Weapons: Drone Wars Past and Future
August 29, 2026: Drones, specifically the quad or octocopter types, have been around for a long time. One of the earliest examples was in 1849 when Austrian forces were besieging Venice. The Austrians assembled 200 hot air balloons, each carrying about 12 kg of explosives. The Austrians underestimated the winds' quirky nature, and only one bomb exploded in Venice; the rest landed in the sea or uninhabited areas.
The next efforts occurred during World War 1, when British and American scientists developed radio-controlled aircraft to destroy German Zeppelins bombing British cities. These drones were flown into the Zeppelin, bringing it down. The Americans developed what they called an aerial torpedo, a precursor to the Tomahawk cruise missile. The aerial torpedo was not operational until just after the war ended. In the 20 years between the two World Wars. Britain created drones that could be launched from warships. The Americans first used the term drones for radio-controlled aerial targets. They also used primitive television sensors with heat-seeking/infrared in drones designed to down enemy bombers. The Russians also experimented with drones in the 1930s but never got them usable.
In the 1930s, a British actor working in Hollywood developed a radio-controlled drone called the RP that the U.S. Army called the OQ-2. Over 15,000 of these were used during World War II as targets for fighters and bomber machine-gunners. At the same time, an American inventor developed devices that allowed a drone aircraft to operate BVR/Beyond Visual Range. The Americans developed a guided cruise missile that worked, but arguments over how it should be used delayed the weapon from entering combat until late 1944, when hundreds were used against Japanese targets in the Pacific.
The Germans developed and used the first combat cruise missile, the 2-ton V-1, and ballistic missile, the V-2. About 30,000 V-1s were produced, and a third of those were launched against Britain, mainly London. About 2,400 V-1s hit London, destroying much property and killing 6,200 and wounding nearly 18,000. Most of the casualties were civilians.
After World War II, the United States was the major developer and user of drones. As jet-propelled aircraft became common, so did jet-powered drones used for target practice and as combat decoys. The U.S. also used radio-controlled B-17s to observe and gather air samples of nuclear tests. Eventually, the military realized it could use smaller, more capable video cameras on reconnaissance drones to collect information. The Soviet Union also began to develop similar drones. The American surveillance drones were used extensively during the 1960s and early 70s over Vietnam. Many of these drones were launched from C-130 transports, giving them longer range and more time over areas of interest. The drones were equipped with parachutes, which were deployed when the drones were over friendly territory, and they, or just their cameras and film, could be recovered by helicopters. The North Vietnamese air force sought to use these drones for target practice, but only six drones were brought down.
During the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, about 600 Iranian Qods Mohajer-1 drones were used. Meanwhile, smugglers and other criminal organizations, as well as Islamic terrorists, were enthusiastically adopting the use of drones. Drones were used by the Russians in their battles in Georgia, Chechnya, Syria, Armenia, and so on. Criminals used drones for smuggling drugs or getting contraband to imprisoned gangsters. Islamic terrorists used drones for surveillance and attacking civilians as well as police and soldiers.
Armed forces worldwide were slower to adopt drones widely. In 2016, when the Chinese Mavic quad-copter drones became available, soldiers often bought them with their own money to increase their combat capabilities. The Ukrainian war actually began in 2014, when Russia seized Crimea and portions of two eastern Ukrainian provinces. Both sides used drones. By then, Russia also had a large surveillance drone similar to the American Predator and Reaper from the 1990s. All three drones were used extensively and remain in use. Iran also developed its triangular propeller-driven Shaheed drones. So far, nearly half a million of these drones, including the Russian Geran, have been produced.
The Drone Revolution occurred when the Ukrainians developed full-on drone warfare with novel new ways to design and deploy drones. FPV drones have radically changed modern warfare. These drones are an omnipresent aerial threat to armored vehicles and infantry. Each FPV drone costs less than $1,000. Operators use the drone's camera to see what is below and find targets. Armed FPV operators are several kilometers away to decide when their FPV drones will drop explosives on an armored vehicle, which has thinner armor on top, or on infantry in the open or in trenches. To do so, drone operators often work in pairs, with one flying behind the other and focusing on the big picture while seeking a likely target. When the reconnaissance drone finds a target, the armed drone is directed to it. The two FPV drone operators are usually in the same room or tent and can take control of new drones, which are lined up and brought outside for launch when needed. Reconnaissance drones are often unarmed so they can spend more time in the air searching for a target.
The Ukrainians developed the FPV drone in 2022, when only a few FPV drone attacks were recorded. The Ukrainian Army was the first to appreciate the potential of FPV drones. By the summer of 2023, the Russian Army also began to use FPV drones in greater numbers. Since then, the number of FPV drone attacks has grown exponentially on both sides. Only twelve percent of those attacks destroyed the target, which could be a vehicle, a group of infantry, or even a sniper firing through a window from inside a building. In this case, the armed FPV drone would fly through the window and explode in the room the sniper was in. The only defense is having a nearby open door the sniper can run to or dive through as the FPV drone approaches. Sometimes that isn’t possible because the armed FPV drone is coming down from above the window and then in. You don’t see those coming until it’s too late.
In 2026, Ukraine plans to build at least eight million, and possibly ten million drones. They built about five million drones last year. In 2024, the total was 1.5 million drones. There have been problems. Chinese component producers are having a hard time keeping up, and last year, to assist the Russians, China halted sending drone components to Ukraine. Suppliers in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere quickly stepped in. At least 70 percent of Ukrainian drones are built entirely in Ukraine, and the rest are built from imported parts or whole assemblies. Some Ukrainian firms have improvised by using plywood and similar materials for their drones. For FPV (first-Person View) drones, cheaper is better if the drone can hit its first and only target. Most Ukrainian drones are FPV models, which are considered a form of ammunition.
Both sides now use FPV drones, but they use them differently in combat. The Ukrainians seek out high-value targets like armored vehicles, electronic warfare equipment, anti-aircraft systems, and storage sites for munitions or other supplies. Russian supply trucks are another prime target.
Russia has lost its war with Ukraine but will continue to send soldiers there for years until they declare victory and finish rewriting their history books.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, August 31, 2026 - 03:17 pm: Edit

