed. The reconnaissance drones are often unarmed, so they can spend more time in the air searching for a target.
The Ukrainians developed the FPV drone in 2022, when only a few FPV drone attacks were recorded. The Ukrainian Army was the first to appreciate the potential of FPV drones. By the summer of 2023, the Russian Army also began to use FPV drones in greater numbers. Since then, the number of FPV drone attacks has grown exponentially on both sides. Only 12% of those attacks destroyed the target, which could be a vehicle, a group of infantry, or even a sniper firing through a window from inside a building. In this case, the armed FPV drone would fly through the window and explode in the room the sniper was in. The only defense is having a nearby open door the sniper can run to or dive through as the FPV drone approaches. Sometimes that isn’t possible because the armed FPV drone is coming down from above the window and then in. You don’t see those coming until it’s too late.
In 2026, Ukraine plans to build at least eight million drones. Ukraine built about five million drones last year. In 2024, the total was 1.5 million drones. There have been problems. Chinese component producers are having a hard time keeping up, and last year, to assist the Russians, China halted sending drone components to Ukraine. Suppliers in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere quickly stepped in. At least 70 percent of Ukrainian drones are built entirely in Ukraine, and the rest are assembled from imported parts or as complete assemblies. Some Ukrainian firms have improvised by using plywood and similar materials for their drones. For FPV drones, cheaper is better if the drone can hit its first and only target. Most Ukrainian drones are FPV models, which are considered a form of ammunition.
Both sides now use FPV drones, but they use them very differently in combat. The Ukrainians seek out high-value targets like the few remaining armored vehicles, plus the more numerous electronic warfare equipment, anti-aircraft systems, and storage sites for munitions or other supplies. Russian trucks carrying supplies are another prime target.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Thursday, August 20, 2026 - 02:22 pm: Edit

Air Weapons: Rusty Dagger Cruise Missile
August 20, 2026: A year ago, the United States approved $825 million for the manufacture and sale of 3,350 ERAM missiles to Ukraine. That was followed by a remarkable development: the U.S. Air Force designed, developed, and put into production a new cruise missile. The AGM-188 Rusty Dagger is a 227-kg cruise missile measuring 2.64 meters long. A 45.4 kg high explosive warhead is sufficient to cause significant damage to targets. Its range is about 1,000 kilometers, and its top speed is about 700 kilometers per hour. Carrying a heavier 230 kg warhead, its range is 450 kilometers. A key aspect of this missile is that it costs about $250,000 each, less than a fifth of a Tomahawk.
Rusty Dagger can be launched from the ground, from F-16s and other combat aircraft as well as from helicopters and ships. The effectiveness of Rusty Dagger has already been demonstrated after Russia reported finding debris from a new cruise missile that turned out to be one of several Rusty Daggers given to Ukraine for combat testing.
Last June, Rusty Dagger manufacturer Zone 5 was given $12 million to develop the capacity to begin mass-producing Rusty Dagger by September 2027. Of that amount, $7.5 million was used to build pre-production missiles, and some of those were later used by Ukraine against Russia. Rusty Dagger is part of the U.S. ERAM Extended Range Attack Munition program. That will supply Ukraine with about 800 missiles by October and another 2,500 during 2027.
This was not the first time such rapid innovation had been seen. Back in 1991, during the hundred-hour war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, it took three weeks for the Americans to transform barrels from obsolete 8-inch cannons into GBU-28 two-ton ground-penetrating bombs that were used to demolish an Iraqi military command bunker. The bombs were built to penetrate 50 meters of earth and 5 meters of concrete. American soldiers who arrived at the scene of the GBU-28 attack were amazed at how thoroughly the bombs did their work.
Meanwhile, the USAF said that Rusty Dagger was the first of many rapid development projects that were projected, planned, or underway.
FYEO

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Thursday, August 20, 2026 - 02:57 pm: Edit

Navy Decoded, a internet website devoted to the U.S. Navy issues posted one hour ago that the navy issued a design change for CVN-81, U.S.S. Doris Miller. (Originally a Ford Class CVN, and the Fourth one constructed after the Bush, JFK and Enterprise.)