Russia: Russians Fear Another 1917
August 29, 2026: The Ukraine War, now in its fifth year, has cost over two trillion dollars, and that could grow to nearly three trillion before it ends. The annual Russian GDP is $2.6 trillion. Russian spending on civilian needs, like infrastructure, roads and much else, has been reduced, or sometimes suspended, to pay for the war. It has reached the point where many Russians, including media commentators, are talking about the possibility of another revolution like the one in 1917 that resulted in the Soviet Union. That process cost Russia about ten million dead soldiers and civilians. World War II was even worse, with 29 million dead, about 13 percent of the pre-war population. Most Russians are unhappy with their government, but do not see another 1917 as a realistic cure for the current mess.
The current crisis did not happen by plan. Russia has refused to face the fact that when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, half the population willingly moved to the 14 new countries, and most of them were enthusiastic about ending the Soviet Union and its domination. The Soviet Union was basically the Russian Empire cobbled together by the old czarist monarchy over more than two centuries of conquest and expansion. Thus, half the Soviet Union population felt like conquered people, not part of any union. The Soviet Union dissolved quickly in 1990-91 because over half the population really wanted it to happen and had wanted it for a long time.
Another issue Russian leader Vladimir Putin ignored was that many ethnic Russians were tired of supporting a lot of the less affluent conquered people and were fed up with the economic failures of communism. Former Soviet Union citizens who regret the breakup tend to be older and disillusioned by how corruption and bad leadership made post-Soviet life less wonderful than expected. Many younger Russians are more realistic, having never lived as adults in the Soviet Union and being intimately familiar with the fact that freedom isn’t free and democracy is difficult to maintain. Putin gained some support for his new empire by using his control of Russian mass media to push the idea that any economic problems inside Russia were not the fault of Russians but evil foreigners, especially the United States. That worked until the Ukraine misadventure, when these younger fans noted that none of the other former portions of the Soviet Union answered Putin’s call to send troops to share the glory in Ukraine. Even Belarus, considered the most pro-Russia of the 14 new nations formed by the half of the Soviet population that was free of Russia since 1991. These former Soviet provinces were more pragmatic and accurate in assessing Russian performance in Syria and Libya, as well as Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions.
For younger Russians, there are more economic opportunities than under communism. While Russia lost half its population in 1991, it retained most of its valuable natural resources, like oil and natural gas, which meant more prosperity for post-Soviet Russians. In Soviet times, there was little legal economic opportunity for anyone, and most everyone was equally poor. The Putin solution is a police state with a relatively free market. In the 20th century, this became known as fascism, and that describes most of the foes the Soviet Union and its western allies faced and defeated during World War II. Vladimir Lenin, the leader of the Communist Party that won power in Russia after World War I, experimented with this idea in the early 1920s, but then he died. His successor, Josef Stalin, faced opposition from many communist leaders who agreed with Lenin's idea of more economic freedom to build a more productive economy. Stalin was concerned about power, not prosperity, and used that to depict his many real or suspected political opponents as traitors to the communist cause and killed or exiled most of them before World War II.
Stalin died eight years after World War II ended, and his successors agreed on purging (often killing) all the officials considered true believers in Stalin’s brutal methods. The successors ignored or were not aware of how inefficient the pure communist command (state-controlled) economy was. That made it worse, and by the 1980s it was obvious to Russian leaders that they were going bankrupt and unable to sustain the Soviet state much longer. The Russian people were suffering a lot more than their corrupt leaders, and by 1990, they were refusing to go along with the communist leadership.
This is a common pattern in dictatorships, including monarchies, and Soviet leaders, like the Tsar overthrown in 1917, did not realize how bad their situation was until it was too late. Putin turned the post-Soviet democracy into a police state pretending to be a democracy with him as the leader-for-life. His failures with the economy, democracy, and now Ukraine leave Putin with more enemies than allies at all levels of Russian society, including the government and security forces. Putin still retains the power to order the use of nuclear weapons, but no fading dictator ever tried to use these weapons to retain power, and the Russian nukes cannot literally be used by one person. Bureaucracies, procedures, and safeguards must be followed to use the nukes. As was demonstrated during the 1980s, there are Russians in that bureaucracy who will not automatically carry out orders to use nukes. Russians at all levels are talking about this, most of them openly. Those closer to Putin must be discreet to survive. They want to survive, and most Russians agree, and Putin has become one of the obstacles to Russian security rather than a trusted guardian of it.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, August 31, 2026 - 03:18 pm: Edit

Peace Time: Post War Ukraine
August 28, 2026: Post-war Ukraine is shaping up to be one of the largest national reconstruction projects since the Soviet Union's post-war effort in the 1950s. Back then, Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, and the reconstruction left it as a center for developing new technologies and building essential equipment like gas turbines and much more. Ukraine also provided much of the Soviet farm income.
Ukraine estimates that reconstruction will cost about $750 billion. Ukraine is planning to rebuild its housing, businesses, roads, rail lines, and infrastructure after five years of fighting. Several hundred thousand homes or apartments were destroyed, along with over a thousand schools and over 50,000 kilometers of roads, with similar damage to rail lines; all the hydroelectric power plants were damaged or destroyed.
Last year, NATO nations promised substantial post-war economic rebuilding aid so Ukraine can fit it into its war plans. For example, the Netherlands, one of the smaller NATO members, announced it was spending several billion dollars on Ukraine aid in 2024 and 2025. Germany's GDP is over four trillion dollars, while the Netherlands' is about one trillion dollars. Germany sent $8 billion in military aid to Ukraine in 2024. Considering its smaller size, the Netherlands has been a major supplier of aid to Ukraine. The Netherlands and Germany plan to provide even larger amounts of aid for the post-war reconstruction.
Dutch aid to Ukraine in 2024 includes a wide array of weapons and services. There will be more air defense systems, UAVs and munitions for various weapons Ukraine already has. Services include training for Ukrainian F-16 pilots and aircraft maintainers. In 2024, a larger portion of the aid was for economic reconstruction and current government financing. Unable to do sufficient damage to Ukrainian armed forces, Russia has been concentrating many of its missile attacks on economic targets. These have to be repaired or rebuilt, especially the targets that provide electricity, heat or clean water and sanitation services. The Russians wanted Ukrainian civilians to suffer when winter arrived. The Dutch can relate to this. During World War 2, German troops occupied the Netherlands, and toward the end of the war, the Germans greatly reduced the food available to Dutch civilians. In the Netherlands, that period of privation is remembered, and they don’t want to see it happen again and again to the Ukrainians.
For centuries, Ukraine has suffered periods of brutal occupation by invaders. The most frequent brutal occupier has been Russia, which has played the homicidal villain several times in the last century. The most infamous Russian occupation incident was the use of famine during 1932 and 1933 to suppress Ukrainian opposition to Russian rule, especially the new Russian ideology of communism, which prohibited private farms and expected all farmers to work for state-owned farms. Many farmers resisted this throughout Russia, but opposition was strongest in Ukraine, where about 20 percent of the Soviet Union’s population lived. Ukrainian farmers were the most productive in Russia and produced most of the exportable wheat. Ukrainian resistance produced a horrific Soviet response, the seizure of nearly all the wheat crops in the areas of most resistance. This lasted two years and killed nearly four million Ukrainians, about an eighth of the population, Ukrainians called this the Holodomor, which translates as the Great Famine.
Russia denied the Holodomor ever happened, and many Western nations and their mass media went along with that. One exception was Britain, where one British reporter risked his life by going to Ukraine and obtaining proof of the Holodomor. The Russian government kept denying the famine ever happened until 1983, when a more open communist government admitted that many communist crimes were true. This made an impression on Russians because they realized more of the victims of the Gulag prison camps and communist terror in general were Russians. As a result, during the 0ccupations of Crimea and parts of Donbas in 2014, the Russians tried to win the support of locals.
That lowered the civilian death toll but did not turn most of the occupied population into loyal citizens of Russia. By 2020, most Ukrainians in the occupied territories wanted out. The most desperate moved to Russia, many others wanted to get to Ukraine, and others sought to go anywhere but Ukraine and Russia.
The Holodomor and many other past incidents of Russian brutality led to Russian troops being initially ordered to not attack civilians during the 2022 invasion. That failed to cause civilians to be any more receptive to the Russian presence and, within a month, troops were told they could loot and not tolerate any resistance from civilians. Russia denied that civilians were being killed or that widespread looting was taking place. Cell phone cameras carried by most Ukrainians made those claims difficult to sustain. Nor were Russian denials of the heavy casualties inflicted on the Russian forces who believed they would easily defeat the Ukrainians and occupy the capital, Kyiv, within two weeks. After a month of this, Russian troops around Kyiv were ordered to withdraw to Russia and try to conceal evidence of mass murder before they left. This produced some mass graves, but many bodies were left in plain view, and many surviving civilians had video evidence of who did what. Russia again denied it, insisting these civilians were killed by Ukrainian forces to make the Russians look bad. Once more, the video evidence, especially from Ukrainians who witnessed it and could identify some of the perpetrators, made the atrocities difficult to deny.
Mindful of that, Russian occupation forces in parts of Ukraine that were seized early on and are still under Russian control were ordered to try really hard to win over the locals without resorting to mass murder. The main occupation zone lies north of Crimea and centers on Kherson, the capital of Kherson province. Kherson City fell during the first week of the invasion, and Russia has held most of the province ever since. The city is a major port because it is located near the mouth of the Dnieper River and the Black Sea. The Dnieper is a major navigable river for Ukraine and has long been used to move cargo, especially exported wheat.
Ukraine has been trying to recapture Kherson City and province ever since and finally did so at the end of 2023, aided by a growing partisan movement inside Kherson province and passive resistance to Russian occupation by most Ukrainians in the province. Some Ukrainians agreed to work for the Russian occupation, and they were soon the targets of attacks by Ukrainian partisans. Some of the turncoats were killed, but more worrisome to the Russians were indications that other Ukrainian officials quietly agreed to work for the partisans. The Russians now believed many of their Ukrainian administrators had worked with the resistance from the beginning.
At the same time, the Russian occupation forces still had orders to try and win over the Ukrainians or at least discourage them from joining an armed insurrection. To help with that, the Russians sought to Russify the province as quickly as possible. That meant replacing the Ukrainian cell phone service with a Russian one. They blocked Ukrainian TV and radio transmissions. Russian ID documents became mandatory, and using the Russian ruble became mandatory. Access to Russian-controlled utilities, especially water and electricity, depended on how cooperative local civilians were. These efforts aimed to link Kherson to the Russian economy. The initial goal of pacifying the population was to make life safer for Russian troops in Kherson. That was never fully achieved, and since then Russian troops have had to worry about roadside bombs or anti-vehicle mines as well as sniper fire and assassination via pistol or a bomb planted in a vehicle.
The goal was to hold elections that could be portrayed as honest and show a majority of Kherson residents supporting annexation by Russia. Ukrainians didn't cooperate, using clever tactics that Russian Information War specialists recognized and struggled to counter. The Ukrainian resistance was armed and dangerous, but also mindful of the importance of outperforming the Russian Information-War campaign. Some of the American aid packages for Ukraine included a lot of Cold War-era PARM anti-vehicle mines that were never used. The Germans developed these mines to halt or disrupt a Soviet invasion that never came. The Germans believed Ukrainian partisans could use these mines. This proved true, and the Ukrainians wanted more after receiving nearly 15,000. Germany had to resume production to meet Ukrainian demand.
Ukrainians depict the Russian occupiers as worse than the German Nazis of World War II infamy. This is particularly embarrassing for the Russians because the official Russian government justification for the invasion is to liberate Ukrainians from neo-Nazi Ukrainians led by President Zelensky, who is Jewish. This tragicomedy was understood by many in Russia early on and led to a largely unarmed but often violent resistance movement inside Russia and Belarus.
Russia denies the extent of the resistance in Kherson, calling armed partisans local bandits and gangsters. Video proof leaks out of Kherson, and Russian troops stationed there complain to friends and family back home. This intensifies resistance to the war inside Russia, where the government wages its own Information War to generate support for the war or at least discredit critics. The growing inability to suppress accurate news also played a role in the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991. Former KGB officers who brought back so many aspects of Soviet rule over the last two decades are having a hard time dealing with media and image control. It’s the 1980s all over again but worse. This reminds us that the Information War is not a state monopoly and is often a multi-sided conflict.

FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Monday, August 31, 2026 - 03:18 pm: Edit