The change is to replace EMALs with Steam Powered Catapults similar to those used on the Nimitz Class.

Good video, very detailed.

Boiled down the issue is that EMALs was sold on the premise that there would on average be 4,600+ launches of aircraft between service interruption or mechanical faults requiring immediate repair.
with. Three Ford class ships, the number of launches between faults vary between a low of 179 successful launches to the most recent period now at 661 launches. ( far short of the 4,600+ predicted.)

It should be noted that this is not a cosmetic change: extensive steam lines will need to be installed into a hull never intended for it.

It also will require a larger deck crew as Nimitz Style catapults are far more labor intensive than EMALs.

It was also mentioned that as energy efficiency is measured, EMALs was predicted to be 90%+ whereas the Nimitz average is closer to 5% (mostly due to friction compared to EMALs electro magnetic systems.)

In short, the New production Ford Class carriers will all be a Nimitz style Ford class.

There was no mention of what changes (if any) will be needed on the three completed Ford Class carriers.

By Alan Trevor (Thyrm) on Thursday, August 20, 2026 - 03:47 pm: Edit

Jeff,

That's all meaningless until Congress authorizes and allocates funds for it.

I'm not saying the change won't happen, only that it is way too early to say...

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Thursday, August 20, 2026 - 04:59 pm: Edit

Alan,

Actually, I do agree with you.

But it IS in line with a couple of executive orders that President Trump issued previously on the same subject(namely, replacing EMAL as a failed system.)

The point that the video (which you probably haven’t seen) made was that steel is being cut and fabricated (and will soon be placed into position for the U.S.S. Doris Miller.

We have been talking for years about the constant changes to ships under construction reflecting modifications, alterations and specifications not authorized by Congress that slow ship production and increase costs.

Unless Congress objects, who else stands in the way of the President and the Secretary of the navy to question any alterations the President deems necessary?

By A David Merritt (Adm) on Thursday, August 20, 2026 - 09:09 pm: Edit

In two years there will be another election. Unless there is a major failure on our current EMALs design, or China's EMALs equipped Fuijan has a spectacular breakdown odds are the next President will reverse the order to go back to steam to reduce costs, first we need someone who builds steam catapults not just makes parts for existing ones, we will need to redesign the Miller and run steam piping with maintenance access space, and increase crew bunks for the larger crew requirements of steam, more supplies, etc.

The odds of the planning being done in two and a half years, let alone design changes being decently started are, shall we say, unlikely.


I expect the Navy to stall for two years, so that they can ignore this directive, while the Navy makes it look like they are taking it seriously. If President Trump had issued this order in his first month in office, it would have been harder to sit on ones hands and avoid doing what the President wants to be done.

By Jeff Wile (Jswile) on Friday, August 21, 2026 - 09:27 am: Edit

President Trump has fired, removed and reassigned twenty flag officers since returning to office.

Perhaps this is way to weed out additional people who do not measure up to whatever standards the President has.

The problem is, EMALs is not living up to the potential, and continued funding of Ford Class Carriers is not justified until or unless its many problems can be fixed (assuming that the issue can be fixed…)

Sadly, if it CAN NOT be fixed, what do you do with the Ford, JFK or Enterprise? Terribly expensive floating parking garages.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Friday, August 21, 2026 - 11:25 am: Edit

Speaking of CVN-81, Acting Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao has been making moves to try to rename it. You get exactly one guess at the recommended new name.

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Friday, August 21, 2026 - 11:29 am: Edit

As to the eventual fate of the EMALs system, David: as I noted several days ago, it's actually been working quite well since Ford emerged from her 2024 overhaul. As such, I somewhat suspect that Congress will be reluctant to authorize the required expense to switch Ford-class ships back to steam catapults (or to move the island further forward, another demand from the President, which he stated was because it "looked better there").

By Matthew Lawson (Mglawson) on Friday, August 21, 2026 - 12:07 pm: Edit

The USS Steve V. Cole?

By Jessica Orsini (Jessica_Orsini) on Friday, August 21, 2026 - 12:31 pm: Edit

Not quite.