Russia: Ukraine Cripples ROSCOSMOS
August 28, 2026: The war in Ukraine is expected to cost Russia a trillion dollars, nearly half its annual GDP. Russia has already spent $866 billion so far, and one of the major victims of that spending is ROSCOSMOS, the Russian space agency. Russian efforts to duplicate SpaceX’s Falcon 9 using the Amur-LNG rocket have been continually delayed. The first launch was supposed to take place this year but was recently delayed to 2031. Unless the Ukraine War ends by then, delays will continue. Delays and disappointments have been ROSCOSMOS's staple for decades. Ukrainian long-range drones recently attacked ROSCOSMOS facilities, and more of those attacks are on the way as crippling ROSCOSMOS has become another Ukrainian objective.
Meanwhile, the space race goes on. China has more than 500 satellites in orbit, compared with 200 for Russia and thousands for America. Russia has only 110 military satellites in orbit, some of them defective, while China has 157 and the United States 247.
Russian satellites are still a threat. Earlier this year, two new Russian satellites, Luch-1 and Luch-2, behaved suspiciously. It was eventually discovered that these satellites were intercepting information flowing through them to several European countries. This means that Russia now has access to many NATO secrets, including plans to aid Ukraine and disrupt Russian sabotage missions in Europe and intelligence efforts throughout the world. This is surprising because, since 2024, the Russian GLONASS satellite system has been in trouble. The problem is familiar: too many GLONASS satellites are ending their service lives, usually after seven years, and ROSCOSMOS does not have the money to replace them all. The cash shortage has stalled the program to build improved GLONASS satellites like GLONASS-K, the first unpressurized GLONASS satellite, which weighs much less at 750 kg and has a longer service life of ten years. The current GLONASS-M weighs 1,450 kg and has a seven-year service life.
Currently, most of the 20 or so GLONASS satellites in service are past their seven-year service lives and, as expected, operating erratically and starting to fail. Maintaining the worldwide GLONASS satellite network is not a high priority because Russian personal, commercial, and military satellite navigation users have long used satellite navigation equipment that contains GLONASS and American GPS receivers. This combination provides more accurate location information and a more reliable system because the two satellite systems contain about fifty satellites.
Keeping GLONASS active with a full constellation of 24 satellites using the latest technology is expensive and used to depend on a steady supply of high-tech components available only from the United States and its allies. Imports of those are blocked by Western sanctions for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Recently, China has also become a major supplier of electronics needed for navigation satellites, so Russia can buy from China the components it used to get from Western countries. Relying on China for components does not solve the fundamental problem that Russia lacks the money to maintain GLONASS. Since the American GPS system began operating in 1993, several other similar systems have appeared. GLONASS went online in 2011, and the Chinese Beidou came online in 2020, at the same time as the European Galileo system. Creating and maintaining these global systems is expensive, and only the United States and China have been able to finance continuous operation and upgrades. Galileo, funded by a coalition of nations, has struggled to get coalition members to provide the needed funds. Russia tried to compete but ran out of money.
Multiple global positioning satellite systems increase signal accuracy and reliability, and provide redundancy and interoperability in case of service disruption. Multiple systems can also create problems involving spectrum congestion, signal interference, and coordination complications.
By 2020, many believed current anti-jamming efforts would be insufficient to reduce the viability of American military GPS use. That proved optimistic because improvements in GPS jamming and spoofing technology emerged faster than expected. Since GPS disruption, it has become increasingly clear that Russia has regularly jammed or spoofed GPS signals, mainly to hide the exact location of equipment that allows GPS tracking. In the last five years, Russia has jammed or spoofed satellite navigation signals used by American GPS, Chinese Beidou, Europe’s Galileo, and Russian GLONASS in thousands of incidents involving foreigners. Most of this activity was not obvious jamming but harder-to-detect spoofing. Russia used this to conceal the true locations of key government officials and military units. Spoofing was particularly common against Russian military forces in Ukraine and Syria. Spoofing replaced the actual satellite signal with a false one, rendering smart bombs or planned attacks on targets inaccurate. Spoofing can introduce false signals gradually and sometimes delay a navigation system's realization that it is being deceived. That’s one function of the INS/inertial Navigation System: to monitor GPS and serve as a backup.
Current INS tech relies on receiving an accurate GPS location initially, and periodically thereafter, to keep both GPS and INS location data in sync. GPS depends on continuous satellite signals to operate, and INS steps in only when the satellite signal becomes temporarily too weak or absent. When the system gets an accurate GPS signal, the INS returns to standby mode. Spoofing can now mimic these momentary disruptions and evade INS detection as a false signal, since it is completely self-contained. This is sometimes a problem for American guided weapons sent to Ukraine that do not have the latest anti-jamming tech installed.
American INS researchers are not the only ones seeking an INS that is accurate and persistent enough to replace GPS for extended periods. INS has long suffered from its inability to provide location as accurately as satellite navigation systems, because the gyroscope and acceleration capabilities of chip-based INS cannot maintain the continuous precision of a space-based satellite system. This is no longer seen as an insurmountable problem, nor is the large cost difference between GPS and INS tech. Israel apparently feels it is closer to a solution than anyone else.
Meanwhile, spoofing satellite navigation systems has become more popular and practical because they do not require expensive or high-tech equipment. While American weapons and military navigation systems have a backup in the form of unjammable INS systems, these are useless if spoofing goes undetected. American systems are supposed to detect spoofing and revert to INS, but the U.S. does not disclose details of how these systems work, making it harder for spoofing systems to be modified to be less detectable. That is one reason the U.S. has not released detailed information on spoofing incidents: some may have evaded INS spoofing-detection tech.
To further complicate the issue, there have also been instances where mandatory AIS Automatic Identification System transponders that all large ships must carry are more frequently reporting instances of getting no GPS signal at all. Large ships usually carry two AIS units, in case one malfunctions, so AIS failure can be ruled out as a cause. Something outside the ship is manipulating the GPS signal. This shows that it is possible to deceive an unjammable INS, and new INS systems are being sought to eliminate that risk by replacing GPS most of the time.
The new INS technology has attracted a lot of attention in the military, where backups are always appreciated because, when equipment fails in combat or for commercial transport users like aircraft or ships, it’s literally a matter of life or death. Meanwhile, the U.S. is building and testing more compact GPS anti-jamming systems for smaller 200 kg UAVs. This is part of a program to equip all American UAVs, even the smallest ones, with more secure GPS. While the operator can fly all UAVs, GPS makes it much easier to track exactly where the UAV is at all times, and sometimes the UAV is programmed to patrol between a series of GPS coordinates. If the GPS jams or fails, the operator can usually use the video feed to find landmarks on the ground and bring the UAV back to a visible spot for landing. Other UAVs have a GPS failsafe system. When it is no longer available, the UAV turns around and heads back in the general direction of the operator. This is better than just allowing the GPS-less UAV to keep flying until it runs out of fuel and crashes somewhere,
GPS reliability threats come from a few suppliers, notably Russia, China, and North Korea. These nations have developed all manner of GPS jamming technology, and over the last decade it has become increasingly obvious that they have used new GPS spoofing technology to conceal the true location of senior personnel and mobile combat units.
Developers and users of GPS jamming gear tend to keep quiet about what they do because this sort of thing is illegal in peacetime, especially when civilians experience GPS disruptions themselves. When the United States tests military GPS jamming, it does so at sea or in remote areas and warns nearby civilians who might encounter GPS problems to watch for the tests and act accordingly. This warning policy has been in use for decades because more electronic equipment designs could cause problems for civilians if the disruptive effect extended farther than expected.
Other nations are less secretive about complaining, and Russia is often the culprit. In 2018 Finland and Norway went public with their accusations that Russia deliberately jammed GPS signals in northern Finland and Norway from a location near the Russian military bases in the Kola Peninsula on the Barents Sea. The jamming took place as NATO held its largest training exercise since the Cold War ended in 1991. Russia denied any responsibility, even though it is known to possess long-range jammers for GPS and other signals. Norway said it had tracked the jammer to a specific location but, when Russia refused to admit any involvement, Norway refused to explain how it tracked the signal because that would give Russia information on Norwegian EW (electronic Warfare) equipment that might be useful to it.
China is seeking to monetize its Beidou satellite navigation system. Beidou is the Chinese version of American GPS. Beidou finally became fully operational, providing worldwide coverage, in January 2020. Three competing systems exist: GPS, GLONASS, and Galileo. The full Beidou network became a worldwide service in early 2020. The American GPS has been operational since 1978, while the Russian GLONASS achieved that status in 1995. Unfortunately, Russia had mostly financial problems keeping GLONASS operational. The European Galileo became operational worldwide in 2020. Each system cost about $10 billion to create and put into service. The American GPS cost $12 billion, mainly because it has been around for so long.
China is determined to do what none of the other three satnav systems have done: become profitable. China has not revealed how it expects to do that, and the other three major satnav providers remain silent on profitability. Currently, the main reason for building a satnav system is national prestige and an alternative to dependence on the Americans, or any single satnav provider.
China has also invested heavily in trying to obtain favorable press coverage for Beidou and somehow establish it as a preferred satnav service. That has cost over half a billion dollars but has not created any acceptance of Beidou as a superior satnav provider. China has a long-range plan for Beidou that includes adding new features and somehow achieving market dominance by 2040. China likes to announce long-range goals like this, then quietly forget about it when the promised future never arrives.
Meanwhile, Chinese state-controlled media have given a global audience unprecedented detail on this technological effort. People first got to experience Beidou in late 2012, when the first few satellites were made available to anyone with a Beidou receiver. China expected Beidou to become a major competitor to existing global navigation systems, at least for civilian users. China made it clear its initial goal was to grab a major share of the satnav market from the original U.S. GPS system by 2030. Progress has been slow so far.
In reality, China has struggled to make Beidou fully operational. By 2020, Beidou service was available worldwide, and the rest of the world was not impressed. Beidou incorporates the best features of the GLONASS and Galileo systems, as well as items planned for the next-generation American GPS satellites. Still, no one has found a way to make a profit, at least not directly. Plenty of ideas exist, but no one has turned any of them into cash yet. Moreover, the Beidou, Galileo, and GLONASS organizations dispute which frequencies each should use. Since GPS entered service first, no one contests the frequencies it uses, but the other three players face problems.
The success of the original GPS satnav system has generated all this competition, but so far these other efforts have found the work much more difficult than expected. A European consortium went forward with Galileo despite growing costs and technical problems. Initially Galileo was to be funded with private money. But costs climbed beyond the most optimistic estimates of future income, so Galileo is now funded with tax dollars, as were GPS and the competing Russian and Chinese systems.
Galileo came about because Europeans didn't want to depend on an American system and didn't believe the Russians could keep their GLONASS system viable. Galileo became operational because the European nations were willing to pay for a system that anyone could use without charge. Dual GPS and Galileo receivers cost about 20 percent more than GPS-only receivers. Two separate signal sets make receivers more reliable and accurate. Also, the way Galileo is being set up will provide improved reliability in higher latitudes and in built-up areas.
GLONASS was at full strength in 1996, shortly after the Cold War ended. But the end of the Cold War in 1991 ended regular GLONASS financing. Maintaining the system required launching replacement satellites every 5-7 years. By the end of 2002, only seven GLONASS satellites were still operational. However, the Russian economy recovered and funded a series of launches in 2003 that increased the number of active satellites to twelve. That rose to 18 by the end of 2007, and Russia had 24 GLONASS satellites in orbit by 2011, with the system fully operational again by 2012. As a result, GLONASS was the first real competitor for GPS. However, GLONASS was not completely functional until 2016 because of delays in building all the ground control stations.
The Russian government funds GLONASS because it does not want to depend on the American-controlled GPS system. But the money was only there because of high oil prices. Most GLONASS receivers in use are actually combined GPS/GLONASS receivers. Russia will have to spend billions of dollars on GLONASS over the next few years to keep the system fully operational, then spend even more to maintain the satellite network. The costs of the Ukraine war are consuming the investment capital needed to maintain Russia’s civilian infrastructure, including GLONASS, its railroad system and oil production. GLONASS is widely used alongside GPS. In other words, many systems, including cell phones that already use GPS, have added GLONASS and Galileo to provide better coverage and fewer instances where the GPS signal was unavailable.
Beidou is a more restricted system. Services available to anyone are less accurate than other systems, though Beidou also has a more accurate military messaging mode available only to the Chinese and Pakistani military. China continues trying to monetize its GPS service, which really would make it unique compared to the others, but few nations are willing to pay for a military-grade sat nav service provided by China. It will take more than a multi-billion-dollar propaganda effort to change global suspicion about Chinese motives and reliability in such matters.
One reason there are so many global positioning satellite systems is that they have both civilian and military applications. The US Department of Defense originally developed GPS to provide precise navigation and timing for its armed forces and allies. Civilians also use GPS widely for mapping, geocaching, tracking, and recreation. Similarly, GLONASS, Beidou, and Galileo have dual-use capabilities that can enhance the economic, scientific, and security interests of their respective countries or regions. For example, GLONASS can support Russian oil and gas exploration, Beidou can facilitate China's Belt and Road Initiative, and Galileo can improve European autonomy and resilience in the face of external threats or disruptions.
Using multiple global positioning satellite systems can also increase signal accuracy and reliability, as well as provide redundancy and interoperability in case of failures or attacks. However, too many systems can also create challenges, including spectrum congestion, signal interference, and coordination difficulties. Moreover, some countries may use their systems for strategic or political purposes, such as denying rivals access or asserting territorial claims. Therefore, establishing international norms and regulations for the peaceful and responsible use of global positioning satellite systems is important.

FYEO

By Ryan Opel (Ryan) on Monday, August 31, 2026 - 07:01 pm: Edit

I wonder how the Russian harvest is going this year. With both fuel and manpower shortages it should be interesting.

By James Cain (Jcain) on Monday, August 31, 2026 - 08:32 pm: Edit

Ryan: I heard the closer the Russian fields are to Ukraine, the more bountiful the available harvest ... if one is looking for a harvest of scrap metal, but that the local farmers consider it to be harvest-at-your-own-risk: risk of being spotted by the local draft board and being drafted, risk of not spotting unexploded ordinance before stepping too close and transforming it into exploding ordinance, risk of being spotted by a Ukrainian drone, risk of not spotting incoming unexploded ordinance before it transforms itself into exploding ordinance...

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Tuesday, September 01, 2026 - 11:20 am: Edit

"European nations have become increasingly dependent on Russian oil and natural gas."

That USED to be true. "EU imports from Russia dropped significantly to roughly €1.7 billion per month, down from pre-war levels of about €20.5 billion per month (read more at the European Centre for International Political Economy)"

Also, the EU is moving towards renewables at a pretty fair clip. "In 2025, renewable energy accounted for 49.9% of gross electricity consumption and 26.2% of total final energy consumption in the European Union according to data from Eurostat Statistics Explained."

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Tuesday, September 01, 2026 - 12:16 pm: Edit

I am currentlly reading Rise of the Machines by Illya Serkin, who has been influential in Ukraine's military. I'd like to quote here what strikes me as a key passage, thoroughly supported by the course of Ukraine's war:

. . . the winners of tomorrow's battles will be the armed forces that use unmanned technologies as the primary means of warfighting and subordinate other weapons systems to it. Put bluntly, you need to make the drone the centrepiece of your striking force, with all other arms of the service built around it.

By Jason E. Schaff (Jschaff297061) on Tuesday, September 01, 2026 - 08:01 pm: Edit

The whole "drones as the primary means of warfighting" runs into the same problem encountered by the Bomber Harris / Curtis Lemay / Billy Mitchel crowd. Air power (of which drones are a modern subset) can do SERIOUS damage, but it can't control territory. You still need the "poor bloody infantry" for that job. And airpower, by itself, has never forced the complete surrender of an enemy.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, September 01, 2026 - 08:26 pm: Edit

I don’t think drones are the center of everything. They are a new system among many and none can be ignored. The one you don’t fully develop and use is the one the enemy exploits to win.

Germany was not the coolest army in 1939-42 because it had tanks but because it worked out combined arms tactics before anny else and better than anyone else.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Tuesday, September 01, 2026 - 08:31 pm: Edit

"among many" . . . sure . . . but different sources have them causing 60-90% of the casualties in the Ukraine war.

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Tuesday, September 01, 2026 - 08:37 pm: Edit

Indeed, but artillery did that previously from about 1916 to about 2023. Nobody built their entire war machine around any one branch.Drones are doing really well right now because they are fighting armies not designed to fight drones. Once new defensive systems are deployed that will balance out. You need everything. Germany short changed logistics and repair systems and that is what got them.

By William Jockusch (Verybadcat) on Tuesday, September 01, 2026 - 08:45 pm: Edit

And drones are not limited to airpower. Russia's Black Sea Fleet has suffered tremendous losses to naval drones. And Ukrainian sources have ground drone missions increasing from 7500 in January to 19900 in July.

By Mike Grafton (Mike_Grafton) on Wednesday, September 02, 2026 - 11:36 am: Edit

Sooner or later trophy/ arena/ triumph/ iron fist APS get truly perfected and flying drones lose much of their dominance.

Got to just fix that overhead vulnerability

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, September 02, 2026 - 01:37 pm: Edit

War comes down to money. (The cause of wars is usually ill-guarded wealth somebody think they can grab, or that they deserve.)

If I can kill your $4 million tank with a million dollar missile, I guess I can try, but given active defenses, it might take several missiles.

If I can kill it with a $300,000 cannon shell, so much the better.

If I can kill it with a $100 drone, even if I have to use 20 of them, bingo!

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, September 02, 2026 - 04:26 pm: Edit

Procurement Failure In America
September 2, 2026: In 1961, when President and former Five-Star General Dwight Eisenhower left government service, he warned of the Military-Industrial Complex. In the previous two decades, Eisenhower had served as Supreme Commander of Allied forces in Europe. After the war, he became the first commander of NATO, then served eight years as president of the United States. After all that, Eisenhower's most important advice was to beware of the Military-Industrial Complex. After eight years of dealing with the American Congress, he could describe the threat more accurately as the Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex.
Recent problems involving Congressional meddling include efforts to produce an affordable naval drone, drones in general, and cruise missiles. These items are needed and have proven their usefulness in Ukraine, but the Ukrainians are at war and can produce drones inexpensively while constantly upgrading their capabilities. In the American Congress, peacetime special interests often disrupt plans to do something effectively.
The military proposes new weapons or military equipment, the defense industries offer to build it on time and on budget, and Congress either approves or tacks on more items that help with re-election for key members. Eisenhower’s prediction was depressingly accurate. Since 1945, technical failures, weapons and equipment that never functioned adequately, and wasteful spending in general have cost the American taxpayers over a trillion dollars.
For example, during the 2003-11 Iraq War, complaints about poor performance by military contractors in Iraq could be traced to quirks in the Department of Defense procurement process. The big problem is that it's easier, from an administrative and cover-your-ass point of view, to get existing suppliers to provide more of the same items they are providing, or related services, like asking a translation supplier to provide interrogators, than it is to go out and find new suppliers who might do a better job. The problem is that the paperwork and procedures for a new supplier are so complicated and lengthy that there's a strong incentive to stick with the existing ones. The current suppliers, of course, are not unhappy with this situation, and tend to have a very "can do" attitude, whether they can actually do it or not.
On top of that, you have, because of the war on terror and operations in Iraq, a surge problem. This causes problems when a small company that is staying on top of a hundred million dollars’ worth of business is suddenly asked to ramp up to handle a billion dollars of work. Things quickly get out of control as too many managers and subcontractors are hired in haste, and things go from bad to worse.
None of these problems, which have been around for centuries, is a mystery to anyone in military procurement. What has proven elusive is a solution. The one solution that works time and again is good management. But so far, that solution is largely unattainable. Government cannot attract the quality managers needed to rapidly expand procurement projects. An attempt has been made to develop a group of large civilian construction and project management firms, which regularly deal with rapid mobilization of resources for non-military projects. But even these firms rarely have to deal with projects that escalate as rapidly as wars. In the 1990s, some of these firms, like Kellogg, Brown & Root, and military staff ran planning exercises to better understand how to avoid the errors and inefficiencies encountered during a large, rapid buildup. While this provided useful guidelines, it also repeated the basic truth: the quality of the procurement managers kept things from spinning out of control.
Getting many quality people into procurement jobs is not easy. It's not a glamorous job, and the Department of Defense knows that procurement fiascos are quickly forgotten. So are procurement successes. The only other new solution involves computerized information and accounting systems to monitor things. But low-tech, low-level officials can still muck things up despite clever software and accounting controls. This is particularly true in places like the Middle East, where taking a little off the top for yourself is considered perfectly normal and acceptable.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, September 02, 2026 - 04:26 pm: Edit

Russia: Foreign Aid Crisis
September 2, 2026: The war in Ukraine forced Russia to become dependent on military and technology aid from Iran, North Korea, and China. While Iran and North Korea are long-time allies, China is a neighbor that considers Russia a reckless, unreliable neighbor. China told Russia that the Ukraine War was a mistake and does not provide aid to Russia, but will sell Russia items it needs and cannot easily obtain because of economic sanctions. In this respect, China is an essential part of the Russian economy because it can provide Russia with access to the Western tech it needs. Both Russia and China have to be discreet about this, because if NATO nations uncover definitive proof of these activities, China would be forced to halt its aid to Russia or face severe damage to its own foreign trade.
Providing aid to Russia comes with several aggravating problems. There is corruption, inflexibility, and inability to improvise as effectively as Chinese and Westerners. For example, earlier this century, Russia asked for hundreds of millions of dollars a year in foreign aid from NATO nations to pay for security around 7,000 sites containing nuclear material found in weapons, hospitals, and research labs. Even more foreign aid came from the West to decommission over 200 retired Russian nuclear submarines. Russia was going to just let the subs rot and sink off the northern coast. This would have been a disaster for nations that catch and process fish in the North Atlantic. NATO nations paid billions and provided technical aid to safely remove nuclear fuel from these submarines.
Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean military aid has been crucial in Russia’s ability to continue the Ukraine War. While Russia quickly puts foreign weapons and munitions to work, support equipment is another matter. Russians require more training and are forced to adopt Western practices, as the Chinese do, to get the most out of this equipment. For example, China provides satellite surveillance data, mainly high-resolution photos and infrared/heat sensitive imagery. While Ukrainians use similar American aid quickly and effectively, the Russians are crippled by their own bureaucracy and rigid forms of command and control. Russia also faces language barriers. The North Korean troops operating in Ukraine still suffer from interoperability problems with insufficient Korean speakers among the Russians and even fewer Koreans who can speak Russian.
Another problem is that the Russian government and military organization value loyalty over competence. Western dependence on decentralization, delegation, and initiative is seen as hostile to the Russian way of doing this, and a threat to the kind of order and authority the Russian military requires.
Another problem is the decline of the Russian space program, ROSCOSMOS, because the war in Ukraine took priority in defense spending. Since 2024, the Russian GLONASS satellite system has been in trouble. The problem is familiar: too many GLONASS satellites are ending their service lives, usually after seven years, and Roscosmos, the Russian space agency, lacks the money to replace them all. The cash shortage has stalled the program to build improved GLONASS satellites like GLONASS-K, the first unpressurized GLONASS satellite, which weighs much less at 750 kg and has a longer service life of ten years. The current GLONASS-M weighs 1,450 kg and has a seven-year service life.
Currently, most of the 20 or so GLONASS satellites in service are past their seven-year service lives and, as expected, operating erratically and starting to fail. Maintaining the worldwide GLONASS satellite network is not a high priority because Russian personal, commercial, and military satellite navigation users have long used satellite navigation equipment that contains GLONASS and American GPS receivers. This combination provides more accurate location information and a more reliable system because the two satellite systems contain about fifty satellites.
Keeping GLONASS active with a full constellation of 24 satellites using the latest technology is expensive and depends on a steady supply of high-tech components available only from the United States and its allies. Imports of those are blocked by Western sanctions for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Recently, China has also become a major supplier of electronics needed for navigation satellites. Russia can buy the components it used to get from Western countries. Relying on China for components does not solve the fundamental problem that Russia lacks the money to maintain GLONASS. Since the American GPS system began operating in 1993, several other similar systems have appeared. GLONASS went online in 2011, and the Chinese Beidou came online in 2020, at the same time as the European Galileo system. Creating and maintaining these global systems is expensive, and only the United States and China have been able to finance continuous operation and upgrades. Galileo, funded by a coalition of nations, has struggled to get coalition members to provide the needed funds. Russia tried to compete but ran out of money.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, September 02, 2026 - 04:27 pm: Edit

Intelligence: Israeli Indian Intelligence Cooperation
September 1, 2026: During the recent Iran war, it was revealed that there were, and long had been, many Indian intelligence operatives active throughout the country. The Indians kept quiet about it, especially the fact that the Indians worked with the Israeli network, which included Iranians, Indians, other Iranian minorities, and a few Israelis. The Israeli network has been active since the 1980s, when a religious dictatorship took control of the government. The Indians were apparently active even longer. Not so much as full-time spies but as Indians willing to tell RAW, the Indian intelligence agency, what they had noticed in Iran. Israel does the same thing. This technique is common worldwide, and the Chinese are the most ardent practitioners, calling this their Thousand Grains of Sand technique. For decades, Israel and India have been trading partners, with India buying lots of high-tech equipment and weapons from Israel. Indian firms export over a billion dollars' worth of manufactured goods to Israel each year.
When, up until 1979, Iran was a constitutional monarchy, foreigners were tolerated, and Iran had its own operatives in Israel and India. The current Iranian government is fueled by endless paranoia that foreigners are out to overthrow their harsh rule. Most Iranians agree with the foreigners, but speaking out in Iran will get you killed or imprisoned and tortured to death. Yet Iran also tries to build peaceful relationships with some of its neighbors.
Last year, Iran and Pakistan agreed to cooperate on economic, diplomatic, and military matters. Each country defines these terms differently. While both nations border Afghanistan, Iran has far fewer problems with the Afghans. Iran recently agreed to upgrade their relations with the new IEA, or Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, government. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is more radical religiously and imposes a strict version of Islamic Sharia law on Afghans. This has led to cutoffs of foreign aid and most nations refusing to establish diplomatic relations.
Iran is trying to peacefully reestablish good relations with the IEA government. Afghanistan and Iran have border and water-rights disputes. Iran wants Afghan refugees in Iran to return home, and the Islamic Emirate Afghanistan is willing to help with that in return for better diplomatic and trade relationships as well as a serious and final effort to agree on their mutual 900-kilometer border.
Pakistan has more serious problems with Afghanistan, with Pakistan accusing the Islamic Emirate Afghanistan of tolerating TTP Islamic terrorists that make attacks into Pakistan. The IEA denies supporting the TTP and admits that its security forces are not numerous enough to eliminate the TTP while also maintaining order in the rest of Afghanistan.
Iran and Pakistan share a common 900-kilometer border that ends at the Arabian Sea. Pakistan accuses Iran of not doing enough to eliminate Pakistani Baluchi separatists from maintaining bases in Iran. While these Baluchi bases have been tolerated, or simply ignored, for years, the Iran-Pakistan talks have resulted in Iranian attacks on the Baluchi groups on the Iranian side of the border. In the past, Baluchi separatists have also caused trouble in Iran. Now Iran and Pakistan agree to coordinate efforts to reduce or eliminate Baluchi separatists on both sides of the border.
Both Iran and Pakistan have serious internal problems. Iran has faced economic sanctions for decades. The Iranian economy is a mess, despite oil income. The sanctions mean Iran has to smuggle out its oil exports and gets less money for it than other oil-exporting nations. Worse, the sanctions have blocked imports of equipment and services needed to keep oil and natural gas fields operational. As a result, more and more Iranian oil wells and natural gas pumping operations are shutting down. This has reached the point where over a dozen power plants that burn natural gas have no supply. This means less electricity and less fuel to keep Iranians warm in the cold weather months.
Another mutual concern is Islamic terrorism. Twenty nations account for over 95 percent of terrorism activity worldwide. Of these twenty, which include Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Yemen, Iran, Uganda, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, Palestinian Territories, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Colombia, Algeria, Thailand, Philippines, Russia, Sudan, Iran, Burundi, India, Nigeria and Israel, all but the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Colombia and Burundi involve Islamic terrorism. In terms of terrorism fatalities, the top four nations are Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia, which account for about 70 percent of the world total. All of this was the result of Islamic radicalism, often directed at other Muslims, and not just non-Muslims or infidels.
This has been the case for decades, and the Muslim world does not like to dwell on it. Many Muslim leaders admit that there is a lot of Islamic terrorism but insist that it’s all the fault of Infidels (everyone who isn’t a Muslim) who are making war on Islam, so some Muslims feel compelled to fight back. The catch-phrase Moslem leaders like to repeat is that Islam is the religion of peace. It is not, and the historical record makes that very clear. The Islamic scriptures incorporated in the Koran explicitly call for violence against Infidels who refuse to accept Islam. For Iranians, this is a problem because Iranians are Shia Muslims while most Muslims are Sunni. Normally Sunni and Shia get along, but these differences can be exploited by government or religious leaders and often are when such strife is needed.
Sixteen years ago, America, India, Britain, and Israel all signed intelligence-sharing agreements with each other to better track Islamic terrorists operating in their territory and planning attacks against all four countries. This is more than exchanging names of terrorists or terrorist suspects. These four countries compare what they have on terrorist tactics, recruiting, training, propaganda, and fundraising, and occasionally plan and carry out joint operations.
Many other countries (Russia, most NATO nations, and several Muslim states) have also entered into counter-terror cooperation deals, but not to the extent of these four nations. That's because America, India, Britain, and Israel are all at more risk from Islamic terrorism than anyone else, and because these four nations have the most resources to deal with the problem. Thus, these nations are careful about who they share information with, because even knowing what they know can reveal sources (who they got it from) and methods (how they collected it, especially electronically).
Even with these agreements, the four nations do not share equally. Britain and the U.S. have the longest and closest relationship. Israel and America are also tight when it comes to counter-terrorism. Israel proved very useful in Iraq, where they helped the Americans implement counter-terror tactics that had been used a few years earlier to shut down the latest Palestinian terror campaign.
India has been on the receiving end of Pakistani-supported Islamic terrorism for over half a century. While India has been close to Britain, relations were rather more strained with the United States (because India held itself up as a left-leaning neutral during the Cold War) The leftist and Cold War attitudes have abated in the last decade, and India has become quite close to Israel and the United States, and even closer to Britain, at least when it comes to dealing with Islamic terrorism.
Israel has also provided India with tactical advice, and modern sensors and electronics for helping stop Islamic terrorists from sneaking in from Pakistan. Israel has also tried, with limited success, to impress on Britain and the United States the true attitudes of Islamic nations towards the West. Many Israelis can speak and read Arabic, and see the anti-West, anti-Infidel (non-Muslim) slant in Arab media all the time. When speaking in English, or whatever language their non-Muslim audience uses, the Arabs play down the constant hate. But this goes a long way towards explaining all those opinion surveys that show the hatred towards the non-Muslim world in Islamic countries. This has been going on for decades, but only the Israelis really know and appreciate it.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, September 02, 2026 - 04:27 pm: Edit

Counter-Terrorism: The Violent Expansion Of Islam
September 1, 2026: During the first century of Islamic expansion, a lot of people died opposing the 35-year-long rampage of the Islamic armies. Most estimates put the number at 100 million or more. But in 700, the world population was essentially the same as in 600. There should have been 10-20 million more people, but those were the number of people in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, North Africa, and Europe who died opposing the Islamic attacks.
In addition to the deaths, the Muslim conquerors radically changed the religious landscape of Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey, which used to be Christian, became Muslim, or paid heavy taxes and suffered other indignities until they did. The same thing happened in Egypt and across Christian North Africa. Islam never completely converted all Egyptians; many belong to the Coptic sect, founded by one of the Apostles, Mark, and about 12 million Copts still exist, mostly in Egypt. Christian and animist Somalis were also forced to accept Islam or die.
Iran and Afghanistan were Zoroastrian and Buddhist in areas closer to Central Asia. While Islam was defeated trying to advance farther into Northern India, what is now Pakistan went from Hindu and Buddhist to largely Muslim. In Southeast Asia, most of the Hindu and Buddhist people became Muslims. While Christian Spain was conquered, French armies halted further Muslim advances beyond the Pyrenees Mountains. The Iberian (Spanish, Portuguese) Christians continued to resist and finally, in 1492, drove the last Muslim armies back to North Africa. In Eastern Europe, the Byzantine Roman Empire halted the Muslim advance until 1453, when Turkish Muslims captured Constantinople and parts of southeast Europe. The Turkish Empire lasted until 1920, when victorious Allied World War I armies defeated the Turkish Sultan and Turkey became a republic that tolerated all religions as long as everyone kept the peace and supported the government.
Despite this long history of resistance to Muslim aggression, the fundamental doctrine of Islam is to conquer the world. Islamic clerics and religious scholars continue to support that goal. Before the 20th century, Western nations simply ignored the Islamic threat and observed the ongoing conflicts between Muslim states. With the discovery of oil in the early 20th century, Persian Gulf states, including Persia, became wealthy and more dangerous to world peace. This was because wealthy members of the oil-rich states were willing to subsidize radical Muslims to carry out their Islamic terrorism in non-Muslim countries. That terrorism never succeeded, and it got many Islamic radicals killed. This left oil-rich nations with fewer radicals to deal with.
FYEO

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, September 02, 2026 - 04:33 pm: Edit

The next thing in warfare is drone defenses. Different defenses for different drones.

For a frontline rifle platoon, some kind of shotgun that can kill a POV recon drone or attack drone.

For a tank, some development of existing systems that automatically intercept missiles.

For a Wildberries warehouse, some kind of mass produced wirblewind anti-aircraft system firing some kind of weapon that preferably doesn't spray lethal rounds across a city. Cost under $1 million, doesn't require more than a reinforced roof spot like an air conditioner uses. Also useful for other fixed infrastructure like bridges and airfields.

Naval, something that can pick a speedboat out of the ocean spray and zap it with existing autocannons.

By Steve Petrick (Petrick) on Wednesday, September 02, 2026 - 04:52 pm: Edit

I do not know. Under water drones have been used, and I can picture an underwater drone carrier unleashing a wave of such things to do massive damage to surface ships. How do you defend against that?

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, September 02, 2026 - 05:46 pm: Edit

Underwater drones would be slow moving long-range cheap things designed to target ships parked by the dock or civilian ships that cannot detect a threat or shoot back. Torpedoes already do anything else.

Underwater drones could be used but would be much more expensive than surface water drones. I think they might appear when the defenses stop the surface water drones.

By MarkSHoyle (Bolo) on Wednesday, September 02, 2026 - 06:36 pm: Edit

Underwater drones could be used but would be much more expensive than surface water drones.

Could we see the resurgence of manned torpedoes i.e. The Italian Maiale (Pig)....

By Steve Cole (Stevecole) on Wednesday, September 02, 2026 - 09:48 pm: Edit

Aug 28: Ukraine hit the Engles-2 airbase in Saratov, 800km away, destroying a key Tu95MS Bear bomber which is flown three times a week with loads of cruise missiles. They used an MICH2000 drone costing $40,000; it has a range of 2000km and a 60kg blast-frag warehead. It is a reverse engineered copy of a Chinese drone. Ukraine builds 6000 MICH2000s a year. The hit blew off the right wing, probably a permanent loss. Russia said that the aircraft hit had not flown in years and had been cannibalized for parts. Burn marks indicate that the bomber was fueled and partially burned. Ukraine has destroyed 12 Tu95s and Russia has 37 left, not all of which are flyable. Russia cannot build more. Each flies with four KH101s rather than a full load of eight due to unknown causes.


In ther attacks destroyed a Russian IRBM missile launch unit, a rare and irreplaceable launcher. Ukraine has decided since it cannot get more Patriots it will hit the launchers.
THE MILITARY SHOW

By MarkSHoyle (Bolo) on Thursday, September 03, 2026 - 10:34 am: Edit

Instead of using Ukraine as a trade partner (who built a lot of Russia's Transport Aircraft), they decided to screw their own supply possibilities up...